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Despite earlier failed attempts to establish similar regional arrangements, why were the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN+3 (APT) successfully created in 
the late 1980s and the late 1990s, respectively?  Why did they take the institutional forms that 
they took, and why did they evolve in the way they did? 
To analyze the formation of these regional arrangements, this dissertation proposes an 
institutionalist framework that addresses two related but analytically distinct questions: why are 
regional institutions created, and how are they created?  Accordingly, the first stage of analysis 
explores the variation of state preferences concerning regionalism among key governments.  It 
reveals that intraregional developments, such as a rise of regional economic interdependence or 
the development of regionalist ideas, did not quickly alter the configuration of state preferences 
in favor of a regionalist approach.  Rather, it argues that the urgent governmental demand for 
both APEC and the APT was primarily driven by the defensive motive to respond to 
extraregional challenges. 
The second stage of analysis investigates the actual political processes by exploring who 
played a leadership role.  It suggests that at critical junctures precipitated by crises, non-great 
powers can exercise entrepreneurial leadership in proposing a new regionalist initiative.  Both 
stages highlight the trigger mechanisms for inducing an urgent governmental demand for a 
regional mechanism and for generating political opportunities for non-great powers to take on a 
new initiative.  In short, this dissertation concludes that the creation of both APEC and APT can 
be explained by three factors: a set of extraregional developments as triggers for institutional 
creation; the governmental demand for a regionalist project; and the supply of political 
leadership by non-great powers. 
To analyze the institutional forms and evolution of APEC and APT, this dissertation 
investigates the four dimensions of institutions: membership, organizational structure, external 
orientation, and issue areas.  The dissertation suggests that the institutional designs of both 
institutions reflect the common denominators of not only large states, but also small ones.  More 
specifically, the organizational structure of both institutions was strongly shaped by the 
institutional preferences of ASEAN members. 
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 1.0  INTRODUCTION 
While many regional organizations were established after World War II in many parts of the 
world, the Asia-Pacific region lacked any formal region-wide institutions until 1989.  Early 
attempts to create regional institutions in the post-war era, including the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), proved largely unsuccessful; 
both disappeared by the 1970s.  The only exceptions were the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
created in 1966 to facilitate economic development of Asian countries, and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), formed in 1967 by five countries in Southeast Asia to 
promote peace and stability in the region. 
Given the region’s extreme diversity with respect to cultural heritage, religion, historical 
experience, political systems, and economic development, the Asia-Pacific region had no 
tradition of intergovernmental collaboration at the regional level.  The Asian region was 
characterized by historical antagonism and mutual mistrust, which contributed to preventing the 
construction of region-wide institutions in Asia.  Moreover, many Asian countries were generally 
afraid that if a regional institution was created, it would be dominated by larger powers.  In fact, 
the United States constructed a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral relationship in Asia with the 
United States at the center, which marked a sharp contrast with its preference for multilateralism 
in Europe. 1   Although economic transactions within the region and the regional economic 
interdependence grew in the 1970s and greatly accelerated in the latter half of the 1980s, the 
Asia-Pacific region lacked formal intergovernmental institutions to promote economic and 
political cooperation. 
                                                 
1 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia?  Collective Identity, 
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 575-607; Peter J. 
Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 44-60. 
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 However, the institutional landscape in Asia and the Pacific dramatically changed in 
1989, when the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was established.  APEC 
became the first-ever region-wide forum at the governmental level.  In the security domain, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed in 1994.  The ARF was the first regional dialogue 
to discuss security issues in the area.  In 1996, the inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
brought together leaders from both Asia and Europe.  The ASEM process addresses political, 
economic, and cultural issues with the aim of strengthening the relationship between the two 
regions.  Beginning in 1997, a new process of regional institution-building emerged, involving 
only East Asian nations and excluding the United States.  This newly emerged regional forum, 
which came to be known as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), brought together for the first time the 
ASEAN countries and the three Northeast Asian countries, namely, Japan, South Korea, and 
China, without the presence of Western powers like the United States.  The successful launch of 
the APT process marked a sharp contrast with the earlier fruitless proposal by Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed for the establishment of the East Asian Economic Group 
(EAEG), whose proposed membership was almost identical with that of the APT.  In December 
2005, the East Asia Summit was inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur, inviting Australia, New Zealand, 
and India as well as all the APT members. (See Table 1 for membership of these regional 
groupings).  This proliferation of many regionalist projects in a region that was once 
characterized by the conspicuous absence of regional institutions requires explanation.  This 
dissertation focuses on the emergence and evolution of “Asia-Pacific” and “East Asian” regional 
arrangements as represented by APEC and the APT, respectively, because of their respective 
significance as regionalist projects in Asia and the Pacific.2
                                                 
2 I will use the term “Asia-Pacific” to refer to an area roughly corresponding to the contemporary membership of 
APEC, while the term “East Asia” will be used to refer to a region covering both Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
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 Table 1-1: Membership of Main Regional Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific 
 ASEAN APEC (EAEG/C) ARF ASEAN+3 EAS 
Year 
Established 
(Proposed) 
Members 
1967 
(10) 
1989 
(21) 
 
(1990/93) 
(15 or 16) 
1994 
(24+EU) 
1997 
(13) 
2005 
(16) 
Japan  • □ • • • 
South Korea  • □ • • • 
North Korea   * • (2000)   
Taiwan  • (1991) □    
China  • (1991) □ • • • 
Hong Kong  • (1991) □    
Mongolia    • (1999)   
India    • (1996)  • 
Pakistan    • (2004)   
United 
States 
 •  •   
Canada  •  •   
Mexico  • (1993)     
Peru  • (1997)     
Chile  • (1994)     
Thailand • • □ • • • 
Indonesia • • □ • • • 
Philippines • • □ • • • 
Malaysia • • □ • • • 
Brunei • (1984) • □ • • • 
Singapore • • □ • • • 
Vietnam • (1995) • (1997) □ • • • 
Laos • (1997)  □ • • • 
Cambodia • (1999)  □ • (1995) • • 
Myanmar • (1997)  □ • (1996) • • 
East Timor    • (2005)   
Australia  •  •  • 
New 
Zealand 
 •  •  • 
Papua New 
Guinea 
 • (1993)  •   
Russia  • (1997)  •   
EU    •   
  
• Members; ◊ observers; □ Expected initial members; *Unknown 
 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian nations 
EAEG/C: East Asian Economic Grouping/Caucus 
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN+3: ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, Korea, and China) 
EAS: East Asia Summit 
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 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation addresses two sets of questions.  The first set of questions relates to the 
formation of APEC and the APT in 1989 and in 1997, respectively.  Why did Asia-Pacific 
institution-building finally take off at the end of the 1980s, while previous proposals for 
institutionalizing intergovernmental collaboration had failed to garner support from key potential 
members for the preceding two decades?  What accounts for the political process in which non-
major powers like Australia took the initiative in creating APEC?  Similarly, why did the 
formation of the APT framework, which excluded the United States, become possible in the late 
1990s, despite the earlier failure to establish an East Asian regional grouping in the early 1990s?  
How is it to be explained that ASEAN successfully launched the APT process, in spite of initial 
reluctance on the part of Northeast Asian countries, especially Japan?  The comparative analysis 
between the successful take-off of the two regionalist projects and the failure of similar proposals 
in the earlier period provides insights for a more general puzzle: Why do some regionalist 
projects get off the ground, while many others do not?  In other words, what are the conditions 
under which regionalist projects are successfully launched? 
The second set of questions is concerned with the institutional form and evolution of 
these regional frameworks.  Why did APEC and the APT both take informal and loose 
organizational structures and adopt non-legalistic and consensus-based decision-making 
procedures?  What accounts for APEC’s embrace of “open regionalism,” despite the U.S. 
concerns about free-riding by other extraregional actors, especially the European Union?  Why 
did APEC adopt the principle of “concerted unilateralism,” despite the U.S. preference for a 
more rigid approach with fixed timelines and binding obligations?  What explains the shift in its 
emphasis across APEC’s different agendas?  Why did APEC lose its momentum in the latter half 
of the 1990s?  With regards to APT, what accounts for the composition of the APT participants?  
How is it to be explained that the “Plus Three” Northeast Asian countries have attended the APT 
summits officially only as the “guests” of the ASEAN members by their invitation?  Why did the 
APT process develop relatively quickly, especially in the area of financial cooperation, despite 
its moderate start in 1997?  Why have APT participants chosen the APT rather than APEC as a 
central forum to promote financial cooperation?  Why has the APT continued to resist the 
establishment of a secretariat, despite Malaysian’s enthusiastic push? 
 4 
 This set of question constitutes part of a larger puzzle: Why do regional institutions in 
different regions take different forms?  What accounts for institutional evolution?  The variation 
of the institutional forms that different regional projects take is of an increasing interest for 
scholars of comparative regional institutions.  The changing institutional architecture in Asia and 
the Pacific also requires a more careful examination.  In sum, the main objective of this 
dissertation is to analyze why and how regional institutions are created and why and how they 
evolve.  Thus, it should be clear at the outset that the primary focus of analysis is placed on 
institutional creation and evolution, not institutional effects, which, albeit important, is outside 
the scope of the present study.  The following section briefly overviews the main arguments put 
forward in the dissertation. 
1.2 ARGUMENTS IN BRIEF 
To account for the timing, motivations, and processes of regional institution-building in the Asia-
Pacific and East Asia, this dissertation proposes an institutionalist framework that highlights 
three elements: 1) triggering mechanisms for institutional creation; 2) the variation of state 
preferences concerning regionalism; and 3) the provision of political leadership and regionalist 
ideas.  With regard to the first element of the framework, it is argued that triggering events not 
only generate an urgent demand for a new institutional mechanism, but also provide windows of 
opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to exploit.  Therefore, they often precipitate a critical 
juncture at which a new regionalist option is chosen.  The next two elements address two related 
but analytically distinct questions concerning institution-building: why regional institutions are 
created and how they are created.3  Put differently, these questions analyze demand- and supply- 
conditions of regional institution-building, respectively.4   
                                                 
3 The idea of separating these questions into “why” and “how” questions was taken from the following book, in 
which the author addresses distinguishing the question of why nations cooperate from the question of how they 
cooperate.  However, the theoretical framework proposed here is completely different from his.  See Lloyd Gruber, 
Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
4 I use the terms “demand” and “supply” only as a metaphor.  While the usage varies, the metaphor is used by some 
scholars of international regimes and regional integration.  For applications of the metaphor to international regimes, 
see, for example, Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., 
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 Demand-side theories of institution-building require explanation of not only why some 
states demand a regionalist approach, but also why others resist it.  In short, this part of the 
analysis explores the variation in state preferences for and against regionalist projects over time 
across key states in order to explain the demand for regional institution-building.  On the other 
hand, supply-side theories explore the political processes of regional institution-building.  It is 
suggested that at critical junctures, non-great powers can play an “entrepreneurial leadership” 
role by assuming the “costs of organizing” in initiating and mobilizing support for a regional 
initiative.5  This stage of analysis also explores the roles played by transnational policy networks 
in providing regionalist ideas and institutional solutions.  Differentiating the why and how 
questions allows the researcher to distinguish between the question of actors’ motivations, on the 
one hand, and the issues related to political processes, including actors’ capabilities and 
strategies, on the other hand. 
The empirical studies reviewed in this dissertation suggest that the demand for both Asia-
Pacific and East Asian regionalist projects were primarily triggered by political urgency to 
respond to extraregional challenges.  In the case of APEC, its formation was motivated by a 
sense of crisis in the global liberal trading system because of the perceived fear of emerging 
trading blocs and increasing U.S. unilateralism in the late 1980s.  In other words, the 
governmental interest in an Asia-Pacific regionalist project among Western Pacific countries was 
driven more by their desire to avoid potential losses than by a clear sense of potential gains.6  In 
the late 1990s, the demand for an East Asian regionalist project grew as a collective regional 
response to the Asian financial crisis, which led to the creation of the APT process.  More 
specifically, the failures of the existing institutional arrangements both at the regional and global 
levels to cope with the crisis prompted government leaders in East Asia to establish a new 
regional mechanism on an East Asian basis.  In short, both cases highlight that the demand for a 
                                                                                                                                                             
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 141-171; Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: 
The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).  For 
applications to regional integration and regionalism, see Vinod K. Aggarwal, "Building International Institutions in 
Asia-Pacific," Asian Survey 33, no. 11 (1993): 1029-1042; Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe 
and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
5 The concept of entrepreneurial leadership is adopted from Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime 
Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization 45, no. 3 
(1991): 281-308..  The concept of “the costs of organizing” is from Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The 
Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 20-21.  Both concepts are 
discussed more in detail in Chapter 3. 
6 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 8, this is consistent with the implication of prospect theory. 
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 regional mechanism was driven by governmental recognition of the inadequacy of the existing 
policy apparatus to cope with extraregional challenges. 
The supply-side argument suggests that middle or small powers, such as Australia and 
ASEAN members as a group, played an entrepreneurial leadership role in initiating the process of 
regional institution-building at the critical juncture precipitated by crises.  Given a more permissive 
configuration of state preferences concerning regionalist projects, these initiators successfully 
brought together initially reluctant key governments on board.  In the case of APEC, it was 
Australia’s entrepreneurial leadership role as an initiator that set the process of regional 
institution-building in motion without excessively arousing ASEAN’s fear.  Nevertheless, as 
some experts have pointed out, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
also played a substantial “behind-the-scenes” role in providing the institutional blueprint for 
APEC and letting the Australian government take explicit leadership.7  Building on the existing 
work concerning the roles that both Australia and Japan played in the process of creating APEC, 
this part of the analysis suggests that Australia’s explicit entrepreneurial leadership as an initiator 
and Japan’s role in providing intellectual leadership were both crucial for the creation of APEC.   
The analysis of the process of creating the APT reveals that ASEAN played a pivotal role 
in successfully inviting the three Northeast Asian countries to its summit meeting.  The study 
shows that the incremental and gradual approach that the ASEAN states deliberately employed 
prior to the first APT informal summit in 1997 was particularly helpful in eliciting the 
participation of Japan, which had been extremely cautious about joining any EAEC-like 
grouping due to U.S. opposition.  Incidentally, the Asian financial crisis provided a great 
opportunity for the development of the APT process, prompting both Japan and China to seek 
active engagement in the Southeast Asian region in response to the demand from the crisis-
afflicted countries.  The change in the Japanese attitude toward the East Asian grouping was 
crucial for the successful launch of the APT process. 
The dissertation also analyzes why and how APEC and the APT took the forms that they did 
and evolved in the way they did.  It characterizes the institutional features of the two regional 
                                                 
7 Richard A. Higgott, "APEC - A Sceptical View," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: 
Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 81.  
Takashi Terada argues that “APEC was a joint enterprise between Japanese and Australian leaders.”  See Takashi 
Terada, "The Genesis of APEC: Australia-Japan Political Initiatives," in Pacific Economic Papers (Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, Canberra, 1999).  See also Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995). 
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 institutions in terms of four dimensions: 1) membership; 2) organizational structure; 3) external 
orientation; and 4) issue areas.  It illustrates the path-dependent nature of institution-building by 
highlighting the importance of the preexisting institutional arrangements.  In particular, the 
institutional form of APEC was highly affected by the institutional features and practices of ASEAN 
and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).8  The APT was formed on top of ASEAN 
activities.  Therefore, both APEC and APT highly reflect the institutional preferences of ASEAN.  
Moreover, nongovernmental transnational policy networks have sometimes provided important 
ideational inputs which prove important for explaining the evolution of the both institutions.  These 
specifically challenge the neorealist perspective, which suggests that smaller powers cannot 
determine the shape of international institutions and that non-state actors have little or no influence 
on state decisions. 
1.3 DEFINING REGIONALISM 
1.3.1 Regionalism vs. Regionalization 
It has become increasingly commonplace to distinguish between “regionalism” and 
“regionalization” as distinct concepts.  Regionalism can be defined as state-led political projects 
which aim at promoting intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional level.9  It is the 
top-down processes in which governments deliberately attempt to enhance cooperation primarily 
through the creation of regional institutions. 10   Thus, by definition, the government is the 
principal architect of regionalism.  The two regional arrangements that this dissertation focuses 
on, namely, APEC and the APT, are examples of regionalism.  Regionalization, on the other 
                                                 
8 As detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, PECC is a non-governmental organization made up from academics, business 
leaders, and government officials participating in their private capacity. 
9 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 39-40; Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, "Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and 
World Order," in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, eds., Regionalism and World Order (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996), 2-3; Shaun Breslin, Richard A. Higgott, and Ben Rosamond, "Regions in Comparative Perspective," in 
Shaun Breslin, et al., eds., New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 13-14. 
10 T. J. Pempel, "Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness," in T. J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East 
Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 6, 19. 
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 hand, refers to the bottom-up processes of increasing regional interactions driven primarily by 
nongovernmental actors.11  In other words, it is essentially not based on the conscious policy of 
states.  Focusing on the economic domain, regionalization refers to the intensification of trade 
and investment flows in a geographically defined area relative to that area’s trade and investment 
flows with the rest of the world. 12   The most important actors at work in economic 
regionalization are multilateral corporations, which engage in cross-border economic 
transactions by creating regional production networks. 
This relationship between the two processes corresponds to the distinction that William 
Wallace has made between “formal” and “informal” integration.  He defines integration as “the 
creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously 
autonomous units.”13  Adopting this definition of integration, he suggests that formal integration 
refers to the creation of and changes in the institutional framework of rules by governmental 
actors through agreement or treaty, while informal integration refers to “those intense patterns of 
interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the 
dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks, and social change.”14  Similarly, 
Richard Higgott draws a distinction between de facto economic integration and de jure political 
cooperation.15
Differentiating these two levels of regional processes, scholars of regionalism have 
debated the relationship between the two.  Does regionalization create pressures for the pursuit 
of regionalist projects,16 as economic interdependence theory would suggest?  Or, conversely, 
does regionalism promote regionalization processes as intended?  As Higgott observes, the 
history of the Asia-Pacific regional economy shows that the de facto economic integration has 
preceded the emergence of de jure processes of institutionalization in this region.17  Yoshinobu 
Yamamoto once characterized the absence of formal regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific 
until 1989 despite the relatively high level of de facto economic integration as “regionalization 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 John Ravenhill, "Competing Logics of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific," Journal of European Integration 18, no. 
2-3 (1995): 179. 
13 William Wallace, "Introduction: The Dynamics of European Integration," in William Wallace, ed., The Dynamics 
of European Integration (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Richard A. Higgott, "De Facto and De Jure Regionalism: The Double Discourse of Regionalism in the Asia 
Pacific," Global Society 11, no. 2 (1997): 165-183. 
16 I use the adjective “regionalist” to correspond to the term “regionalism” and “regional” to “regionalization.” 
17 Higgott, "De Facto and De Jure Regionalism: The Double Discourse of Regionalism in the Asia Pacific," 181. 
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 without regionalism.”18  There is consensus among scholars that the dominant feature of the 
Asia-Pacific regional economy was characterized by de facto regionalization rather than de jure 
regionalism.  Many experts assume that the regionalization process created the bottom-up forces 
for the creation of regional institutions.   
Nonetheless, as demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, the relationship between the 
two is not entirely straightforward.   If the regionalization process generated the pressures for the 
construction of regionalism, why did the Asia-Pacific region have to wait until 1989 to witness 
the creation of the first-ever intergovernmental framework?  What are the links that connect 
these two different levels of regional processes?  What are the mechanisms by which the forces 
from below translate into the top-down regionalist projects by states?  There are two possible 
paths that may link these two levels.  The first possibility is that private firms that operate in the 
regional production networks generate pressures for governments to create intergovernmental 
mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of their economic activities.  In return, the government 
may respond to the increasing demand from below for regionalist projects.  The other possible 
link between the two is that track-II nongovernmental actors generate the bottom-up forces that 
demand the creation of formal institutions.   
However, as this dissertation demonstrates in Chapters 4 and 6, the bottom-up forces do 
not automatically lead to the creation of regionalist projects.  Certainly, these two kinds of actors 
played an important role in generating the “push effect” for the construction of regionalism.  
However, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, it is imperative to pay more attention to 
extraregional factors to explain the growth of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.19  
Undoubtedly, the relationship between regionalization and regionalism is an issue of critical 
importance both theoretically and empirically.  However, this dissertation stresses the 
importance of exploring the “pull factor” of the forces associated with globalization and the 
growth of regionalisms in other parts of the world as a more decisive factor for inducing the 
                                                 
18 Yoshinobu Yamamoto, ed., Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism: Asia in Search of its Role in the Twenty-
First Century (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). 
19 Richard Higgott makes a similar point, suggesting that lack of attention to extraregional relations was the major 
deficiency of the early integration literature.  See Richard A. Higgott, "The Theory and Practice of Region: The 
Changing Global Context," in Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber, eds., Regional Integration in East Asia and 
Europe: Convergence or Divergence? (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 24.  Similarly, Mark Beeson points out the 
importance of “extraregional geopolitical forces” that shape regional processes.  See Mark Beeson, "Rethinking 
Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of European Public Policy 12, 
no. 6 (2005): 970. 
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 formation of regionalism.  The analysis of the relationship between the global and regional 
processes as well as the relationship between regions is an increasing important topic in the 
growing literature of “new regionalism,” a topic to which I turn below.20
1.3.2 “Old Regionalism” vs. “New Regionalism” 
Since the late 1980s, a “new wave of regionalism”21 has emerged such as the European Union 
(EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), MERCOSUR (Common Market of 
the South), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Put in this context, the 
emergence of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalist projects, represented by APEC and the 
APT, is not an isolated phenomenon. 
A growing body of literature on “new regionalism”22 emphasizes that the current wave of 
regionalism since the late 1980s is qualitatively different from the old regionalism that emerged 
during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s.  The first wave of regionalism originated in 
Western Europe with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1951, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(or Euratom) in 1958, and the eventual consolidation into the European Community (EC) in 
1967.  Regionalist projects in other parts of the world included the formation of the Central 
American Common Market (1960), the Organization of African Unity (1963), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (1967), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) (1973), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1975).  
With the exception of rather proactive regionalist projects in Europe, old regionalism was 
primarily characterized by developing countries’ attempts to seek regional autonomy from the 
great power rivalry and to reduce North-South economic linkages.23
The late 1980s and the 1990s witnessed the emergence of new regionalism.  APEC 
provides an excellent example of this new type of regionalism.  Paul Bowles observes that new 
                                                 
20 Higgott, "The Theory and Practice of Region: The Changing Global Context," 27. 
21 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," International Organization 53, no. 
3 (1999): 589-627. 
22 For example, see Björn Hettne, András Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel, eds., Globalism and the New Regionalism 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Theories of New Regionalism: 
A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
23 Paul Bowles, "ASEAN, AFTA, and the 'New Regionalism'," Pacific Affairs 70, no. 2 (1997): 225. 
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 regionalism has two important features distinct from the older form: 1) North-South regionalism; 
and 2) multiple regionalism.  North-South regionalism refers to the fact that many of the new 
regionalist groupings are made up of members from both developing and advanced countries.  
As Bowles points out, the objective of new regionalist projects is no longer based on the desire to 
enhance independence from the global economy but can rather be seen as “a measure to ensure 
continued participation in it.  The fear of developing countries was no longer one of dependence 
on the global economy but one of being excluded from it.”24  ASEAN members’ participation in 
this type of North-South regionalism in the form of APEC can be analyzed from this perspective.  
The second feature of the new wave of regionalism is the fact that “countries belong to different 
regional groupings and organizations (some of which have, in practice, overlapping 
memberships).”25  The emergence of various regionalist projects, such as APEC, the ARF, the 
APT, and the EAS, is a case in point. 
Although the earlier literature on regionalism tends to treat a region as a more or less 
autonomous sub-system of the broader international system, the growing literature on new 
regionalism emphasizes the relationship between regionalism and extraregional environment.26  
In particular, many scholars investigate the relationship between regionalism and globalization.  
There has emerged a debate between those who see regionalism as stumbling blocks to 
globalization and those who view regionalism as stepping stones to it.27  But many scholars of 
new regionalism tend to view regionalization and globalization as mutually reinforcing, rather 
than contradictory, processes.  For them, the emergence of new regionalism can partly be seen as 
a response to globalization, but not as resistance to it.  In the age of globalization, as Peter J. 
Katzenstein argues, states often turn to regionalism because regionalist projects “often mediate 
between national and global effects.” 28  Similarly, Helen Wallace sees regions as a “filter for 
globalization.”29   
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.: 226. 
26 Fredrik Söderbaum, "Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism," in Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, 
eds., Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4. 
27 Robert Lawrence, "Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks," in Richard O'Brien, 
ed., Finance and the International Economy: The AMEX Bank Review Prize Essays in Memory of Robert Marjolin 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24-36. 
28 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Regionalism and Asia," in Shaun Breslin, et al., eds., New Regionalisms in the Global 
Political Economy: Theories and Cases (London: Routledge, 2002), 104. 
29 Helen Wallace, "Europeanisation and Globalisation: Complementary or Contradictory Trends?," in Shaun Breslin, 
et al., eds., New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases (London: Routledge, 2002), 149. 
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 The new regionalism literature emphasizes the outward-looking orientation of new 
regionalism, in sharp contrast with the inward-looking regionalism in earlier times.  APEC’s 
endorsement of the principle of “open regionalism” is a case in point, as discussed in more detail 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  The idea that regions can be a mediating factor between national and global 
processes is particularly helpful for analyzing the motives behind the formation of ASEAN+3, as 
we will see in Chapters 6 and 7.  In short, the new regionalism literature suggests that 
“regionalism can be simultaneously a response to and a dynamic behind globalization.”30   
1.3.3 Regional Institutions 
If regionalism is construed essentially as a project of constructing intergovernmental institutions 
at the regional level as discussed above, how should we define institutions?  Defining institutions 
has given rise to a great deal of debate in the literature of institutionalism and international 
relations (IR).  Before discussing the variation in the definitions of institutions, it is first 
important to distinguish institutions from organizations.  Oran Young suggests that institutions 
can be thought of as “social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters 
of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles,” whereas 
organizations are “material entities possessing physical location (or seats), offices, personnel, 
equipment, and budgets.” 31   Although multilateral institutions are often accompanied by 
organizations,32 it is not always the case. 
There is not yet one universally accepted definition of institutions.  For a rational choice 
institutionalist like Douglas North, institutions consist of “informal constraints and formal rules 
and of their enforcement characteristics.  Together they provide the rules of the game of human 
interaction.”33 Proponents of historical institutionalism define institutions more broadly as “the 
formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
                                                 
30 Breslin, Higgott, and Rosamond, "Regions in Comparative Perspective," 8. 
31 Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), 32. 
32 Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," International Journal 45, no. 4 (1990): 733. 
33 Douglass C. North, "Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic Performance," in Karen S. Cook and 
Margaret Levi, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 384. 
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 structure of the polity or political economy.” 34   Sociological institutionalists tend to equate 
institutions with the broader normative structures themselves.35  For them, institutions not only 
provide structures of incentives and constraints as rational choice institutionalists assume, but 
also help define actors’ interests and identity. 
From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, in the IR literature, Robert O. Keohane 
defines institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe 
behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”36  Following the same tradition, 
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal define international institutions as 
“explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or 
authorize behavior.”37  These definitions of institutions, however, are not particularly helpful for 
the purpose of this study.  Particularly problematic is that these definitions are not neutral to the 
effects of the institutions in the sense that they are defined in terms of the functions that the 
institutions perform. 
So what do we mean by a regional institution here?  Can we view regional arrangements 
such as APEC and the APT as examples of regional institutions?  Does it make sense to study 
institutional features and evolution of these regional forums?  Obviously, both APEC and the 
APT are not institutions in the same sense as the IMF or the EU is.  APEC started as an 
essentially informal consultative forum.  Although APEC established a small secretariat, annual 
budget, several committees, and working groups, the center of APEC activities lies in a series of 
regular meetings at different levels.  APT has not departed much from a series of regular 
meetings organized at different levels and has not even established a secretariat other than 
establishing a unit in the ASEAN secretariat.38
                                                 
34 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political 
Studies 44 (1996): 938. 
35 Simon Reich, "The Four Faces of Institutionalism: Public Policy and a Pluralistic Perspective," Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration 13, no. 4 (2000): 507. 
36 Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," 732.  For similar definitions in more recent literature, see, 
for example, Judith Goldstein et al., "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics," International Organization 54, 
no. 3 (2000): 387. 
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," 
International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 762. 
37 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," 762. 
38 Following Young’s definition, then, APEC can be considered both a regional institution and a regional 
organization.  However, it seems difficult to view the APT as a regional organization; instead, it is considered a 
regional institution. 
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  However, I suggest that each of the regional arrangements does have certain institutional 
characteristics and can be thought of as a regional institution, if institutions are defined in a 
broad sense.  I highlight four dimensions of such institutional features: membership, internal 
structure, external orientation, and issue scope.39  First, regional institutions can be identified by 
their membership.  Each institution is a regional institution in the sense that its membership is 
defined at least partly by some reference to a geographical location.  Second, regional institutions 
can be recognized by some sort of persistent structure.  They can range from informal 
consultative forums or regular meetings without permanent supporting organizations to highly 
structured and centralized arrangements characterized by a high degree of bureaucratization and 
a large number of staff.40  Nonetheless, multilateral institutions should not be confused with “ad 
hoc meetings and short-term arrangements to solve particular problems.”41  Third, a regional 
institution should be distinguished from other institutional arrangements—at both the regional 
and global levels.  In this respect, external orientation is an important feature of a regional 
institution.  Fourth, regional institutions can be identified by the scope of issue coverage.  Their 
members are bound together to address certain issues, whether narrowly or broadly defined.  
Because of these features, it is possible to consider both APEC and the APT as instances of 
regional institutions and to analyze the formation and evolution of the two institutions in these 
four dimensions. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study is primarily two-fold.  First, it contributes to a theoretical 
understanding of the creation and evolution of regionalism in Asia and the Pacific.  With the 
exception of some recent works, 42  most studies of Asian regionalism have been largely 
                                                 
39 These dimensions are partly based on the following literature.  See Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New 
Asia-Pacific Order (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), 12-15; Michael Wesley, "Introduction," in Michael Wesley, 
ed., The Regional Organizations of the Asia Pacific: Exploring Institutional Change (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 4-5. 
40 Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order, 13. 
41 Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," 733. 
42 Some recent examples of theoretically-oriented work include: John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of 
Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Helen E. S. Nesadurai, Globalisation, 
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 atheoretical, in sharp contrast with the theoretical sophistication of the literature on European 
regionalism. 43   Furthermore, comparative studies on the creation and evolution of regional 
institutions within the Asia-Pacific region are almost non-existent.44
Second, the comparative analysis of the factors that triggered the creation of APEC and 
the APT has significant policy implications, because these two regional groupings represent 
different conceptions of economic regionalism in the region.  Many suggest that the Asian 
financial crisis became a watershed which separated between old Asia-Pacific regionalism and 
“new East Asian regionalism.”45  Paul Bowles argues that while regionalization in the Asia-
Pacific was driven by the private sector,46 the “post-crisis regionalism” in Asia was state-driven, 
departing significantly from its pre-crisis path.47  However, given the emergence of transnational 
policy networks in East Asia, this claim requires a more detailed empirical scrutiny. 
More radically, Heribert Dieter and Higgott suggest the possibility that the current APT 
process represents the emergence of a new type of regionalism focusing on monetary and 
financial cooperation (what they call “monetary regionalism”), which may depart significantly 
from the old type of regionalism based on trade and investment.48  The question of whether the 
emergence of East Asian regionalism offers a new type of regionalism, other than differences in 
membership, is an intriguing issue for both academics and policymakers. 
This dissertation, then, contributes to the literature on East Asian political economy and 
comparative regional institutions in three ways.  First, the study’s focus on the origins, 
formation, and distinctive form of institutions in the Asia-Pacific provides insights for a growing 
literature on comparative regionalisms.  The cross-national study of the shifting state preferences 
                                                                                                                                                             
Domestic Politics and Regionalism: The ASEAN Free Trade Area (London: Routledge, 2003); Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
43 For an overview of different theoretical approaches toward European integration, see, for example, Antje Wiener 
and Thomas Diez, eds., European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
44 For recent exceptions, see Mark Beeson, ed., Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organizations 
after the Crisis (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Michael Wesley, ed., The Regional Organizations of the Asia 
Pacific: Exploring Institutional Change (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Miles Kahler, "Legalization as 
Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case," International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 549-571. 
45 Hyun-Seok Yu, "Explaining the Emergence of New East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest-Based 
Approaches," Asian Perspective 27, no. 1 (2003): 263-288. 
46 Richard Stubbs, "Asia-Pacific Regionalization and the Global Economy: A Third Form of Capitalism?," Asian 
Survey 35, no. 9 (1995): 786. 
47 Paul Bowles, "Asia's Post-Crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back In, Keeping the (United) States Out," 
Review of International Political Economy 9, no. 2 (2002): 244-270. 
48 Heribert Dieter and Richard A. Higgott, "Exploring Alternative Theories of Economic Regionalism: From Trade 
to Finance in Asian Co-operation?," Review of International Political Economy 10, no. 3 (2003): 430-454. 
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 over time provides an empirically-rich examination of the intersection between international 
forces and domestic responses.  Second, the theoretical framework employed in this dissertation 
is novel, though a similar approach has been adopted in the European integration literature.  It is 
an attempt to promote theorizing of relatively under-theorized and mostly descriptive literature 
on Asia.  Third, the case study of ASEAN+3 adds to a still-developing literature on the relatively 
new ASEAN+3 process. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is organized into eight chapters.  Chapter 2 critically reviews the existing 
literature of regional institution-building.  It first evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
three major international relations theories.  Then the following section provides an overview of 
the literature on European regionalism and Asian regionalism.  Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework employed in the dissertation.  The rest of the dissertation consists of four empirical 
chapters and a concluding chapter.  Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the institutional formation and 
evolution of Asia-Pacific regionalism, while Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the 
construction of East Asian regionalism.  Chapters 4 and 6 address the first research question with 
regard to why and how regional institutions are created, whereas Chapters 5 and 7 take up the 
second research question concerning why and how regional institutions evolve in the way they 
do.  Chapter 8 provides a summary of the findings of the preceding four empirical chapters, an 
assessment of theoretical claims, and an agenda for future research. 
 17 
 2.0  EXISTING APPROACHES 
This chapter is divided into two main sections offering a critical overview of two bodies of 
literature that provide some insight into the creation of regional institutions.  The first body of 
literature is concerned with explaining the creation and evolution of international institutions.  In 
this section, major international relations theories will be outlined.  The second body of literature 
focuses on regionalism.  Given the long history of European integration, the literature on 
European integration arguably provides the most theoretical treatment of regional integration and 
regionalism.  Indeed, students of regionalism often take the European case as a reference point to 
study regionalist projects in other parts of the world.  Therefore, this section first briefly 
discusses the literature of European regionalism and then reviews the existing literature on Asian 
regionalism. 
2.1 THEORIES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
In the existing literature in international relations theory, there are at least three perspectives 
from which we can analyze the creation of international institutions: Neorealism, liberalism, and 
constructivism.  This section critically evaluates each of these perspectives by focusing on their 
respective accounts of the timing, motivation for, and process of regional institution creation as 
well as institutional design.  The following overview, however, shows that none of these 
perspectives is sufficient in and of itself to account for the creation of regional institutions. 
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 2.1.1 Neorealism 
Neorealists generally find the formation of institutions to be of little interest.  For them, the state 
is the principal actor in an anarchic world, where relative power relations are the predominant 
concerns for each state.  Scholars in this tradition believe that multilateral institutions “have 
minimal influence on state behavior.”1  Nonetheless, there are at least two strands of neorealist 
thinking that take into account the impact of institutions on state behavior.  First, hegemonic 
stability theory suggests that a hegemonic power has an incentive to create international 
institutions to promote its own interests.  Institutions, in this view, are seen as devices by which 
the hegemon either imposes or legitimates its own preferred rules and norms.  According to 
hegemonic stability theory, the existence of a hegemonic power is a necessary condition for the 
creation of international institutions. 2   By focusing on the distribution of power resources, 
hegemonic stability theory implies that the greater the power disparities between the leading 
state and secondary countries, the higher the level of institutionalization. 
Applying this logic to the regional level, some suggest that the creation of a regional 
institution requires the existence of a single regional hegemon which is both able and willing to 
play a principal role in creating a regional institution by utilizing preponderant power assets at its 
disposal.3  According to hegemonic stability theory, it is hypothesized that there is a correlation 
between power asymmetry and regional institutionalization.4   However, if a high degree of 
power asymmetry is the only explanatory variable in accounting for the creation of regional 
institutions, it cannot explain the difference in the level of institutionalization between Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific.  The theory would suggest the opposite should happen, because the United 
States holds a greater power asymmetry between itself and other powers in the Asia-Pacific than 
                                                 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5. 
2 Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317-
347; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 
72-80.  For a classic formulation of hegemonic stability theory, which suggests that the existence of a single 
hegemonic leader is necessary for the stability of international liberal economic order, see Charles P. Kindleberger, 
The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 
3 For example, Mattli’s concept of an “undisputed leader” on the supply-side primarily reflects this line of thinking.  
See Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 50, 56. 
4 Joseph M. Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, 
and the Americans," in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 173-174. 
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 in Europe.5  Hegemonic stability theory simply cannot explain why the United States, despite its 
preponderant power assets, has failed to establish a regional multilateral institution in the Asia-
Pacific, while taking the lead in the creation of global multilateral institutions such as the post-
war Bretton Woods institutions, and regional multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO).  By the same token, it fails to account for the absence of Japanese 
leadership in the process of building a regional institution in East Asia, despite its dominant 
economic power in East Asia.  These cases of “hegemonic defection”6 contradict the prescription 
of hegemonic stability theory. 
Moreover, contrary to the expectations of hegemonic stability theory, regional institutions 
in the Asia-Pacific were created through initiative by weaker powers.  As will be detailed in 
Chapter 4, the creation of APEC was initiated by Australia, against the background of a rather 
passive attitude of the United States.  Similarly, as shown in Chapter 6, APT was created through 
ASEAN’s initiative, despite the initial reluctance of the Japanese and Chinese governments.  In 
fact, there is little evidence to support the hegemonic leadership approach, which leads Joseph 
Grieco to conclude that “the presence of an overall regional hegemon appears to be neither a 
necessary not a sufficient condition for the emergence of regional economic institutions.” 7   
Therefore, a hegemonic construction of an international institution is best viewed as providing 
only one possible pathway toward institution-building, while leaving other pathways 
unexplained. 
With regard to the institutional form, neorealism postulates that it generally reflects the 
preference of the hegemonic power.  From the neorealist perspective, especially in the Waltzian 
formulation, weaker powers are not expected to be influential in making international rules and 
norms.8  However, as shown in the analysis of institutional forms of APEC and APT in Chapters 
5 and 7 respectively, weaker powers like ASEAN members had a more significant influence on 
the institutional shape of both APEC and APT than the stronger members of these two groups.  
                                                 
5 Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable 
Multipolarity," International Security 23, no. 2 (1998): 48. 
6 See Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, "Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Andrew 
Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific 
Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 8.  For the original conception of “hegemonic defection,” see John Gerard 
Ruggie, "Multilateralism: Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 593. 
7 Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the 
Americans," 174. 
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). 
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 Furthermore, since the realist tradition treats the state as the dominant and unitary actors in 
international relations, it neglects the role of non-state actors in shaping the institutional form 
and evolution. 
In contrast to the first perspective’s focus on the central role of the hegemon in creating 
international institutions, the second perspective suggests that the weak often engage in 
institution-building to constrain the behavior of the strong.  According to this view, multilateral 
institutional arrangements are seen as a tool for middle or small powers to “hedge against the 
hegemon turning nasty.”9  In the eyes of many observers, European integration was to some 
extent aimed at “taming” Germany in institutional frameworks through “regionalist 
entrapment.”10  From this perspective, the creation of APEC can be seen as an attempt to reduce 
the autonomy of the U.S. hegemon.  The formation of APT may have been partly an attempt to 
check and constrain the actions of an increasingly powerful China.   
In short, both perspectives view multilateral institutions as instruments that states can use 
to advance their own interests.  While hegemonic stability theory cannot explain the process by 
which the two regional arrangements were created in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia, the second 
line of neorealist logic provides plausible insights into why weaker powers initiated regional 
institution-building in these areas.  There remains, however, a question of whether institutional 
arrangements created by weaker powers can be effective mechanisms for placing any constraints 
on the behavior of great powers.11  In fact, many scholars in the neorealist tradition are skeptical 
about the impact of regionalist projects initiated by weaker powers.  Nonetheless, as stated 
clearly at the outset, this dissertation is concerned with the issue of institutional creation, but not 
with institutional effects.  This dissertation investigates the conditions under which regionalist 
endeavors by weaker powers lead to the actual formation of regional institutions. 
                                                 
9 Davis B. Bobrow, "Hegemony Management: The US in the Asia-Pacific," The Pacific Review 12, no. 2 (1999): 
177.  See also Yuen Foong Khong, "ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference and Regional Forum: A Convergence of 
Post-Cold War Security Strategies," in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington, eds., United 
States-Japan Relations and International Institutions after the Cold War (La Jolla, CA: Graduate School of 
International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1995), 45. 
10 Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," 50.  For discussions on Germany in European integration, see 
Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
11 For example, many observers with neorealist insights criticize regional forums like the Asian Regional Forum for 
being “talk shop[s].” 
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 2.1.2 Liberalism 
Liberals and neoliberal institutionalists generally argue that an increasing level of interstate 
interactions within a particular region creates a functional need for governments to work closely 
by increasing the costs generated by lack of coordination among them.  While neoliberal 
institutionalists take the state as a unit of analysis, a variety of liberals examine the role of non-
state actors such as specialized international agencies and their technical experts 
(functionalists); 12  interest groups, political parties, and supranational bureaucracies 
(neofunctionalists);13 and multilateral corporations and transnational coalitions (interdependence 
theorists). 14   Neoliberal institutionalists suggest that states form institutions because of the 
expected mutual benefits from policy coordination through international institutions.  In their 
view, institutions can facilitate international cooperation by providing information, reducing 
transnational costs, and reducing the likelihood of cheating.15  While there are differences among 
these approaches, they generally postulate that as the level of regional economic interdependence 
rises, the demand for institutionalization grows.  In other words, these theories suggest that 
regionalization leads to regionalism if these terms are carefully defined in the distinct way 
introduced in the previous chapter.16   
In fact, many advocates for Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalist projects identified 
increasing economic interdependence as the key motivation for the emergence of regionalist 
projects.  However, the perspectives that focus on the level of regional economic 
interdependence as the main variable for explaining the formation of regionalism have at least 
three shortcomings.  The first weakness relates to the issues of how to measure interdependence 
and whether the measure of interdependence can be a good indicator for explaining the 
emergence of regionalist projects.  The following section begins with discussions of how to 
                                                 
12 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago,: Quadrangle Books, 1966). 
13 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, Calif.,: 
Stanford University Press, 1958). 
14 Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the 1970s," World Politics 24, no. 1 
(1972): 158-181; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 
15 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 
(1995): 39-51. 
16 John Ravenhill, "The Growth of Intergovernmental Collaboration in the Asia Pacific Region," in Anthony G. 
McGrew and Christopher Brook, eds., Asia-Pacific in the New World Order (London: Routledge, 1998), 251. 
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 measure regional economic interdependence.  Using the work of Peter Petri as a model, the 
following three measures will be reviewed here:17
Absolute measure (A): A = Xij / X** 
Relative measure (B): B = A / (Xi* / X**) = Xij / Xi* or B´ = Xij / X*j 
Double-relative measure (C): C = A / (B B´) = XijX** / Xi*X*j 
Xij refers to exports from country i to country j, and the subscript * indicates the summation 
across all i or j.  Thus, Xi refers to the total exports for country i, X*j represents total imports of 
country j, and X** represents total world trade. 
The absolute measure (A) compares the scale of a particular bilateral (or intraregional) 
trade volume to total world trade, while the relative measure (B) represents A’s ratio to the share 
of the exporting country in world exports, or the share of the importing country in world imports.  
The relative measures (B, B´) are useful for judging the importance of partners to one another.  
The double-relative measure (C), sometimes called the gravity measure or the trade intensity 
index, represents A’s ratio to the overall trade flows of both partners.  The trade intensity index 
is the best measure for assessing “the extent of trade bias toward particular partners, that is, the 
ratio of trade relative to the trade that would be observed under a neutral assignment of trade 
flows across partners.”18  The advantage of using the double-relative measure is that it takes into 
account the overall trade levels of the partner economies.19
Table 2-1 provides changes in these three measures for the four regions of the world from 
1938 to 2004.  Interestingly, the table demonstrates that intraregional trade measured by all three 
measures shows that the East Asian region was highly interdependent before World War II.  In 
the immediate aftermath of World War II, East Asia’s intraregional trade both as a share of 
world trade and as a share of regional trade fell sharply.  However, the absolute measure of East 
Asian interdependence recovered rapidly as the region’s overall trade volume grew..  Yet the 
East Asian region’s extraregional trade initially grew faster than intraregional trade (hence the 
initial decline of the relative measure).  The relative measure showed a steady increase as trade 
                                                 
17 Peter A. Petri, "Is East Asia Becoming More Interdependent?," Journal of Asian Economics 17, no. 3 (2006): 381-
394.  See also Peter A. Petri, "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History," in Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles 
Kahler, eds., Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia (Chicago: University o Chicago 
Press, 1993), 21-52. 
18 Petri, "Is East Asia Becoming More Interdependent?," 385. 
19 However, a small regional group tends to have a high trade intensity index. 
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 within East Asia increased as a share of the region’s overall trade after the 1970s, which 
confirms the conventional wisdom about the growth of East Asian interdependence.  However, if 
we use the double-relative measure to assess the intensity or bias of East Asian regional trade, 
the index shows “a steady and sharp decline during most of the post-war period, lasting into the 
mid-1980s, indicating a decline in intraregional bias.”20  It was only very recently that the index 
showed a sign of increase.  The relative measure of the Pacific Rim showed an increase from 
1979 to 1995.  However, the level of the intraregional trade bias of Pacific Rim (the double-
relative measure) was higher in 1969 and 1979 than it would be in 1985 and 1990. 
 
Table 2-1: Measures of Regional Interdependence (exports plus imports) 
  1938 1955 1969 1979 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Absolute measure: intratrade as a share of world trade     
    North America 0.030 0.067 0.069 0.042 0.064 0.053 0.522 0.062 0.052 
    Western Europe 0.182 0.196 0.287 0.293 0.271 0.338    
    East Asia 0.100 0.022 0.029 0.042 0.064 0.079 0.126 0.124 0.139 
    Pacific Rim 0.180 0.135 0.169 0.156 0.248 0.246 0.305 0.310 0.284 
          
Relative measure: intratrade as a share of regional trade         
    North America 0.227 0.334 0.379 0.287 0.330 0.313 0.303 0.312 0.301 
    Western Europe 0.461 0.491 0.647 0.664 0.654 0.712    
    East Asia 0.671 0.313 0.293 0.332 0.363 0.407 0.513 0.510 0.607 
    Pacific Rim 0.583 0.450 0.566 0.545 0.643 0.649 0.698 0.677 0.702 
          
Double-relative measure: gravity coefficients             
    North America 1.73 1.65 2.09 1.95 1.71 1.84 1.74 1.57 1.74 
    Western Europe 1.16 1.23 1.46 1.51 1.58 1.50    
    East Asia 4.48 4.45 2.97 2.64 2.05 2.09 2.06 2.09 2.64 
    Pacific Rim 1.89 1.49 1.90 1.91 1.67 1.71 1.60 1.48 1.74 
 
Source: Adapted from Peter A. Petri, “Is East Asia Becoming More Interdependent?,” Journal of Asian Economics 
17(3) (2006), pp. 381-394; and Peter A. Petri, “The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History,” in 
Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler, eds., Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific 
Asia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 21-52. 
Notes: Calculations described in text.  The regions referred to here is North America (the United States and Canada), 
East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Singapore), and Pacific Rim (North America, East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand). 
 
No matter which measure is used to assess the level of regional economic 
interdependence, it is questionable whether regional economic interdependence can help to 
identify the timing of regional institution-building.  The fundamental problem is that the 
                                                 
20 Petri, "Is East Asia Becoming More Interdependent?," 387. 
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 approach that focuses on the level of interdependence does not specify a threshold; it does not 
tell us what level of economic interdependence is enough to foster demand for the creation of 
intergovernmental institutions. 21   Moreover, a “low” level of interdependence may not 
necessarily prevent regional states from creating a regional institution.  For example, ASEAN 
was created despite the relatively low level of economic interdependence among the member 
states. 
The second shortcoming in these approaches is that, although liberal theories generally 
suggest that there is a positive correlation between regionalization and regionalism, a causal link 
between the two is not easily established.  Many scholars have suggested that East Asian 
regionalization has proceeded without formal institutional mechanisms. 22   Instead, the 
regionalization process has primarily been driven by private corporations without the strong 
involvement of government.  In this respect, it is disputable as to whether the activities of the 
private sector have created the bottom-up forces that prompted governments to create an 
intergovernmental process.  It is not entirely clear why private firms, which have operated very 
successfully to promote their business activities, especially through the establishment of 
production networks, “seek government intervention to assist in the promotion of economic 
collaboration.” 23   Indeed, the “virtual integration” created by the private sector may “have 
lowered incentives for intergovernmental integration.” 24   As Stephan Haggard points out, 
“[t]here is little evidence for the theory that higher levels of interdependence generate the 
demand for deeper integration.”25
The third weakness in these approaches is that these approaches focus primarily on the 
demand-side of institution-building by highlighting the expected benefits of creating institutions.  
There is an implicit assumption that a demand for the creation of institutions will be translated 
                                                 
21 Ravenhill, "The Growth of Intergovernmental Collaboration in the Asia Pacific Region," 259. 
22 Stubbs, "Asia-Pacific Regionalization and the Global Economy: A Third Form of Capitalism?," 786; John 
Ravenhill, "Competing Logics of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific," Journal of European Integration 18, no. 1 
(1994): 179; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," Cooperation and Conflict 31, no. 2 
(1996): 123-159; Richard Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 
(2002): 446. 
23 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 25.  See also Miles Kahler, "Organizing the 
Pacific," in Robert A. Scalapino, et al., eds., Pacific-Asian Economic Policies and Regional Interdependence 
(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies University of California, 1988), 337. 
24 Keiichi Tsunekawa, "Why So Many Maps There?  Japan and Regional Cooperation," in T. J. Pempel, ed., 
Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 13. 
25 Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas," in Edward D. Mansfield 
and Helen V. Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 45. 
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 into a supply of institutions.26  Thus, these demand-side theories tend to overlook the existence 
of political sensitivity and obstacles to the formation of regional institutions.  There may be 
strong resistance against the creation of such institutions because of actors’ concerns for unequal 
distributive consequences of institutions, their fear of being dominated by larger states, or the 
existence of norms against regional cooperation.  In short, whereas demand-side theories of 
institution-building are better at explaining why institutions are created, they do not provide an 
explanation for “how and when they will be supplied.” 27   These theories need to be 
complemented by supply-side theories, which address the actual political processes of interstate 
negotiations. 
2.1.3 Constructivism 
Constructivists depart from the rationalist view of international institutions simply as a product 
of states’ calculating the costs and benefits according to largely materialistic concepts of 
instrumental rationality.  Rather than treating interests and identity as exogenously given a priori, 
constructivists argue that both interests and identities are endogenously constructed through 
interactions with other actors. 28   In this view, through interactions and socialization, states 
redefine their interests and “can alter the views actors hold of what each can do separately and 
what both can accomplish jointly.”29  Constructivists take an essentially sociological approach to 
the formation of actors’ interests and identity by emphasizing the impact of collective ideas and 
norms. 
From a constructivist perspective, institutions emerge and operate within broader social 
structures produced by the interactions of agents.  Instead of viewing the formation of 
institutions as driven by “a logic of expected consequences” as in the rationalist view, 
constructivists emphasize “a logic of appropriateness,”30  where human actions are guided by 
                                                 
26 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 13. 
27 Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41, no. 3 
(1987): 506. 
28 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
29 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," in Peter J. Katzenstein and 
Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 5. 
30 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 949-952. 
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 social norms and actors’ identity rather than by a utilitarian view of instrumental rationality.  
Accordingly, institutions, in this view, reflect prevailing norms and widely-accepted procedures.  
The emergence of institutions is deeply affected by the degree of convergence of norms and 
identity. 
Constructivist-inspired scholars of regionalism put “the idea of region” at the center of 
analysis.31  From a constructivist perspective, the concept of a region is not simply determined 
by its physical existence or geographical proximity.  Instead, it is socially constructed through 
interactions among various actors, is politically contested, and historically evolves over time.  
Hence, what constitutes a region is at the heart of the constructivist approach to regionalism.  For 
example, as will be illustrated in Chapter 4, the concept of the Asia-Pacific region is a relatively 
recent construction which evolved in the post-war era. 32   Constructivists also explore the 
formation of regional identity, which emerges through the demarcation of “us” from “others” and 
historically evolves through interactions with others. 
To explain the construction of regional institutions, constructivist-inspired scholars trace 
the origins and evolution of the idea of the region itself and examine the emergence of regionalist 
projects.  For example, to explain the formation of APEC, they look into the origins and 
evolution of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas over significant periods of time.  However, 
constructivism does not provide a sufficient explanation for the timing of regional institution-
building unless it is combined with approaches that examine shifts in the structural environment.  
Constructivists are generally more interested in exploring institutional origins, form, evolution, 
and effects than in identifying the timing of institutional creation. 
In line with a constructivist approach, some commentators may suggest that the formation 
of APEC and the APT can be seen as the manifestation of the emergence of (or the search for) 
Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional identities, respectively.  However, there is no evidence that 
such regional identity emerged.  On the contrary, there is ample evidence that the Chinese and 
Koreans have a negative image of Japan, given Japan’s war atrocities and its unwillingness to 
resolve the problem.  As shown in Table 2-2, 42.2 percent of South Korean respondents and 43.2 
                                                 
31 Shaun Breslin and Richard A. Higgott, "Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New," New 
Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 335.  See also Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
32 Arif Dirlik, "The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure," in Arif 
Dirlik, ed., What is in a Rim?  Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Regional Idea (Lanham, ML: 
Rowman&Littlefield, 1998), 15-36. 
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 percent of Chinese respondents provided negative (“dislike”) perceptions of Japan, while the 
positive (“like”) perceptions were only 17.1 percent and 18.8 percent, respectively.  On the other 
hand, the percentage of Japanese respondents who presented a negative perception of China was 
higher than those who presented a positive one.  As for South Korea, more Japanese respondents 
perceived the country positively than negatively in 2000.  However, a larger proportion of 
Japanese respondents presented a positive perception of the United States. 
 
Table 2-2: Perceptions of other Countries, ROK, Japan, and China, Late 2000 (%) 
    ROK Japan China 
1. Like 30.7 29.4 33.0 
2. Dislike 18.7 7.6 31.0 
3. Neither like nor dislike 50.6 60.9 33.4 
Q1: (ROK, Japan, China) Do 
you like or dislike, or neither 
like nor dislike, the United 
States? 4. Do not know/No response  2.1 2.6 
1. Like 22.6 17.1  
2. Dislike 20.6 20.1  
3. Neither like nor dislike 56.8 59.4  
Q2: (ROK, Japan) Do you 
like or dislike, or neither like 
nor dislike, China? 
4. Do not know/No response  3.4  
1. Like 17.1  18.8 
2. Dislike 42.2  43.2 
3. Neither like nor dislike 40.7  33.6 
Q3: (ROK, China) Then you 
like or dislike, or neither like 
nor dislike, Japan? 
4. Do not know/No response   4.4 
1. Like  20.4 34.5 
2. Dislike  16.8 15.8 
3. Neither like nor dislike  60.0 44.8 
Q4: (Japan, China) Then, do 
you like or dislike, or neither 
like nor dislike, South 
Korea? 4. Do not know/No response  2.8 4.9 
 
Source: Adapted from Samuel S. Kim, “Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges 
and Contending Explanations,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia 
(Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 46, Table 1.12. 
Note: South Korea: N=2,000, survey conducted October 25-November 18, 2000.  Japan: N=3,000, survey conducted 
November 1-19, 2000.  China: N=1,000, survey conducted November 1-10, 2000. 
 
 
In fact, the Japanese public had a far closer affinity with the United States than any other 
Asian countries, including China, South Korea, and ASEAN during the period 1990–2000.  
Japan’s affinities with ASEAN and South Korea were both strongly negative throughout the 
1990s until they both improved in 2000.33  Meanwhile, Japan’s affinity with China worsened 
during the latter half of the 1990s.  From a constructivist perspective, the absence of regional 
identity is the most serious obstacle to the formation of Asian regionalism. 
                                                 
33 Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, Defensive Internationalism: Providing Public Goods in an Uncertain 
World (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 122-124.  For data, see Table 3.15. 
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 2.2 REGIONALISM 
Although constructivism sheds light on the concept of region, both neorealism and liberalism are 
most concerned with the question of how and why international institutions are created.  The 
following section outlines the literature which places regionalism at the center of analysis.  It 
starts with a brief overview of the literature on European regional integration.  Undoubtedly 
Europe provides the most institutionalized form of regional integration in the world.  Although I 
reject a Euro-centric perspective that implicitly or explicitly assumes that regionalist projects in 
other parts of the world will more or less follow a linear projection toward the European path, the 
European case does provide some theoretical and empirical insights about the study of 
regionalism in general.  After a brief review of the theories of European regionalism, I turn to the 
existing literature on Asian regionalism. 
2.2.1 European Regionalism 
From the 1950s through the 1990s, the central theoretical debate in the study of European 
integration was one between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.34  Initially proposed 
by Ernst Haas, neofunctionalism sees European integration as an incremental and gradual 
development that is essentially driven by self-sustaining processes of functional and political 
spillovers. 35   The central tenet of neofunctionalism is its suggestion that integration in one 
functional area will spread to other sectors.  In particular, it predicted that socio-economic 
integration would “spill over” into political integration.  Neofunctionalist scholars also highlight 
the role of technocratic experts and supranational actors as the catalyst of European integration. 
                                                 
34 For a brief overview of the literature of European integration, see, for example, Mark A. Pollack, "Theorizing the 
European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in the New Governance?," Annual 
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35 Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
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 In contrast, intergovernmentalism emphasizes the role of member governments as 
gatekeepers of the European integration. 36   Unlike the neofunctionalist view (which sees 
European integration essentially as the technocratic imperative), intergovernmentalists explain 
the European integration process as the result of a series of inter-state negotiations.  For 
intergovernmentalists, member governments are fundamentally the central architects of the 
European Community (EC) and its successor, the European Union (EU), whereas supranational 
organizations such as the European Commission have little or no influence over the outcomes of 
interstate negotiations.  In this view, member governments retain control over the direction and 
pace of the European integration process.  Therefore, the major difference between 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism lies in the difference in their emphasis on the role of 
different actors in the process of European integration: While many scholars in the 
neofunctionalist tradition highlight the roles of supranational actors and transnational policy 
networks, intergovernmentalists stress the primacy of national governments. 
Building on the intergovernmentalist tradition, Andrew Moravcsik proposes an influential 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach for analyzing a series of major historical decisions that 
promoted European integration.37  His theoretical framework consists of three stages: The first 
stage of analysis is based on a liberal theory to explain the formation of national preferences by 
investigating the configuration of preferences among domestic actors; the second stage 
emphasizes intergovernmental bargaining in contrast to supranational entrepreneurship; and the 
third stage provides a model of institutional choice aimed at ensuring credible commitments.  In 
his view, European integration is not driven by supranational entrepreneurs, unintended 
consequences of spill-over effects from earlier integration, or transnational coalitions of interest 
groups.  Instead, it is primarily led by the convergence of preference among the most powerful 
member states and interstate bargaining among them.38
                                                 
36 Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete?  The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," 
Daedalus 95, no. 3 (1966): 862-915; Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The 
European Community's Internal Market," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 533-560; Andrew Moravcsik, 
"Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of 
Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1993): 473-524. 
37 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(London: UCL Press, 1998). 
38 Pollack, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in the New 
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 From this perspective, Moravcsik advances the view that European integration actually 
enhances national executives vis-à-vis its domestic constituencies as well as global market 
actors. 39   Moving out of Europe, as Richard A. Higgott points out, given the absence of 
supranational actors in the Asia-Pacific, the idea that regionalism may strengthen the national 
government may be even more relevant for the analysis of Asian regionalism than in the study of 
European integration.40  However, the fact that supranational actors do not exist in Asia does not 
completely rule out the role of non-governmental actors in providing innovative ideas and 
information for crafting a regional intergovernmental institution in the region.  In contrast with 
the European context, the distinction between state actors and non-state actors is far more blurred 
in Asia.41  Indeed, as Charles E. Morrison argues, in Asia, the relationship between governments 
and non-governmental policy networks can be characterized as a symbiotic one.42  Hence, in the 
Asian context, the theoretical divide between intergovernmentalism (which insists on the central 
role of states) and neofunctionalism (which stresses supranational entrepreneurship) itself does 
not make much sense.  Then, in this case, instead of seeing these two approaches as alternative 
explanations, it is more useful to view them as complementary, recognizing that both the non-
governmental policy networks and governments have roles to play in the process of regional 
institution-building.43  The issue, rather, is exactly what roles they play respectively. 
In the literature of regionalism, comparison between the Asian experience and the 
European experience has been ubiquitous.44  A cursory comparison between European and Asian 
regionalism often results in the simple observation that European regionalism is far more 
advanced than regionalism in Asia.  Some studies implicitly assume that there is a linear pattern 
of development in regional institution-building.  However, rather than comparing the 
“underdevelopment” of Asian regionalism with the present form of European regionalism, a 
                                                 
39 Mark A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies 
39, no. 2 (2001): 226. 
40 Richard A. Higgott, "Economic Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific: A Theoretical Comparison with the European 
Union," Journal of European Public Policy 2, no. 3 (1995): 374-375. 
41 Richard A. Higgott, "Ideas and Identity in the International Political Economy of Regionalism: The Asia-Pacific 
and Europe Compared," Kokusai Seiji 114 (1997): 30. 
42 Charles E. Morrison, "Track 1/Track 2 Symbiosis in Asia-Pacific Regionalism," The Pacific Review 17, no. 4 
(2004): 547-565. 
43 For a similar suggestion in the context of the European literature, see David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: 
Causes and Consequences," in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the New 
European Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 30. 
44 See, for example, Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang, eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning 
from the European Experience (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002). 
 31 
 more appropriate comparison would be to compare European and Asian regionalism “at similar 
stages of development.”45  As Higgott warns, though, this does not mean that we can assume that 
Europe’s present is Asia’s future.46  The key question for the study of comparative regionalism, 
then, is why different regions pursue different approaches toward regional cooperation. 
It has become conventional wisdom that regional integration in the Asia-Pacific region 
was driven by market forces rather than state-led regionalist efforts. 47   Urata Shujiro, in 
comparing the regional processes of Europe and Asia, characterizes the regional integration 
process in Western Europe as “institution-driven,” while he observes that regionalization in East 
Asia was primarily “market-driven” and that the shift from “market-driven” to “institution-
driven” regionalization has just begun with the recent surge of proposals for free trade 
agreements.48  Similarly, other scholars distinguish between a “top-down” approach in Europe 
and a “bottom-up” process in Asia.49
Arguably the initial impetus for the formation of European regionalism was 
geopolitical/security motivations among member states to prevent a repeat of the devastation 
experienced in the two World Wars.  The major motive behind the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, which marked the first step toward the creation of a 
European community, was to prevent a future war between Germany and France. 50   The 
emergence of the Cold War provided a context conducive to the development of European 
integration in that many Western European countries were bound together to counter the 
common threat of the Soviet Union.  In the Asia-Pacific region, perceptions of external threats 
varied.  Moreover, many Asian states were hostile toward one another within the region.  
Furthermore, there existed communist threats in the form of internal communist insurgencies.  In 
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 the context of the Cold War, the U.S. support for multilateralism in Europe was an important 
drive behind the early phase of European regional integration.  As some scholars suggest, in 
Europe, the Cold War and the U.S. foreign policy were both a “centripetal” factor, contributing 
to the early development of the integration process.  In contrast, as discussed below, in Asia, the 
Cold War and the U.S. choice for bilateralism were both “centrifugal.”51
2.2.2 Asian Regionalism 
Why were there no region-wide institutions in the Asia-Pacific and East Asian regions until the 
late 1980s?  What accounts for the recent emergence of regionalism in these regions?  The 
existing literature on Asian regionalism provides at least five explanations for these questions.  
However, since much of the literature on Asian regionalism is atheoretical, a large part of the 
differences have not necessarily been explained using alternative theoretical orientations; instead, 
their explanations tend to differ depending on the regional expertise of scholars.  Accordingly, 
the first three perspectives reviewed below are named U.S. hegemony explanations, Japan-
centered explanations, and ASEAN-centered explanations, depending on the focus of their 
analysis. 52   While some works examined in these three groups do adopt insights from the 
theories of international relations, there has not been much clear theoretical “great debate” as in 
the case of the literature on European integration (e.g. neofunctionalism vs. 
intergovernmentalism, rationalism vs. constructivism, etc). 53   The other two explanations 
examined below are diversity explanations and policy-network explanations. 
 
U.S. Hegemony Explanations 
The first set of approaches focus on the impact of U.S. foreign policy on shaping the 
regional order in Asia.  A first explanation, suggested by Donald Crone, offers a modified realist 
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 account of the absence of Asia-Pacific regional institutions until the late 1980s and the 
subsequent non-hegemonic (or post-)hegemonic form of institution-building that unfolded in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 54   Adopting a neorealist perspective, Crone primarily focuses on the 
distribution of capabilities, especially power differentials between the leading state and other 
countries.55  However, he reverses the proposition of hegemonic stability theory by suggesting 
that U.S. predominance was the major factor which prevented, rather than contributed to, the 
emergence of regional institutions in the Pacific.  Given the huge power differentials between the 
United States and its Asian allies (which he calls “extreme hegemony”) in the post-war period, 
U.S. policymakers had few incentives to pursue a multilateral approach that would “only 
increase American commitment with little measurable enhancement of joint capabilities.”56  At 
the same time, the U.S. extreme hegemony “inhibited early attempts to organize the Pacific, by 
creating disincentives for the parties to institutionalize and multilateralize relationships.”57
From this perspective, the U.S. choice of bilateralism is largely based on the neorealist 
logic that bilateralism would provide the hegemonic power with a larger bargaining leverage 
over weaker states than multilateralism (which would constrain the freedom of action of the 
hegemonic power).58  Therefore, the hegemonic position of the United States in the post-war 
period led U.S. policymakers to create a series of bilateral alliances with countries in the Asia-
Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New 
Zealand.  In this view, the preponderance of the U.S. power and its creation of the so-called 
“hub-and-spokes” system with the United States as a hub kept the subordinate states in the 
system from pursuing the creation of regional coalitions to challenge the American hegemony. 
For Crone, then, it was the erosion of U.S. hegemony that opened opportunities for 
regional middle powers like Australia to pursue a regionalist approach and propose the APEC 
initiative to constrain the hegemon’s unilateral actions.  On the one hand, the declining hegemon 
is likely to make some concessions to eliminate potential challenges, while using its dominant 
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 position to “preserve bargaining power that is perceived to be eroding.”59  From this perspective, 
it is the decline of U.S. hegemony rather than its ascendance that explains institution-building in 
the Asia-Pacific.  Crone explains the emergence of APEC as a response to the “leveling” of the 
difference in economic and political power between the United States and the other countries in 
the Pacific.60
At first sight, the late emergence of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific seems to be 
explained by Crone’s thesis.  However, the significance given to the decline of U.S. hegemony 
contains some problems.  First, if the decline of U.S. power provided an opportunity for the 
emergence of Asian regional institutions, it does not explain why institution-building did not take 
off in the 1970s or early 1980s, by which time the decline of U.S. hegemony had been observed 
by many commentators.61  Second, if great powers tend to avoid multilateralism because of their 
concern of being constrained, the thesis does not explain why the United States endorsed 
multilateralism in Europe, where it should have had a greater concern about losing its unilateral 
freedom of action than it did in Asia, because the power disparity between the U.S. and 
European powers was much smaller than that between the U.S. and countries in Asia.62
A second explanation, provided by Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, also 
attributes the absence of multilateral security organization in post-war Asia to the U.S. 
preference for bilateralism.  However, they explain the U.S. choice for bilateralism in terms of 
the Americans conception of their identity, rather than focusing only on concerns about the 
distribution of power.63  According to them, multilateralism “requires a strong sense of collective 
identity in addition to shared interests.” 64   They argue that, while the American close 
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 identification with the European countries led U.S. policymakers to opt for multilateralism in 
Europe, in Asia they did not share identity with the Asian countries, believing instead that the 
Asian countries “belonged to a different and inferior political community.” 65   From this 
perspective, it was this American lack of shared identity with the Asian countries rather than its 
extreme hegemony that led U.S. policymakers to pursue bilateralism in dealing with the Asian 
countries. 
Despite the differences in the two above explanations, U.S.-centered approaches explain 
the absence of multilateral regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific by pointing to the central role 
of the United States in shaping the regional order in Asia.  Certainly the U.S.-dominated hub-
and-spoke order had significant regional consequences in setting the basic pattern of political and 
economic interactions among the countries in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War period, and 
maybe beyond.66  As T. J. Pempel explains, the U.S. “opened its own markets asymmetrically to 
its Asian allies, fostering pan-Pacific economic linkages that tied a number of Asian countries 
economically and strategically.”67  As a result, “many of America’s Asian allies had far stronger 
ties across the Pacific than they had among themselves.”68
However, the absence of multilateralism in Asia cannot be solely attributed to U.S. 
policies.  These U.S.-centered approaches largely ignore local factors – material and ideational 
alike – that influenced the intraregional dynamics.  As Amitav Acharya points out, although 
Hemmer and Katzenstein examine the impact of collective identity on shaping the Asian regional 
order, they primarily focus on American self-conception of collective identity without paying 
attention to “the norms and collective identities of the Asians themselves and intraregional 
interactions.”69  Moreover, since the driving force behind the shift to multilateralism in the Asia-
Pacific came not from the United States, but from other regional powers, it is necessary to 
examine how smaller powers convinced U.S. policymakers to accept the value of regional 
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 multilateralism in this region.70  In short, it is imperative to explore the interactions between the 
local and extraregional factors.   
 
Japan-Centered Explanations 
The next set of approaches emphasizes the role of Japan in promoting the regionalization 
process in East Asia.  In general, this view suggests that Japan has primarily contributed to the 
regional integration of the East Asian economies, either through the activities of Japanese private 
firms or through the regional policies of the Japanese government.  There are two distinctive 
threads in these approaches.  The first thread focuses on the business practices of Japanese firms 
and related governmental economic policies.  In their seminal work Asia in Japan’s Embrace, 
Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura argue that Japan has created regional production networks in 
Asia by establishing a hierarchical system of production links which vertically connects Japanese 
affiliates operating overseas with the parent company in Japan. 71   In this view, Japanese 
multilateral corporations became the central driving force in forging an integrated regional 
economy in Asia.  The Japanese firms “have sought to construct a hierarchical division of labor 
based on the different but complementary factor endowments and industrial structures, and thus 
the different but complementary comparative advantages, of Asian economies.”72  The activities 
of the Japanese firms have been strongly supported by the Japanese government, which has 
played a “coordinating role” by sponsoring business forums and organizing trade associations.73  
Moreover, the Japanese government sought to exert its influence on business and government 
overseas by exporting its system of administrative guidance.74  The establishment of regional 
“production alliances” promoted by the Japanese government and business leaders resembles 
their domestic practice of creating vertical networks of affiliates and subsidiaries called keiretsu.  
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 Put succinctly, Asian regionalization, in this view, can be viewed as a regional extension of 
Japan’s domestic approach to economic development.75
In their edited book, Network Power: Japan and Asia, Katzenstein and Shiraishi Takashi 
propose the concept of “network power” to describe a distinctive informal form of regional 
integration primarily driven by the network extensions of Japanese state and business practices.76  
To explain “the relative lack of the formal political institutions of Asian regionalism,” he focuses 
on “the character of domestic state structures” as well as “power and norms in the international 
system.”77  In particular, he argues that “the network organization that characterizes the Japanese 
state” is the major factor in shaping “the informal network structures that define Asian regional 
integration.”78  In this view, the growing Japanese penetration of Asian economies was driven by 
the “network power” of the Japanese corporate strategies and the state.79
T. J. Pempel80 and Glenn Hook81 each examine the central role that Japan played at 
different stages in the growth of economic integration in Asia.  They both identify two stages in 
the development of Asian economic integration process: the first stage was driven primarily by 
Japan’s trade and aid, the second by the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japanese 
firms.  The first stage started with Japan’s efforts to “re-enter” Asia through the reparation 
payments to the countries victimized by the military aggression of the Japanese empire. 82   
During this period, trade and aid became the principal means for Japan to develop its relations 
with its Asian neighbors.83  As Pempel points out, “it was the government, rather than the private 
sector, that took the lead, even if at times this role was as a wedge for private Japanese-owned 
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 companies.”84  In particular, Southeast Asia became a key target of Japan’s economic diplomacy 
to pursue its twin goals of trade promotion and resource procurements.85
The second phase was brought about by a major change in the international economic 
system as a result of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971.  The 
ensuing rise in the Japanese yen led to the gradual growth of Japanese outward FDI.  The biggest 
surge of Japanese FDI was catalyzed by the Plaza Accord of 1985 and the resultant sharp 
appreciation of the yen.  Subsequently, Japanese companies moved their manufacturing 
production facilities first to Taiwan and South Korea, but then to many Southeast Asian 
countries.  Pempel emphasizes the role of investment capital, especially from Japan, rather than 
simple trade, as an increasingly important factor in promoting the integration of Asian 
economies.86  In short, these scholars explain the growth of Asian regionalization by exploring 
Tokyo’s economic policy and the business strategies of Japanese firms and the creation of 
regional production networks. 
The second thread of explanation focuses on the role of the Japanese government as well 
as Japanese academic and business elites in proposing and promoting regional schemes in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  The central argument of this perspective is that Japan has been the primary 
architect of Asia-Pacific regional institutions.  Using information from numerous interviews with 
key policymakers who got involved in the creation of APEC, Yoichi Funabashi provides an 
empirically-rich description of the process of establishing APEC.  In his work, he emphasizes the 
role that Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry played in proposing an Asia-
Pacific ministerial forum and convincing the reluctant ASEAN governments to participate in the 
forum. 
Takashi Terada also conducted extensive interviews with important government officials 
as well as academic and business leaders.  His work provides a detailed analysis of the longer 
historical processes that led to the creation of APEC.  In several articles, he argues that Japan, 
along with Australia, has played a significant role in the institutional development of the Asia-
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 Pacific region, starting with the creation of non-governmental economic institutions such as the 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the Pacific Basin Economic Council 
(PBEC), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and followed by the 
establishment of the first-ever intergovernmental forum in the form of APEC.87  In particular, he 
emphasizes that the Japanese government’s special attention to incorporating ASEAN’s interests 
was conducive to the creation of APEC.  To portray Japan’s leadership role in the creation of 
APEC, he uses the concept of “directional leadership” by which he means “leaders’ efforts to 
adjust different interests of potential participants and persuading them to join new regional 
institutions by setting up common goals, which can be legitimated by followers who perceive the 
benefits of complying with those goals.”88  Employing this concept, he suggests that Japan 
played a directional leadership role, especially by providing the so-called “institutional 
blueprint” for a new Asia-Pacific regional forum that would be acceptable to the skeptical 
governments in ASEAN.89
In terms of strategy, Terada suggests that with full awareness of ASEAN’s cautious 
attitude, the Japanese government had chosen Australia as its partner to promote Asia-Pacific 
regional schemes.  Emphasizing the complementary roles between Australia and Japan, he 
concludes that both Japan and Australia played “pivotal roles” in the creation of APEC, just as 
they earlier did in creating the three non-governmental organizations of the PBEC, the PAFTAD, 
and the PECC.90
The strength of both Funabashi’s and Terada’s research lies in the empirical richness of 
their studies.  However, their weakness stems from lack of theoretically-induced research 
hypotheses.  Terada’s use of the concept of “directional leadership” seems plausible, but it does 
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88 Terada, "Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of 
PECC and APEC," 199.  The original concept of directional leadership was proposed by Raino Malnes.  See Raino 
Malnes, "'Leader' and 'Entrepreneur' in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis," European Journal of 
International Relations 1, no. 1 (1995): 87-112. 
89 Terada, "Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of 
PECC and APEC," 198. 
90 The following works focus on the roles that both Japan and Australia played in the formation of APEC.  Therefore, 
his work is not strictly Japan-centered.  However, since the works cited above place Japan at the center of analysis, I 
group his works in this category.  See Terada, "The Genesis of APEC: Australia-Japan Political Initiatives."; 
Takashi Terada, "The Australia-Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co-
operation," Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 175-198. 
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 not help us to understand, for example, why the Japanese government did not exert such a 
leadership role to create an intergovernmental mechanism in the Asia-Pacific earlier than it did to 
create an Asia-Pacific regional forum like APEC.  Moreover, ASEAN members’ change of mind 
cannot be solely attributed to Japanese (or Australian) diplomacy into persuading ASEAN 
officials to participate in the proposed Asia-Pacific forum.  Arguably, ASEAN members’ change 
in attitudes toward Asia-Pacific regionalism seems to have been more a function of the changes 
in its external environment and the resultant domestic shifts in their economic policies rather 
than the sole result of persuasion. 
To sum up, the literature outlined above examines the growth of economic integration 
and the subsequent establishment of regional economic institutions from the vantage point of 
Japan.  Focusing on the growth of Japan’s economic linkages with the rest of Asia, primarily 
driven by the Japanese business strategies (supported by the government), the first category of 
work argues that Japan’s growing economic engagement with other Asian economies helped to 
create an integrated regional economy connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia,91  that Japanese 
capital and technology were the key factor in weaving together the economies of Asia.92  The 
second group of literature focuses on the role that the Japanese government played in the 
institutional development of the Asia-Pacific. 
However, Japan-centered approaches became largely obsolete due to the new dynamics 
of the East Asian regional economy after the bursting of the Japanese “bubble economy” at the 
beginning of the 1990s and the subsequent economic stagnation which lasted over a decade.93  
Although Japan-centered approaches largely explain the Asia-Pacific regionalization process and 
highlight the contributions that Japan made in the process of establishing APEC, they cannot 
account for the formation of the APT framework, in which Japan was extremely reluctant to get 
involved.  It is necessary to examine the emergence of East Asian regionalism in the context of 
the changing dynamics of the patterns of interactions in East Asia, especially the shift in the 
center of gravity away from a Japan-centered regional process to a more complex regional 
                                                 
91 Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, 63. 
92 Hatch, "Japanese Production Networks in Asia: Extending the Status Quo," 29. 
93 For a concise discussion of the major transformation of the East Asian regional economy focusing on the collapse 
of a Japan-led image of the East Asian regional economy, see Andrew MacIntyre and Barry Naughton, "The Decline 
of a Japan-Led Model of the East Asian Economy," in T. J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of 
a Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 77-100. 
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 process in which China exercises a growing influence but no single country dominates.94  As 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, China’s increasing role in East Asian regionalism should be fully 
explored in the analysis of East Asian regionalism. 
 
ASEAN-Centered Explanations 
To explain the lack of Asia-Pacific regional institutions until the late 1980s, ASEAN-
centered approaches suggest that it was ASEAN’s resistance that prevented the creation of such 
institutions.  All the Southeast Asian countries except Thailand had experienced Western 
colonization.  When they gained independence in the aftermath of World War II, they 
emphasized the norms of sovereignty and noninterference. 95   Moreover, the legacy of 
colonialism had made them very skeptical about the benefits of external forces.  Therefore, they 
shared a preference for maintaining regional autonomy.  However, in the wake of the Cold War, 
the Southeast Asian countries were afraid of being drawn into the Cold War great power rivalry.  
Therefore, when ASEAN was formed in 1967, the principle of regional autonomy emerged as an 
important ASEAN norm.96  Central to this norm is the principle of “regional resilience,” which is 
closely associated with Suharto’s concept of “national resilience.”97  The ASEAN members 
initially desired to promote regional autonomy free from great power intrusion.  Therefore, the 
ASEAN members’ search for regional autonomy and their fear of domination by external great 
powers prevented the ASEAN governments from joining any wider regional groupings that 
would involve major external powers.  In this view, ASEAN’s resistance was a major obstacle 
for the creation of an Asia-Pacific intergovernmental mechanism. 
To explain the low level of institutionalization in regional institutions in Asia, ASEAN 
experts with constructivist insights, such as Amitav Acharya, focus on the existence of regional 
norms among the Southeast Asian countries.  They are collectively known as the “ASEAN Way” 
                                                 
94 In their newer work, Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi suggest that the East Asian regionalization process 
can no longer be understood as a mere extension of any single national model.  Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi 
Shiraishi, eds., Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
95 For details on how the norms of sovereignty and non-interference came to be at the forefront for the Southeast 
Asian leaders and how these normative forces prevented the formation of collective defense organizations in the 
region, see Acharya, "'Why Is There No NATO in Asia?'  The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism," 1-50. 
96 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 51. 
97 The concept of national resilience aimed at the construction of an internally strong state by mobilizing political, 
economic, social, cultural, and psychological forces.  See Donald E. Weatherbee, ed., International Relations in 
Southeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 73. 
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 and consisted of a set of procedural norms and principles which include a preference for informal 
dialogue and nonbinding commitments over formalistic and legalistic approaches, consensual 
decision-making based on consultation, and the principles of sovereign equality and non-
interference.98  ASEAN members’ endorsement of this particular code of conduct for inter-state 
relations led them to eschew formal regional institutionalization. 
Once ASEAN members agreed to join an Asia-Pacific regional framework, the ASEAN 
governments attempted to infuse their preferred procedural norms and principles into any wider 
regionalist projects in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.  In other words, ASEAN sought to 
transplant the “ASEAN Way” into a wider regional grouping like APEC and the ARF by 
transforming it into an “Asia-Pacific Way.” 99   Contrary to neorealist expectations, 100  
constructivist-inspired scholars of Southeast Asia suggest that, despite ASEAN’s extremely 
limited material power assets, ASEAN members effectively exercised disproportionate influence 
on determining the institutional forms of regionalist projects that emerged in the Asia-Pacific and 
East Asian region, including APEC, the ARF, and ASEAN+3.101
From this perspective, ASEAN has been at the center of regional institution-building 
efforts in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.  Proponents of this view suggest that ASEAN played 
what might be called a “normative leadership” role in generating norms and spreading them into 
wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional processes.102  They point out that ASEAN provided a 
distinctive form of regionalism, which marks a sharp contrast with the regionalist path that 
Europe took.  For them, Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional institutions are, to a significant 
degree, characterized by an extension of the ASEAN practices into these broader regionalist 
processes. 
                                                 
98 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 63-
70.  See also Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-
Pacific Way'?," The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 328-337; Acharya, "Regional Institutions and Asian Security 
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Amitav Acharya, "Culture, Security, Multilateralism: The 'ASEAN Way' and Regional Order," in Keith Krause, ed., 
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100 From the neorealist perspective, weaker powers are generally “norm-takers” and are not “norm-makers.” 
101 For an excellent discussion on the difference between neorealist and constructivist approaches with respect to 
ASEAN, see Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs, "Is ASEAN Powerful?  Neo-Realist versus Constructivist 
Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 135-155. 
102 Acharya, "Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change," 
211. 
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 These approaches offer important insights for analyzing the role that ASEAN played in 
the process of broader regional institution-building.  However, while the ASEAN norms did 
seem to contribute to shaping the institutional features of broader regionalist projects, at least to 
some extent, the sole emphasis on relatively static regional norms cannot adequately account for 
a change in the attitudes of those Southeast Asian countries to join Asia-Pacific and East Asian 
regionalist projects in the first place, despite their previous reluctance.  Specifically, it is 
necessary to explain a cognitive shift among ASEAN leaders from an inward-looking orientation 
focusing on the principles of regional autonomy and self-reliance to an outward-looking 
orientation pushing to actively engage with external powers.  This requires the researcher not 
only to pay closer attention to the existence of competing norms, such as the regional autonomy 
norms and neoliberal norms (such as the notion of “open regionalism”), but also to explore how 
and why one norm becomes more prevalent than another.103  To analyze the normative change, 
these approaches need to be complemented by investigation of both domestic and global changes 
as well as of the impact of the emergence of new norms.  In this respect, it is important to 
consider the possibility that political leaders use norms in an “instrumental” and “strategic” 
manner rather than being persuaded by those norms.104  For example, ASEAN’s new activism in 
broader regionalism with its insistence on the ASEAN Way can be analyzed in the context of the 
end of the bipolar Cold War structure and the resultant loss of ASEAN’s strategic importance.  
Another major problem with this approach is that ASEAN experts naturally tend to 
overstate the role of ASEAN.  For example, we need to explain why APEC developed in a 
direction that many ASEAN members did not desire after 1993, despites ASEAN’s apparent 
success in convincing other APEC members to adopt many of the procedural norms and 
principles of ASEAN at APEC’s formative stage.  We need a more nuanced perspective, which 
incorporates the variation in the impact of these ASEAN norms over time, while paying enough 
attention to the limitations of the ASEAN norms.  In general, it is important to carefully examine 
under what conditions the ASEAN norms have mattered in the wider regional framework. 
 
 
                                                 
103 Amitav Acharya addresses this issue, but more works are required.  Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism: The Meso 
Public Domain in Latin America and South-East Asia," in Daniel Drache, ed., The Market or the Public Domain?: 
Global Governance and the Asymmetry of Power (New York: Routledge, 2001), 296-318. 
104 Kahler, "Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case," 549-571. 
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 “Extreme Diversity” Explanations 
To challenge the Crone thesis discussed earlier, some scholars suggest that the absence or 
weak nature of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific can be attributed to “extreme diversity” 
within the region, rather than “extreme hegemony” of the United States, as Crone suggests.105  
From this perspective, the diversity among the Asia-Pacific countries in terms of their stages of 
economic development, type of political and economic systems, and cultural differences 
including region, language, and colonial heritage, as well as historical antagonism against each 
other, is considered to have been a major factor in inhibiting any collective efforts to build 
multilateral institutions in this region. 
As T. J. Pempel observes at the beginning of the twentieth century, “Asia was largely a 
fragmented collection of disparate Western colonies”: 
the British controlled Singapore, Burma, Malaya, and Hong Kong (as well as Australia 
and New Zealand); the Dutch had Indonesia; the French had Indochina; the Portuguese, 
Goa and Macao; the Philippines belong first to Spain and then to the United States; 
Taiwan and Korea were under Japanese control; China, racked by civil war, was 
occupied, crossed, and redressed by military forces from virtually all of these powers.  
Japan and Thailand were the only two Asian countries free, or mostly so, of Western 
colonial rule”106
 
The fragmentation of Asia was further exacerbated in the years immediately following World 
War II.  Even after decolonization in the post-war era, the impact of the colonizers on the 
colonies in Asia remained. 
Examining the region’s diversity in population, economic size, economic affluence, 
economic openness, and other non-economic dimensions, Edward J. Lincoln argues that “[the 
East Asian region’s] diversity is wider than that prevailing in either Europe or North America 
and therefore is an important factor in explaining its relative lack of regional economic 
integration.”107  Some commentators suggest that the historical diversity of the region has been 
disappearing through common historical experiences in the post-WWII period.108  Contrary to 
these observations, however, Lincoln concludes that the region’s diversity continues to exist and 
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 inhibit “the kind of economic regionalism that has emerged in Europe and North America over 
the past several decades.”109
Undoubtedly, the diversity clearly remains a major impediment for developing 
regionalism in the Asian region.  However, if we only focus on the difficulty for constructing a 
regional institution, we cannot explain the emergence of regional institutions, despite the 
region’s remaining diversity.  
 
Policy Network Explanations 
In contrast with the above literature, which focuses on the obstacles for regionalism in 
Asia, the following literature investigates the driving forces “from below,” behind the gradual 
institutional development in the Asia-Pacific.  This group of literature explains the formation of 
APEC as a result of at least two decade-long regional network activities of non-governmental 
organizations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), the Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference (PAFTAD), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC, 
formerly Conference).110  The PBEC was formed by a group of business representatives in 1967.  
The PAFTAD, established by a group of economists, started a series of academic conferences in 
1968.  The PECC was established in 1980 as a tripartite organization made up from academics, 
business leaders, and government officials participating in their private capacity. 
Focusing on these groups of professional experts and business leaders and their activities, 
many scholars suggest that they laid the groundwork for the subsequent establishment of APEC 
by developing regionalist ideas and diffusing them into the policy elites.  Richard A. Higgott 
suggests that the gradual development of dense networks of personal interactions among these 
groups of individuals formed nascent regional “policy networks” over time.111  According to him, 
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 the formation of APEC represents “the culmination of longer processes of gestation in regional 
economic networking through organizations such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC.”112  Similarly, 
Stuart Harris highlights the roles that these individuals played in “advocating and participating in 
regional cooperation” and argues that the formation of APEC “was possible only after a 
substantial and lengthy process of dialogue on issues of economic cooperation in the region at a 
non-governmental level.”113
In exploring the role of policy networks in the Asia-Pacific, Higgott specifically 
addresses the impact of the ideas and knowledge that these policy networks developed on 
government policies.  He suggests that most researchers involved in the PAFTAD and PECC 
(mostly economists) largely believed in the idea of “free-market” economies prescribed by neo-
classical economics and, thus, advocated “market-led theories of integration and open 
regionalism.” 114   However, the impact that these experts have made on their national 
governments seems to have varied across countries in the Asia-Pacific.115  The difference is 
partly attributed to a variation in the level of connections between experts and political elites.116  
Nonetheless, the difference in the receptivity to neoliberal economic policy prescriptions also 
stems from the different levels of economic development in those countries. 
                                                                                                                                                             
communication) that structure interaction (the exchange of relevant policy resources such as information, expertise, 
and trust) between them.”  In contrast, the concept of a policy community refers to “a more formalized relationship, 
characterized by the identification of an emerging set of institutionalized relations between non-governmental and 
governmental members of a policy network to facilitate policymaking and policy implementation.”  Higgott, "Ideas, 
Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific," 373.  Defined as such, Higgott observed in 1994 that several 
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communities.  He also considered the applicability of the concept of “epistemic communities” and concluded that 
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View," 66-97. 
112 Higgott, "Ideas, Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific," 367. 
113 Emphasis added.  Harris, "Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific 
Region," 392, 381. 
114 Higgott, "Ideas, Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific," 370. 
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Economic Cooperation and Australia: Some Questions about the Role of Knowledge and Learning," Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 (1992): 182-197. 
116 Miles Kahler suggests that “in some countries in the region, experts are closely linked to governments, but are 
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 However, not only is there a lack of sufficient empirical research on the variation in the 
impact of ideas and policy networks on national governments across countries, the major 
weakness of these approaches that focus on the role of policy networks and their ideas is that 
they cannot explain the timing of the formation of APEC.117  The idea that Asia-Pacific countries 
should develop some sort of institutional arrangement can be traced back to the mid-1960s.  
However, it was not until the late 1980s when the idea found its way into governmental policy in 
the form of APEC.  As Higgott points out, “the presence of a big idea is not of itself a sufficient 
motor for progress.  Ideas need articulate intellectual-cum-policy elites to carry them forward 
onto the political agenda.”118  Therefore, it is imperative to investigate “the manner in which 
ideas find their way into public policy” 119 as well as under what conditions non-governmental 
policy networks can influence the policies of government.  I return to this question in the next 
chapter. 
As illustrated in subsequent chapters, I believe that these policy networks played a 
significant role in both developing and spreading Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas.  However, the 
question of timing requires investigating other factors, including the extraregional variable as a 
major source of the governmental demand for such ideas and the existence and capabilities of 
political leaders who can act on those ideas.  In doing so, we need to specify further exactly what 
roles that the nascent policy networks such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC played in the 
formation of APEC.  Moreover, the absence of similar policy networks to promote East Asian 
cooperation before the emergence of the APT process shows that the existence of such policy 
networks is not a prerequisite for the initial launching of regionalist projects.  Yet, after the APT 
process started, there emerged growing embryonic policy networks that supported the activities 
of the APT framework. 120   I investigate the roles of these non-governmental actors on the 
subsequent development of the APT process in Chapter 7.  In doing so, I address the question of 
whether the existence of such non-governmental actors is necessary for explaining the evolution 
of the APT process. 
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 The literature reviewed above is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list of all of the 
important works on this subject.  In particular, even though they are not included in the above 
discussion because they are difficult to be grouped in one category, the following two books 
deserve special attention.  First, John Ravenhill’s APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim 
Regionalism provides the most theoretically sophisticated and comprehensive analysis of 
APEC. 121   He utilizes the major international relations theories to analyze the formation, 
evolution, effects, and prospect of APEC.  He explicitly adopts an “eclectic approach” to 
regionalism.122  While the strength of his work stems from the application of various insights 
taken from the major international relations theories, its weakness is the lack of an overarching 
framework.  Joseph A. Camilleri’s Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order provides the most 
comprehensive historical overview of the evolution of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region, 
ranging from ASEAN, APEC, the ARF, and the APT. 123   He calls for an evolutionary or 
historical perspective that examines the “unique conjuncture of influences – endogenous and 
exogenous, ideational and material, integrative and disintegrative – which significantly alters the 
dynamic of challenge and response as experienced by regional formations and their constituent 
members.”124  In this way, he suggests that the historical approach allows us to identify different 
historical phases.  Unfortunately, neither of these works provides a parsimonious explanation for 
the construction of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific. 
The preceding overview of the existing literature reveals the complexity of regional 
institution-building.  Scholars have highlighted various factors that prevented the emergence of 
regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia (including the American hegemon’s 
preference for bilateralism, ASEAN norms against broader regionalism, and the countries’ 
extreme diversity) and different drivers for the regionalization and institutional development in 
the region (Japan’s role in the East Asian regionalization process, ASEAN’s role in providing its 
model of institutional design, and the bottom-up forces of transnational policy networks).  The 
review of the existing literature leads to two conclusions.  First, there is a need to combine 
                                                 
121 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. 
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 insights from both theories of institution-building and less theoretically-oriented literature on 
Asian regionalism.  Second, the theory of regionalism requires analysis of the cross-national 
studies of preferences among relevant governments over time and of the primary movers for 
regional institution-building.  The analytical framework proposed in the next chapter is by no 
means a parsimonious one; however, it does highlight the two dimensions of regional institution-
building. 
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 3.0  THEORIZING ASIAN REGIONALISM 
To explain institutional origins, creation, and evolution, I propose an institutionalist framework 
that builds on a historical institutionalist approach to institutions.  Historical institutionalism 
suggests that institutions emerge or experience a radical change only at certain historical “critical 
junctures.”1  However, once institutions are created (or go through a major reform), they set 
“historical trajectories” that are largely “path dependent.” 2   Path-dependent processes are 
characterized by “incremental and gradual” institutional evolution between punctuated periods of 
relatively rapid and profound changes. 
Many historical institutionalists emphasize the role of crises or external shocks in 
precipitating the critical junctures, thus inducing institutional change.3  A crisis can be defined as 
a situation of instability that requires immediate solutions.  Examples include war, economic 
depression, the collapse of the international economic system, oil shocks, financial crises, and so 
forth.  The notion of “punctuated equilibrium,” taken from evolutionary biology, provides the 
most extreme version of the model, suggesting that profound institutional change occurs only 
during periods of crisis, which are followed by long periods of stasis.4  From this perspective, 
Stephen D. Krasner argues that “institutional change is episodic and dramatic rather than 
continuous and incremental.”5
                                                 
1 For discussions on the concept of “critical junctures,” see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the 
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 However, as Douglas C. North reminds us, “the overwhelming majority of [institutional] 
change is simply incremental and gradual.”6  Therefore, Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson 
suggest that institutional change can involve both “episodic” and “incremental” changes.7  In 
analyzing the institutional formation and evolution of two regional institutions, I take this relaxed 
view and explore not only episodic changes like the creation of a new institution at historical 
critical junctures, but also both incremental developments between the periods of dramatic 
change.8  I also concur with Cortell and Peterson in that not only a crisis but also a non-crisis 
situation (such as changes of governments and relatively gradual shifts in the balance of power) 
can also induce institutional creation or change “if it discredits existing institutions or raises 
concerns about the adequacy of current policy-making processes.”9  In this view, institutional 
creation or change can be triggered by actors’ perception of problems as a result of either crises 
or relatively slowly-developing events.  The important point is that these challenges prompt the 
actors to recognize the insufficiency of the existing institutional arrangements to deal with the 
problems that they have encountered.  I refer to these challenges – both crisis and non-crisis 
events – that are likely to induce institutional creation or change as “triggers” in general.10
However, triggers (crises or perceived problems in general) do not automatically induce 
institutional creation or change for the following two reasons. 11   First, although crises, by 
definition, create the urgent need for solutions to deal with the challenges posed by the crises, 
there may be strong resistance to the creation of a new institution among some actors.  Also, 
there may be differences among actors in their perceptions of the urgency of the problems.  
Furthermore, even if governments recognize problems in the existing institutional arrangements, 
there may be variation in terms of actors’ preferred policy responses.  Second, recognition of 
problems does not induce institutional creation if there is no leadership (or if there is a conflict of 
leadership) to translate the demand for forming an institution into its supply or if concrete ideas 
that offer institutional solutions to the problems at hand do not exist.  Therefore, I suggest that all 
                                                 
6 Douglass C. North, "Five Propositions about Institutional Change," in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining 
Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 19-20. 
7 Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson, "Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change," British 
Journal of Political Science 29 (1999): 177-203. 
8 Institutional creation can be considered a form of institutional change. 
9 Cortell and Peterson, "Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change," 185. 
10 Ibid.: 177-203. 
11 As John L. Campbell postulates, problems (or crises) are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for institutional 
change.  See John L. Campbell, Institutional Change and Globalization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 175. 
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 three conditions – triggers, demand for a regional institution and supply of leadership and 
regionalist ideas – must be present for a regional institution to be created.12  In this study, I refer 
to this “period of significant change” (when demand- and supply- conditions converge) as a 
critical juncture.13
As empirical studies of the creation of regional institutions in subsequent chapters reveal, 
there is often a mismatch between demand- and supply- conditions.  For example, the demand 
for institutional creation may exist long before the supply of leadership and ideas that translate 
the demand into supply.  Similarly, the supply of regionalist ideas may fail to generate the 
governmental demand for such ideas.  Accordingly, it is necessary to examine how demand- and 
supply- conditions interact with one another and how they converge only at certain historical 
moments.  My argument at the abstract level, then, is that it is the confluence of demand and 
supply factors at the historical critical junctures, precipitated by certain triggers, that makes 
institution-building get off the ground. 
A historical institutionalist approach, which underscores the importance of timing and 
sequence, highlights conjunctures – “interaction effects between distinct causal sequences that 
become joined at particular points in time.”14  In order to reveal and specify such conjunctures, it 
is necessary to examine not only the immediate causes triggering institutional creation, but also 
long-term historical processes that unfold over extended periods of time.15  As Paul Pierson 
reminds us, some causal processes and outcomes occur slowly, because they may be 
“incremental,” “cumulative,” have “threshold effects,”16 or involve long-term “causal chains” 
over extended periods of time.17
                                                 
12 My thinking of these three factors was mostly inspired by the following work, in which Andrew P. Cortell and 
Susan Peterson argue that the presence of triggers, change-oriented preferences, and institutional capacity are all 
necessary conditions for institutional change in a democratic state.  See Cortell and Peterson, "Altered States: 
Explaining Domestic Institutional Change," 177-203. 
13 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics 
in Latin America, 29. 
14 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in Ira 
Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: Norton, 2002), 702. 
15 Pierson emphasizes the importance of analyzing slow-moving long-term causal processes, because they are often 
ignored in the contemporary social sciences due to an obsession with immediate causes.  See Pierson, Politics in 
Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, 79-102. 
16 The concept of threshold refers to the fact that “many social processes may have little significance until they attain 
a critical mass, which may then trigger major change.”  Pierson and Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in 
Contemporary Political Science," 703. 
17 Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, 79-102. 
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 Thus far, I have presented an institutionalist framework for analyzing institutional 
creation and development in general.  However, to explain the emergence of regionalism in the 
Asia-Pacific and East Asia, we need a theory of regional institution-building.  Regionalism, as 
defined in Chapter 1, essentially refers to the formation of institutions aimed at promoting 
intergovernmental cooperation in a geographically defined area.  Therefore, a theory of 
regionalism requires addressing the issue of “why an institution is created on a regional basis.”  
Building on the brief discussion of the literature on historical institutionalism above and 
incorporating some insights from international relations theories discussed in the previous 
chapter, the ensuing section presents an institutionalist framework for analyzing the creation of 
regional institutions.  The analytical framework consists of three parts: 1) triggers; 2) the 
configuration of state preferences for or against regionalism (demand-side); and 3) the provision 
of entrepreneurial leadership and regionalist ideas (supply-side). 
The conceptual overview of the argument is summarized in Figure 3-1.  As indicated in 
the figure, crises or perceived problems not only generate an urgent demand for creation of a 
regional institution, but also provide windows of opportunity for non-major powers, in this case 
Australia and ASEAN members as a group, to provide entrepreneurial leadership. More 
specifically, I argue that governmental demand for creating a regional institution was driven by 
the inadequacy of the existing policy apparatus to deal with extraregional challenges, stemming 
from problems primarily associated with the global arrangement.  On the supply side, I highlight 
the roles that smaller powers played in initiating a regional forum by bringing the previously 
reluctant governments on board.  It will also be illustrated that transnational policy networks 
provided important ideational input in shaping institutional design. 
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Figure 3-1: Overview of the Argument 
3.1 TRIGGERS 
As John G. Ikenberry argues, while state officials are constantly engaged in dealing with 
challenges that the state faces through existing channels and institutions, some challenges “call 
into question existing rules of the game and the repertories of state action.”18  Those challenges, 
therefore, often induce institutional creation or change by undermining the legitimacy of existing 
arrangements and highlighting the potential benefits of alternative institutional mechanisms.19  
At the same time, they open potential windows of opportunity for state officials or societal actors 
                                                 
18 Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," 234. 
19 Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson, "Agents, Structures, and Domestic Institutional Change," in Andrew P. 
Cortell and Susan Peterson, eds., Altered States: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Institutional 
Change (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 8. 
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 to take on new policy ideas, including the creation of new institutions.20  Put succinctly, triggers 
– either crises or perceived problems – not only generate the urgent need for new policy 
mechanisms to deal with the problems at hand (demand-inducing functions), but also provide 
political opportunities (supply-inducing functions). 
In line with the above discussion, some scholars of European integration emphasize the 
role of crises or perceived problems in inducing institutional innovation.21  They suggest that 
perceived problems or policy failures provide political opportunities for “policy entrepreneurs” 
or “skilled social actors” to introduce new policy mechanisms.  Although the importance of 
crises as a source of policy changes are also recognized by some scholars of Asian regionalism,22 
the conceptual applications of the impact of crises to institution-building in Asia and the Pacific 
have been rare.  A recent exception is work by Kent Calder and Min Ye, which brought the 
concept of critical junctures and the roles of crises to the center of analysis for explaining what 
they call the “organizational gap” in Northeast Asia.23  According to them, a critical juncture has 
at least three defining features.  First, a crisis usually “calls the legitimacy of current 
arrangements into serious question.”  Second, a crisis induces “stimulus for change” by 
generating an urgent “need for collective action to address a common problem.”  Third, there is 
intense time pressure for action.24  Specifically, they apply the critical juncture framework to 
                                                 
20 Cortell and Peterson, "Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change," 183; Cortell and Peterson, 
"Agents, Structures, and Domestic Institutional Change," 8. 
21 See, for example, Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein, and Wayne Sandholtz, "The Institutionalization of European 
Space," in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, eds., The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 18-19; Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European 
Bargain," World Politics  (1989): 95-128; Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National 
Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," International Organization 45, no. 1 (1991): 53; 
Neil Fligstein and Iona Mara-Drita, "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market 
in the European Union," American Journal of Sociology 102, no. 1 (1996): 1-33. 
22 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 65-72.  Vinod K. Aggarwal also highlights the 
importance of “an initial impetus” that “significantly alters the preexisting bargaining context.”  See Vinod K. 
Aggarwal, "Analyzing Institutional Transformation in the Asia-Pacific," in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Charles E. 
Morrison, eds., Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1998), 34. 
23 Kent E. Calder and Min Ye, "Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the "Organizational Gap" in 
Northeast Asia," Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (2004): 191-226.  In their article, the authors distinguish the 
“critical juncture framework” from historical institutionalism (which focuses on path dependence).  However, I 
incorporate both approaches under the same label, historical institutionalism, because many historical 
institutionalists postulate that institutional change involves both episodic changes at the critical junctures and 
incremental, path-dependent developments between the critical junctures.  See, for example, Cortell and Peterson, 
"Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change," 177-203. 
24 Calder and Ye, "Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the "Organizational Gap" in Northeast Asia," 
198-199. 
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 explain the formation of the San Francisco System after the Korean War and the establishment of 
the Chiang Mai Initiative after the Asian financial crisis.  Another recent example of the 
application of a similar concept to regional institution-building in Asia is Julie Shannon’s work, 
which utilizes the John W. Kingdon’s concept of “windows of opportunity” to explore “how 
environmental conditions have operated either alone or in combination to bring about thresholds 
for change within regional organizations” in the Asia-Pacific.25
Building on these works, this part of the analysis underscores two functions of triggers: 
1) triggers induce governmental recognition of problems that require new collective 
mechanisms; and 2) they provide political opportunities for new policies.  However, as already 
indicated, the recognition of shared problems and the opening of political opportunities by 
themselves are not enough in and of themselves for countries to undertake a collective 
regionalist project.  It requires the demand for a regionalist response (rather than a bilateral or 
global response) and the existence of political leaders who can propose and coordinate a 
regionalist initiative.  The next two parts of the analytical framework, therefore, focus on, first, 
analyzing the variation of policy preferences among key governments and, second, exploring 
who provides leadership in initiating and mobilizing support for a regionalist approach and 
where regionalist ideas come from. 
3.2 WHY ARE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS CREATED? 
The central question to be addressed in this stage of the analysis is why some governments desire 
to form or join regional institutions.  Also, it is equally important to examine why some 
governments resist the creation of a regional institution.  When some governments desire the 
creation of a regional institution, it is said that there is demand for regional institutions (which is 
here referred to as “positive demand”).  Conversely, when governments are opposed to the 
establishment of a regional institution, there is “negative demand.”  In short, this stage of the 
                                                 
25 Julie Shannon, "The Conditions of Change," in Michael Wesley, ed., The Regional Organizations of the Asia-
Pacific: Exploring Institutional Change (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 148, 148-176.  Kingdon employs the 
concept to refer to the opening of political opportunities for advocates of political change (what he terms “policy 
entrepreneurs”) to promote their particular policy ideas and proposals.  See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, 
and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1984). 
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 analysis examines the variation of state preferences for or against the creation of regional 
institutions among key potential members over time. 
The variation of state policy preferences may stem from a combination of political, 
economic, and social factors.  However, what factors directly trigger governmental demand for a 
regionalist approach?  While states have a range of policy options, including unilateral, bilateral, 
and multilateral approaches, what causes some states to prefer a regionalist approach?  When do 
governments find an interest in regionalism? 
Many scholars of regionalism recognize that motivations behind regionalist moves are 
multifaceted.26  While such multiple motives are often intertwined, the three major motivations 
are highlighted by the three major international relations theories discussed in the previous 
chapter: neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.  The ensuing section reviews each 
perspective in turn.  After the brief discussion, I propose my working hypothesis with regard to 
the demand-side account of institution-building.  As discussed below and demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters, my central argument is that although many governments in the Asia-Pacific 
and East Asia were reluctant to commit to or even hostile to the idea of creating a regional 
institution, the governmental recognition of the inadequacy of the existing policy apparatus to 
deal with extraregional challenges altered the configuration of state preferences in favor of 
regionalist projects. 
3.2.1 Regionalism as a Power-Enhancing Instrument 
Both classical realists and neorealists emphasize the logic of power competition in forming 
regional arrangements.  From the realist perspectives, states create or join regional groupings in 
an attempt to increase their power vis-à-vis others.  In particular, neorealists explain the 
formation of economic regional arrangements in much the same way that they explain the 
formation of military alliances.27  For them, the formation of regional groupings can be generally 
                                                 
26 Many authors emphasize multiple motives for advancing regionalism.  See, for example, John Ravenhill, 
"Regionalism," in John Ravenhill, ed., Global Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 120-126; 
Andrew Hurrell, "The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory," in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne, and 
Luk van Langenhove, eds., Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 40-41.  
See also Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," 35-65. 
27 Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," 47.  For the seminal work of structural realism or neorealism, 
see Waltz, Theory of International Politics.  In his revised formulation of structural realism, Stephen M. Walt argues 
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 viewed as an attempt to form a regional coalition to respond to external challenges.  By 
highlighting the strategic implications of regionalism, neorealism emphasizes the “balancing” 
function of regional groupings in the broader configuration of power relations.  From this 
perspective, the formation of APEC, for example, can be viewed as a response by Western 
Pacific countries to the growth of regionalism in Europe and North America.  Some governments 
may use regionalism as a source of bargaining leverage over an external actor through a coalition 
of two regional groups against the third.  This was exemplified by the American use of APEC as 
an instrument of extraregional foreign policy to extract European concessions at the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT negotiations.28
As noted in Chapter 2, regionalism can be a particularly appealing option for weaker 
powers.  They may seek regionalist approaches to enhance their collective power over great 
powers.  Weak powers may construct a regional coalition among themselves by excluding great 
powers.  Alternatively, weak states can seek to engage great powers in a multilateral setting 
whereby they can increase their collective bargaining power vis-à-vis great powers and dilute the 
influence of the latter.  In short, realists view regionalism as a power-enhancing instrument that 
states employ to enhance their collective capabilities vis-à-vis others. 
3.2.2 Regionalism as a Response to Economic Regionalization 
In contrast with realists, who emphasize relative power considerations, liberals focus on the 
expected joint benefits from the creation of regional institutions.  They stress the efficiency-
enhancing role of institutions in fostering policy coordination and thus promoting regional 
economic development.  From this perspective, states seek regionalism to enhance economic 
gains through economies of scale by expanding the market for export industries.  In doing so, 
regionalism provides a political vehicle for enhancing market activities and sustaining economic 
development through elimination of trade barriers and harmonization of standards.  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                             
that states form alliances to balance against threat rather than power.  See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
28 Jürgen Rüland, "APEC, ASEAN, and EAEC - A Tale of Two Cultures of Cooperation," in Jürgen Rüland, Eva 
Manske, and Werner Draguhn, eds., Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): The First Decade (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 43-44; Higgott, "Economic Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific: A Theoretical Comparison 
with the European Union," 375; Richard A. Higgott, "ASEM and the Evolving Global Order," Global Economic 
Review 29, no. 1 (2000): 30. 
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 governments often find regionalism a more attractive option than global multilateralism because 
the former can be more flexible in allowing for protection of non-competitive domestic sectors 
that would not survive in global competition.29
Liberals generally argue that a rise of economic interdependence creates a functional 
need for governments to work closely in order to reduce transaction costs generated by lack of 
coordination among them.  From the liberal perspective, there is a straightforward relationship 
between regionalization and regionalism if they are carefully defined in a distinct way as 
introduced in Chapter 1.  Liberal theories of institution-building, (neo)functionalism and neo-
liberal institutionalism alike, suggest that regionalization prompts governments to seek 
regionalism.   De facto economic cooperation generates demand for the creation of de jure 
political framework for intergovernmental cooperation. 
This line of reasoning has often been applied to provide an economic rationale for the 
formation of APEC.  Two prominent economists who have promoted the idea of Pacific 
cooperation prior to the inception of APEC, Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut, saw APEC as a 
logical response to increasing economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region.  According 
to them, economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific promotes “market integration” rather than the 
“institutional integration” or “discriminatory integration” that characterizes institutional 
arrangements in Europe and North America.   They argued that Asia-Pacific economies have 
benefited significantly from trade liberalization, therefore enabling the trade expansion game in 
the Asia-Pacific to be called “prisoner’s delight” rather than “prisoner’s dilemma.”30  From this 
perspective, intergovernmental coordination aims at enhancing the process of market integration 
by providing public goods that support a favorable environment for the international market and 
by removing barriers and resistances in trade.31
                                                 
29 Ravenhill, "Regionalism," 124. 
30 Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut, "The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of Economic Integration," in 
C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland, eds., Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System (Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 187-188. 
31 Ibid., 220-221. 
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 3.2.3 Cognitive Regionalism 
Instead of conceiving a regionalist project as a rational pursuit of material incentives such as 
political power or economic interests, constructivists view regionalism as a result of regional 
awareness and regional identity based on “the shared sense of belonging to a particular 
community.”32  For some constructivists, the existence of collective identity is an important 
component of regionalist projects.  They suggest that “like-minded” countries, which share 
similar political norms and values, are likely to develop “collective identity,” and thus are likely 
to create a regional community.33
Others do not view the existence of regional identity based on shared norms and 
collective identity as necessary for the formation of regionalism.  Instead, identification of some 
outsiders as “the other” often provides enough reasons for states to come together and form a 
regional grouping.34  This parallels, to some extent, the political realist logic of regionalism, 
which emphasizes the balancing function of regional groupings against others.  However, it is 
significantly different from the realist perspective in that constructivists do not conceive the 
formation of regionalism simply as a means to increase collective bargaining power vis-à-vis 
others.  Instead, they view the formation of regionalism as a quest for regional identity.  Amitav 
Acharya points out that “ASEAN regionalism began without a discernible and pre-existing sense 
of collective identity among the founding members, notwithstanding some important cultural 
similarities among them.”35   Rather, the development of ASEAN itself can be viewed as a 
continuing process of regional identity-building. 
Regional consciousness may emerge as a result of common experiences.  In particular, 
shared experiences with extraregional actors can contribute to the demarcation of the boundaries 
between “us” and “them.”  For example, as will be discussed in the analysis of the formation of 
ASEAN+3 in Chapter 6, the Asian financial crisis and the crisis-afflicted Asian countries’ shared 
                                                 
32 Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," 64. 
33 Some constructivists focus on liberal democratic norms as a factor which encourages a positive identification 
among those countries which share the norms.  See Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, 
Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," Security Studies 8, no. 2/3 (1998/99): 94-144. 
34 Iver B. Newmann, for example, examines how the self/other nexus is operative in collective identity formation in 
world politics by focusing on how the concept of “the East” was conducive for creating a European collective 
identity.  See  Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
35 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 28. 
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 harsh experience with external actors during the crisis, including the United States and the West-
dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF), contributed to creating an at least limited sense 
of shared identity among East Asian states vis-à-vis Western powers.  In this view, a sense of 
shared identity among regional states or a collective search for a regional identity vis-à-vis 
outsiders provide ideational foundations for defining the boundary of a region and forming an 
institutional framework for that region. 
3.2.4 Defensive Regionalism 
Motives behind regionalism derive from a complex combination of political, economic, and 
ideational reasons.  However, in line with the problem-induced approach to institutional creation 
discussed at the outset, I suggest that governmental demand for regionalism is generated by a 
sense of inadequacy in the existing policy channels to deal with extraregional challenges.  More 
specifically, the urgent government interest in a regional arrangement in the Asia-Pacific and 
East Asia has been primarily triggered by defensive motives: Governments have employed a 
regionalist approach in order to defend domestic interests that are threatened by extraregional 
developments, including the challenge from the unilateral actions of the hegemonic power, the 
development of discriminatory regionalist projects in other parts of the world, the volatility of 
the unregulated financial capital, and so forth.36
The importance of defensive motives over the expected benefits is highlighted by 
prospect theory, which suggests that actors tend to value avoiding the loss of their properties 
more highly than the expected losses. 37   From this perspective, it can be expected that 
governments’ interest in regionalism was driven by their desire to use a regional forum as a 
mechanism to avoid expected losses rather than by a clear sense of potential benefits.  But why 
choose regionalism?  It is argued that states often turn to regionalism when they perceive the 
insufficiency of global institutional frameworks to protect their domestic interests.  Governments 
                                                 
36 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 15, 79; Nesadurai, Globalisation, Domestic 
Politics and Regionalism: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 16; Naoko Munakata, Transforming East Asia: The 
Evolution of Regional Economic Integration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 27-29. 
37 For an example of the application of prospect theory for international relations, see Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, 
Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict," International Political 
Science Review 17 (1996): 179-196. 
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 view a regional mechanism as a way to either supplement the global mechanism or to guard 
against the possible negative impacts of global processes.38  Put differently, regionalism can be 
viewed as a regional collective response to a predicament in the global mechanisms. 
Specifically, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the formation of APEC was triggered by the 
U.S. move to appeal to unilateral means, the development of inward-looking regionalism in 
Europe and North America, and the resultant uncertainty about the prospect of the liberal trading 
regime.  The emergence of global-scale problems outweighed the concerns of the governments 
which had previously resisted the broader regional arrangement.  For many participants, APEC 
was seen as an insurance mechanism to ensure market access across the Pacific while 
constraining the U.S. unilateral tendency.  As discussed in Chapter 6, the Asian financial crisis 
prompted East Asian policy elites to cooperate on an East Asian regional basis rather than 
within the existing broader institutional frameworks at either the global or Asia-Pacific levels. 
3.3 HOW ARE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS CREATED? 
While the previous section addressed demand-side conditions of institution-building by asking 
the question of why a regional institution is created, this part of the analysis deals with supply-
side conditions by asking how questions.  The question of “how” requires investigating the actual 
political process of construction, examining who provides leadership in initiating and organizing 
the efforts to establish a regional institution and who provides ideas that shape institutional 
design.  It also requires examination of under what conditions the supply of leadership becomes 
possible. 
As implied earlier, I reject the view implicit in most demand-side theories of institution-
building that assumes that as the demand for the creation of institutions increases, it will be 
automatically translated into the supply of an institution.  Even if there is strong demand for the 
creation of a regional institution, no institution will be created if no one takes initiatives and 
                                                 
38 Defraigne et al., Report on East Asian Integration: Opportunities and Obstacles for Enhanced Economic 
Cooperation, 99; Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security, and Economic 
Development (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5. 
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 assumes the “costs of organizing.”39  As Wayne Sandholtz points out, “without leadership, the 
demand for cooperation will remain latent.”40  Specifically, I highlight the way in which non-
great powers provide entrepreneurial leadership in forming a regional institution.  I also explore 
the role that policy networks can play in providing innovative policy ideas and information.  The 
ensuing section first outlines the different types of leadership that states can exercise, second 
discusses the concept of “policy networks,” and lastly considers the existence of structural 
constraints which limit the successful exercise of entrepreneurial leadership by non-great powers. 
3.3.1 Leadership 
Traditionally, supply-side theories of institution-building have focused on the presence of a 
hegemon.41  Drawing on insights from hegemonic stability theory, some scholars maintain that 
the existence of a single regional hegemon is a necessary condition for constructing a regional 
multilateral institution.  Others suggest that institution-building may be led by what Thomas 
Schelling calls a k-group, that is a minimum subset (k) of the entire group (n) that can benefit 
from the provision of public goods even if other members (n-k) free ride.42  Still others highlight 
the importance of the regional “core” composed of a few powerful countries, which can provide 
“joint leadership.”  For example, the importance of the Franco-German axis as a motor of 
European integration is well recognized in the literature on European literature.43  Whether led 
by a single hegemon or a small number of core countries, this type of institution-building is 
based on what Oran Young calls “structural leadership,” which is predicated upon the possession 
of material resources that can be translated into bargaining power.44
                                                 
39 Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation, 20-21. 
40 Ibid., 303. 
41 Aggarwal, "Building International Institutions in Asia-Pacific," 1031. 
42 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978).  See also Duncan Snidal, 
"The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39, no. 4 (1985): 579-614.  For an 
application of this line of thinking to institution-building in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia, see David P. Rapkin, 
"Leadership and Cooperative Institutions in the Asia-Pacific," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific 
Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
43 See, for example, Douglas Webber, The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union (London: Routledge, 
1999); Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, The Franco-German Axis in European Integration (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2001). 
44 Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International 
Society," 281-308. 
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 However, this concept of structural leadership is not only very limited analytically, but 
also fails to capture the way that regional institution-building unfolded in the Asia-Pacific and 
East Asia.  To explain the construction of regional institutions led by weaker powers such as 
Australia (in the case of APEC) and the ASEAN members as a group (in the case of APT), this 
dissertation draws on the literature which deals with the non-structural types of leadership.  
Young identifies two non-structural forms of leadership: entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership.  These notions of leadership do not rely on material power assets as a source of 
influence.  Instead, “entrepreneurial leadership” derives from “negotiating skill to frame issues in 
ways that foster integrative bargaining,” while “intellectual leadership” is based upon 
“intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the perspective of those who 
participate in institutional bargaining.”45  Akin to Young’s concept of entrepreneurial leadership, 
Ikenberry proposes the concept of “situational leadership,” which is based on “the ability to see 
specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power 
capacities of the state.”46
This pluralistic view of leadership allows us to explore the possibility that weaker powers 
can take non-structural forms of leadership in forming regional institutions.  Andrew F. Cooper, 
Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal suggest that “middle powers” are often engaged in 
a very distinct type of diplomacy characterized by the exercise of entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership.47  According to them, the concept of middle powers can be best defined in terms of 
the form of their diplomatic activities: “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to 
international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, 
and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their 
diplomacy.”48  Similarly, the literature on middle powers generally highlights several diplomatic 
features common to middle powers, including their attempts to maximize their diplomatic 
capability by concentrating resources based on their priority of goals, their creativity to generate 
innovative ideas, their tendency to construct coalitions of “like-minded” states, and the 
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 likelihood of gaining credibility in their initiatives. 49   The concept of middle power is 
particularly useful for analyzing Australia’s initiative in proposing the APEC. 
More generally, I take insights from a body of literature on the role and influence of non-
great powers in international relations.50  This body of literature challenges the neorealist view 
that powerful states shape international relations by imposing their interests and will on others.  
The extreme form of realism rests on the earlier premise, suggested by Thucydides, that “the 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what the have to accept.”51  
Contrary to this traditional view, many scholars, including Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
point out that power differentials in material resources and assets do not by themselves explain 
bargaining outcomes. 52  Part of the explanation for this lies in the differences in the intensity of 
preferences – “the willingness of states to expend resources or make concessions.”53  From this 
perspective, smaller states may exercise more influence over bargaining outcomes than larger 
states when they have more intense preferences than the latter.  Building on this body of 
literature, I explore the possibility that weaker states can influence the process and form of 
regional institution-building, challenging the traditional overall power structure model’s view 
that “powerful states make the rules.”54
In line with the preceding discussion, I adopt the notion of political leadership proposed 
by Sandholtz, which departs significantly from the traditional conception of leadership that 
focuses on its role in providing public goods or underwriting the international rules.55  According 
to Sandholtz, “political leaders are actors who are willing to assume the costs of organizing.”56  
This view of leadership highlights the roles of leaders in proposing, mobilizing, shaping the 
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 agenda, building consensus, and brokering compromises.  All of these functions are the costs 
required for initiating and forming cooperative efforts.  They include investments of time, 
personnel, energy, financial commitments, and other political resources. 57   This type of 
leadership does not necessarily require the preponderance of material resources necessary for 
hegemonic leadership. 
Building on this notion of non-structural leadership, I argue that at the time of structural 
changes, non-great powers like Australia and the ASEAN members as a group exercised political 
leadership in initiating and fostering the process of regional institution-building in the Asia-
Pacific and East Asia.  In the case of APEC, the Australian government took a primary role in 
assuming “the costs of organizing” by proposing the initiative, mobilizing support from the 
previously hesitant ASEAN governments, and suggesting the agenda.  The Japanese government 
also played a supportive role in fostering to broker compromises and build consensus among the 
proposed members in its maneuver to shape the Australia-proposed Asia-Pacific regional forum 
into its own vision, which better reflected ASEAN’s concerns than the Australian proposal.  In 
the case of APT, the ASEAN members as a group initiated the process, mobilized support from 
the three Northeast Asian countries, and played a central role in preparing the agenda as a 
convener of the APT meetings.  Given the lack of a hegemonic leadership in creating a regional 
institution, the roles that these less powerful states played were pivotal in creating both regional 
arrangements. 
3.3.2 Policy Networks 
Even if in the end it may be the state which plays a central role in the actual establishment of an 
intergovernmental regional arrangement, there is no reason to deny the possibility that non-state 
actors can contribute to the construction of the regional forum.  In particular, I explore the roles 
that policy networks can play in providing policy ideas and information which influence the 
shape and direction of regional institutions. 
Policy networks can be defined as “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of 
non-hierarchical and independent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests 
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 with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests 
acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.”58  The concept of a 
policy network should be distinguished from that of a policy community, which refers to a more 
formalized and institutionalized relationship between non-governmental and governmental 
members of a policy network which is highly integrated into the policy-making process.59
Peter M. Haas proposed the concept of “epistemic community,” defined as “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area,” who share a 
set of “normative and principled beliefs,” “causal beliefs,” “notions of validity,” and “common 
policy enterprise.”60  Transnational advocacy networks refer to more broader networks of actors, 
which includes not only a group of scientists like epistemic communities but also economic 
actors, firms, and activists, who are bound together by shared ideas and values and who are more 
explicitly enthusiastic about advocating policy change.61  Whether such policy communities, 
epistemic communities, or transnational advocacy networks exist in the Asia-Pacific and East 
Asia itself is an empirical question worth investigation.  I use the broadest concept of a policy 
network to refer to these different kinds of groups. 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, in the literature of European integration, advocates 
of neofunctionalism generally emphasize the importance of the role of supranational 
entrepreneurship played by such organizations as the European Commission.  While there are 
disagreements over whether the role of supranational actors is essentially indispensable in 
determining the content and pace of European integration, there seems little doubt that 
supranational actors have sometimes provided government negotiators with new policy ideas that 
proved conducive to the development of European integration.  Although such supranational 
actors do not exist in Asia, nascent nongovernmental policy networks for promoting regional 
institution-building efforts did form, first in the Asia-Pacific and then in the East Asian context.  
This part of the analysis aims at identifying the conditions under which these policy networks 
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 can play a role in the regional intergovernmental process.  It also attempts to clarify the exact 
roles that they play in the process of regional institution-building. 
It is often suggested in the existing literature that under conditions of uncertainty, policy 
networks, either epistemic-like communities or advocacy networks, are more likely to be able to 
act as policy entrepreneurs, who bring changes in public policy by introducing innovative policy 
ideas and setting new agendas. 62   This is because these moments of uncertainty are when 
government officials are faced with unusual or unstable situations that make it difficult for them 
to make informed decisions.63  Therefore, policy entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in 
promoting their policy ideas at those critical historical moments.  However, as discussed below, 
even at these moments, decision-makers’ choice among those ideas available to them is 
constrained by the broader normative structures. 
3.3.3 Structural Constraints 
What are the conditions under which non-great powers can play an entrepreneurial leadership 
role?  When can weaker states play a significant role in determining the shape of regional 
institutions that involve great powers?  When can policy networks effectively influence public 
policy by providing innovative ideas? 
The supply of political leadership by smaller powers and the successful entry of ideas 
provided by non-governmental actors into governmental policy are not free from material and 
normative constraints.  “Negative demand,” discussed earlier, can translate into “negative 
supply” – which is roughly defined here as an effort to prevent or block any efforts to construct 
institutions.  When such negative supply derives from a country with structural power, it can act 
as what David P. Rapkin calls “blocking power,” which refers to the negative exercise of the 
same kinds of structural power necessary for positive leadership activities to block the other’s 
initiatives for collective action.64  According to Rapkin, the absence of this sort of blocking 
power is a necessary condition for a successful exercise of leadership.  This is supported by the 
fact that, on several occasions, East Asian countries’ attempts to build “Asians-only” regional 
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 groupings were effectively blocked by the U.S. government.  Therefore, as discussed in 
subsequent chapters, the attitude of the U.S. government toward a regionalist project was a 
particularly important factor for determining whether the initiative got off the ground. 
Moreover, the provision of leadership is constrained by normative structures.  For 
example, in the Asia-Pacific context, the inability of Japan to take a leadership role, despite its 
economic capabilities, is often attributed to what some call a “legitimacy deficit” because of the 
historical memory of colonialism, military aggression, and war atrocities prevalent among Asian 
countries.65  Therefore, the question of who can provide leadership not only a matter of material 
power assets, but also of normative consideration of legitimacy of the actor among potential 
members.  From this view, as Ravenhill points out, “who promotes an initiative can be a 
significant factor in whether or not it is successful.”66
Similarly, the question of which ideas are chosen to shape institutional design is not free 
from historical normative structures.  Critical junctures provide moments of “openness” as 
suggested by the punctuated equilibrium model. 67   However, even at these critical choice 
moments, which are considered to allow for more agency, “ideas do not float freely.”68  They are 
still both constrained and guided by historically evolved normative structures.69  In other words, 
what Ikenberry calls the “shadow of the past” weighs heavily on which ideas are permissible and 
which course of action is possible and appropriate.70  In summary, the choice of who can take a 
leadership role and what kind of institutions can be accepted is constrained by normative 
structures. 
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 3.4 INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION 
Having proposed an analytic framework for exploring the creation of regional institutions, this 
stage of analysis delves into the questions of institutional features and evolution.  Why do 
regional institutions take the forms that they take and why and how do they evolve? 
There are at least four contending views on institutional form and evolution: neorealism, 
functional rationalist institutionalism, constructivist/sociological institutionalism, and historical 
institutionalism.  The neorealist perspective postulates that institutional characteristics reflect the 
underlying power relations among member states.  For neorealists, institutions are designed to 
allow more powerful states to promote their interests at the expense of the less powerful states.  
Institutions change as a result of either shifts in the underlying distribution of capabilities among 
member states or changes in the interests or preferences of the most powerful states.  The second 
view, a functional rationalist approach, suggests that institutions are created for the functions that 
they perform, especially in terms of reducing transactions costs and thus enhancing efficiency.  
From this perspective, institutional features should reflect the nature of problems that they face.  
Institutions change as a result of either “upgrading” (learning effects) or institutional dysfunction 
because of a shift in external conditions or the emergence of new types of problems.71  The third 
view is based on a constructivist or sociological understanding of institutions.  In this view, 
institutions emerge out of a diffusion of norms and ideas.  Therefore, institutional features reflect 
the most prevailing shared norms among actors.  Institutional change occurs as the shared norms 
change or they are replaced by new norms.   
The last view is provided by historical institutionalism.  It maintains that institutional 
creation is a result of long-term historical processes and it often emerges at historical critical 
junctures.  Institutional choice is guided and constrained by previous decisions.  Hence, 
institutional form is adopted from historically available options.72  Once an institution is created, 
it tends to be “sticky,” even after the initial conditions that triggered its creation have 
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 disappeared. 73   Institutional development is characterized by a path-dependent evolution, 
because of the lock-in effects of “increasing returns.”  Institutional change is likely to be 
characterized by a process of layering (creating new institutions by building on the preexisting 
institutions) and conversion (remodeling of existing institutions for new purposes).74  Therefore, 
institutional features reflect the historical accumulation of practices, norms, and procedures in 
preexisting institutions.   
To explore institutional features and evolution of regional institutions more in depth, I 
analyze four key dimensions of the institutions: 1) membership; 2) organizational structure; 3) 
external orientation; and 4) issue areas.75  The issue of membership is highly contested in any 
regional institution.  Who is included and who is not?  Is membership exclusive and restrictive or 
inclusive and flexible?  Should expansion of membership be allowed?  Who favors or resists the 
enlargement?  What determines membership preferences?  Alternative perspectives on 
membership will be assessed as to whether membership reflects either members’ concerns over 
bargaining power within and/or outside the organization, the density of economic interactions 
and cross-border economic complementarities, the identities of member states, or membership in 
the preexisting institutions. 
Organizational structure refers to the way in which the constituent entities are 
connected. 76   It includes such elements as how their linkages are structured, how internal 
decisions are made, and the nature of agreement.  The relationship among the constituent entities 
can be loosely connected through conventions and customs without a tightly fixed structure or 
highly structured with a high degree of bureaucratization, centralization, and administrative 
infrastructures with a highly-tasked secretariat.  Decision-making rules may be based on 
unanimity, consensus, majority-voting, or supermajority-voting.  In terms of decision-making 
styles, informal consultations or formal negotiations may be emphasized.  The nature of 
agreements and decisions can be legalistic or non-legalistic.  Legalistic agreements can involve 
legally-binding obligations, specific rules and procedures, and the delegation of some functions 
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 of monitoring and enforcement to a third party.77  Non-legalistic agreements are informal and 
non-binding and are usually ambiguous and flexible about the rules and obligations, and 
implementation of the agreed commitments is based on voluntary actions of members, subject 
only to peer pressure.  As with membership, alternative views on the organizational structure will 
be examined according to whether it reflects either the preferences of the most powerful 
members, a rational design aimed at maximizing efficiency of the organization, regional norms 
and procedures, or the institutional forms of preexisting regional institutions. 
External orientation78 refers to the relationship between the regional institution and the 
existing external institutional arrangements, including the global regime and other regional 
institutions.  Is the newly created regional institution supportive of or obstructive to the global 
trade regime based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or its successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)?  Is it inward-looking and thus discriminatory against non-
member states?  Or is it based on the concept of “open regionalism” (which means that trade 
concessions given to members are given to non-members as well)? 
Vinod K. Aggarwal points out that there are at least four schools of thought with regard 
to institution-building in the Asia-Pacific: (1) pure GATT/WTO-ists; (2) the PECC-led 
GATT/WTO-consistent school of open regionalism; (3) skeptics of open regionalism; and (4) 
advocates of an Asian bloc. 79   How should a new institution be “nested” within broader 
preexisting institutional arrangements?80  Neorealists tend to see the formation of a new regional 
institution as a counter-balancing regional bloc (namely, the fourth group in Aggarwal’s 
category).  Liberals would support the global liberal economic order based on GATT/WTO 
(namely, Aggarwal’s first group).  Both constructivist and historical institutionalism would 
emphasize the new institution’s “nesting” within the broader normative structures (namely, 
Aggarwal’s second group). 
Regional institutions can also be distinguished by the scope of issues that they cover.  Do 
they deal with a wide range of comprehensive issues or narrowly focused specific ones?  What is 
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 the balance of emphasis among different issue areas?  What explains the shift in the priority 
among different issue areas?  Alternative views will be assessed based on whether the issue 
scope and priority reflects the preference of the most powerful members, institutional solutions 
to the problems that member states face, the widely accepted appropriateness of the issue areas, 
or the issue-scope of the preexisting institutions. 
3.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The primary purpose of the dissertation is twofold: 1) to identify the conditions that led to the 
formation of two regional arrangements, namely, APEC and the ASEAN+3; and 2) to analyze 
the institutional evolution of each institution after its inception.  To achieve the first goal, I have 
suggested an analytical framework comprising three elements: 1) triggers; 2) the configuration of 
state preferences concerning regionalism; and 3) the provision of leadership and regionalist 
ideas.  Accordingly, the central hypothesis is that three factors – triggering events or 
developments, the demand for a regionalist arrangement; and the supply of political leadership 
and regionalist ideas – must be present if any initiative for regional institution-building is to get 
off the ground.  The last two elements highlight the two dimensions of institution-building, 
namely, demand- and supply-side conditions.  With regard to the sources of these demand- and 
supply- conditions, the following auxiliary hypotheses will be explored in this study.  After 
laying out the alternative hypotheses on these two conditions, competing hypotheses with regard 
to institutional form and evolution are presented. 
 
Demand-Side Hypotheses 
With regard to the demand-side conditions for triggering regional institutional-building, 
the key question is: Why and when do governments demand the creation of a regional 
institution?  The following four hypotheses are deduced from competing theoretical perspectives 
(Neorealism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Defensive Regionalism) with regard to the motives 
and timing of constructing a regional arrangement.  The first hypothesis derives from the 
neorealist perspective which highlights the “collective power-enhancing” function of regionalism.  
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 The formation of a regional grouping may be aimed at enhancing collective bargaining power 
against either the hegemon or regional groupings outside the region. 
H1: Governments are likely to demand the creation of a regional institution when there is 
a major shift in the geopolitical balance of power (either because of the decline of the 
hegemon or the emergence of regional blocs). 
 
The key indicator for this hypothesis is a change in the distribution of capabilities.  This includes 
a change in the hegemon’s power or a shift in the configuration of regional groupings.  The 
second hypothesis is based on the liberal proposition as follows: 
H2: Governments are likely to demand creation of a regional institution as the level of 
cross-border economic interactions within a region grows. 
 
The key indicator for this hypothesis is a change in the level of economic transactions, measured 
in terms of intraregional trade and investment vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  The third 
hypothesis is deduced from the constructivist approach: 
H3: Governments are likely to demand the creation of a regional institution as a result of 
either a rise in regional awareness or internalization of regionalist ideas. 
 
If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect to observe a shift in policy elites’ policy discourses 
and speech in how they identify their countries in relations with others and in their ideas about 
how the region should be organized vis-à-vis the rest of the world before a regional institution is 
created.  The fourth hypothesis is derived from the defensive regionalism perspective discussed 
earlier: 
H4: Governments are likely to demand the creation of a regional institution when they 
perceive extraregional challenges that the existing policy apparatus cannot manage.  
 
If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect to observe governmental perceptions of the 
external challenges (either from a shift in the hegemon’s actions, a rise of protectionism, or a 
crisis in the global liberal regime) and their recognitions of the inadequacy of the existing 
institutional arrangements to cope with them.  The rationale for this hypothesis stems from the 
premise that governments undertake new policies when they perceive problems in their existing 
policies.  Without the presence of urgent problems, inaction may well be a preferred policy 
option.  By considering these alternative hypotheses, this stage of analysis aims not only to 
reveal governmental motivations behind the creation of regional institutions, but also to identify 
the timing for governmental actions. 
 75 
 Supply-Side Hypotheses 
With regard to the supply-side conditions for bringing a regional institution into being, 
the four hypotheses below will be considered.  Each hypothesis privileges different actors in 
explaining how a regional institution is created.  Two questions are at the heart of theoretical 
and empirical investigation.  The first question is concerned with the relative importance of great 
powers and non-great powers in the process of regional institution-building, while the second 
relates to the respective role between state and non-state actors. 
With regard to the first question, the neorealist perspective emphasizes the roles played 
by the most powerful states, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Regional institution-building is led by either a single regional hegemon or a core of 
powerful states through the exercise of structural leadership.  Only powerful states 
can assume the costs of organizing regional institution-building efforts and mold the 
institution in their favor. 
 
If neorealist perspectives are right, then the creation of APEC should be led by the most 
powerful member, namely, the United States.  The establishment of APT should be led by 
greater powers, such as Japan and China.  According to this perspective, smaller states are 
expected to have little influence over the process of constructing regional institutions. 
An alternative hypothesis can be deduced from the literature on non-great powers: 
H2: Regional institution-building is led by smaller powers which assume the cost of 
organizing through the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership in proposing an 
initiative and mobilizing support. 
 
This view challenges the neorealist perspective by arguing that non-great powers can be active 
players in world politics and have significant influence on the policies of greater powers through 
non-structural leadership. 
With regard to the relative importance of state and non-state actors, the neorealist 
perspective provides the following hypothesis: 
H1: Non-governmental actors have little or no influence on the process of regional 
institution-building.  States retain control over the direction and pace of regional 
institution-building. 
 
In contrast to the neorealist perspective, policy network approaches provide an alternative 
hypothesis:  
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 H2: Non-governmental policy networks play an important role in the process of regional 
institution-building, especially by providing new policy ideas that depart from the 
aggregation of state interests. 
 
To assess the alternative hypotheses outlined above, this stage of analysis requires a careful 
empirical examination of the actual process of regional institution-building. 
 
Hypotheses Regarding Institutional Form and Evolution 
With regard to institutional form and evolution, the following four competing hypotheses 
are considered.  From the neorealist perspective, the following hypothesis is deduced: 
H1: Institutional form reflects the underlying relative power differentials among member 
sates.  Institutional change is driven by shifts in the distribution of capabilities or 
changes in the preference of the most powerful members. 
 
If neorealist theories are right, we would expect that the institutional form is largely shaped by 
the preference of the most powerful members; small states are expected to have little or no 
influence on the institutional form.  In the case of APEC, the United States, as the most powerful 
member, has the most significant impact on shaping the institutional design of APEC, and 
APEC’s institutional development should be influenced by changes in U.S. capabilities or 
preferences.  In the case of APT, neorealist theorists would expect that the institutional form 
should reflect the preferences of the three Northeast Asian countries, namely, Japan, China, and 
South Korea. 
From the functional rational institutionalist perspective, the following hypothesis is 
deduced: 
H2: Institutional form is rationally designed by a functional logic for solving collective 
action problems and for enhancing efficiency.  Institutional change occurs as a result 
of a change in the nature of problems that members face. 
 
If functional rationalist arguments are right, then institutional development should be 
characterized by increasing efficiency as a result of institutional learning.  Such institutional 
“upgrading” may be triggered by changes in the nature of problems. 
From the constructivist-sociological institutionalist perspective, the following hypothesis 
is deduced: 
H3: Institutional form is shaped by regional norms and identity.  Institutional change 
occurs as norms and actors’ identities evolve. 
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If constructivist-sociological institutionalists are right, then institution form and development 
should reflect the dominant normative structures and the prevailing understanding of what 
constitutes a region. 
From the historical institutionalist perspective, the following hypothesis is deduced: 
H4: Institutional form is shaped by previous institutional choices.  Institutional change is 
characterized by creating new institutions on top of the preexisting institutional 
arrangements (“layering”) or by redirecting the existing institutions for new purposes 
(“conversion”). 
  
If historical institutionalists are right, we should expect to observe a close resemblance between 
preexisting institutions and newly created ones. 
3.6 RESEARCH METHODS 
To test the research hypotheses outlined in the previous section, this study employs the case-
study method as it allows the researcher not only to identify the conditions under which 
institution-building proceeds, but also to investigate “causal mechanisms” in a historically-
informed context.  Although a large-N statistical study may be able to generate more 
generalizable theories, this dissertation aims at providing “contingent generalizations” rather 
than at discovering a “covering law” conception of causal patterns.81   
I reject the view that regional institution-building takes only one path.  Just as the 
literature on state-building or democratization suggests many pathways to these ends, I believe 
that regional institution-building also involves “complex” causal relations and can take many 
different paths rather than one specific causal pathway.82   Therefore, my aim is to identify 
“causal configurations” of conditions, each of which can be generated through different causal 
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 pathways, but both demand- and supply- conditions need to be met at the critical juncture if a 
regional project is to be launched successfully.  In other words, those factors are necessary 
conditions which are jointly sufficient for inducing an outcome of interest – in this case, the 
creation of regional institutions.83
In each of the paired case studies discussed below, the method of “structured, focused 
comparison” will be employed, whereby the same set of questions about the conditions and 
processes are asked to provide methodological rigor.  Further, in each longitudinal “within-case” 
study, I use the method of “process-tracing,” by which one seeks “to investigate and explain the 
decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.” 84   The 
process-tracing method allows the researcher to investigate the causal mechanisms which 
produced the causal effects.  In employing these methods, the researcher collected data from 
various sources, including primary sources (policy statements, documents, and other archival 
materials), secondary literature (newspaper reports, academic articles and books), and interviews. 
 
Case Selection 
My case studies are composed of two sets of roughly paired comparisons:  1) the failure 
of the OPTAD proposals in the 1970s and early 1980s vs. the successful establishment of APEC 
in 1989; and 2) the abortive effort to create the EAEG/C in 1990 vs. the successful take-off of 
the APT process in the late 1990s.  Since selecting successful cases only (selecting on the 
dependent variable 85 ) suffers from a selection bias problem, I have intentionally chosen to 
investigate at least one failed case of an institution-building attempt.  Since there have been 
numerous proposals for institution-building in the Asia-Pacific that have failed, it is difficult to 
identify what constitutes a representative of those cases of failure.  The cases that I selected to 
investigate are chosen not only because of their prominence but also because of the fact that they 
share certain crucial characteristics with the successful cases which allow the researcher to 
                                                 
83 For concepts of “causal complexity,” “causal configurations,” and “conjunctural causation,” see Charles C. Ragin, 
The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987).  For more discussion on necessary and sufficient conditions, see Gary Goertz and Harvey 
Starr, eds., Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2002); Gary Goertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
84 Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," 
Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 35. 
85 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 129-137. 
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 examine directly the question of why one proposal succeeds while the other fails, despite these 
similarities. 
These two sets of comparisons are used to test the theoretical framework proposed here to 
identify the conditions under which institution-building succeeds.  They show the variation of 
major independent variables, i.e., the presence or absence of three conditions (demand- and 
supply- conditions and triggers).  While the examination of the two successful cases of 
institution-building itself can make a “before and after” comparison, the inclusion of the failed 
cases makes the variation of the dependent variable more explicit. 
For the successful cases, I chose to focus on the two regional institutions APEC and the 
APT rather than other prominent cases of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific – the ADB, 
ASEAN, and the ARF, for example – for five reasons.  First, as mentioned above, both cases can 
be compared with fairly similar proposals that had previously failed.  Second, while the ADB 
and ASEAN were established largely in the context of the Cold War East-West rivalry, the other 
three institutions were created mostly in the post-Cold War environment.  Third, ASEAN was 
excluded from the analysis, because it was composed of only developing countries, and there are 
arguably different motivations for creating regional institutions between those involving only 
developing countries and those which include both developed and developing countries.  Fourth, 
the ARF was excluded to limit the issue scope of the study - it mainly deals with security issues, 
while both APEC and the APT primarily focus on economic issues.  Also, the comparison 
between APEC and the APT makes an interesting case because the former focuses more on trade 
and investment issues and the latter on financial and monetary issues.  Finally, while each of the 
paired comparisons between the successful and failed cases provide a primary comparative 
study, the comparison between “Asia-Pacific” and “East Asian” regional arrangements also 
makes an interesting case because they contain “competing conceptions of economic 
regionalism,” being comprised of a different membership.86
The case selection of those regional institutions only within Asia and the Pacific is 
justified for several reasons.  If one is interested in understanding the conditions for institution-
building, why study regional institutions in Asia and the Pacific as opposed to doing cross-
regional comparisons, for example, between Europe and Asia-Pacific or between Asia and North 
                                                 
86 Richard A. Higgott and Richard Stubbs, "Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC 
in the Asia Pacific," Review of International Political Economy 2, no. 3 (1995): 516-535. 
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 America?  While I concur that a systematic comparison among regional institutions across 
different regions has its benefits in that it increases the number of cases which can thereby 
generate more generalizable hypotheses about institution-building, comparisons of cases dealing 
with approximately the same membership within the same region (which permits success vs. 
failure comparison) has its own merits.  The most obvious benefit of a “within-case” comparison 
is that it allows the researcher to control many factors, such as cultural contexts, that cannot be 
controlled in cross-regional comparative studies. 
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 4.0  CONSTRUCTING ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONALISM 
Regionalist ideas for creating an institutional mechanism for promoting Pacific economic 
cooperation have existed since the mid-1960s.  However, it was only in 1989 that the first-ever 
region-wide intergovernmental forum in the Asia-Pacific region was created in the form of Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) through Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s 
initiative.  In particular, as John Ravenhill points outs, the Hawke initiative had “a remarkable 
resemblance to those made two decades previously for an Organization for Pacific Trade and 
Development (OPTAD).”1  This raises a set of questions: Why and how did the APEC initiative 
by Hawke finally get off the ground, while similar proposals for Asia-Pacific regional schemes 
in the previous decades failed to elicit governmental support from potential members?  What 
accounts for the change of attitude among the previously reluctant governments toward Asia-
Pacific regionalist projects?  How is it explained that an initiative from a non-great power like 
Australia led to the creation of a regional multilateral arrangement? 
For some analysts, APEC follows the economic logic of regionalism as an attempt to 
capitalize on the rapid economic growth of East Asian economies and the increasing economic 
interdependence among them.2  For others, APEC represents the culmination of longer historical 
processes of the network activities of individuals, including academics, business leaders, and 
committed government officials.3  However, as argued below, although the rise of economic 
interdependence and the aspirations for Asia-Pacific regionalist schemes provided a supportive 
background for forming APEC, both factors did not cause the creation of APEC.  We need to 
analyze the specific historical and political circumstances that made the formation of APEC 
possible and the actual political process by which the long-incubating Asia-Pacific regionalist 
idea was brought into practice. 
                                                 
1 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 41. 
2 Peter Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1988); Drysdale and Garnaut, "The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of Economic 
Integration," 183-223. 
3 For example, see Higgott, "Ideas, Identity, and Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific," 367. 
 82 
 To this end, this chapter analyzes both the configuration of state preferences concerning 
Asia-Pacific regionalism among key governments (demand-side) and the exercise of political 
leadership (supply-side) in proposing a regionalist project, eliciting support from the previously 
reluctant governments, and brokering compromises.  It will be argued in this chapter that the 
urgent demand for an Asia-Pacific regionalist mechanism was triggered by several developments 
in the extraregional environment in the late 1980s, including the growth of U.S. unilateralism, 
the prospect of rising regional trading blocs, and the stalemate of the GATT negotiations.  While 
Japan and Australia both desired the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional forum, it was the 
Australian government that took the explicit initiative in proposing and convening such a forum 
in Canberra in November 1989.4
This chapter is organized into two main parts.  The first section begins by tracing the 
origins of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas in the 1960s and 1970s.  The chapter then moves to 
analyze why these early proposals for an intergovernmental institutional arrangement failed to 
get off the ground by investigating the variation of state preferences among key governments 
with regard to regionalism during the same period.  This first section ends with an exploration of 
how and why only a semi-governmental body, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC), was formed in 1980 instead.  The second part analyzes the formation of APEC by first 
exploring the shift in state preferences among the same governments in an attempt to explain 
why APEC was formed in 1989.  Finally, the chapter investigates the process by which APEC 
came into being in order to account for how it was created.  In both parts, the emphasis will be 
placed on Japan and Australia as the central drivers for promoting Asia-Pacific regionalist 
schemes and the United States and ASEAN states as veto players for such proposals. 
                                                 
4 The inaugural Canberra meeting brought together trade and foreign ministers from twelve economies in the Asia-
Pacific region: six member countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) and other six non-ASEAN members (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the 
United States). 
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 4.1 ORIGINS OF ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONALIST IDEAS 
The origins of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas can be traced back to the mid-1960s, when Japanese 
academics made several proposals for promoting Pacific economic cooperation. 5   The first 
important regionalist idea was advanced through a series of studies and research undertaken by 
Japanese economists such as Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima at the Japan Economic Research 
Center (JERC) established in December 1963.  In November 1965, Kojima of the Hitotsubashi 
University and Hiroshi Kurimoto, an official of the Japan ECAFE Association, proposed the idea 
of a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) at JERC’s first international conference in Tokyo.  The 
PAFTA proposal called for a regional trade arrangement that would consist of five developed 
economies, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.  Modeled as a 
regional free trade area like the European Economic Community (EEC), it would involve 
discrimination in tariff and trade policies against non-member countries.  Kojima’s original 
proposal was primarily motivated by his concern about the consequences of the forming a 
European closed economic bloc and the desire to counter the emergence of European 
regionalism in the form of the EEC by strengthening Pacific economic cooperation through trade 
liberalization and production specialization.6
In March and April of 1967, Kojima, at the request of Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo 
Miki, undertook a ‘study tour’ to promote his PAFTA proposal in the other four advanced 
countries.  Through this tour, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Kojima 
discussed his idea with many of the prominent figures who have since played a major role in the 
development of Pacific regionalist ideas and transnational policy networks.7  While the PAFTA 
proposal did not materialize, Kojima’s tour laid the foundation for the first Pacific Trade and 
Development (PAFTAD) conference in January 1968.8
                                                 
5  Tsutomu Kikuchi, APEC: Ajia Taiheiyo Shinchitsujo no Mosaku [APEC: In Search of a New Order in the Asia-
Pacific] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1995); Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in 
Comparative Perspective," 1-44.  See, however, Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy.  In this book, the author traces the 
origins of Pacific cooperation to the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), formed in 1925. 
6 Kiyoshi Kojima and Hiroshi Kurimoto, "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Developing Countries," 
Measures for Trade Expansion of Developing Countries (Japan Economic Research Center, 1966), 93-114. 
7 The people Kojima met include Peter Drysdale and John Crawford, both located at the Australian National 
University (ANU), Frank Holmes at the Victoria University of Wellington, Howard P. Jones of the East-West 
Center in Honolulu, Harry G. Johnson of the University of Chicago, Hugh T. Patrick of Yale University, and H. 
Edward English of Carleton University in Ottaw.  See Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy, 42. 
8 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 51. 
 84 
 In 1968, with the support of Foreign Minister Miki and the sponsorship from his ministry, 
Kiyoshi Kojima organized the first PAFTAD conference under the auspices of JERC and chaired 
by its president, Saburo Okita.  This conference brought together a group of economists from the 
five advanced countries to discuss the desirability and feasibility of the PAFTA proposal.  The 
PAFTA proposal was quickly rejected, particularly by the American participants, who argued 
that regionalism would undermine the U.S.-supported global liberal trading system.9
Faced with the lack of interest in his PAFTA proposal among governments in the other 
four Pacific developed countries, Kojima reformulated his original PAFTA proposal, recognizing 
that his proposal for a PAFTA was premature.  At the conference, he proposed that an 
Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) be established as “an intermediate 
step” to achieve a long-term goal of realizing a Pacific Free Trade Area.  The OPTAD, as a more 
modest organization, was to be modeled after the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  At the same conference, the Australian economist Peter Drysdale of the 
Australian National University (ANU), who was a student of both Kojima and Sir John Crawford, 
introduced his version of an OPTAD proposal.  Nevertheless, neither proposal generated any 
significant interest from governments in the region.10
The outcomes of the first PAFTAD conference were twofold.  First, participants 
generally agreed that a Pacific free trade area as proposed by Kojima was not feasible.11  As 
Kojima himself admits, the distribution of gains would be very unequal because of different 
levels of economic development among the five proposed members.  Moreover, his PAFTA 
proposal was criticized in that it would create a “rich men’s club” which would have adverse 
effects on developing Asian countries.  While the PAFTA proposal was originally restricted to 
the five advanced Pacific countries, it was designed to welcome developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America as associated members.  Nevertheless, the gains for these developing countries to 
join the group were expected to be insignificant.12
The second important outcome was that, while the PAFTA and OPTAD proposals did not 
gain much support from participants in the conference, they recognized the need to continue 
                                                 
9 Hugh T. Patrick, "From PAFTAD to APEC: Economists Networks and Public Policymaking," in Discussion Paper 
No. 2 (APEC Study Center, Columbia University, 1997), 10. 
10 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 52. 
11 Patrick, "From PAFTAD to APEC: Economists Networks and Public Policymaking," 10. 
12 See Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN and the Political Economy of Pacific Cooperation," Asian Survey 23, no. 12 (1983): 
1260-1261; Kikuchi, APEC: Ajia Taiheiyo, 72. 
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 discussions on broader issues of regional economic cooperation other than trade arrangements.  
Moreover, they agreed that it was imperative to invite economists from developing countries as 
participants in the subsequent conferences to incorporate the interests of developing countries in 
examining Pacific cooperation issues.13
Accordingly, the second Pacific Trade and Development conference was convened in 
1969 at the East-West Center in Hawaii.  The central theme of this second conference was 
regional developments in general and the role of developing countries in particular.  This 
conference brought together economists not only from the original five participating countries at 
the first conference, but also from the Asian developing economies.  At this conference, 
Australian representatives called for a conference the following year to consider foreign direct 
investment issues, which led to the third PAFATAD in Sydney in August 1970.  At the third 
PAFTAD conference, Canadian participants promised to hold a fourth conference in Canada to 
examine barriers to trade among the Asia Pacific economies.  Thus, efforts by committed 
individuals to ensure the completion of the series of preliminary conferences by taking 
leadership and securing funding began the PAFTAD process which continued in the following 
decades.14  Subsequently, the PAFTAD conferences were held at one and a half year intervals on 
average.15
In October 1972, at a joint ministerial conference between Australia and Japan, the two 
governments agreed to fund the establishment of the Australia, Japan, and Western Pacific 
Economic Relations Research Project to be conducted jointly by JERC and the ANU’s Research 
School of Pacific Studies.  The project was headed by Saburo Okita and Sir John Crawford, and 
research was led by Kiyoshi Kojima and Peter Drysdale.  These prominent figures in the 
PAFTAD circle kept the OPTAD proposal alive during the first half of the 1970s. 16  Their joint 
report, presented by Crawford and Okita to the governments of Australia and Japan in 1976, 
recommended that the two governments should work together to realize the establishment of an 
                                                 
13 Patrick, "From PAFTAD to APEC: Economists Networks and Public Policymaking," 10-11.  In this paper, the 
author points out that this point was strongly articulated in particular by Arthur Paul of the Asia Foundation.  See 
also Kikuchi, APEC: Ajia Taiheiyo, 73. 
14 Patrick, "From PAFTAD to APEC: Economists Networks and Public Policymaking," 11. 
15 For different themes of each conference, see Peter Drysdale, The Pacific Trade and Development Conference: A 
Brief History (Canberra, Australia: Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University, 1984), 2; 
Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy, 44. 
16 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 52. 
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 OPTAD.17  Nevertheless, the report did not elicit any prompt or substantial responses.  The 
proposal was largely neglected outside of Australia, Japan, and PAFTAD circles until the late 
1970s.18
In the business world, an initiative of Japanese and Australian business leaders led to the 
formation of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in April 1967. 19   This private 
organization brought together businessmen, bankers, and industrialists, originally from the five 
developed Pacific countries, to promote discussions regarding regional trade and investment and 
cooperation between the private and public sectors.  The PBEC grew out of the development of 
bilateral collaboration between Australian and Japanese businessmen through the Australia-
Japan Business Cooperation Committee, established in 1962.20
In summary, some regionalist ideas for Pacific cooperation emerged during the 1960s, 
mostly from Japanese academics in collaboration with Australian counterparts.  During the 
period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, Pacific regionalist ideas were “internationalized” 
through the formation of nascent transnational policy networks such as PAFTAD and PBEC, 
though they remained confined to academic and business circles. 21   There are at least two 
important developments in Pacific regionalist ideas.  First, while the original regionalist ideas 
were mostly oriented toward cooperation among advanced Pacific countries rather than 
cooperation between developed and less developed countries, there was a growing consensus by 
the late 1970s that developing countries, represented by ASEAN, should be incorporated into 
any proposed group in Asia and the Pacific.  Second, while Kojima’s original PAFTA proposal 
in 1965 envisioned an EEC-type of institutional integration, a group of academics in the 
PAFTAD circle, including Kojima himself, abandoned the original proposal and modified it into 
a more loosely structured institutional arrangement modeled on the OECD.  The PAFTAD 
                                                 
17 Sir John Crawford and Saburo Okita, Australia, Japan and Western Pacific Economic Relations: A Report to the 
Governments of Australia and Japan (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976). 
18 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 52. 
19 For the official history of the PBEC, see Esme Marris and Malcolm Overland, PBEC: The History of the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council, 1967 to 1997: Bridging the Pacific (Honolulu: Pacific Basin Economic Council, 1997). 
20 Takashi Terada, "Nagano Shigeo: Business Leadership in the Asia Pacific Region and the Formation of the 
Pacific Basin Economic Council," Australian Journal of Politics and History 47, no. 4 (2001): 475-489.  See also 
Peter Drysdale, "The Proposal for an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development Revisited," Asian Survey 23 
(1983): 1294. 
21  Hadi Soesastro, "Institutional Aspects of Pacific Economic Cooperation," in Hadi Soesastro and Sung-joo Han, 
eds., Pacific Economic Cooperation: The Next Phase (Jakarta: CSIS, 1983), 3-52; Hadi Soesastro, "Pacific 
Economic Cooperation: The History of an Idea," in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, eds., Asia Pacific Regionalism: 
Readings in International Economic Relations (Pymble, Australia: Harper Educational, 1994), 77-88. 
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 played a significant role in developing more realistic regionalist ideas, while forming a group of 
experts with similar interests.  Yet the OPTAD concept did not gain much attention at the 
governmental level until the late 1970s, as discussed below. 
4.1.1 State Preferences Concerning Regionalism 
Having briefly outlined the origins of regionalist ideas and the formation of the two non-
governmental forums in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1960s and 1970s, the following section 
examines governmental responses toward those regionalist ideas and the variation of preferences 
with regard to regional cooperation among relevant governments. 
4.1.1.1 Japan 
The Japanese government was the first to take an interest in Asia-Pacific regionalist 
schemes proposed by academics.  The first official expression of Japanese interest in the idea of 
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation was Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s announcement of his 
“Asia-Pacific Policy” in 1967.22  In his Diet speech in March, he stressed the importance of 
cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries.  In May of that year, he further detailed his Asia-
Pacific policy in the speech entitled “Asia-Pacific Diplomacy and Japan’s Economic 
Cooperation.”  In this speech delivered at the Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic 
Development), he highlighted four key points in his Asia-Pacific policy.  The first point was the 
importance of developing a shared recognition among Asia-Pacific countries that the stability 
and prosperity of the region required cooperation among them.  Second, he stressed the necessity 
of regional cooperation among Asian developing countries and Japan’s role in providing 
financial, technological, and intellectual assistance to those countries.  The third point was 
cooperation among the advanced Pacific countries.  But he did not forget to highlight the 
importance of ensuring that the policy would not create a rich man’s club or a closed bloc.  
Fourth, and most importantly, he called for a solution to the North-South problem in the Asia-
Pacific region.  He maintained that it was imperative for the “haves” of the Pacific to give 
                                                 
22 Before Miki became a foreign minister in December, 1966, he had since the late 1940s expressed his interest in 
the North-South problem in general and in reducing Asia’s poverty in particular.  See Terada, "The Origins of 
Japan's APEC Policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's Asia-Pacific Policy and Current Implications," 340. 
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 assistance to the “have-nots” of Asia.  In this context, Miki suggested that Japan play an 
important role as a “bridge” between developing Asian countries and advanced Pacific nations.23  
Although this speech signaled the first official endorsement of a Pacific organization by the 
Japanese government, Miki’s Asia-Pacific policy did not lead to major policy initiatives while he 
was Foreign Minister.  Nevertheless, as noted above, his support for Kojima’s PAFTA project 
and for the PAFTAD conference contributed to the subsequent development of Asia-Pacific 
cooperation ideas.24
In contrast to the active research at the private level, Japan’s official interest in the idea of 
Asia-Pacific cooperation remained dormant for a decade until Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira 
came into office in 1978.25  The 1970s witnessed many changes in the external environment, 
which posed serious challenges to the Japanese government.  They include the decline of the 
U.S. hegemony as demonstrated by the defeat in the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 and the increasing concerns for securing natural 
resources, the rise of North-South tensions as represented by the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) movement, the entry of China into the international scene, and the rising trade 
frictions as exemplified by U.S.-Japan negotiations over textiles.  These challenges highlighted 
some of the recurring themes of post-war Japanese policy-making, including how to manage the 
supremely important bilateral relationship with the United States, especially in the face of 
shifting U.S. power and the resultant increasing pressure on Japan, how to improve Japan’s 
relationship with other Asian countries, and how to secure natural resources necessary for its 
economic prosperity. 
Since the mid-1970s, the Japanese government’s interest in strengthening its relationship 
with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region grew with the recognition of the danger of 
                                                 
23 Ibid.: 342.  While Miki put the North-South problem at the center of his concern, his approach to the issue was 
primarily the one from the North, emphasizing the role of the provision of aid and development assistance for 
developing countries in Asia by the advanced Pacific countries, including Japan.  See also Terada, "Directional 
Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC," 200; 
Mie Oba, Ajia Taiheiyo Chiiki Keisei eno Dotei: Kyokai Kokka Nichigo no Aidentiti Mosaku to Chiiki Shugi 
[Journey to the Formation of the Asia-Pacific Region] (Kyoto: Mineruvashobo, 2004), 209-210; Kikuchi, APEC: 
Ajia Taiheiyo, 65-66. 
24 Peter Drysdale, "An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the 
Resource Trade," Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area: Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference Held in San Francisco, California, August 22-26, 1977 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco, 1978), 618. 
25 Young Jong Choi, "Institutionalizing Asia and the Pacific: Interdependence, States and Institutional Preferences: 
Japan's Policy in a Comparative Perspective" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1998), 314. 
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 excessive dependence on the United States, especially in response to two Nixon shocks in the 
early 1970s.  The newly-elected Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, in December 1976, placed a 
special emphasis on Japan’s relations with the ASEAN countries.  In reaction to the anti-
Japanese demonstrations that Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s 1974 visit to Southeast Asia 
caused in the region, Prime Minister Fukuda announced Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia in 
1977 in what is known as the Fukuda Doctrine, which stipulates that Japan will never seek to 
become a military power and that Japan will seek to establish its relationship with ASEAN as 
equal partners based on a “heart-to-heart” understanding.26
Against this backdrop, the next wave of governmental interest in Japan was driven by the 
elevation of Prime Minister Ohira in 1978.  During his campaign for the Prime Ministership, 
Ohira frequently stressed the importance of cooperation among Pacific countries.  Immediately 
after he came into office, Ohira established the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group (PBCSG) 
to seek ways to promote regional cooperation among Pacific countries.  The study group, 
composed of Japanese bureaucrats, businesspeople, and academics, was headed by Saburo Okita 
until he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in November 1979.27  The interim report and 
the Final Report were submitted in November 1979 and in May 1980, respectively.28
 The report included the most comprehensive issue areas including the promotion of 
cultural and educational exchanges, the development of transportation and communication in the 
region, a call for joint research for energy, food, and the exploitation of maritime resources, and 
the importance of developing cooperative and mutually supportive relations with the existing 
institutions in the region.29  The broad approach endorsed in this study was not unrelated to the 
concept of “comprehensive security” advanced by the Ohira government.  In the face of rising 
                                                 
26 For a detailed analysis of the Doctrine, see Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN : New Dimensions in 
Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). 
27 Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy, 90; Soesastro, "ASEAN and the Political Economy of Pacific Cooperation," 5. 
28 The final report is included in Ohira Sori no Seisakukenkyukai Hokokusho [Reports of Prime Minister Ohira’s 
Study Group] (Jiyuminshuto Kohokuiinkai Shupankyoku: Tokyo, 1981).  It is included also in United States. 
Congress. Joint Economic Committee., Pacific Region Interdependencies : A Compendium of Papers (Washington: 
U.S. G.P.O., 1981). 
29 Hoon-mok Chung, "Economic Integration in the Pacific Basin: A Historical Review," in Sung-joo Han, ed., 
Community-Building in the Pacific Region: Issues and Opportunities (Seoul, Korea: Asiatic Research Center Korea 
University, 1981), 17. 
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 resource nationalism during the 1970s, the importance of “energy/resource security” was 
increasingly felt by the Japanese, whose country was endowed with few natural resources.30   
Most importantly, the PBCSG developed the concept of “open regionalism” which 
became the fundamental principle upon which APEC was later founded.31  The report by the 
study group states that ‘[a] regionalism that is open to the world, not one that is exclusive and 
closed, is the first characteristic of our concept.”32  The Japanese governmental interest in the 
Pacific Basin Cooperation concept faded in the aftermath of the sudden death of Ohira in June 
1980.  Yet it has since become central to any conception of regionalist projects that the Japanese 
government has promoted.   
The Japanese preference for open regionalism is not surprising because Japan traded on a 
global scale.  The Japanese general support for an “Asia-Pacific” concept also makes sense for 
the combination of economic, political, and ideational reasons.  Economically, Japan had close 
trade relationships with both sides of the Pacific.  While the U.S. market proved most important 
for Japanese products, Southeast Asia became important for Japan as a source of raw materials 
and export markets (which compensated for the loss of China in the immediate post-war era).  
Politically, given the supremely important bilateral relationship with the United States, Southeast 
Asia became a natural place where Japan could seek some diplomatic autonomy vis-à-vis the 
United States through its economic diplomacy, while not deviating from U.S. core interests.  In 
terms of identity, although clearly located in Asia, Japan was alienated from the other Asian 
countries because of its war atrocities and its infamous Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Concept.  
On the other hand, when Japan was accepted to the OECD in 1964 and became the only Asian 
industrial country, the Japanese felt isolated in the West-dominated organization.  Thus, the 
Japanese government has long sought to strengthen its position both as a member of Asia and as 
a member of Pacific advanced countries at the same time.  The concept of “Asia-Pacific” to 
combine both the Asian and Pacific regions was a solution to Japan’s search for its regional 
                                                 
30 The issue of energy/resource security was the theme in the Ninth PAFTAD conference held in San Francisco in 
1978.  For a Japanese perspective, see Kiyoshi Kojima, "Japan's Resource Security and Foreign Investment in the 
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 identity.  Promoting the concept of Asia-Pacific, Japan worked to position itself as a bridge 
between Asian developing countries and Pacific advanced countries. 
4.1.1.2 Australia 
Just as Japan’s initial interest in ideas of Pacific cooperation grew in response to the 
development of European integration, Australians became increasingly concerned about the loss 
of the European market and the consequent impact on their trade and economy as a result of the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960.33  To respond to the development of European integration 
since the late 1950s, Australia began to diversify its economic relationship by discovering new 
trading partners in Asia and the Pacific, with Japan at the top of the list. 
In 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed to establish the EEC, Australia signed the 
Agreement on Commerce between Australia and Japan in order to expand its trade with Japan.  
In 1960, Australia agreed to the conditional export of iron ore, which had been prohibited since 
1938.  In 1963, Australia further removed the restriction of Australian iron ore exports, which 
provided a significant boost to the Japanese steel industry in particular and to the Japanese 
economy in general.34  As a result, Australian trade with Japan expanded dramatically during the 
1960s. 
In 1961, the U.K. formally announced its intention to apply for full membership in the 
EEC.  The establishment of European Common Agricultural Policy in 1962, and the prospect of 
the U.K. participation in the EEC, raised further concerns among the Australians for whom the 
European market was crucial for their exports of agricultural products.35  Australia’s response to 
these challenges was to intensify the development of new markets in Japan and other countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region.36   In 1967, Japan became the largest importer of Australian goods, 
replacing the United Kingdom.  Australian exports to Japan in relation to its total exports grew 
                                                 
33 The original members of the EEC were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, while 
those of the EFTA include the U.K., Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
34 Terada, "Nagano Shigeo: Business Leadership in the Asia Pacific Region and the Formation of the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council," 473. 
35 The accession of the U.K. to the EEC did not materialize at this time, when General de Gaulle rejected its 
membership in 1963.  See Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, 84. 
36 Drysdale, "An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the Resource 
Trade," 613. 
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 from 4.0% in 1949/50, to 14.4% in 1959/60 and 25.0% in 1969/70, while its exports to the U.K. 
dropped from 39.4% to 11.8% during those two decades.37
However, the Australian government was relatively indifferent to the idea of Pacific 
cooperation when some Japanese politicians expressed their interest in the idea in the early 
1960s.38  Thus, Australian interests in the idea of Pacific cooperation were primarily led by 
academic and business leaders.  Business leaders became strongly concerned about the 
development of the EEC, the prospect of the U.K. admission to the EEC, and its consequent 
removal of the Commonwealth preference system.  In 1963, Australian and Japanese business 
leaders established the Australia-Japan Business cooperation Committee (AJBCC) in Australia 
and its counterpart, the Japan-Australia Business Committee (JABCC) in Japan to promote their 
bilateral commercial relations.  In 1967, W.R.C. Anderson, Director of the Associated Chambers 
of Manufactures of Australia and Executive Director of AJBCC put forward a proposal to bring 
business leaders from the Pacific Basin countries together to discuss issues of mutual concern 
and interest, which resulted in the establishment of PBEC in 1967.39  As noted earlier, Drysdale 
at the ANU was one of the earliest advocates for an OPTAD.  His OPTAD proposal examined 
the costs and benefits of the Australian participation in PAFTA/OPTAD.  These business and 
academic leaders led the way in promoting cooperation among Pacific countries and in 
developing the idea of Asia-Pacific cooperation from the late 1960s through the 1970s. 
The period from the late 1960s and the early 1970s witnessed more challenges to 
Australia.  In 1967, the U.K. announced its plan to gradually retreat its military forces east of 
Suez.  In 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon called for self-reliance in defense matters for Asian 
states in his speech that came to be known as the Guam Doctrine.  These announcements 
increased uncertainty in regional security in the Southeast Asian region, which in turn challenged 
Australia’s foreign policy in the region.  In 1971, the U.S. announced its decision to end its 
commitment to convert U.S. dollars into gold.  The end of the gold standard and the subsequent 
Smithsonian agreements resulted in a shift in the floating exchange rates system.  This shift not 
only increased uncertainty in economic affairs, but also demonstrated the decline of U.S. 
                                                 
37 John Ravenhill, "Australia and APEC," in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Charles E. Morrison, eds., Asia-Pacific 
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 hegemony.  Furthermore, the U.K. was finally admitted to the European Community (EC) in 
1973, further reducing Australian exports to the United Kingdom. 
Against this backdrop, the Labor government of Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) hastened to 
end Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, endorsed the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) proposal, and sought to improve Australia’s relationship with ASEAN 
countries.  Further, Whitlam proposed the establishment of a broader consultative grouping in 
Asia and the Pacific region, though he failed to elaborate the proposal in any detail.40
As discussed below, the 1979 meeting between the next Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser 
and the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira paved the way for starting the PECC process the 
following year.  Nevertheless, his conservative Coalition government (1975-1983) was not that 
enthusiastic about establishing an intergovernmental forum in Asia and the Pacific that people in 
the OPTAD circle advocated.41   Instead, Fraser was more interested in being active in the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM) which was brought into 
being through his own initiative.42
4.1.1.3 United States 
The traditional U.S. position favored a global multilateral trading forum over a regional 
one.  Thus, in principle, the U.S. government generally employed a multilateral approach based 
on GATT to pursue trade and investment liberalization abroad.  At the same time, in dealing with 
smaller countries in Asia, the U.S. government preferred a bilateral approach in order to 
maximize its negotiating leverage. 43   Given the U.S. preference for globalism, the earliest 
proposal for Pacific regional economic cooperation in the form of a Pacific Free Trade Area 
                                                 
40 John Ravenhill, "Adjusting to the ASEAN Way: Thirty Years of Australia's Relations with ASEAN," The Pacific 
Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 274. 
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 (PAFTA) proposed by Kojima in 1965 “was largely ignored by the United States.” 44   
Participation in a regional preferential trading system was not consistent with the U.S. 
commitment to an open, multilateral, global trading system.  Accordingly, the proposal “never 
attracted significant support in the United States for either economic or political reasons.”45
It was not until the late 1970s that Pacific regionalist ideas were taken up in American 
public policy discourse.  A decade had passed since the original OPTAD was proposed by 
Kojima in 1968.  In April 1978, the U.S. Senator John Glenn, Chair of the Subcommittee on East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, showed an interest in the 
Pacific economic cooperation concept and requested the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
to conduct the feasibility study of a Pacific economic cooperation in April 1978.  Commissioned 
by the CRS, Drysdale and Patrick undertook the study and examined the interest and 
participation of the United States in an OPTAD.   
With the submission of the paper entitled Evaluation of a Proposed Asian-Pacific 
Regional Economic Organization in May 1979, the OPTAD idea was seriously considered in 
U.S. congressional circles for the first time.46  The paper was prepared in response to “a new 
interest in the idea of a regional economic association among Asia-Pacific nations, especially 
with the elevation of Mr. Ohira to the Prime Ministership of Japan in November 1978.”47  This 
new interest in a Pacific regional institution was partly inspired by a conference held in Shimoda, 
Japan in late 1977, which included discussions on the topic of regionalism in the context of 
problems in the U.S.-Japan economic relations. 48   Glenn, who participated in the Shimoda 
conference, followed Ohira’s frequent speeches during his election campaign in which he talked 
about his idea of Pan-Pacific Association.49
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 The revised Drysdale and Patrick’s proposal called for the creation of an 
intergovernmental organization by concluding that the OPTAD would promote the U.S. interests 
as “a useful vehicle for the effective revitalization of the United States economic leadership in 
the Asian-Pacific region.”50   However, the Jimmy Carter administration did not support the 
proposal and remained mostly skeptical about the creation of a regional institution in the Asia-
Pacific region.  This U.S. stance did not change after the newly elected President Ronald Reagan 
came into power in 1981.  Reagan was even more preoccupied with developments outside of the 
region as the renewed tension between the two camps of the Cold War intensified further.51
In summary, the U.S. government continued to reject regional approaches to Asia Pacific 
economic cooperation in favor of multilateral approaches on a global level and bilateral 
resolution of particular issues with specific countries in Asia.52  While it was significant that the 
idea of Pacific cooperation entered policy discourses in the United States in the late 1970s, the 
proposal was not endorsed by the government.  Skeptics within the government believed that 
regional approaches would undermine the U.S. global economic policy and unnecessarily 
constrain U.S. policy autonomy. 
4.1.1.4 ASEAN 
Most of the Southeast Asian countries, except Thailand which was never colonized, 
gained independence in the fifteen years after the end of World War II.  Therefore, these nations 
had a strong preference for maintaining their newly-achieved national sovereignty.  In the 
context of the Cold War, many countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, pursued 
neutrality and nonalignment policies.  When ASEAN was created in 1967, it was aimed at 
enhancing stability and security in the region by reducing tensions among the member nations 
and by keeping the communist forces outside. 
Given the strong preference for regional autonomy, the idea of Pacific cooperation was 
largely ignored in ASEAN circles until the late 1970s.  Government officials in the ASEAN 
countries took note of the Pacific cooperation idea only in 1978, when Japanese Prime Minister 
Ohira announced his Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept.  Earlier proposals were generally 
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 viewed as reflecting only the interests of the advanced Pacific countries and their desire to 
dominate the region’s economic development.53
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, government officials in ASEAN perceived an 
increased interest in the idea of Pacific cooperation among other countries in the Asia-Pacific, as 
represented by the U.S. Congressional report.  However, government officials did not take the 
idea seriously enough to consider it at the governmental level.  Instead, the Indonesian 
government, for example, suggested that at this stage it was most appropriate to study the idea at 
the non-governmental level to examine the pros and cons for ASEAN countries.  Academics in 
research institutions, such as the Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia, 
had been interested in the idea at least since 1979, when CSIS began to prepare the seminar on 
the topic of Asia-Pacific economic interdependence in the following year.  The resulting report 
of this seminar suggested the desirability of establishing a loosely-structured non-governmental 
mechanism to facilitate consultations among its members on economic issues of mutual 
interest.54  Meanwhile, Narongchai Akrasanee organized a study project in ESCAP on the topic 
of ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation.  The summary report of this project was 
presented at the second PECC meeting in Bangkok in June 1982, which was initiated by the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and organized by the Pacific Cooperation 
Committee (PCC) of Thailand. 
Yet, ASEAN governments remained “reluctant to jump on the Pacific community 
bandwagon.”55  They were concerned that a wider regional grouping would dilute the identity 
and cohesion of ASEAN itself, which was formed in 1967 but which still lacked a strong 
foundation.  Moreover, they were particularly afraid of the possibility that a new regional 
arrangement would be dominated by great powers in the region.  Another reason for the 
reservations among ASEAN countries derived from their desire to safeguard “non-alignment” 
credentials, which might be undermined by joining a regional institution closely associated with 
the United States and Japan.56  Given these concerns, the idea of Pacific cooperation was “hard 
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56 Ibid.: 1288. 
 97 
 to sell” among ASEAN countries.57  Therefore, the reactions from ASEAN countries to the idea 
of Pacific cooperation were largely negative when the idea finally gained some attention.  
Writing in 1983 at the CSIS meeting in Thailand, Jusuf Wadandi aptly summarized the concerns 
among ASEAN countries about the Pacific cooperation idea as follows: 
Many government circles in the ASEAN countries have reiterated the fact that (a) 
ASEAN itself remains their main preoccupation in view of the many tasks that still need 
to be tackled; (b) the idea of broader Pacific regional cooperation remains unclear as to 
its objectives, substance, membership, and leadership; and (c) the ASEAN governments 
themselves do not have the manpower and time to explore the idea further.58
 
Strong reservations among the ASEAN countries notwithstanding, by the late 1970s or 
early 1980s, there was a consensus among advocates of the Pacific cooperation idea that the 
participation of ASEAN was crucial.59  Therefore, in the eyes of those advocates, the resistance 
by the ASEAN countries was a major obstacle for institution-building in the Pacific.60
4.1.2 The Failure to Launch the OPTAD and the Formation of PECC 
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira’s official announcement of the idea of a Pacific Basin 
Cooperation Concept in 1978 and discussion of the OPTAD proposal within U.S. congressional 
circles in 1979 heralded “the beginning of a new era in the development of Pacific economic 
cooperation ideas.”61  In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the concept of Pacific cooperation 
was widely discussed in some governmental circles.  Despite the momentum that the idea gained 
during this period, the proposal for creating an intergovernmental organization did not get off the 
ground.  The outcome of interstate discussions on the Pacific cooperation concept during this 
period was the creation of an only semi-governmental forum in the form of PECC (Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Conference, later Council) in 1980.  What explains the failure to launch 
an intergovernmental organization?  How was the PECC established, instead? 
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 The 1979 the Drysdale/Patrick paper reformulated the previous OPTAD proposal.  While 
Kojima’s original PAFTA/OPTAD proposals were largely motivated by external events such as 
the development of European regionalism, Drysdale and Patrick focused on internal dynamics by 
highlighting the growing economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific region and the 
consequent increasing need for creating institutional mechanisms. 62   They pointed to three 
factors that “gave a major impetus to the increased importance of the Pacific within the world 
economy and the growth of economic interdependence among the Asia-Pacific economies 
themselves.”  The first was the growth of Japan’s economic power.  Japan’s development into 
the third largest economy in the world had an enormous impact on the Pacific economy.  The 
second important factor was the remarkable trade and economic growth achieved by the 
developing economies of Northeast and Southeast Asia.  This development was encouraged by 
the effect of Japan’s trade and economic growth on regional trade growth and the shift towards 
the deliberate adoption of outward-looking trade-oriented industrialization strategies replacing 
the previous protectionist strategies.  The third factor was the slowing-down of economic growth 
in Western Europe.63  However, the U.S. administration remained skeptical about the OPTAD 
proposal.  The U.S. adopted a passive position by treating ASEAN’s response to the Pacific 
cooperation idea as a determinant in shaping the U.S. response.64  Thus, the U.S. government 
took no initiative on the proposal. 
As noted earlier, Japan’s Prime Minister Ohira established the Pacific Basin Cooperation 
Study Group (PBCSG), which had its first meeting in March 1979.  In May 1979, Prime 
Ministers Ohira and Malcom Fraser of Australia had a meeting at UNCTAD V in Manila, where 
they explored a vague concept of regional cooperation.65  To further discuss the concept, Ohira 
visited Fraser in Australia in January 1980, accompanied by his new foreign minister Okita.  
This meeting between Ohira and Fraser led to the agreement between the two that they hold a 
seminar meeting to discuss the concept further.  Given ASEAN’s reservations on the Pacific 
Concept, they agreed that a non-governmental seminar was the proper first step for discussing 
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 the Concept.66  Following the Ohira-Fraser agreement, Foreign Minister Okita asked his old 
friend Sir John Crawford, who was Chancellor of the Australian National University, if he would 
be willing to host a seminar to explore the Pacific Community idea.  Crawford agreed to hold the 
seminar on the conditions that both Australian and Japanese governments defer the decision on 
the seminar’s participants, agendas, and modality to him and that they both support the 
seminar.67
Prior to the seminar, in March 1980, the Japanese government dispatched Kiyohisa 
Mikanagi, former ambassador to the Philippines, to five ASEAN countries to explain the Pacific 
Concept and elicit support from ASEAN’s support.  Although Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Thailand gave positive responses, Indonesia and Malaysia responded cautiously, reserving their 
judgment.68  In response to the skeptical attitudes of some ASEAN countries, both Australian 
and Japanese governments confirmed that it would be premature to establish an 
intergovernmental organization.  Yet, the seminar chairman, Crawford, insisted on the 
importance of governmental involvement in the seminar.69
Accordingly, the Pacific Community Seminar was held in Canberra in September 1980, 
inviting not only academics and business leaders, but also government officials in their private 
capacity.  Although it was not clear at this moment whether a similar conference would be held 
in the following years, the Canberra Seminar became known as the first PECC meeting.  The 
PECC was subsequently held in every one and a half year, retaining a unique tripartite 
composition.  Its original national member committees represented the following economies: 
Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Thailand, the United States, and the Pacific Islands.  In addition to these member 
committees, PBEC and PAFTAD also participated in PECC as institutional members, though as 
such they had no vote on the standing committee.   
Although the Canberra meeting witnessed considerable reservations among members, 
especially from ASEAN, a consensus emerged around the following principles: 
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 • the need to avoid military and security issues in order to create a sense of community 
without creating a sense of threat; 
• that an EEC-type discriminatory trading arrangement is not an appropriate form of 
economic cooperation in the Pacific; 
• the need to “hasten slowly,” and to proceed towards long-term goals step by step; 
• the need to ensure that any new wider regional mechanism is complementary with the 
existing bilateral, regional, and global arrangements and that it does not undermine them; 
• the need to ensure that it is an outward-looking arrangement; 
• the need for an “organic approach,” building upon the existing non-governmental 
arrangements in the Pacific; 
• the need to involve academics, business leaders, and government officials jointly in this 
co-operative effort; 
• the need to avoid unnecessary bureaucratization; 
• the need for a fairly loose, and as far as possible, non-institutionalized structure; 
• the need for all members to be placed on an equal footing; 
• the need to concentrate attention on areas of mutual interests.70 
 
These principles highlighted in the so-called Canberra consensus were closer to those 
recommended by the Japanese study group organized than was the OPTAD proposal in the 
PAFTAD circles.  The Canberra seminar shifted discussions over Pacific economic cooperation 
ideas from “what is desirable” to “what is feasible.”71  Therefore, the participants in the seminar 
put forward a modest, more practical approach, taking into consideration the disparity in levels 
of economic development in the region and the political sensitivities involved. 
Based on this Canberra consensus, Crawford, the chair of the seminar, sent a report to all 
governments represented at the meeting.  However, none of those governments, even the 
Japanese government, gave him any official response.72  Not surprisingly, ASEAN governments 
were most skeptical of the proposal.  For example, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadia refused to offer any official response on the grounds that the contents of the 
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 proposed Pacific cooperation were unclear.73  As Stuart Harris argues, it was ironic that the 
vagueness deliberately embraced in the outcome of the Canberra seminar, generated out of the 
concerns of the ASEAN countries in particular, increased ASEAN’s skepticism about hidden 
motivations of the developed countries.74
4.1.3 Explaining the Failure to Launch the OPTAD 
Why and how did the OPTAD proposal fail to get off the ground in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, despite the fact that it finally caught attention from most relevant governments?  The 
preceding discussion has shown that some regional governments, especially Japan and Australia, 
recognized the demand for creating an intergovernmental body.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
administration remained largely unenthusiastic about the idea.  Moreover, some ASEAN 
countries remained extremely cautious about the proposal because of the fear of domination, 
especially in the context of the Cold War great power rivalry.  In other words, there was a strong 
“negative demand” for an Asia-Pacific regionalist scheme in favor of strengthening ASEAN’s 
solidity.  By this time, however, advocates of Pacific economic cooperation had concluded that 
the ASEAN’s involvement in the proposed intergovernmental process would be necessary.  
Consequently, ASEAN’s resistance to the creation of an intergovernmental institution proved a 
major obstacle for launching an Asia-Pacific regionalist project. 
Given ASEAN’s reservations about the idea of Pacific cooperation, no government was 
willing to take the initiative to establish an intergovernmental institution.  The reluctant U.S. 
government only suggested that the creation of such an institution would be predicated on 
acceptance by ASEAN countries.  Japan’s Ohira and Australia’s Fraser took a joint initiative to 
create PECC, a semi-governmental organization, instead.  Although it was significant that the 
PECC process incorporated government officials, the PECC was essentially non-governmental, 
because government officials participated only in their private capacity.  Unfortunately, Ohira 
suddenly passed away from a heart attack in June 1980 before the PECC meeting was held.  
Unlike Ohira, his successor, Zenko Suzuki, was not interested in the Pacific Basin Concept.  
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 Moreover, MOFA officials were not that enthusiastic about Ohira’s Pacific Concept.75  They 
were particularly concerned that the Japanese initiative in Asia would raise ASEAN’s suspicions 
about Japan’s ambitions for regional hegemony, given the latter’s historical legacy and its 
growing economic clout. 
In short, neither demand nor supply conditions were met at this time.  On the demand 
side, the growing recognition of the need for an intergovernmental process among the Japanese 
and Australian governments was outweighed by the existence of strong resistance (or “negative 
demand”) by the ASEAN governments.  On the supply side, although there were ample 
regionalist ideas that were mostly developed by non-governmental actors, there was no political 
leadership to act on those ideas. 
4.2 THE FORMATION OF APEC 
While earlier Asia-Pacific regionalist proposals did not materialize, why was the APEC initiative 
successfully launched in 1989?  The ensuing section explores both the demand- and supply- 
conditions that resulted in the formation of APEC in turn.  It will be argued that the late 1980s 
witnessed the convergence of different factors conducive to the formation of regionalism, 
including the politically-driven demand for a regionalist project and the supply of political 
leadership which assumed the “costs of organizing” by proposing a regionalist initiative, 
mobilizing support, and brokering compromises. 
4.2.1  Why Create an Asia-Pacific Institution? 
The following section assesses the configuration of state preferences concerning regionalism 
among key governments, including Japan, Australia, the United States, ASEAN members, in the 
latter half of the 1980s.  It also examines what underlies the divergent preferences among 
relevant governments. 
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 4.2.1.1 Japan 
As discussed earlier, Japan has been central to the development of the Asia-Pacific 
concept.  The late 1980s witnessed a renewed interest within the Japanese government in the idea 
of an Asia-Pacific intergovernmental forum.  In contrast to the previous time which was 
characterized by politicians’ strong personal commitment to the idea, this time the idea was 
taken up by bureaucrats in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).  The MITI’s 
new interest in a regionalist approach was directly triggered by the move of the U.S. to consider 
a bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and Japan. 
In response to the growing trade frictions between the United States and Japan, the 
United States had put increasing pressure on Japan, through bilateral negotiations, to open its 
market.  Further, the unilateral tendency in the U.S. policy was most explicitly demonstrated by 
the U.S. threat of using the Super-301 authority of the amendment introduced in the 1988 trade 
bill.  To respond to these challenges, Japan was motivated to use a multilateral arrangement to 
hedge against the increasing U.S. pressures in the bilateral negotiations.76  Moreover, in the face 
of the decline of the U.S. hegemony, the Japanese were increasingly worried about the impact of 
an eventual drop in the absorption capacity of the U.S. market on the region’s export-oriented 
economies.77
In February 1988, an informal study group for Asia Pacific Trade Development was 
formed within MITI.  The group submitted an internal report in June 1988, calling for the 
creation of an Asia-Pacific forum.  The MITI report identified the following three factors that 
promoted MITI to propose regional economic cooperation: 1) the growth of regionalism in North 
America and Europe (the conclusion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in January 1988 
and the EC’s move toward the Single European Market in 1992); 2) the rapid growth of Asia 
Pacific economies that could disturb the current world economic order; and 3) the proliferation 
of many proposals, such as a U.S.-ASEAN free trade zone, a U.S.-Japan trade agreement, and an 
Asia Pacific OECD.78
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 The increasing Japan’s demand for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in the late 1980s 
was based on a combination of political, economic, and ideational motivations.79  Politically, in 
the face of increasing U.S. unilateral tendency and bilateral pressures, the Japanese preferred a 
multilateral approach to dealing with the United States.  In envisioning an Asia-Pacific regional 
institution that would include the United States as a member, the Japanese expected that it would 
constrain U.S. unilateralism in a multilateral setting where many Asian countries with similar 
concerns over U.S. policies.  Such an approach would maximize their bargaining leverage vis-à-
vis the United States.  Economically, given the growing trade and investment relationship 
between Japan and Southeast Asian countries within the context of the continued importance of 
the U.S. market, Asia-Pacific economic cooperation made perfect sense.  In terms of Japan’s 
search for a regional identity, the Asia-Pacific concept provided Japan with a solution for 
avoiding the unwanted choice between the West and Asia.  To sum up, although Tokyo’s interest 
in the Asia-Pacific concept reflected Japan’s long search for its own identity between Asia and 
the West as well as its economic interest to further enhance regional market activities and to 
secure market access on both sides of the Pacific, what became a direct trigger for the MITI’s 
proposal was the political incentives to hedge against the rise of U.S. unilateralism and to 
counter the growth of regionalism in North America and Europe. 
4.2.1.2 Australia 
It was not until 1983, when Prime Minister Bob Hawke from the Labor Party came into 
office, that the Australian government started to pursue an overt “push into Asia” in its search for 
a community.80  Immediately after he came into office in March 1983, Hawke expressed his 
intention to strengthen Australian relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific on several 
occasions.  In November 1983, in his speech before the Australia-Thai Chamber of Commerce in 
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 Bangkok, Hawke proposed the creation of a regional economic association, underscoring his 
government’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.81  
Just as Japan often found itself awkwardly positioned between the Western advanced 
countries and other Asian countries, Australia “sits uneasily between two worlds” – between the 
Anglo-American world of Australia’s nineteenth-century origins and twentieth-century 
development and the new world of an Asian “neighborhood.”82  Hawke’s attempt to redefine 
Australian identity more with Asia and away from the old European orientation reflected his 
search for an appropriate regional identity.  This so-called “Asianization” of Australia in its 
search for a regional identity, however, was not unrelated to the Australian desire to strengthen 
its relationship with the fast-growing economies in Asia. 
In the early 1980s, economic crises afflicted those economies that depended heavily on 
commodity exports, including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.  In order to help the 
Australian economy recover, the Hawke administration was required to undertake major 
domestic economic reforms.  The appointment of Ross Garnaut, an economist at the ANU, as 
Hawke’s economic policy advisor was important for this purpose.  Partly based on Garnaut’s 
advice, the Hawke administration implemented economic reforms, including the deregulation of 
financial and foreign exchange markets, liberalization of foreign investment policy, and the 
reduction of company taxes.  Most importantly, the Hawke government reduced the level of 
tariff protection to the Australian manufacturing industry by a third.83  The reduction of tariff 
levels had been initiated by the Whitlam Labor government.  However, the liberalization process 
was largely stalled during the conservative Fraser government. 84   In principle, the Labor 
government adopted the teaching of neoclassical economics, replacing the Keynesian consensus 
that had been dominant among Australian bureaucrats for much of the postwar period. 
The need for economic reform intensified in the mid-1980s.  A sharply rising current 
account deficit and a steep fall of the Australian dollar prompted then-Treasurer Paul Keating to 
warn that the country was slipping into the status of a “banana republic” unless tough measures 
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 were taken immediately.85  Australia’s external debts rose at an alarming rate as its terms of 
trade deteriorated with the decline of world markets for primary products.  As a country whose 
foreign earnings derived largely from a few primary commodities with little value added, such as 
agricultural and mineral products, the future of the Australian economy looked grim.86
The late 1980s added a further challenge to the Australian economy, as the prospect of 
the fragmentation of the global economy was increasingly perceived, especially by Keating.87  In 
North America, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1987, while 
negotiation of the Single Internal Market arrangements for 1992 proceeded in Europe.  The fear 
of being marginalized in a world of trading blocs from whose membership Australia would be 
excluded was certainly the motive behind Hawke’s APEC initiative in the beginning of 1989.88  
Meanwhile, Australia was increasingly frustrated with GATT negotiations, where the issue of 
liberalization of agricultural products was not gaining enough attention.  Disputes over 
agricultural trade with the United States had prompted Canberra to take the lead in organizing 
the Cairns group at the outset of the Uruguay Round to increase the collective bargaining power 
among countries committed to the liberalization of agricultural trade.89  The fact that the initial 
Hawke proposal did not include the United States apparently signaled his government’s desire to 
create “a new source of leverage against Washington.”90
Together, the slow progress in the Uruguay Round, the growth of regionalism in other 
parts of the region, and the increasing U.S. tendency to resort to unilateralism all contributed to 
Australian motivations to seek a multilateral approach with countries in the Asia-Pacific. 91   
Thus, these external developments in the late 1980s became a major trigger for Hawke’s APEC 
initiative.  However, the initiative also reflected long-term themes in Australian foreign policy, 
including its goals of securing market access after the loss of its market in Europe and of seeking 
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 a regional identity in search of community, with the fear of being left alone.  Therefore, the idea 
of Asia-Pacific cooperation comfortably found its way into the Australian policy initiative in 
response to both the immediate causes and the Australian long-term search for its place in the 
world. 
As discussed above, Australian interest in the idea of Pacific cooperation was advanced 
first by business leaders and academics from the late 1960s on.  The APEC initiative taken by the 
Hawke government was largely consistent with ideas promoted by PAFTAD and PECC circles.  
Australia was home to many influential people who were involved in those communities that had 
been developing and promoting the idea of Pacific cooperation for a long time.  Many of these 
individuals became directly involved in the government as well.  The group included: Stuart 
Harris, former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and head of the 
Northeast Asia Program at the Australian National University; Andrew Elek, who accompanied 
Hawke’s trip to Seoul, and was the head of the Economic and Trade Division within DFAT and 
an economist in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the ANU; Ross Garnaut, who became 
Hawke’s chief economic policy advisor, and was a professor of economics in the same Research 
School at the ANU; and Peter Drysdale, head of the Australia-Japan Research Centre at the ANU 
who long collaborated with Japanese academics close to the Japanese government.  As John 
Ravenhill concludes, “[t]heir views were influential in the trade policy bureaucracy and shaped 
Australian attitudes on the form that APEC should take and the role it should play.”92
As in the case of Japan, Australian interest in the Asia-Pacific regionalist idea was based 
on the long-term themes in Australian foreign policy, including economic interests in securing 
market access after the loss of the European market and the search for a new regional identity 
independent of the nation’s European heritage.  However, the major impetus for Hawke’s APEC 
initiative came from political challenges arising from a set of external developments in the late 
1980s. 
4.2.1.3 The United States 
Since the U.S. government continued to favor its traditional preference for globalism in 
principle and bilateralism in dealing with Asian countries, U.S. policymakers did not think of a 
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 regionalist option as a particularly attractive approach.  However, the U.S. government came to 
accept a regionalist approach at the end of the 1980s.  Why did they become more receptive to an 
Asia-Pacific regionalist idea? 
In the mid-1980s, U.S. growing trade deficits with Asian countries became one of the 
central issues in its economic policy.  As a result, the U.S. interest in Pacific cooperation began 
to emerge, viewing it as “a means of reducing the growing trade frictions that had accompanied 
expansion of Pacific commerce.”93  The growing economies in the NIES and ASEAN countries 
even prompted Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to forecast a 
“shift in the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy interests from the transatlantic relationship 
toward the Pacific Basin and particularly Japan.”94
In the meantime, the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, started in 1986, got 
stalemated, especially in the face of European resistance.  Consequently, U.S. officials found 
regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific to be a means to induce European concessions at the 
round.  In face of the difficulty in reaching an agreement on trade liberalization, the United 
States started to consider a regional approach as an alternative to its long-standing position which 
favored global multilateralism.  The U.S. concluded a free trade agreement with Canada in 1988 
and started to discuss possible free trade agreements with other countries, including Japan and 
ASEAN. 
Against this background, several proposals for a regional strategy toward the Pacific 
region were advanced in mid-1988 and early 1989.  In July 1988, Secretary of State George 
Shultz, under the second Reagan administration, proposed the creation of an intergovernmental 
mechanism for economic cooperation in the Pacific region.  In his speech before the Association 
of Indonesia Economists in Jakarta, Schultz proposed a “Pacific Basin forum where like-minded 
countries could compare experiences, discuss ideas, and prepare analyses on subjects that are of 
interest to most countries in the region.”95  In December 1988, Senator Bill Bradley called for a 
coalition of eight Pacific Rim countries (PAC-8) to reinforce the Uruguay Round at GATT, 
promote policy coordination, and remove barriers to economic growth in less developed 
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 countries.96  In April 1989, Senator Alan Cranston introduced a resolution that called for the 
establishment of annual summit meetings to promote economic and military cooperation in the 
region.97
The increasing interest in the creation of a Pacific economic arrangement was shared and 
supported by many prominent academics as well as by some Pacific-oriented business leaders 
who had been participating in non-governmental organizations such as PECC.  Yet the U.S. 
government took no formal initiatives to respond to these calls for the establishment of an 
intergovernmental institution in the Pacific.98
When Hawke’s initiative was announced in January 1989, the U.S. reaction was 
“restrained – if not skeptical,” partly because Bush had been in office barely two weeks.99  It was 
not until Baker’s speech that the Bush administration officially endorsed the Asia-Pacific 
cooperation idea.  On June 26, 1989, Secretary of State James Baker in his speech to the Asia 
Society in New York argued that “the need for a new mechanism for multilateral cooperation 
among the nations of the Pacific Rim is an idea whose time has come.”  Baker highlighted three 
points.  First, a new mechanism should cover a wide range of issues from trade and economic 
affairs to issues such as cultural exchange and the protection of the Pacific region’s natural 
resources.  For that purpose, each government should act according to its resources and 
capabilities based on what President George W. Bush called “creative responsibility-sharing.”  
Second, any region-wide institution in the Pacific should be an “inclusive entity” that would 
promote trade and investment and that should be consistent with existing institutions such as the 
GATT, the OECD, and ASEAN.  Third, a pan-Pacific arrangement should “recognize the 
diversity of social and economic systems and differing levels of development in the region.”100  
This speech signaled a major change in the U.S. attitude toward a regional multilateral approach 
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 by dropping the previous position that viewed the creation of a regional institution as a solution 
in search of a problem. 
This shift in U.S. policy was motivated by three reasons.  First, U.S. officials started to 
view an Asia-Pacific regional arrangement as a vehicle for reducing the growing trade deficits 
especially with countries in Asia.  Second, the stalemate of the GATT negotiations prompted U.S. 
policymakers to actively seek an alternative approach to achieve trade liberalization, which 
dropped the traditional commitment to avoid any regional arrangements.  Also, the U.S. 
government viewed cooperation with other countries in the Asia-Pacific as a means to increase 
its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Europe in global multilateral negotiations.  Finally, U.S. 
policymakers were increasingly concerned about securing its market access in the fastest 
growing economies in Asia.101  As implied in the initial Hawke proposal which did not include 
the United States, “the prospect of being left out and of being the target of such a bloc” 
apparently contributed to the U.S. change in favor of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation.102
4.2.1.4 ASEAN 
Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN members remained largely suspicious about the creation 
of a wider regional institution of which ASEAN would be a part.  However, ASEAN finally 
agreed to participate in an Asia-Pacific regional forum proposed by Australia in 1989.  What 
changed the attitudes of ASEAN leaders? 
ASEAN’s eventual agreement to participate in the Asia-Pacific regional scheme can be 
attributed to external changes in the world economy and the resultant modification of their 
economic policies.  First, as in the case of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, most countries 
in ASEAN were afflicted by the economic crises that hit commodity exporters in the first half of 
the 1980s.  As a result, ASEAN countries were under pressure to take major steps toward 
domestic economic liberalization.  Meanwhile, the rapid economic growth demonstrated by the 
NIES, which had employed an export-led economic strategy since the mid-1960s, had a 
demonstrable effect on ASEAN’s development strategy.  Partly driven by the collapse of oil and 
commodity prices from 1982 to 1986, and partly because of the successful model of the NIES in 
their neighborhood, the ASEAN countries embarked upon successive policies of deregulation, 
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 liberalization, and reforms. 103   The crises provided a window of opportunity for pro-
liberalization reformers in the countries. 104   As a consequence, as John Ravenhill argues, 
economic liberalization policies implemented in these countries “removed some of the obstacles 
that had previously stood in the way of regional economic collaboration.”105
Second, the shift in economic policy in the 1980s in ASEAN countries led to a major 
change in the composition of their exports.  By the end of the 1980s, the share of manufacturing 
in total exports rose to more than half the total export earnings of Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand, and more than a third of those of the Philippines and Indonesia.106  The rise of the 
share of manufacturing in these economies served to reduce the reluctance of ASEAN 
governments toward the establishment of a regional economic institution backed by the more 
internationally-oriented sectors which had become more confident in their competitiveness in the 
world economy. 
As a result of these changes, by the end of the 1980s, the ASEAN countries had 
experienced a cognitive shift in terms of their relations with external regions as well as a major 
shift in their economic policies.  As Amitav Acharya argues, during the first wave of regionalism 
in the 1950s and 1960s, “many countries in the developing world saw collective self-reliance 
through regional cooperation as an important way of countering Western dominance.” 107   
ASEAN was no exception.  Like other regionalist projects in the developing countries, ASEAN 
sought to increase “regional autonomy and self-reliance.”108  However, the acceleration of neo-
liberal economic policies in the age of globalization since the 1980s undermined these regional 
norms.  Consequently, instead of using regional institutions to reduce dependency, policy elites 
in developing countries have started to view them as devices to strengthen their participation in 
the global economy.109
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 ASEAN has largely dropped discourses informed by the dependency school of thought 
and has adopted an export- and foreign investment-led industrialization strategy, replacing its 
previous import-substitution economic policy. 110   Ravenhill suggests that existing non-
governmental regional institutions such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC have contributed to 
“transforming the debate about regionalism in the Asia Pacific away from the dependency theory 
rhetoric of North-South confrontation towards notions of interdependence.”111  Although the fear 
of domination by greater powers has remained in the minds of ASEAN policy elites, they have 
become more aware of the need to establish stronger ties with external powers, as demonstrated 
by the establishment of the Post-Ministerial conferences (PMC) in the late 1970s.   
A direct impetus for considering a new policy alternative came from the United States, 
which unofficially sounded out the ASEAN members regarding the idea of concluding an 
ASEAN-U.S. FTA in the late 1980s.112  Simply put, ASEAN was not ready for an FTA with the 
United States.113  Meanwhile, facing the rise of protectionist tendencies in other parts of the 
world, ASEAN was increasingly concerned about their market access at the global level, which 
underlay their rapid economic growth experienced in the 1980s.  Consequently, although 
ASEAN members continued to be concerned about the possibility of being diluted in the wider 
Asia-Pacific regional framework, ASEAN finally, though reluctantly, agreed to participate in the 
Asia-Pacific forum in 1989. 
4.2.2 Explaining the Shift in State Preferences 
Despite earlier reservations, why did those reluctant governments in the Asia-Pacific region, 
including ASEAN and the United States, come to agree to join an Asia-Pacific 
intergovernmental arrangement?  What led to the shift in the configuration of state preferences 
among key governments in favor of Asia-Pacific regionalism? 
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 Having observed the change in the configuration of state preferences in the previous 
section, the following analysis evaluates the four different precipitants for explaining the 
emergence of regionalist motives identified by major theoretical approaches that we reviewed in 
the previous chapters.  The first perspective emphasizes the political logic of regionalism based 
on geopolitical concerns and seeks evidence in the change in the distribution of power.  The 
second perspective stresses the economic logic of regionalism by hypothesizing the relationship 
between regionalization (the rise in the level of regional economic transactions) and regionalism.  
The third perspective highlights the ideational underpinnings of regionalism by investigating 
ideational changes through elite socialization.  The last perspective views regionalism as a 
defensive mechanism, arguing that a set of extraregional developments induces collective 
regionalist reactions to deal with the new challenges that many regional powers face. 
State preferences with regard to regionalism are certainly predicated upon the 
combination of geopolitical, economic, and identity-based concerns.  However, as the preceding 
investigation of the relevant governments revealed, it is argued that what was most decisive in 
inducing the urgent governmental demand for an Asia-Pacific regionalist project was a sense of 
crises in global processes caused by a set of extraregional developments emphasized by the 
fourth perspective. 
4.2.2.1 The Distribution of Power 
Realists emphasize the shift in the broader distribution of power as a main factor for 
inducing the creation of regionalism.  In this respect, two important changes in the configuration 
of power relations in the late 1980s were identified by many analysts: 1) the decline of U.S. 
hegemony; and 2) the shift in regional power alignments due to the development of regionalism 
in Europe and North America.  The first perspective, represented by Donald Crone’s work 
reviewed in Chapter 2, explains the emergence of regional institutions as a result of the decline 
of the U.S. hegemony.114  However, the decline of U.S. hegemony during the 1980s is not 
empirically substantiated.  If measured in terms of share of world trade, the U.S. share in 1989 
(13.84 %) was almost at the same level as that of 1970 (13.79 %).  Also, the importance of the 
U.S. market for the rest of the world increased during the same period, as the U.S. market share 
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 of world imports rose from 13.5 % to 15.8 %.  Furthermore, the share of the U.S. in the exports 
of the economies of the Western Pacific increased substantially in the first half of the 1980s.115  
As argued below, what mattered was the change in the U.S. policy. 
The second perspective attributes the emergence of Asia-Pacific regionalism to the 
formation and strengthening of regional groupings in other parts of the world.  In particular, the 
signing of the Single European Act in February 1986 (which aimed at the conclusion of the 
European Single Market by the end of 1992) and the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 
December 1987 provided regionalist competitive impulses among some Asia-Pacific countries.  
Coupled with other extraregional developments, it is argued below that these developments were 
significant in inducing the demand for Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
4.2.2.2 The Growth of Regional Economic Interdependence 
A growing economic interdependence has been frequently cited as an economic rationale 
for creating an intergovernmental regional institution. 116  Table 4-1 shows that the level of 
intraregional trade within the APEC economies as a share of total trade increased from 53% in 
1962 to 59% in 1980 and to 69% in 1990.  In this respect, this observation generally seems to 
support the liberal perspective that posits that regionalization leads to regionalism.  APEC’s trade 
intensity index increased from 1.64 in 1962 to 1.86 in 1975, but it decreased in the 1980s, 
indicating the decline of intraregional trade bias.  However, as already noted in Chapter 2, no 
matter which measure is used as an indicator for regional economic interdependence, the level of 
intraregional trade itself does not provide any guidance on what level of intraregional trade is 
sufficient to induce the creation of an intergovernmental mechanism aiming to support the 
activities of private firms. 
These data on intraregional trade need to be complemented by a more detailed analysis of 
the patterns of cross-border interactions among private firms.  Indeed, as often argued, the Asian 
regionalization process was driven by the private sector.117  Most importantly, Japanese private 
corporations became the central drivers in developing an integrated regional economy in Asia.  
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 During the 1970s, the Japanese full removal of restrictions on the export of capital led to 
increasing flows of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) into other Asian countries.  This in 
turn increased trade among the Asia-Pacific countries.118
 
Table 4-1: Intraregional Share as a Share of Total Trade of the Region 
  1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
APEC 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.68 0.69 
ASEAN 6 0.31 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.17 
EU-15 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.66 
EFTA 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Mercosur 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 
Andean Community 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
NAFTA 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.38 
Source: Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington, DC: 
Institute of International Economics, 1997), p. 22, Table 2-1. 
Notes: APEC (18): ASEAN 6 plus China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, 
United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Papua New Guinea 
 ASEAN (6): Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand 
EU (15): Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
EFTA (6): Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland 
Andean Community (5): Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 
NAFTA (3): the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
 
 
Table 4-2: Trade Intensity Indices of Selected Regional Arrangements 
  1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
APEC 1.64 1.69 1.82 1.86 1.82 1.74 1.76 
ASEAN 6 9.57 9.22 8.22 4.86 4.08 5.11 3.98 
EU-15 1.24 1.28 1.33 1.41 1.46 1.51 1.49 
EFTA 1.25 1.39 1.74 2.61 2.21 2.29 2.01 
Mercosur 2.45 6.42 5.57 3.82 6.14 4.84 9.07 
Andean Community 0.29 0.69 1.57 2.63 3.37 4.41 8.06 
NAFTA 1.63 1.76 1.93 2.17 2.08 1.95 2.09 
Source: Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington, DC: 
Institute of International Economics, 1997), p. 26, Table 2-2. 
 
The single most important catalyst for the surge of Japanese foreign investment in 
Southeast Asia was the 1985 Plaza Accord, which led to the rapid appreciation of the yen from 
around 250 yen to the dollar in April 1985 to around 150 yen to the dollar in July 1987.119  This 
forced an increasing number of Japanese export-manufacturing companies to re-locate outside 
Japan.  Many companies first looked to South Korea and Taiwan as their destinations for 
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 investment.  However, as their currencies began to appreciate, they shifted their target to 
Southeast Asia to seek cheap labor and land. 
Coincidentally, many ASEAN countries were seeking to attract more FDI.  Triggered by 
low commodity prices, a region-wide recession in 1985 and 1986 prompted the governments of 
Malaysia and Thailand to liberalize their inward FDI policies to attract export-oriented foreign 
firms in the manufacturing sector to diversify their economies and earn foreign currency.120  
These opening moves were followed by the FDI liberalization of the Philippines and Indonesia.  
Consequently, as shown in Table 4-3, ASEAN attracted growing amounts of FDI in the 1980s.  
Table 4-4 indicates the importance of these FDI inflows for all of the ASEAN Five countries.  
Between 1971 and 1990, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand recorded an increase in the ratio of 
FDI to gross domestic capital formation.  During the same period, Singapore and Malaysia were 
most heavily dependent on the inflow of FDI; its ratios to gross fixed capital formulation were 
42.1% and 28.7%, respectively. 
 
Table 4-3: Inward Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN (US$ million) 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Indonesia 300 133 225 292 222 310 258 385 576 682 1,092 
Malaysia 934 1,265 1,397 1,261 797 695 489 423 719 1,668 2,611 
Singapore 1,236 1,660 1,602 1,134 1,302 1,047 1,710 2,836 3,655 2,887 5,575 
Thailand 189 289 188 356 412 160 262 354 1,106 1,837 2,575 
Philippines 114 243 193 247 137 105 157 415 999 568 550 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI Statistics, Online. 
  
Table 4-4: Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment Inflow to Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
(Percentages) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
Indonesia 18.3 20.7 27.8 33.4 
Malaysia 24.0 27.2 34.1 29.3 
Philippines 25.3 30.1 24.0 17.9 
Singapore 41.4 42.0 46.8 37.7 
Thailand 24.7 27.3 23.5 32.1 
Source: Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and Simon Reich, "Southeast Asian Prospects and Realities: American 
Hopes and Fears," in The Pacific Review 9(1) (1996), p. 10. 
 
In the post-Plaza Accord era, Japan has become a particularly important source of 
investment for many Southeast Asian countries.  As Figure 4-1 shows, Japan’s FDI into 
Singapore and Thailand skyrocketed in the latter half of the 1980s.  Subsequently, from the end 
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 of the 1980s into the early 1990s, Malaysia and Indonesia also received increasing amounts of 
Japanese FDI.  Consequently, Japanese FDI in the ASEAN region rose from $855 million in 
1986 to $4.7 billion in 1989.121  Many Japanese companies created regionalized networks of 
production by developing sub-contracting links to their affiliates in the Asian region.122  The 
establishment of regional production networks, primarily by Japanese firms, promoted a 
triangular trade pattern in which Southeast Asian economies imported capital goods, parts, and 
components from Japan; processed and assembled intermediate goods; and exported the final 
products to Western markets, especially the United States.  Japanese capital and technology 
played a central role in the economic development of East Asian economies, especially in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
 
Figure 4-1: Direct Investment in ASEAN-5 by Japan, 1983–1993 
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Sources: JETRO, Historical Data, Japan’s outward FDI by country and region, 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/statistics/rnfdi_01_e.xls; Prepared by JETRO from Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) statistics for Japan's inward and outward FDI, MOF Policy Research Institute Monthly Finance 
Review, and Bank of Japan foreign exchange rates. 
 
 
The massive inflow of Japanese FDI into the ASEAN region was followed by the Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIES), such as Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, which further 
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 increased regional economic activities.  Consequently, during this period, FDI became a more 
important factor than simple trade in integrating a regional economy.123
As shown in the preceding section, the empirical data provides enough evidence for the rise of 
intraregional market activities within the Asia-Pacific region.  However, many observers have 
pointed out that Asian regionalization in the form of increasing regional cross-border 
transactions in the private sector was not followed by state-led regionalist projects to create 
formal political institutions.124   Undoubtedly, private corporations have served as the major 
drivers in the process of regionalization in East Asia.  However, it is not clear whether they were 
influential in the construction of regionalism (as opposed to regionalization).  There is not 
enough evidence to support the argument that these private firms strongly demanded the creation 
of an intergovernmental forum.  According to Ravenhill, “[f]or the most part, export-oriented 
firms have used their own production networks rather than attempting to seek help from 
governments to overcome the transaction costs of transnational business operations in East 
Asia.” 125   In light of the private sector’s relative lack of interest in putting demands on 
governments to create an intergovernmental forum to support their corporate activities, the 
relationship between regionalization and regionalism is not as straightforward as assumed by 
liberals. 
Instead, as illustrated in the previous section, despite the growing factors for supporting 
the economic logic of regionalism, political resistance against the creation of an 
intergovernmental regional institution, especially among ASEAN countries, prevented the 
creation of such an institution until the late 1980s.  Furthermore, since liberal perspectives focus 
primarily on the intensification of intraregional cross-border economic transactions as the major 
variable for explaining the emergence of regionalism, they tend to overlook the impact of 
extraregional developments, which, as argued below, played a more decisive role in changing the 
minds of reluctant government officials.  
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 4.2.2.3 Ideas, Elite Socialization, and Policy Networks 
As described earlier, increasing interactions and social exchanges among individuals 
within the Asia-Pacific region had been gradually developed since the late 1960s.  Like the rise 
in regional interdependence, the activities of non-governmental policy networks and the 
development and diffusion of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas provided a context conducive to the 
formation of a regional arrangement.  The inauguration of the PECC process in 1980 and the 
subsequent continuation was particularly important for keeping Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas 
alive and further developing dense networks of people.  After the first PECC meeting in 1980, 
the Malaysian government declined to support a second PECC meeting in the following year.126  
Therefore, the initiative taken by Thai Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman to host the second 
PECC meeting in 1982 was especially important in keeping the process moving. 
At the instigation of Thanat, who is often referred to as the father of ASEAN, the second 
PECC meeting was organized by Thailand Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee and the 
John F. Kennedy Foundation (Thailand) with the assistance of ESCAP.  At this meeting, the 
PECC International Standing Committee (PECC-ISC) was established.  The PECC-ISC 
comprised eight members: Crawford (Australia), Okita (Japan), Thanat (Thailand), Ali Moertopo 
(Indonesia), David Sycip (the Philippines), Eric Trigg (Canada), Richard L. Sneider (U.S.), and 
Nam Duck-Woo (Korea).  This group of individuals, sometimes collectively referred to as 
Pacific Mafia, was at the core of the Pacific cooperation movement.127
Although the PECC process did not lead to the creation of an intergovernmental regional 
institution, it nonetheless laid an important groundwork for the formation of APEC in at least 
two respects.  First, by taking an inclusive approach to the issue of membership, the PECC 
served to “defuse many of the divisions which had until now posed major conceptual and 
practical obstacles to innovation.” 128   Within the first decade, its membership expanded to 
include twenty national member committees.129  By expanding its membership to many Pacific 
Latin American countries and the Pacific island nations, it deflected the argument that Pacific 
cooperation reflects only the interests of advanced economies.  Also, Chinese participation in the 
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 organization in 1986 was important because both government and business leaders in the Asia-
Pacific were increasingly concerned about how to integrate this fast-growing economy into the 
regional economy since its adoption of open door reform policy in the late 1970s. 
Second, the direct involvement of government officials, albeit in a private capacity, made 
the PECC an important site of information exchange and expression of differences in an informal 
setting.  Understanding differences among economies at different levels of economic 
development was especially important in crafting a feasible institutional design for a new, 
intergovernmental institution with diverse membership.  The tripartite compositions of the group 
strengthened the interactions and communications among academics, business leaders, and 
government officials.  In other words, it became an important agency of socialization of policy 
elites in the region by making them familiar with important ideas such as the principle of open 
regionalism.130
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the role that PECC played in the creation of 
APEC was more indirect rather than in a directly causal way.  Certainly, it was significant that 
the push for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation was promoted through personal networks among 
a small group of individuals in a number of Asia-Pacific countries at the non-governmental level 
over extended periods of time.131  However, the development and promotion of regionalist ideas 
by nascent policy networks failed to generate the immediate governmental demand for creating 
an institutional arrangement at the official level.  As shown in the previous section, until the late 
1980s, many governments, especially in ASEAN members and the United States, viewed 
proposals for intergovernmental regional arrangements as “solutions in search of problems.”132  
In short, the emergence and spread of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas did not cause the creation of 
APEC.  Rather, these ideas provided what John Ruggie calls “reasons for action” rather than 
“causes of action.”133
The direct impetus for the creation of APEC was not the result of the pressure from these 
transnational policy networks like PECC.  PECC and PBEC had lobbied governments to create 
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 an intergovernmental forum in 1988.134  However, despite their general support for the creation 
of a ministerial-level meeting, many PECC participants were uncomfortable about Hawke’s 
original proposal for creating an OECD-type institution in Asia.135   Moreover, some PECC 
participants were concerned that the Hawke initiative would undermine the role of PECC.136  
There was some resistance against the Hawke initiative from PECC members due to the 
differences of opinions with regard to the desirable form of regional cooperation.137  Yet, even 
within PECC participants, they were also divided between those who thought that it was 
desirable to maintain the tripartite structure of regional cooperation in the form of PECC and 
those who considered that the PECC was a temporary stepping stone toward creating an 
intergovernmental regional organization. 138   Consequently, although PECC participants had 
discussed the possibility of convening a PECC-sponsored ministerial conference in 1988, some 
remained skeptical about the creation of an intergovernmental body and cautioned that it would 
be premature and unnecessarily raise difficult political concerns.139
In this light, the role that PECC played in inducing the governmental demand for a 
regional intergovernmental mechanism was rather indirect.  One of the functions that the 
network activities of non-governmental bodies such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC played was 
“to serve as an agency of socialization.”140  According to Jusuf Wanandi, a change in ASEAN’s 
attitudes toward the creation of a broader regional institution was partly driven by “a gradual 
process of socialization of the idea of Pacific economic cooperation within each of the ASEAN 
countries.”141  Despite the important role that nascent transnational policy networks such as 
PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC played in developing and spreading the idea of Pacific cooperation, 
it was not a sufficient condition for the creation of APEC.  As argued in the next section, the 
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 major trigger for inducing the urgent governmental demand for such an idea came from a set of 
extraregional developments. 
4.2.2.4   Perceived Crises in Global Processes as a Trigger 
The preceding discussions suggested that intraregional developments, either the rise in 
regional economic interdependence or the development of regionalist ideas did not automatically 
prompt reluctant government officials to change their attitudes in favor of Asia-Pacific 
institution-building.  Instead, as demonstrated by the cross-national studies in the previous 
section, it was a set of extraregional challenges that prompted governments to realize the 
inadequacy of the existing policy apparatus and the urgent need for a new political mechanism.  
More specifically, the urgent demand for a collective regionalist response among many 
governments in Western Pacific countries was primarily driven by perceived crises in global 
processes stemming from the U.S. unilateral tendency, the growth of inward-looking regionalism 
in Europe and North America, and the possible collapse of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations and its consequent breakdown of the liberal trading system.142
The first challenge came from the growing unilateral tendency of U.S. trade policy.  In 
the face of its growing trade deficits with many Asian countries in the late 1980s, the U.S. 
government was increasingly frustrated with what Americans viewed as unfairly closed markets 
in those economies.  The U.S. administration actively sought to use the Super-301 section of its 
domestic trade bill.  As a result, governments under Western Pacific economies felt increasing 
pressure from the U.S. government to open their markets.  The U.S. government, albeit 
unofficially, even proposed the possibility of concluding free trade agreements with many Asian 
countries, which were also perceived as a threat for them.  Therefore, political leaders in many of 
Western Pacific countries felt an increasing need to collectively create a mechanism to constrain 
the U.S. hegemonic behavior by what some analysts call “regional entrapment.”143
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 A second development which became an impetus for the formation of APEC was the 
emergence and strengthening of inward-looking regionalism in Europe and North America.  The 
adoption of the Single European Act in 1987, which aimed at the completion of the European 
Single Market by the end of 1992, created fears of “Fortress Europe” throughout Asia.  The U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement signed in December 1987 also became a serious concern among 
the Western Pacific countries because they heavily relied on North American markets.  
Moreover, the agreement signaled the U.S. policy shift toward a regional approach and away 
from its previous long-standing position which viewed the multilateralism based on the GATT 
global liberal trading system as the only appropriate strategy for pursuing trade liberalization.  
The growth of regional protectionism spurred growing fear among Asian economies whose rapid 
economic growth relied heavily on an export-led strategy.  Asian countries became concerned 
about securing their market access in the North American and European regions as a result of 
their protectionist tendency. 
Finally, the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, started in 1986, were stalled, which 
raised a fear of the possible collapse of the liberal trading regime and the possibility that the 
global economy would be divided into rival trading blocs.  As the main beneficiaries of an open 
trading system, the possible breakdown of the GATT negotiations presented a threat to many 
countries in the Asia-Pacific.  The importance of promoting the Uruguay Round came to be 
shared by both government officials and the private sector. In May 1988, the PECC Osaka 
meeting highlighted “the urgency of bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion.”144  
Yet the Montreal mid-term review of the Uruguay Round in December 1988 failed to reach an 
agreement, which raised a sense of crisis in the global trading system.  Australian Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke’s speech to the Korean Business Association in January 1989 reflected this sense of 
crisis in the GATT system.  His call for a regional institution in the Asia-Pacific was motivated 
by his search for a regional approach to respond to these challenges in the international economic 
system. 
Together, the U.S. unilateral tendency, the rise in inward-looking regionalism in North 
America and Europe, and the stalemate in the GATT negotiations constituted a sense of crisis in 
the global liberal trading system, which lowered the threshold for creating a new regional 
framework.  The demand for regionalism was driven by regional leaders’ shared desire to avoid 
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 expected losses rather than to gain the expected immediate economic gains.  In other words, the 
creation of APEC at the critical juncture was spurred by “common aversions” rather than 
“common interests.”145  For many Asia-Pacific policy elites, the formation of an Asia-Pacific 
regional economic forum based on the principle of open regionalism was viewed as a “defense 
against the closed markets”146 or “a way of countering the protectionist tide which was perceived 
to be on the rise.”147
4.2.3 How was APEC Created? 
The previous section examined the demand-side conditions by exploring the shift in state 
preferences in favor of Asia-Pacific regionalism in the late 1980s among key Asia-Pacific 
governments.  However, the growing demand for a regional institution was not sufficient for 
bringing such an institution into being.  Without political leadership, such aspirations would not 
be put into practice. 
The ensuing section focuses on the supply-side conditions by investigating the actual 
political process by which APEC was brought into being in the late 1980s.  In addressing how 
APEC was created, one cannot ignore the long-term historical forces that unfolded in the 
preceding decades.  While the previous section argued that the activities of non-governmental 
bodies such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC failed to create the governmental demand for an 
Asia-Pacific institutional arrangement, they were nevertheless significant in developing and 
promoting Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas.  The history of regional institution-building in the Asia-
Pacific region was characterized by path-dependent processes through the activities of those non-
governmental organizations over extended periods of time. 
However, how was the APEC initiative successfully launched in the late 1980s after the 
long incubation period over more than two decades?  How did the formation of APEC become 
possible at this timing, but not earlier?  More specifically, how did an initiative from a non-great 
power like Australia result in the creation of APEC, despite the earlier resistance from ASEAN 
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 countries and the initially lukewarm reaction from the U.S. hegemon?  The following pages 
explore the roles that key governments played in the process of constructing APEC. 
4.2.3.1 Australia 
When Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke called for the creation of an Asia-Pacific 
regional forum in his speech before the Korean Business Association in January 1989, it did not 
attract much attention outside government circles. 148   However, only ten months later, the 
Hawke initiative culminated in launching the first APEC ministerial meeting in Canberra in 
November 1989.  How did the Australian government manage to gain support for the APEC 
proposal? 
Since the announcement of the Hawke initiative, the Prime Minister’s Office was 
responsible for developing and promoting Hawke’s regional economic cooperation policy.149  In 
the meantime, Australia’s National Pacific Cooperation Committee (NPCC), chaired by Russell 
Madigan, advanced a proposal for a ministerial meeting on Pacific economic cooperation with 
the recognition that a more direct government involvement would be necessary to make the 
PECC process more meaningful.  Madigan briefed the Prime Minister’s Office about the 
proposal, arguing that PECC could be the convener for such a meeting.  The link between the 
Prime Minister’s Office and NPCC proved important in elaborating the idea of regional 
economic cooperation.150   
Furthermore, the merger between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department 
of Overseas Trade into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 1987 proved 
significant in promoting a coherent economic policy in the region in general and subsequently 
advancing the APEC initiative in particular. 151   In early 1988, the Economic and Trade 
Development Division in DFAT, headed by Andrew Elek, began working on revising Hawke’s 
1983 proposal for a regional forum.152  When the Japanese prime minister called for a Pacific 
forum modeled after OECD, and Shultz proposed a Pacific Basin forum in 1988, DFAT 
disagreed with the both proposals.  On the one hand, Nakasone’s proposal was too broad, 
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 involving both political and economic issues, and was considered difficult to materialize.  On the 
other hand, DFAT felt that Shultz’s proposal was too restrictive, focusing on transport 
communications and lacking trade issues.  Therefore, DFAT pursued a middle ground.  Further, 
in full recognition of ASEAN’s concerns about any proposal from the two biggest economies in 
the world, DFAT believed Australia had an advantage as a middle power to launch a similar 
proposal.153
On January 31, 1989, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke gave a speech in Seoul 
which called for the establishment of a regional meeting of a ministerial-level to set the stage for 
a “more formal intergovernmental vehicle.”154  The final decision to announce this proposal was 
not made before Hawke left Australia.  When he met with Korean President Roh Tae Woo the 
day before the official announcement of the proposal, Hawke discussed the idea with the Korean 
president and learned that the Korean president was enthusiastic about his plan.  Encouraged by 
the strong support, Hawke consulted with his staff.  He decided to go ahead with the official 
announcement of the proposal for a regional forum in front of a group of Korean business 
people.155
After his speech, Hawke commissioned Richard Woolcott, Secretary of DFAT, as the 
Prime Minister’s special envoy to explain and discuss the Australian proposal for creating an 
intergovernmental forum for regional economic cooperation.  Woolcott’s mission to several 
countries in the region in April 1989 proved especially important, because Hawke announced his 
proposal without informing in advance any countries except South Korea, and also because 
Hawke did not provide many details of his proposal during the speech.156  Woolcott visited 
Australia’s closest political partner, New Zealand, where he received a positive response.157  
With full recognition that convincing leaders in ASEAN would be most challenging and crucial 
for the successful launch of the proposed regional forum, the ASEAN countries were the first 
group after New Zealand to be consulted about the proposal.158
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 Woolcott gave special priority to Indonesia, which he viewed as the most important 
country “because it was the largest, and ASEAN does not react to any particular proposal or 
policy without ascertaining Indonesia’s view.”159   Since Indonesia was most afraid that the 
creation of a wider regional arrangement would dilute and undermine the existing regional 
institution, namely ASEAN, Woolcott emphasized the Australian reassurance that ASEAN 
would be the “core” of the process.  Yet Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas only promised 
that “he would study it.”160
Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew gave the most enthusiastic response to the 
Australian proposal.  While some ministers and officials in other countries in ASEAN remained 
cautious about the proposal, most capitals in ASEAN afforded general support for the Australian 
proposal in principle.161  During this trip, Woolcott had to distinguish Canberra’s proposal from 
one by Japan’s MITI by stating that Australia is “neither in competition or collusion with 
Japan.”162  Australia’s status as a middle power appeared to ease suspicions among ASEAN 
countries. 
4.2.3.2 Japan 
As discussed earlier, the MITI had proposed creating an Asia-Pacific regional forum 
prior to the Hawke announcement.  In the face of growing U.S.-Japan trade frictions and the U.S. 
tendency to appeal bilateral pressures, MITI officials sought a multilateral path to curb U.S. 
unilateral actions and protectionist tendencies.  In early 1987, then-MITI Minister Hajime 
Tamura proposed a ministerial-level meeting among Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand.  The proposal was aimed at discussing economic issues of common interest 
among those Pacific industrial countries.  Tamura’s proposal, however, did not materialize in the 
face of immediate opposition from the MOFA, which feared that the Japanese initiative, given its 
historical legacy of World War II, would arouse suspicion among ASEAN countries about 
Japan’s intentions.163
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 The following year, a direct trigger for Japan’s move toward Asia-Pacific cooperation 
came from the United States.  When Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita visited 
Washington in January 1998, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd suggested to him that the 
United States and Japan should study the possibility of concluding U.S.-Japan free trade 
agreement.  Immediately after Takeshita came back to Japan, he ordered Shinji Fukukawa, then 
MITI’s vice minister, to study the subject.  Subsequently, the Study Group for Asia Pacific Trade 
Development was established, directed by MITI’s then-director general of the International 
Economic Affairs Department, Yoshihiro Sakamoto.164  In June 1988, the group submitted an 
interim report, the so-called Sakamoto Report, which called for the creation of an Asia Pacific 
economic forum to counter the U.S. proposal for a series of bilateral FTAs with Asia-Pacific 
economies.165  The report suggested the following key points: 
• The Asia-Pacific region’s economic and trade relations should shift from “development 
through U.S. dependency” to “development through role-sharing cooperation in the 
region.” 
• The OECD model of rigid organization is not appropriate in the Asia-Pacific, which 
include countries with different levels of economic development.  Any arrangement for 
economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific should be consistent with the existing 
institutions such as ASEAN and it should operate by consensus, progress gradually, and 
remain open to other regions. 
• To promote the above goals, Japan must expand its imports, increase its FDI in the 
region, and support the development of regional human resources.166 
 
As Ellis S. Krauss argues, this report provided an institutional blueprint much closer to 
the form that APEC eventually took than the one envisioned by Australia.167  Most importantly, 
the MITI’s proposal envisioned the inclusion of the United States from the beginning. 
However, MITI was aware that the overt Japanese initiative would alienate other Asian 
countries because of Japan’s historical legacy of World War II and its economic power.  From 
Tokyo’s perspective, Australia was considered an appropriate partner to promote the idea of 
regional cooperation forum, because it could play a “cushioning role” as a middle power, which 
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 would lessen suspicion and caution from other Asian countries.168  Hirokazu Okumura, who was 
then seconded from MITI to the Sydney office of Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 
consulted closely with DFAT officials about MITI’s proposal.169  Sakamoto also concluded that 
Australia would be an appropriate candidate for taking public leadership in proposing the forum 
because of Australia’s non-threatening nature and a shared interest in promoting a regional 
cooperation arrangement. 170   When MITI’s Vice Minister for International Affairs, Shigeo 
Muraoka, met with Australia’s Minister of Negotiations, Michael Duffy, in Montreal in 
December 1988, he told Duffy that MITI was ready to let the Australians take explicit 
leadership.171  Muraoka maintained that Japan’s appropriate role in the process was to “work 
behind the scenes.”172   
After the Hawke proposal was announced in January 1989, MITI assigned Okumura and 
Hidehiro Konno, then Director of International Economy at MITI, to visit ASEAN countries to 
assess local reactions to the Hawke proposal and to discuss the MITI proposal.  Upon his return, 
Okumura reported to Tokyo that ASEAN officials showed a positive response to the proposal.173  
Subsequently, in March, 1989, Muraoka visited many of the same countries, including Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.  While he received general support for the idea of regional 
economic cooperation, he found that most ASEAN officials expressed hesitation about the 
inclusion of the United States in the proposed regional arrangement.  It was only Singaporean 
Trade and Industry Minister Lee Hsien Loong who strongly supported the participation of the 
United States in a proposed arrangement.174  Therefore, he made particular efforts to convince 
those officials in ASEAN countries who were reluctant regarding U.S. membership, arguing that 
“it would perhaps be more effective to combat and contain U.S. unilateral actions on trade issues 
if we could include the United States in the forum.”175  Officials in most ASEAN countries 
accepted this reasoning. 
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 4.2.3.3 The United States 
Given the U.S. preference for bilateral approaches to dealing with problems in Asia, the 
U.S. government was slow to recognize the demand for a regional institution in the Asia-Pacific.  
The U.S. government at first did not respond to the MITI proposal. 176   When the Hawke 
initiative was officially announced in January 1989, the U.S. reaction was mostly “reactive” – 
very uncharacteristic of the usual U.S. foreign policy.  The U.S. government was busy with the 
transition from the Reagan administration to the newly inaugurated Bush administration.177
However, when Secretary of State James Baker met with Australian Minister Gareth 
Evans in Washington in March 1989, Baker complained to Evans that Australia did not consult 
with the United States before it launched the proposal.  Baker, in fact, vehemently opposed the 
original Australian proposal, which failed to include North America in the proposed grouping.178 
Baker firmly convinced the Australians that any regional arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region 
should include the participation of the United States.  As noted above, Baker’s June 1989 speech 
expressed general U.S. support for an Asia-Pacific regional forum. 
4.2.3.4 ASEAN 
In response to the Hawke initiative and the Woolcott mission, some ASEAN countries 
reacted negatively.  Indonesia was particularly critical of the idea of creating a new institution in 
the region because there was already a mechanism for ASEAN countries to talk with external 
powers through the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC).  In response to the Woolcott 
mission, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas claimed, “Why not think about existing 
forums?”179
At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Brunei on July 3–4, 1989, ASEAN 
ministers discussed the proposals from Australia and Japan’s MITI for establishing an 
intergovernmental forum to promote Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, and confirmed the 
ASEAN’s position that ASEAN should remain the core of any Asia-Pacific forum.  For example, 
Siddhi Savetsila, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, stated that “ASEAN would have to 
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 be accorded a central place because of the cohesion already existing among the ASEAN states 
and because a mechanism for Pacific consultations already exists within the ASEAN PMC 
framework.”180  At the following ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) held in Brunei on 
July 6–8, the concept of Asia-Pacific cooperation was officially raised.  At this PMC, ASEAN 
finally agreed to participate in the Canberra meeting by consensus.181  Yet, some countries, 
especially Indonesia and Malaysia, remained cautious toward APEC.  Alatas continued to 
express his skeptical view by stating that the Canberra meeting would be a one-off event.182  
Nonetheless, ASEAN’s agreement to participate in the Canberra meeting allowed Hawke to 
proceed with his initiative.  Subsequently, in August, the Australian government issued formal 
invitations to the inaugural Asia-Pacific ministerial meeting to be held in Canberra in November 
1989.183
Once ASEAN agreed to attend the Canberra meeting, ASEAN members sought to 
present ASEAN’s unified position at APEC, despite the internal differences among the ASEAN 
members.  Immediately before the APEC, senior officials meeting for determining the agendas 
of the inaugural APEC meeting on September 10–12, 1989, ASEAN senior economic officials 
and economic ministers had an informal consultation to lay down guidelines for ASEAN’s 
approach toward the inaugural APEC meeting.184
At the inaugural APEC meeting, ASEAN had an opportunity to present its perspective of 
APEC.  As the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Alatas presented ASEAN’s view.  
In his statement, he put forward the basic principles, modalities and objectives which ASEAN 
viewed as the basis for the development of Asia-Pacific cooperation: 
1. In any enhanced Asia Pacific economic cooperation, ASEAN’s identity and cohesion 
should be preserved and its cooperative relations with its dialogue partners and with 
other third countries should not be diluted. 
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 2. Enhanced Asia Pacific economic cooperation should be based on the principles of 
equality, equity, and mutual benefit, taking fully into account the differences in stages 
of economic development and in socio-political systems among the countries of the 
region. 
 
3. Enhanced Asia Pacific economic cooperation should not be directed towards the 
formation of an inward-looking economic or trading bloc; on the contrary, it should 
strengthen the open, multilateral economic and trade systems in the world. 
 
4. Enhanced Asia Pacific economic cooperation should provide a forum for consultation 
and constructive discussions on economic issues and should not lead to the adoption 
of mandatory directives for any participant to undertake on implement. 
 
5. Enhanced Asia Pacific economic cooperation should be aimed at strengthening the 
individual and collective capacity of participants for economic analysis and at 
facilitating more effective, mutual consultations so as to enable participants to 
identify more clearly and to promote their common interests and to project more 
vigorously those interests in the larger multilateral forums. 
 
6. Implementation of enhanced Asia Pacific cooperation should proceed gradually and 
pragmatically, especially in institutionalization or institutional development, without 
inhibiting further elaboration and future expansion.185 
 
Alatas also emphasized the importance of the existing institutional framework such as the 
ASEAN PMC.  Subin Rinkayan of Thailand also spoke as the Chairman of the ASEAN 
Economic Ministers, cautioned against being too hasty in the initial stage of the APEC 
process.186
In what a senior official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry called “a remarkable show of 
unity,” ASEAN managed to convince the conference chairman, Gareth Evans, to stipulate in the 
Chairman’s Summary Statement a more loose organizational character for the new grouping than 
had been described in the original draft.187  ASEAN also succeeded in receiving assurance that if 
similar meetings were to be held in the future, at least every other meeting should be held in an 
ASEAN member country. 188   Moreover, it was decided that representatives of the ASEAN 
secretariat would be invited to a preparatory meeting of high-ranking officials from the APEC 
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 members to determine the agenda for the future APEC meetings.189  On the whole, the first 
APEC meeting strongly reflected ASEAN’s concerns about the institutionalization of the APEC 
process. 
Still, after the first meeting, ASEAN continued to reiterate the conditions for ASEAN’s 
continued participation in the APEC process.  At the joint meeting of the ASEAN economic and 
foreign ministers in Kuching, Malaysia in February 1990, ministers reconfirmed ASEAN’s 
position on APEC, most of which had already been  stipulated in Alatas’s statement.  This came 
to be known as the Kuching consensus.  Similarly, in July 1990, foreign ministers agreed that 
“APEC should continue to be a loose, exploratory, and informal consultative process, that APEC 
process should not dilute ASEAN’s identity and that it should not be directed towards the 
establishment of an economic trading bloc.”190  Reflecting these resilient reservations among 
some ASEAN countries, Wanandi, director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
in Jakarta, who was part of Indonesia’s delegation to the Canberra meeting, wrote in early 1990 
that although ASEAN supported the holding of the first APEC meeting in Canberra, “ASEAN’s 
participation in it cannot be taken for granted.”191
As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, in the initial stage of the APEC 
development, ASEAN managed to put some input in shaping the institutional form of APEC.  
Although many ASEAN members started to appreciate the benefits of APEC by the early 1990s, 
ASEAN continued to caution against the institutionalization of APEC in favor of its preferred 
informal forum based on consultations and consensus. 
4.2.4 Explaining the Process of Construction 
What explains the process by which APEC was created?  How did an initiative from a non-great 
power like Australia result in the creation of APEC?  Incremental and path-dependent processes 
by non-governmental organizations such as PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC in the preceding 
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 decades laid groundwork for the creation of APEC by developing and spreading Asia-Pacific 
regionalist ideas.  However, it was the Australian Prime Minister Hawke’s entrepreneurial 
leadership that made an Asia-Pacific regionalist idea gets off the ground. 
As a middle power, Australia’s power assets were circumscribed.  Nevertheless, the 
Australian government pursued what Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called “niche diplomacy” 
by “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather 
than trying to cover the field.”192  The appointment of Evans as foreign minister in 1988 was 
particularly significant in promoting Australia’s middle power activism.193  Moreover, Australia 
used its middle-power status as strength rather than a weakness, because an initiative from a 
major power would cause suspicions from smaller powers, especially within ASEAN. 
On the other hand, the Japanese government played a supportive role behind the 
scenes.194  Japan’s covert role can be explained by the following two factors.  First, Japan was 
normatively constrained by other Asian nations’ fear of Japan’s resurgence in the region.  
Second, Japanese foreign policy was constrained by its important bilateral relationship with a 
major global power, the United States, which did not allow Japan to take a leadership role when 
it conflicted with U.S. interests.195
Despite the pivotal roles played by entrepreneurial leadership by Australia and Japan’s 
support behind the scenes, the U.S. support expressed in Baker’s speech in June 1989 was also 
significant for a non-great power like Australia to take the initiative in launching the APEC 
project successfully.  Moreover, since ASEAN had been a major obstacle for the creation of 
regional institution, ASEAN’s agreement in July 1989 to participate in the proposed Asia-Pacific 
regional forum was “a turning point in the history of Asia-Pacific regionalism.”196
The empirical investigation of the process of APEC creation revealed the importance of 
political leadership at the “moment of openness” precipitated by structural changes in the world 
economy.  The importance of timing highlights the historically contingent nature of institutional 
creation.  A shared sense of crises in global processes in the late 1980s and the changes in the 
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 attitudes of the United States and ASEAN provided a political opportunity for Australia to take a 
new regionalist initiative.  Tellingly, Australian diplomat Geoff Brenan has been quoted as 
saying “[i]t wasn’t just the idea; it was the timing of the idea.”197
4.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the formation of the first-ever region-wide intergovernmental forum in 
the form of APEC by highlighting the shift in preferences over regionalism, the provision of 
political leadership, and the triggering circumstances.  Figure 4-2 summarizes the argument put 
forward in this chapter.  The main arguments of this chapter are: 1) A shared sense of crisis 
served as a major trigger for inducing the urgent demand for a collective regionalist reaction; 2) 
This sense of crisis also provided a political opportunity for a non-great power like Australia to 
take a new initiative; and 3) The confluence of demand- and supply- conditions created the 
critical juncture that resulted in the creation of a new regional arrangement like APEC. 
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A shared sense 
of crisis 
Demand (why) 
• To constrain U.S. 
unilateral actions 
• To hedge against the rise 
of regional trading blocs 
• To support global trade 
negotiations 
• To keep the U.S. military 
engaged in the region 
Supply (how) 
• Australia’s 
entrepreneurship 
• Japan’s ideational input 
• The availability of 
accumulated ideas from 
policy networks (esp. PECC) 
 
APEC 
Windows of 
opportunity 
Time 
pressure 
Critical juncture 
• U.S. unilateralism 
• Growth of  
regionalism in Europe 
and North America 
• Stalemate in GATT 
negotiations 
• End of the Cold 
War 
 
Figure 4-2: Summary of the Argument for the Creation of APEC 
 
This chapter has highlighted the two aspects of regional institution-building in the case of 
APEC.  The first stage of analysis addressed why APEC was created in the late 1980s.  The 
empirical evidence shows that the existence of “negative demand” among ASEAN countries was 
the major obstacle for creating an Asia-Pacific intergovernmental arrangement until 1989.  
Therefore, ASEAN’s agreement to join the Asia-Pacific economic forum proved crucial for the 
successful launch of the Asia-Pacific regionalist project.  While some ASEAN officials remained 
very skeptical of the Hawke initiative, ASEAN countries agreed to participate in the first 
Canberra meeting.  This shift in the attitudes of the ASEAN governments was made possible for 
at least two reasons.  First, the economic crisis of 1985–86 precipitated a change in the domestic 
balance of power among domestic actors in favor of liberal reformers.  Furthermore, the adoption 
of export-led liberal economic policies led to a rapid economic growth experienced in most 
ASEAN countries, which eased the resistance against the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional 
economic forum.  Second, the shift in most of the ASEAN countries’ economic policies in the 
1980s led to a major change in the composition of their exports, which dramatically increased the 
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 share of manufactured goods in total exports.  These changes eased the level of resistance to the 
creation of a regional economic forum in the ASEAN countries. 
In the late 1980s, the strongest demand for the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional 
institution came from Japan and Australia.  Politically, they both shared an interest not only in 
increasing their bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States through a multilateral approach, 
but also in countering the growth of regionalism in Europe and North America.  Economically, 
the growth of economic links with the Asia-Pacific region provided both countries with an 
economic logic to promote economic collaboration by reducing transaction costs and securing 
market access in the region.  Ideationally, the concept of “Asia-Pacific” provided a solution to 
both Australia’s and Japan’s search for their own identity in the region, because both countries, 
for different reasons, felt that they were isolated from other countries in the region. 
The most direct triggers that created the urgent demand for an Asia-Pacific regional 
institution came from a sense of crisis shared by many countries in the region with regard to the 
stalemate of GATT negotiations, the rise of inward-looking regionalism in Europe and North 
America, and the U.S. proclivity for unilateralism.  This sense of urgency lowered the threshold 
for creating an Asia-Pacific economic institution, which provided a window of opportunity for 
policy entrepreneurs to take initiatives. 
The second stage of analysis explored how APEC was created by stressing the 
importance of political leadership.  During the preceding two decades before the formation of 
APEC in 1989, the activities by non-governmental policy networks such as PAFTAD, PBEC, 
and PECC promoted path-dependent processes of regional institution-building through an 
incremental institutional evolution.  However, given the strong resistance against the creation of 
an Asia-Pacific intergovernmental arrangement among the ASEAN countries, no political 
leaders took the initiative to create an intergovernmental arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Consequently, the lack of political leadership was a major problem in the Asia-Pacific region 
until the late 1980s. 
Although the bottom-up forces by non-governmental network activities provided a 
context conducive to creating APEC, the establishment of APEC did not directly follow a linear 
path.  Encouraged by a more permissive condition and driven by its own political urgency to 
respond to the new challenges in the late 1980s, it was the Australian government that assumed 
the primary “costs of organizing” by proposing the APEC initiative and mobilizing support from 
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 its potential members.  Despite the initial U.S. opposition to the original Australian proposal that 
excluded the United States, the subsequent U.S. support for the revised version of Australian 
proposal that included the United States created a political space for Australia to undertake this 
initiative.  Meanwhile, the Japanese government also played a supportive role in brokering 
compromises between different visions for the Asia-Pacific forum.  Japan’s inability to play a 
more explicit role and its willingness to let the Australian government take the lead is largely a 
function of the normative constraints on Tokyo due to its past military aggression.  In summary, 
this chapter argued that the formation of APEC can be explained by a shared sense of crisis 
stemming from a set of extraregional developments that not only created an urgent demand for 
an Asia-Pacific regionalist mechanism, but also provided an opportunity for a non-great power to 
play a leadership role in meeting that demand. 
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 5.0  THE INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION OF APEC 
Although the creation of APEC in 1989 signaled a major turning point in institutional 
development in the Asia-Pacific region, an area traditionally characterized by “institutional 
deficit,”1 APEC remains far more “underinstitutionalized” than regional institutions in Europe 
and North America.  Scholars of “comparative regionalisms” correctly characterize Asian 
regional institutions such as APEC with such modifiers as “weak,” “soft,” “informal,” “loose,” 
“underdeveloped,” and so forth.2  Unlike the European Union (EU), there are no supranational 
institutions within APEC.  In other words, there is no sovereignty pooling (or delegation of 
national sovereignty to a supranational entity) in APEC.  Instead, it was deliberately designed as 
an intergovernmental consultative forum among member economies.  In sharp contrast to the EU, 
Asian regional arrangements such as APEC are “geared to sovereignty enhancement” rather than 
sovereignty pooling.3
While APEC has evolved from an informal consultative dialogue among foreign and 
trade ministers into a multilayered forum involving leaders’ meetings, it remains ultimately an 
informal forum to discuss policy collaboration among members without any binding obligations.  
APEC’s modus operandi is characterized by consensus-based decision-making procedures and 
non-legalistic approaches that emphasize informality and agreements of a non-binding nature.  
APEC introduced the concept of “concerted unilateral action,” which means that the goals that 
APEC set up are followed on the basis of voluntary commitments of members.  Another 
important principle that APEC adopted is the notion of “open regionalism,” which means that 
any trade concessions reached within APEC would be applied to outsiders as well.  In other 
words, APEC does not discriminate against non-members. 
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 Given these distinctive characteristics of APEC, this chapter analyzes the institutional 
design and evolution of APEC.  Why did APEC take the weak institutional form that it took and 
why did it evolve in the way that it did?  More specifically, why did APEC take non-legalistic 
approaches that avoid binding obligations?  Why has APEC continued to avoid excessive 
institutionalization?  Why did APEC adopt the principle of open regionalism, despite the fact 
that some member countries, especially the United States, were concerned about free-riding by 
outsiders like the EU and favored instead the principle of reciprocity?  What accounts for the 
shift in priority among different issue areas?  Why did APEC lose its momentum in the latter half 
of the 1990s?  Specifically, how and why did APEC member economies agree on the 1994 
Bogor declaration on trade liberalization?  Subsequently, why did they fail to implement the 
Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) initiative in 1997 and 1998? 
To answer these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows: The first section provides a 
brief overview of the historical evolution of APEC during the first decade since its inception.  
The second section analyzes the institutional form and evolution of APEC, first by investigating 
the institutional preferences of key APEC members and second by exploring interstate 
bargaining with regard to four dimensions of the institution: membership, organizational 
structure, external orientation, and issue areas.  The third section focuses on APEC’s trade 
liberalization efforts from the Bogor Declaration in 1994 to the setback of the EVSL in 1998 as a 
mini-case study.  It illustrates how divergent preferences among members have affected 
interstate negotiations over trade liberalization.  The last section evaluates alternative 
explanations for why APEC took the form that it took and why it evolved in the way it did. 
It will be argued in this chapter that although there was a minimum level of convergence 
of state preferences in favor of a regionalist project at the birth of APEC, there continued to be 
differences among the APEC participants in terms of their institutional preferences over the 
forum’s objectives, forms, and modalities.  The diversity of institutional preferences among the 
APEC members is a major factor that explains the low level of institutionalization of APEC.  
The major dividing line lies between Anglo-American members, who desired to transform APEC 
into a rule-based negotiating mechanism for trade liberalization, and most Asian members, who 
preferred to keep APEC as an informal consultative forum for discussing economic issues and 
promoting economic and technical cooperation. 
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 5.1 APEC’S FIRST DECADE 
The following section provides a brief historical overview of how APEC has evolved during its 
first decade.4  The history of APEC’s institutional development during its first decade can be 
roughly divided into three phases.  The first phase was from 1989 to 1992, during which time 
APEC ministerial meetings were regularized, the membership was expanded to the “three 
Chinas” (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), and a small secretariat was established.  The second 
phase from 1993 to 1995 witnessed the holding of informal summit meetings and the prominence 
of the trade and investment liberalization agenda.  The third phrase from 1996 to 1998 saw the 
erosion of APEC’s institutional credibility as a result of the setback of sectoral trade 
liberalization attempts and its failure to provide an effective mechanism to respond to the Asian 
financial crisis.  
5.1.1 The First Phase: 1989–1992 
On November 6–7, 1989, foreign and trade ministers from twelve regional economies gathered 
in Canberra to discuss how to advance economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.  At this 
inaugural APEC ministerial meeting, however, the participants were not able to reach an 
agreement on the issue of institutionalization.  At that meeting, ministers maintained that “it was 
premature at this stage to decide upon any particular structure either for a Ministerial-level forum 
or its necessary support mechanism.” 5   While they agreed to hold the second ministerial 
consultative meeting in Singapore in 1990 and the third in Korea in 1991, they deferred the 
decision with regard to whether to hold further meetings on a regular basis in the future.6
At the second Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1990, the ministers restated the 
general principles adopted in Canberra.  They also reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion 
of an open trading system and announced a separate APEC Declaration on the Uruguay Round.  
                                                 
4 For comparative purposes, the analysis is limited to the first decade after APEC’s creation to compare the 
institutional evolution of APEC and the APT during approximately the same time periods. 
5 Joint Statement, APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra, 6-7 November 1989, in APEC, Selected APEC Documents, 
1989-1994, 39. 
6 Asahi Shimbun, November 8, 1989, p. 1; See also, Yamakage, ASEAN Pawaa: Ajia Taiheiyo no Chuukaku e 
[ASEAN Power: Putting ASEAN in the Core of the Asia-Pacific], 244-245. 
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 To support the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the ministers endorsed Canada’s 
decision to convene a meeting of APEC ministers in September 1990 to assess and advance 
developments in the Uruguay Round.7
The third Ministerial Meeting in Seoul in November 1991 marked the first time that 
APEC began to gain wider attention from the international community.8  This meeting realized 
the participation of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  As a result, APEC became the first 
international organization that successfully embraced the three Chinas.  The admission of the 
three Chinese economies significantly increased the importance of APEC, which now accounted 
for half of the world’s GDP and 40 percent of world trade.9  At this meeting, the ministers also 
announced the Seoul Declaration, stipulating APEC’s general principles, objectives, and mode of 
cooperation.10  As discussed in detail below, at the fourth Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in 
September 1992, ministers decided to set up a small secretariat in Singapore and also agreed to 
create the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) to provide a vision for APEC. 
5.1.2 The Second Phase: 1993–1996 
The second phase of APEC began in 1993 when the United States hosted the fourth Ministerial 
Meeting and the inaugural Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Seattle.  At the Ministerial Meeting 
held on November 17–19 in 1993, APEC ministers discussed a wide range of issues, including 
the report of the EPG, economic trends and issues, trade and investment issues, the APEC Work 
Program, participation issues, and organizational issues.  Ministers welcomed the submission of 
the first EPG’s report in October 1993.  The EPG report identified three threats to the region’s 
economic growth: the erosion of the multilateral global trading system; the growth of inward 
looking regionalism; and the risk of fragmentation within the Asia-Pacific region. 
Following the ministerial meeting, President Clinton hosted the first APEC Economic 
Leaders’ Meeting at Blake Island on November 20.  The historic event signaled a major 
                                                 
7 APEC, Selected APEC Documents, 1989-1994, 57, 62. 
8 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 73. 
9 John Hogg, Australia and APEC: A Review of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Canberra: Australia Parliament, 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2000), 53. 
10 The contents of the Declaration will be discussed later. 
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 breakthrough in attracting a wider attention from the international community. 11   At the 
inaugural informal summit, APEC leaders recognized “the emergence of a new voice for the 
Asia Pacific in world affairs,” pledged their commitment to bring the Uruguay Round to a 
successful conclusion, and provided a vision of “a community of Asia Pacific economies” on the 
basis of “openness and partnership.”12  The leaders also confirmed their pledge to “continue to 
reduce trade and investment barriers” to promote regional and global trade and investment 
liberalization processes.  To achieve these goals, the leaders put forward several concrete 
initiatives, including the convening of a finance ministers meeting, the establishment of the 
Pacific Business Forum, and the development of an investment code.13
Despite reservations among some Asian countries, the second APEC Economic Leaders’ 
Meeting held in Bogor, Indonesia, in November 1994 saw the announcement of an ambitious 
goal of achieving free and open trade investment by the year 2010 for industrialized economies 
and by the year 2020 for developing economies.14  In the next APEC meetings in Osaka, the 
APEC leaders discussed the details of how to implement the goals set by the Bogor Declaration.  
The Japanese government proposed the concept of “Concerted Unilateral Action” (CUA), which 
would allow each member to proceed with the liberalization efforts without binding 
commitments.  At the 1996 Leaders’ Meeting, the APEC leaders pledged to move “from vision 
to action.”  The leaders adopted the Manila Action Plan for APEC, which identified “the first 
step of an evolutionary process of progressive and comprehensive trade and investment 
liberalization” to achieve the Bogor goals.15
5.1.3 The Third Phase: 1997–1999 
During this period, APEC encountered several serious challenges.  The Vancouver APEC 
meetings were held in November 1997 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, which started in 
July 1997.  At Vancouver, APEC leaders confirmed the central role of the International 
                                                 
11 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 79. 
12 “APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement, Blake Island,” Seattle, November 20, 1993 in APEC, Selected 
APEC Documents, 1989-1994, 1. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 “APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: From Vision to Action,” Subic, Republic of the Philippines, November 
25, 1996, APEC, Selected APEC Documents, 1996 (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1997), 1-2. 
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 Monetary Fund (IMF) on a global level and endorsed the Manila Framework (which was set up 
by central bankers and finance ministers of 14 of the 21 APEC members).  The Manila 
Framework aimed to develop a regional economic monitoring and surveillance mechanism, but it 
primarily supported the centrality of the IMF in dealing with the crisis.  As a result, APEC was 
sidelined in the management of the crisis.  Many policy elites and observers criticized APEC for 
failing to provide any effective solutions for the crisis-affected countries. 
The setback of the negotiations over the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) 
initiative at the 1998 Kuala Lumpur meetings was another serious blow to APEC.  The EVSL, 
strongly promoted by the United States, aimed at early trade liberalization in certain designated 
sectors.  Consequently, by the late 1990s, APEC’s trade liberalization lost its momentum.  In 
short, APEC experienced an institutional crisis by the end of its first decade. 
5.2 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION 
The following section analyzes the institutional form and evolution of APEC, first by 
investigating institutional preferences among key APEC members, and second by delving into 
the four dimensions of APEC’s institutional features. 
5.2.1 Governments’ Institutional Preferences 
What kind of institutional designs did key APEC members prefer and why?  What did they 
expect from APEC?  This section explores the institutional preferences of key APEC members: 
Australia, Japan, the United States, and ASEAN members. 
5.2.1.1 Australia 
As the initiator of APEC, the Australian government was the most enthusiastic supporter 
of APEC during the Labor Party’s rule headed by Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating 
from the inception of APEC until it was replaced by the conservative Coalition headed by Prime 
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 Minister John Howard in 1996.16  The previous chapter showed that Canberra’s interest in APEC 
was primarily triggered by the fear of marginalization in the perceived fragmentation of the 
world economy into regional trading blocs none of which would naturally include Australia.  
Therefore, Australia’s APEC initiative reflected its desire to be admitted as part of the Asian 
region to capitalize on rapidly expanding markets. 
It is noteworthy that the original Hawke proposal for establishing a regular ministerial 
meeting did not envision the participation of the United States.  Foreign and Trade Secretary 
Richard Woolcott explained that this provision was only intended to discourage the United States 
to take the lead, because the excessive U.S. involvement in the initiative would alienate ASEAN 
countries, thus preventing the proposal from getting off the ground.17  However, many observers 
concluded that Hawke deliberately excluded the United States to use this new group as 
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States – which Foreign Minister Gareth Evans later 
admitted.18  At least initially, there were several strong motivations for Australia to exclude the 
United States.  Not only was the United States a rival of Australia, particularly in the fields of 
agriculture and minerals, but the U.S. attempts to retaliate against protectionist European 
competitors often inadvertently worked against Australian agricultural exporters.19  Moreover, 
without the U.S. presence, Australia would have been able to maximize its political influence 
within the proposed group.  Whatever the real intentions behind the Hawke initiative were, 
however, Australia had no choice but to accept the U.S. membership in the face of strong U.S. 
opposition. 
With regard to the participation of China, Australia strongly supported the idea from the 
beginning.20   However, the Labor government opposed further addition of new members in 
APEC.  Canberra was opposed to the participation of Latin American countries in APEC on the 
grounds that it would complicate decision-making processes of an institution which operates by 
                                                 
16 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 114. 
17 This is based on Woolcott’s account.  See Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 62-63. 
18 See, for example, Cotton and Ravenhill, "Australia's 'Engagement with Asia'," 7-9.  In his memoirs Hawke denied 
the suggestion that he envisioned a regional grouping that did not include the United States.  However, as James 
Cotton and John Ravenhill suggest, this claim is doubtful, judging from his Seoul speech. 
19 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 63. 
20 “Unspecific Pacific: Canberra’s Asia-Pacific Proposal Gets Cautions Nod,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 
11, 1989, 20. 
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 consensus.  By the same token, the Australian government opposed both Indian and Russian 
membership.21
In terms of APEC’s institution-building, the Australian government favored further 
institutionalization. 22   The Hawke proposal had initially envisioned a regional institution 
modeled after the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).23  Prime 
Minister Paul Keating, who succeeded Hawke in December 1991, was even more active than 
Hawke himself in advancing APEC’s institutionalization.24  In April 1992, Keating proposed 
regular heads-of-government meetings to provide a major boost to the APEC process – an idea 
that American President Bill Clinton acted upon subsequently. 
With regard to external orientation of APEC in its relations with GATT, the original 
Hawke initiative was ambiguous. 25   Nevertheless, from the beginning, the Australian 
government saw APEC as a means to reach a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  
Alternatively, it viewed APEC as an insurance regime to secure access to the dynamic 
economies in Asia in case the Uruguay Round failed.  Moreover, as argued in the previous 
chapter, Australia’s interest in proposing a regional forum was to an important degree driven by 
its growing concern about the perceived rise of regional blocs in which Australia would be 
excluded.  Therefore, the Australian government was opposed to creating an inward-looking 
trading bloc, supporting instead the concept of “open regionalism” in principle. 
In terms of issues to be covered in APEC, having pursued domestic economic 
liberalization policies, Australia’s Labor Party advanced a trade and investment liberalization 
agenda in APEC.  The Labor Government believed in the neoclassical economic argument that 
unilateral trade liberalization is beneficial for the country’s economy.26  In his Seoul speech, 
Hawke identified three tasks for the proposed institution: 1) to contribute to a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round; 2) to discuss the obstacles to international trade in the region; 
and 3) to identify common economic interests and issues to enhance regional economic 
                                                 
21 Ravenhill, "Australia and APEC," 155. 
22 This is based on the 1993 assessment of William Bodde who was the first Executive Director of APEC Secretariat.  
Other countries which he listed as most enthusiastic about institution-building are the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, Korea, and Singapore.  See William Bodde, View from the 19th Floor: Reflections of the First APEC 
Executive Director (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 6. 
23 Terada, "The Genesis of APEC: Australia-Japan Political Initiatives," 20. 
24 Ravenhill, "Australia and APEC," 158. 
25 Ibid., 153. 
26 Ibid., 155-156. 
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 complementarities.27  In short, the Australian government envisioned and pursued APEC as a 
regional institution in the area of liberalization with considerable safeguards against U.S. 
hegemony.28
5.2.1.2 Japan 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan’s MITI proposal envisioned an Asia-Pacific 
regional forum much closer in form to the actual institutional form that APEC took than the 
proposed Australian one, at least initially.  MITI was interested more in “enlarging the pie” 
through economic growth and cooperation than simply liberalizing markets. 29   Therefore, 
Japan’s preferred institutional design for APEC was a loose and informal consultative forum for 
promoting economic cooperation rather than a formal body involving trade negotiations for 
liberalization. 
In terms of membership, unlike Australia, Japan insisted on the participation of the 
United States from the beginning.  It is not surprising, given the former’s important political and 
security relationship with the United States.  Moreover, a significant part of Japan’s interest in 
APEC stemmed from its desire to deal with the strained economic relations with the United 
States in a multilateral setting.  In short, Japan’s goals in APEC sought “to lock the United States 
into Asia, to blunt protectionist pressures in the United States, and to diffuse U.S. economic 
‘result-oriented’ demands away from singling out Japan for bilateral bargaining.”30
In terms of the organizational form, the Japanese government rejected the Australian 
vision for an Asia-Pacific OECD as being too rigid in favor of a less institutionalized form.  To 
present Japan’s preference for an informal regional forum, Ippei Yamazawa, a Japanese 
intellectual architect of APEC, coined the term “open economic association” (OEA). 31   
According to him, an OEA is: 
- open in that its structure and policies do not lead to discrimination against trade and 
investment with the rest of the world; 
- economic in its primary policy focus; and 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 152. 
28 Davis B. Bobrow and Robert T. Kudrle, "Foreign Direct Investment in the Context of Regionalism: The Case of 
APEC," in Kenneth P. Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault, eds., Racing to Regionalize: Democracy, Capitalism, and 
Regional Political Economy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 67. 
29 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 66. 
30 Bobrow and Kudrle, "Foreign Direct Investment in the Context of Regionalism: The Case of APEC," 65. 
31 Ippei Yamazawa, "On Pacific Economic Integration," Economic Journal 102, no. 415 (1992): 1528. 
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 - a voluntary association in that its members do not cede sovereignty to any supranational 
regional institution.32 
 
Japan’s preference for an OEA rather than a treaty-based formal institutional integration matches 
ASEAN’s institutional preferences.  Japan consistently opposed any attempt to turn APEC into a 
more institutionalized organization or a discriminatory preferential trading arrangement.  For 
example, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro expressed Japan’s preference for an informal and 
incremental approach to a more formal institution at the inaugural economic leaders’ meeting in 
Seattle in 1993, stating that: 
The Japanese government had no desire to see the regional forum [APEC] 
institutionalized or turned into a free trading area…. It is very important that we respect 
the interest of the developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region and heed their opinions 
and try to promote the activities of APEC step by step.33
 
At the Bogor APEC economic leaders’ meeting in November 1994, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Tsutomu Hata expressed three principles with regard to the institutional development of APEC: 
“(1) it should become an area of relaxed discussions rather than negotiations, (2) it should be a 
group which is open to other nations, and (3) it should seek to implement a gradual reduction of 
tariff duties through discussions.”34
The Japanese government repeatedly emphasized that APEC “is a loose forum for 
consultations and cooperation.”35  In his speech to journalists at the Osaka APEC meetings in 
November 1995, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono asserted that, given the political, economic, and 
social diversity among the APEC members, “it would not be practical to look for a legalistic 
framework imposing rights and obligations on all members in a uniform fashion.”36
With regard to APEC’s external orientation, Tokyo as an exporter on a global scale 
strongly endorsed the principle of open regionalism.  This endorsement was based on Japan’s 
objection to creating a discriminatory regional bloc that would further escalate the growth of 
inward-looking regionalism in Europe and North America, a trend that the Japanese government 
                                                 
32 Ippei Yamazawa, "APEC's New Development and Its Implications for Nonmember Developing Countries," 
Developing Economies 34, no. 2 (1996): 29. 
33 Cited in Yong Deng, "Japan in APEC: The Problematic Leadership Role," Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (1997): 357. 
34 Cited in Ibid.: 358. 
35 “Japan's Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific, and the Significance of APEC: Speech Given by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Yohei Kono at the Kansai Press Club,” November 15, 1995, APEC 1995 Osaka Official Information, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/yk_spech.html
36 Ibid. 
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 observed cautiously in the early 1990s.  In preparing the draft Action Agenda for the Osaka 
APEC meetings in 1995, Kono highlighted the importance of the principles of WTO-consistency 
and non-discrimination.  He stated that “Japan is strongly committed to maintaining and 
strengthening the multilateral free trading system, and strongly supports the development of 
APEC as a framework for open regional cooperation which is consistent with the WTO 
Agreement” and insisted that “non-discrimination within APEC should be ensured as a premise 
for non-discrimination vis-à-vis non-APEC economies.”37
Since APEC’s inception, Japan’s preferred functional objective of APEC has been the 
promotion of economic cooperation between developed and developing countries.  The Japanese 
government viewed trade and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF) and economic and 
technical cooperation (Ecotech) as “two wheels of the same axle” both indispensable for the 
growth of the Asia-Pacific economies.38
Tokyo’s particular enthusiasm for promoting a development cooperation agenda was 
demonstrated by its initiative for Partners for Progress (PFP) which Foreign Minister Yohei 
Kono initially proposed during the Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in November 1994.39  It was 
aimed at promoting economic and technical cooperation beyond studies and seminars by 
establishing a standing agency within APEC to administer projects.40   Japan’s original PFP 
proposal, however, was not endorsed by APEC members because of opposition from some 
advanced countries.  Nonetheless, it demonstrated Japan’s willingness to promote the Ecotech 
agenda as an essential part of APEC activities.  Subsequently, during his speech in Osaka in 
1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama announced that Japan would commit 10 billion yen 
over several years to the promotion of TILF.41
                                                 
37 “Japan’s Position: Remarks by Minister Yohei Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan,” APEC 1995 Osaka 
Official Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/j_pstion.html
38 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996 Diplomatic Bluebook, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/I-b.html
39 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partners for Progress (PFP), 15 November 1995, at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/briefing/br4.html
40 Ippei Yamazawa, "APEC's Economic and Technical Cooperation: Evolution and Tasks Ahead," in C. Fred 
Bergsten, ed., Whither APEC?  The Progress to Date and Agenda for the Future (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International economics, 1997), 138. 
41 Ibid., 138. 
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 5.2.1.3 The United States 
As noted in the previous chapter, although the U.S. attitude toward APEC during the 
George H. W. Bush administration was mostly reserved, the U.S. government vehemently 
opposed the exclusion of the United States from a regional grouping as initially envisioned by 
Australia.  As discussed in the next chapter, the U.S. government also opposed the proposal of 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir for creating an East Asian Economic Grouping. The 
proposal aimed at creating an “Asia-only” grouping without the participation of Western powers 
including the United States.  Instead, the U.S. government pressed for strengthening trans-Pacific 
regional cooperation in the form of APEC to capitalize on the dynamic Asian economies. 
Once President Bill Clinton took an active interest in APEC when he came into office in 
1993, the U.S. government put forward its own vision for APEC.  In a series of speeches in July 
1993, President Clinton called for the establishment of a “Pacific Community,” identifying 
APEC as providing the foundation for the proposed community.42  The U.S. government viewed 
APEC as a channel to put pressure on Asian countries to open their markets.  To this end, it 
preferred a more institutionalized approach with specific tangible goals, fixed deadlines, and 
binding commitments.  In the words of then Undersecretary of State Joan Spero, the U.S. 
government sought to transform APEC “from a dialogue forum to an action-oriented, results-
producing forum.”43  Put succinctly, the United States envisioned a more formal body involving 
result-oriented negotiations with binding obligations rather than an informal consultative forum 
as originally conceived. 
Moreover, the U.S. government attempted to use APEC in its extraregional foreign policy.  
In particular, the Clinton administration saw APEC as a means to increase bargaining leverage 
against the EU during the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations. 44   In terms of how 
liberalization should be implemented, the United States was not enthusiastic about the concept of 
open regionalism.  Instead, the U.S. government maintained that any liberalization measures 
                                                 
42 Susumu Yamakage, "Japan's National Security and Asia-Pacific's Regional Institution in the Post-Cold War Era," 
in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 293. 
43 Testimony for Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, House 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Asia and Pacific Affairs and International Economic 
Policy and Trade, July 18, 1995.  Cited in Bobrow and Kudrle, "Foreign Direct Investment in the Context of 
Regionalism: The Case of APEC," 64. 
44 Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, 93; Higgott, "ASEM and the Evolving Global 
Order," 30. 
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 undertaken within APEC should be applied to non-APEC member states on the basis of 
reciprocity.  This position stemmed mainly from U.S. concerns about European free riding.45  
Once the WTO was formed in 1995, the U.S. government desired to use APEC as a mechanism 
to expand and accelerate trade liberalization under the auspices of the WTO or to pursue trade 
liberalization agendas that were deeper and broader than those of the WTO (which came to be 
known as “WTO Plus”). 
In terms of issue areas, the U.S. government clearly pressed for using APEC as a vehicle 
for trade and investment liberalization, until it encountered the debacle over U.S.-led Early 
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization initiative which will be discussed later in this chapter.  In 
contrast with its enthusiasm in trade and investment liberalization, the United States was not 
interested in minimizing the development gap among member economies.  The U.S. government 
also desired to discuss political and security issues, a position strongly rejected by some 
members of APEC, such as China, which did not want to discuss security matters in the presence 
of Taipei leaders.46
5.2.1.4 ASEAN 
Although ASEAN was initially very reluctant to participate in the APEC process, the end 
of the Cold War and the subsequent uncertainty prompted ASEAN leaders to view APEC a 
useful vehicle to maintain continued access to export markets in the face of the rise of U.S. 
protectionism and the stalemate of the GATT trade negotiations.  With the end of the Cold War, 
ASEAN lost somewhat its strategic importance to major powers.  Consequently, ASEAN faced 
“the danger of being ignored by the key players.”47  Moreover, ASEAN was worried about a 
diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI) away from ASEAN to newly opened Eastern 
Europe and China.  Therefore, many ASEAN members started to view APEC as a means of 
keeping continued U.S. and Japanese economic attention.48
Although ASEAN’s agreement to participate in APEC signaled a watershed in its 
attitudes toward an Asia-Pacific regional framework, ASEAN continued to emphasize its 
                                                 
45 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 95. 
46 Yamakage, "Japan's National Security and Asia-Pacific's Regional Institution in the Post-Cold War Era," 294. 
47 Mohamed Ariff, "APEC and ASEAN: Complementing or Competing?," in Siow Yue Chia, ed., APEC: 
Challenges and Opportunities (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1994), 168-169. 
48 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 67. 
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 preference for informality and warned against excessive institutionalization of the new 
organization.  Put simply, ASEAN’s preferred institutional form has been based on the extension 
of ASEAN’s norms and principles into the Asia-Pacific regionalist project.49
The previous chapter noted that the major reason for ASEAN’s initial reluctance to 
participate in a wider regional form stemmed from the fact that the proposed Asia-Pacific 
grouping would involve major advanced countries.  Many ASEAN countries feared that such an 
organization would be dominated by larger countries like the United States.  Malaysia and 
Thailand expressed their reservations about the U.S. membership, while Singapore welcomed the 
participation of the United States and Canada.50  Despite ASEAN’s agreement to join the Asia-
Pacific process, ASEAN members remained wary of the possibility that the United States would 
use APEC as “a tool for U.S. regional domination.”51  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin 
Mohamad was the most outspoken opponent of the participation of Western members in APEC 
in general and the dominant role of the United States in particular.  As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, in December 1990 Mahathir called for the establishment of an East Asian Economic 
Group (EAEG), which was to be composed of only East Asian countries. 
With regard to APEC’s organizational structure, ASEAN resisted any attempt to turn 
APEC from an informal consultative forum, their preferred form, into a more formal negotiating 
body.  To caution against the institutionalization of APEC, ASEAN members agreed on a list of 
principles for their participation in the APEC process at the ASEAN Joint Ministerial Meeting in 
Kuching, Malaysia, in February 1990.  The so-called Kuching consensus identified the following 
principles: 
• ASEAN’s identity and cohesion should be preserved and its cooperative relations 
with its dialogue partners and with third countries should not be diluted in any 
enhanced APEC; 
 
• An enhanced APEC should be based on the principles of equality, equity and 
mutual benefit, taking fully into account the differences in stages of economic 
development and socio-political systems among the countries in the region; 
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 • APEC should not be directed towards the formation of an inward-looking 
economic or trading bloc but, instead, it should strengthen the open, multilateral 
economic and trading systems in the world; 
 
• APEC should provide a consultative forum on economic issues and should not be 
lead to the adoption of mandatory directives for any participant to undertake or 
implement; 
 
• APEC should be aimed at strengthening the individual and collective capacity of 
participants for economic analysis and at facilitating more effective, mutual 
consultations to enable participants to identify more clearly and to promote their 
common interests and to project more vigorously those interests in the larger 
multilateral forums; and 
 
• APEC should proceed gradually and pragmatically, especially in its 
institutionalization, without inhibiting further elaboration and future expansion.52 
 
Furthermore, to prevent ASEAN from being diluted within APEC, the ASEAN members 
desired that ASEAN remain the core of the APEC process.  Philippine Finance Minister Jesus 
Estanislao provided ASEAN’s vision in the form of a “concentric circles” model, which saw 
different levels of cooperation – subregional (i.e. ASEAN), regional (i.e. APEC), and global 
processes (i.e. GATT) – as a multilayered process.53  Endorsing this model at the ministerial 
meeting in Singapore in 1990, Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke of the 
relationship between ASEAN and APEC as “two concentric circles of cooperation.”54
The ASEAN members emphasize the importance of processes over structures in the 
APEC process.55  ASEAN repeatedly cautioned against being too hasty in institutionalizing the 
APEC forum in favor of a gradual and incremental approach.  Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, who was 
an Indonesian member of APEC’s Eminent Persons Group discussed below, described the 
“Asian” approach as agreeing on principles first, then discussing the details later.  This contrasts 
with the “American” approach which many in Asia considered too legalistic and too 
institutionalized.  He argued that “[t]o start with legally binding commitments covering a wide 
range of issues scares many people in Asia.”56
                                                 
52 Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circles Work?," The Pacific Review 8, no. 3 (1995): 483-484. 
53 Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC, 67. 
54 Ibid., 129. 
55 Soesastro, "ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circles Work?," 484. 
56 Ibid.: 486. 
 154 
 Despite ASEAN’s desire to present one voice at APEC, internal differences within the 
ASEAN members with regard to their institutional preferences over APEC gradually surfaced, 
especially when trade liberalization came to the center of APEC’s agenda after 1993.  At the two 
extremes have been Singapore and Malaysia.57  Singapore has been most enthusiastic about 
strengthening the institutional structure of APEC and has consistently supported APEC’s trade 
liberalization efforts.  On the other hand, Malaysia has resisted any efforts toward APEC’s 
institutionalization.   For example, in protest against the U.S. initiative to hold a leaders’ meeting, 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir boycotted APEC’s inaugural leaders’ meeting held in 1993.  
Indonesia had been among the least supportive of APEC’s trade liberalization agenda but 
became more positive about APEC.  When Indonesia hosted the leaders’ meeting in 1994, the 
Indonesian government under President Suharto “took a more pro-active, more enthusiastic 
attitude towards APEC.”58
In terms of external orientation of APEC, ASEAN supported the principle of open 
regionalism in opposition to the creation of a closed trading bloc.  At APEC’s initial stage, 
ASEAN supported the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks.  In this 
respect, ASEAN began to view APEC as “a platform to advance ASEAN’s interest in global 
multilateral trade negotiations.”59
Not surprisingly, ASEAN’s preferred agenda for APEC has been economic and technical 
cooperation rather than trade liberalization.  As discussed below, many ASEAN states resisted 
attempts by many Western members of APEC to use APEC as a vehicle for promoting trade 
liberalization.  Meanwhile, Singapore, which had already removed all tariffs on most products, 
was the only consistent supporter for APEC’s push for trade liberalization.  Thailand and the 
Philippines also showed sporadic interests in trade liberalization.60
At APEC’s initial stage, ASEAN’s interest in APEC was driven by its desire to use 
APEC as a vehicle to maintain continued access to export markets in the face of the rise of U.S. 
protectionism and the stalemate of the GATT trade negotiations and to attract attention from 
major economies like the United States and Japan.  ASEAN was increasingly concerned about 
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 the prospect of diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI) away from Southeast Asia to newly 
opened Eastern Europe and China.61  For example, Lee Hsien Loong, Minister for Trade and 
Industry, maintained: 
At a time when Eastern Europe is attracting more attention from the developed countries, 
APEC will provide an extra incentive for the U.S., Japan, and the other major regional 
economies to strengthen their ties with ASEAN.62
 
However, despite the initial worries, not only did the U.S. market remain open to Asian exports, 
but the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations were successfully completed by 1994.  
Because of these subsequent developments after APEC’s birth, by the mid-1990s the initial 
external challenges that had driven the participation of the Southeast Asian countries in APEC 
had become marginal.63  This weakened ASEAN’s interest in APEC as a way to maintain market 
access. 
5.2.1.5 China 
Until the early 1990s, China had been mostly skeptical about multilateral approaches.  
Since the adoption of the Open Door Policy in 1978, China has gradually opened its economy 
and has been increasingly integrated into the world economy.  Yet, in principle, Beijing 
continued to prefer an “independent” foreign policy, which was officially adopted in 1982.  In 
dealing with regional affairs, China generally preferred bilateral approaches because Beijing 
could take advantage of the greater leverage that it enjoyed over many countries in the region, 
especially ASEAN members.64  Chinese skepticism about regionalism was based on their belief 
that regional forums would be dominated by major powers like the United States at the expense 
of its own interests.  This “fear of inclusion” – “the fear that China would be included on terms 
set by other regional players” – was gradually outweighed by the “fear of exclusion.”  
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 Notwithstanding China’s continuing reservations over regionalism throughout the 1980s, the 
period from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s witnessed a growing recognition among Chinese 
policy elites that the opportunity cost of China staying out of regional economic groupings would 
be high.65   
The Tiananmen incident of June 1989 and the international reaction to that event was a 
major setback for China’s integration into the world community.  In response to the post-
Tiananmen diplomatic isolation and the end of the Cold War, China turned to regionalism.66  In 
the early 1990s, Chinese leaders “realized their country would wield more influence as a 
participant than as a nonparticipant.”67  In 1991, China was accepted as a member in APEC.  
When APEC had its inaugural informal leader’s meeting in 1993, Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
took a personal interest in APEC.68  China’s decision to join APEC reflected not only its fear of 
exclusion, but also its desire to use it as an opportunity to make a complete return to the 
international stage in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. 
In terms of organizational form, China preferred a loose consultative form of regional 
arrangement with a gradualist and consensus-based approach.  At the Seattle leaders’ meeting, 
Jiang Zemin stated that “APEC should be an open, flexible and pragmatic forum for economic 
cooperation and a consultation mechanism rather than a closed, institutionalized economic 
bloc.”69  In his speech, he identified four principles for economic cooperation during the Seattle 
meeting: “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, opening up to each other, as well as 
common prosperity.”70  At the next APEC informal summit meeting in November 1994, the 
Chinese government put forward the following five principles: (1) mutual respect and 
consultative consensus; (2) gradual progress and stable development; (3) opening to each other 
and non-discrimination; (4) comprehensive cooperation and mutual benefit; (5) reducing the 
development gap and common prosperity.71
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 In terms of issue areas, like other Asian countries, China stressed the importance of 
economic and technical cooperation.72  Also, China rejected dealing with political and security 
issues within the APEC framework.73  In short, China’s institutional preference over APEC had 
a close resemblance with that of ASEAN countries. 
5.2.2 Four Dimensions of Institution 
The following section analyzes the institutional form and evolution of APEC in four dimensions: 
membership, organizational structure, external orientation, and issue areas.  In doing so, it 
examines why APEC evolved in the way it did by exploring how different institutional 
preferences among key members played out in each dimension. 
5.2.2.1 Membership 
Since its inception, APEC’s membership has expanded from 12 to 21 within the first 
eight years of its existence (See Table 5-1).  The following pages first outline a brief history of 
APEC membership and then explore an important debate between the advocates of widening the 
grouping by inviting new members and the proponents of deepening cooperation within the 
existing APEC members. 
 
Table 5-1: Year in which Member Economies Joined APEC 
 Member Economies 
1989 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States 
1991 People’s Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong 
1993 Mexico, Papua New Guinea 
1994 Chile 
1998 Peru, Russia, Vietnam 
 
The issue of membership was extremely controversial from the beginning when APEC 
was formed in 1989.  When the Hawke proposal was announced, the question of which countries 
were to be invited to this newly proposed forum was probably more contentious than what 
agendas were to be discussed at the inaugural meeting.  The previous chapter illustrated that 
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 Southeast Asian developing countries were particularly concerned about joining a regional forum 
which would involve the major advanced countries.  The issue of U.S. participation was most 
controversial in discussion of who would participate in the inaugural Asia-Pacific regional forum.  
As noted earlier, the initial Hawke proposal failed to list the United States as a member of the 
proposed grouping.  The Japanese government had proposed a similar regional forum that 
envisioned the United States as an indispensable member.  Japan’s interest lied in embedding the 
United States in a regional, multilateral forum rather than creating a regional forum that would 
exclude the United States.  Therefore, the Japanese government took pains to convince skeptical 
ASEAN countries about the U.S. participation.  Meanwhile, the U.S. government strongly 
opposed being excluded from the proposed regional arrangement, which left the Australian 
government no choice but to invite the United States.  At the inaugural APEC ministerial 
meeting held in November 1989, twelve countries gathered in Canberra, including Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United States, and the six member countries of 
ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). 
However, conspicuously absent from the Canberra meeting were the “Three Chinas,” 
namely, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.74  While some countries like 
the United States and Australia were enthusiastic about the participation of three Chinas as soon 
as possible, many ASEAN countries were reluctant about the early inclusion of these 
economies.75  At that time, three ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei, still did 
not have diplomatic relations with Beijing, although each has established ties subsequently.  At 
the Canberra meeting, Tokyo wanted to defer the China question until later, although it 
supported the eventual inclusion.76  The Americans agreed to defer the issue, because they were 
afraid that the focus on the issue of Chinese membership “could divert APEC from getting off 
the ground.”77  Consequently, the subsequent senior officials’ meeting was given the task of 
reaching agreement on how to incorporate the “three Chinas.”  Despite the initial divergent 
preferences among APEC members, the participation of the “Three Chinas” was realized at the 
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 third ministerial meeting in Seoul in November 1991 through the brokerage of South Korea 
under the leadership of Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee See-Young.78
At the same meeting, a general rule about membership was also reached and endorsed in 
the Seoul Declaration, which stipulated that “[p]articipation in APEC will be open, in principle, 
to those economies in the Asia-Pacific region which: (a) have strong economic linkages in the 
Asia-Pacific region; and (b) accept the objectives and principles of APEC as embodied in this 
Declaration.”79  Like other issues in APEC, decisions on future membership were to be made on 
the basis of a consensus among APEC members.  At the next ministerial meeting in Bangkok in 
1992, APEC ministers reaffirmed the criteria for APEC membership set forth in the Seoul 
Declaration in the previous year and “expressed the view that APEC was entering a phase when 
consolidation and effectiveness should be the primary consideration, and that decisions on 
further participation required careful consideration in regard to the mutual benefits to both APEC 
and prospective participants.”80  In 1993, Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted, and the 
ministers decided to admit Chile the following year.  However, at the 1993 ministerial meeting, 
the ministers “agreed to defer consideration of additional members for three years.”81
By the end of the first moratorium, more than ten candidates expressed their interest in 
participating in APEC.  The leading candidates were believed to be Russia, India, Mongolia, 
Peru, Vietnam, Ecuador, Colombia, Laos, and Panama.82  Russia had formally announced its 
interest in APEC’s membership in March 1995.  However, Australia opposed the participation of 
Russia on the grounds that Russia was more oriented toward Europe rather than Asia Pacific.  
For example, Andrew Elek pointed out that Russia’s trade with Europe was larger than that with 
APEC economies.83  Critics thus argued that Russia did not meet at least one of the APEC 
membership criteria mentioned above, which states that members should “have strong economic 
linkages in the Asia-Pacific region.”84  On the other hand, other APEC members, including 
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 Japan and China, supported Russia’s entry into APEC, but their support was motivated more by 
political reasons than economic rationale.  In their views, Russia’s participation in APEC would 
help them to improve their respective relationship with Russia.  Moscow’s interest in APEC was 
also driven by political motives rather than the expected economic benefits from participating in 
APEC.  Specifically, Moscow wanted to demonstrate its commitment to the Asia-Pacific region 
as a Pacific power in the hope of increasing its political status in the region.  Similarly, Vietnam 
aspired to be an APEC member as a part of wider strategy of ending its former isolation.85  
ASEAN supported the admission of Vietnam, which had joined the Association in 1995.86  Japan 
also supported the participation of Vietnam and Peru.87
At the 1997 ministerial meeting, the ministers agreed to admit three of these applicants – 
Russia, Vietnam, and Peru – the following year.  However, at the same meeting, the ministers 
also agreed upon a ten-year moratorium on APEC membership.88   The second membership 
moratorium indicated APEC members’ recognition that the enlargement of APEC’s membership 
has complicated APEC’s consensual decision-making and made it extremely difficult to pursue 
its stated goals and reach any substantial agreement.  This has been at the heart of the debate 
between advocates for enlargement and their opponents, an issue that I turn to below. 
 
 “Deepening” versus “Widening” 
Like any organization, APEC has faced a classic dilemma between “deepening” and 
“widening.” 89   On the one hand, the more economies that join APEC and thus commit 
themselves to trade liberalization and other goals of APEC, the better.  On the other hand, APEC 
operates on the basis of consensus.  Therefore, if more economies are involved in APEC, it will 
become more difficult to reach consensus on the goals and modalities of the forum.90
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 Some members, especially Australia and the United States, have expressed their 
reservations about admitting new members on the grounds that the expansion of the group would 
make APEC’s liberalization goals more difficult to achieve.91  In particular, Australian Prime 
Minister Keating strongly opposed the expansion of the grouping.  In his memoir, he explains his 
opposition to the expansion of APEC’s membership by writing: “if APEC got too big, or its 
membership became more diffuse – for example, by drawing in Latin America – we could not 
achieve what we wanted to do strategically.”92  On the other hand, Malaysia has enthusiastically 
supported the expansion of APEC’s membership.  China also has been generally supportive of 
increasing the membership of APEC, as exemplified by its support for the inclusion of Peru and 
Russia.93  (For a summary of some members’ preferences with regard to APEC’s membership, 
see Table 5-2). 
 
Table 5-2: Representative Members' Preferences on APEC’s Enlargement 
Enlargement No Enlargement 
Malaysia, China, (Japan) Australia, the U.S. 
 
It is noteworthy that Malaysia, which has been the least enthusiastic member of APEC, 
has also been the most enthusiastic advocate of enlarging APEC’s membership.  In fact, many 
observers commented that Malaysia’s support for the enlargement of APEC stemmed from its 
interest in deliberately weakening the grouping.94  Sharing this observation, Keating criticized 
Malaysia’s lobbying for the admission of new members as “an attempt to make APEC 
ineffective before it had really begun.”95  Similarly, some commentators believed that Japan’s 
support for Russian membership in APEC was to some extent driven by its desire to complicate 
the grouping’s trade liberalization agenda by further enhancing the diversity of APEC, especially 
at a time when the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization initiative was at the center of APEC’s 
agendas.96  In short, decisions on the admission of new members have become highly politicized. 
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 5.2.2.2 Organizational Structure 
From the outset, APEC has emphasized the informal nature of the forum.  In 1989, APEC 
started as a consultative forum among foreign and trade ministers from member economies.  
Various sectoral ministerial meetings have also been later added in the following areas: 
education, energy, environment and sustainable development, finance, human resource 
development, regional science and technology cooperation, small and medium enterprise, 
telecommunications and information industry, trade, transportation, women’s affairs, and 
tourism.  As noted earlier, beginning in 1993, economic leaders’ meetings have been held 
annually.  APEC currently operates at three levels: Leaders’ Meetings, Ministerial Meetings, and 
Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM).  It has four committees, eleven sub-committees, SOM special 
task groups, and eleven working groups.  The APEC host economy is responsible for chairing 
the Ministerial and Economic Leaders’ Meetings.  APEC adopted an informal practice of 
alternating the chairmanship between an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member every two years – 
a practice which lasted until the Brunei meeting in 2000.  Since then the rotation of ASEAN 
chairmanship of APEC has been once every three years.97
APEC operates by consensus reached among APEC members through open dialogue and 
consultation.  It has often been recognized that APEC focuses on the process of interactions 
rather than structure or substance. 98   APEC’s agreements are not based on legally binding 
commitments; APEC’s decisions are implemented through the unilateral actions of members, 
subject only to peer pressure. 
As we have already seen, the institutional development of APEC can be divided into 
three phases.  The first phase between 1989 and 1992 was characterized by ASEAN’s vigorous 
efforts to prevent the institutionalization of APEC.  The inaugural Canberra meeting emphasized 
the principle that APEC operates through “open dialogue and consensus” and “cooperation 
should be based on non-formal consultative exchanges of views among Asia Pacific 
economies.”99  Similarly, at the second Ministerial Meeting in 1990, the ministers confirmed that 
“APEC is a non-formal forum for consultations among high-level representatives of economies” 
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 in the Asia Pacific region.100  The 1991 Seoul Declaration identifies APEC’s mode of operation, 
stipulating that cooperation would be based on: 
(a) the principle of mutual benefit, taking into account the differences in the stages of 
economic development and in the socio-political systems, and giving due 
consideration to the needs of developing economies; and 
(b) a commitment to open dialogue and consensus-building, with equal respect for the 
views of all participants.101 
 
Although some countries desired to adopt the 1991 Seoul Declaration as the APEC Charter, this 
desire was not realized because of ASEAN’s opposition.  ASEAN also resisted stipulating the 
establishment of a secretariat and budget that were eventually removed from the final text.102  In 
particular, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas warned against the institutionalization of 
APEC, including the establishment of an APEC secretariat, and argued that if such a secretariat 
were deemed necessary, APEC could utilize the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta.103  ASEAN also 
opposed the Australian proposal for establishing an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) of experts.104  
Nonetheless, the ministers recognized the need to consider “the possibility of establishing a 
mechanism on a permanent basis to provide support and coordination for APEC activities at 
various levels; ways to finance APEC activities, including a procedure for apportionment of 
expenses; and other organizational matters.”105  The adoption of the Seoul Declaration was the 
first comprehensive statement of APEC’s mission. 
 
Secretariat 
Some APEC members, such as Australia and the U.S., had envisioned the creation of a 
permanent secretariat since the inception of APEC.106  Meanwhile, many Asian countries had 
opposed it as a move toward APEC’s institutionalization.  However, once Thailand, as the host 
economy of the 1992 APEC meeting, expressed an interest in establishing the APEC secretariat 
in Bangkok, other countries like Singapore, Indonesia, and South Korea also called for bringing 
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 it to their capitals.  Although most members agreed that the secretariat should be established in 
an ASEAN member capital, the competition between Singapore and Bangkok was stalled.  
Through the brokerage of senior officials, who collected opinions of member governments, at the 
1992 ministerial meeting in Bangkok, ministers agreed to establish the secretariat in 
Singapore.107  At Bangkok, ministers also endorsed the recommendation of senior officials that 
“The APEC Secretariat should be small in size, simple in structure, and flexible enough to meet 
APEC’s needs.”108
Accordingly, a small secretariat was established in Singapore in February 1993.  It is 
headed by an Executive Director from the current APEC host economy and a Deputy Executive 
Director from the next host economy.  The Secretariat operates as “a support mechanism to 
facilitate and coordinate APEC activities, provide logistical and technical services as well as 
administer APEC financial affairs under the direction of the APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting 
(APEC SOM).”109   It is staffed by only twenty-two program directors, who seconded from 
APEC Member Economies, with an additional 27 staff employed directly by the Secretariat to 
fulfill specialist and support functions.110
The establishment of the permanent secretariat in Singapore marked the first step in 
APEC’s institutional development.  However, the role of the secretariat remains extremely 
limited to that of “a service organ to keep records, provide logistics, and serve as a central 
clearinghouse in a still highly decentralized institution.”  Moreover, the constant rotation of 
officials makes the development of a sense of organizational identity or institutional memory 
extremely difficult.111   The main part of institutional work remains in the hands of various 
ministries at the national level, especially that of the incoming host economy. 112
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 Budget 
At the Bangkok APEC ministerial meeting in September 1992, ministers agreed to 
establish the APEC Central Fund to cover APEC administrative and operational costs with the 
upper limit of US$2 million.  They agreed that APEC members make small annual contributions 
to the Fund on a proportional basis.113  At the subsequent Senior Officials’ Meeting, senior 
officials agreed on the formula for members’ contribution to the APEC Central Fund with a 
maximum of 18% provided by the United States and Japan.114 APEC’s annual central budget has 
grown from US$2 million in 1993 to US$3.38 million in 1999.  These funds are used to fund the 
APEC Secretariat in Singapore and various APEC projects.  Since 1997 Japan has provided the 
additional funds called the APEC TILF Special Fund (between US$2.7 and 4.2 million each 
year) to support APEC’s trade and investment liberalization and facilitation goals.115  However, 
the size of the budget is considerably lower than that of other regional organizations. 
  
Leaders’ Meetings 
The elevation of APEC meetings to the economic leaders’ level heralded the beginning of 
the second phase of APEC’s institutional evolution.  As mentioned earlier, the original idea for 
leaders’ meetings came from Australian Prime Minister Keating.  During his foreign policy 
speech in April 1992, he proposed establishing regular heads-of-government meetings in every 
two or three years.  He wrote letters to the leaders of the three key countries whose support he 
considered crucial: American President George H. W. Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa, and Indonesian President Suharto.  The initial response from the U.S. president was a 
non-committal one.116  Miyazawa offered tentative support for Keating’s idea.  However, it was 
not until July 1993 that the Japanese government fully endorsed it.  The initial Japanese 
hesitation stemmed from their concerns about a politically sensitive problem associated with the 
attendance of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  Moreover, Japan was worried about the 
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 possibility of ASEAN’s boycotting the leader’s meeting.117  Suharto also initially reacted to the 
proposal cautiously.118  Subsequently, Keating wrote to the leaders of the other APEC members.  
Meanwhile, when Foreign Minister Gareth Evans sounded out ASEAN members about the 
proposal at a meeting in August 1992, he received generally encouraging responses.119  Despite 
the initial cautious attitudes of some governments, the Keating proposal began to receive a 
moderate support. 
A major boost to the proposal, however, came from the newly-elected President Clinton 
who took an active interest in Keating’s proposal when Keating personally wrote to him.  
Although the Bush administration had offered quiet support for the idea of leader’s meetings, it 
was President Clinton who acted upon the idea and took the initiative to hold an informal 
leaders’ meeting in the incoming APEC meeting to be hosted by the United States that year.  To 
accommodate the politically sensitive issue of sovereignty associated with the participation of 
the Three Chinas, the name had been changed from a “heads-of-government” to an “APEC 
leaders’ economic meeting.”120   With the exception of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, 
Clinton received general support for the holding of the inaugural leader’s meeting at Seattle.  On 
November 20, 1993, President Clinton successfully invited the leaders of the APEC member 
economies except Mahathir to participate in an informal economic leaders’ meeting immediately 
after the regular meetings of foreign and trade ministers. 
Fred Bergsten commented that the “leaders in Seattle began the process of converting 
APEC from a purely consultative body into a substantive international institution.”121  This move 
toward institutionalization led primarily by the United States worried many ASEAN members.  
For example, Rafidah Aziz, the Malaysian Minister for Trade and Industry stated in March 1994 
that “APEC is slowly turning out to be what it wasn’t supposed to be, meaning that APEC was 
constituted as a loose consultative form.”122  Despite concerns among some ASEAN countries 
about APEC’s institutional development, leaders’ meetings became a regular part of the APEC 
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 process when President Suharto of Indonesia as APEC host in 1994 invited the leaders to meet 
again that year. 
The direct involvement of leaders in the APEC process since 1993 has strongly 
influenced the direction and pace of APEC’s institutional development.  While this had the 
positive effect of providing successive leaders a strong incentive to mark their accomplishments, 
the rotation of chairmanship also revealed its weakness because APEC’s member economies “are 
vastly different in size and also have different degree of interest in and commitment to the APEC 
process.”123
 
Nongovernmental Actors 
The second phase of APEC’s institutional development has also witnessed growing input 
from nongovernmental actors.  At the 1992 Ministerial meeting in Bangkok, ministers agreed to 
set up an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) “to enunciate a vision for trade in the Asia-Pacific 
region to the year 2000, identify constraints and issues which should be considered by APEC, 
and report initially to the next Ministerial Meeting in the United States in 1993.”124  Chaired by 
Fred Bergsten, the EPG was composed mostly of economists, who have been deeply involved in 
the activities of non-governmental organizations, including PAFTAD and PECC. 
The first EPG report, submitted in October 1993, recommended that APEC work toward 
the creation of “a true Asia Pacific Economic Community.”125  To this end, it recommended “a 
modest institutionalization of APEC.” 126   Other EPG recommendations included the 
establishment of a target date and timetable for the achievement of free trade in the region, the 
adoption of a voluntary APEC investment code, and the establishment of an effective settlement 
mechanism.  The second EPG report, submitted in August 1994, provided more specific 
recommendations to achieve the long-term vision proposed in the first report.  Most importantly, 
this report recommended that APEC adopt the goal of completing the liberalization process by 
the year 2020.  In response to criticism from some Asian countries, the second EPG report 
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 dropped the term “community,” which may suggest the image of the EC type of community.127  
It also emphasized such principles as “mutual benefits,” “mutual respect and egalitarianism,” 
“pragmatism,” “consensus,” and “open regionalism.”128  Yet some ASEAN officials remained 
skeptical of the EPG, considering that the vision of the EPG reflected that of advanced countries.  
At the ASEAN economic ministerial meeting in September 1994, ASEAN economic ministers 
called for the dissolution of the EPG.129  The EPG was disbanded after it submitted its third and 
final report in August 1995.   
 
Business Communities 
At the first Leaders’ Meeting in 1993, the leaders agreed to establish a Pacific Business 
Forum (PBF) “to identify issues APEC should address to facilitate regional trade and investment 
and encourage the further development of business networks throughout the region.”130  In 1995, 
the Leaders agreed to establish the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) as a permanent 
business advisory body, replacing the PBF.  The ABAC became a major institutional link 
between APEC and the business community.  To stimulate the business community’s interest in 
APEC, the 1996 leader’s meeting in Manila put forward the slogan “APEC Means Business.” 
 
Institutionalization 
As illustrated above, by the mid-1990s, the divergent institutional preferences among 
member economies with regard to institutionalization became the center of contention within 
APEC.  On the one hand, Anglo-American members of APEC, including the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, favored strengthening the institutional structure of APEC, 
including the adoption of legally binding obligations and tangible goals with fixed deadlines.  On 
the other hand, most Asian members resisted the institutionalization of APEC in favor of an 
informal and loose structure.131  These countries preferred a gradual and incremental approach to 
institutional evolution. 
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 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir was the most outspoken critic of U.S.-led attempts to 
transform APEC into a more institutionalized organization for the negotiation of trade 
liberalization.  China also has attempted to “obstruct U.S.-led efforts to transform the forum into 
a more formal rules-making organization.”132  The Japanese government was also opposed to 
making APEC a site of negotiation for trade liberalization.  Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei 
Kono described what he calls the “Asia-Pacific Way” to proceeding with the liberalization 
process within APEC as follows: “APEC members decide upon common principles and 
guidelines within the Action Agenda beforehand, then follow these while pushing forward with 
voluntary liberalization in a concerted way and taking collective actions within APEC as a 
whole.”133  Moreover, he also emphasized the principles of flexibility and voluntarism with 
regard to not only the pace but also the modalities of trade liberalization and facilitation.134  
Table 5-4 summarizes the divergent preferences among key APEC members over APEC’s 
institutionalization. 
 
Table 5-3: Representative Members' Preferences on APEC’s Institutionalization 
Drivers* Brakemen* 
The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore 
Most ASEAN members (especially Malaysia), China, 
Japan 
Sources: William Bodde, Views from the 19th Floor: Reflections of the First APEC Executive Director (Singapore: 
ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 37; Nicole Gallant and 
Richard Stubbs, “APEC’s Dilemma: Institution-Building Around the Pacific Rim,” Pacific Affairs (1997), 
pp. 212; and supplementary data. 
Note: *The metaphors "drivers" and "brakemen" are taken from Fran Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: 
Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International 
Organization (2001), pp. 47-80. 
5.2.2.3 External Orientation 
Since its inception, APEC members have emphasized the outward-looking nature of the 
forum and the principle of “open regionalism.”  APEC was not designed to create a 
discriminatory trading bloc, and it supported the promotion of an open multilateral trading 
system.  During its first years, APEC members repeated their support for an early successful 
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 conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations until it was concluded in 1994.  To 
confirm APEC’s consistency with the global multilateral setting, the 1991 Seoul Declaration 
identified the objectives of APEC as follows: 
a) to sustain the growth and development of the region for the common good of its peoples 
and, in this way, to contribute to the growth and development of the world economy; 
b) to enhance the positive gains; both for the region and the world economy, resulting from 
increasing economic interdependence, including by encouraging the flow of goods, 
services, capital and technology; 
c) to develop and strengthen the open multilateral trading system in the interest of Asia-
Pacific and all other economies; 
d) to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and investment among participants in a 
manner consistent with GATT principles, where applicable, and without detriment to 
other economies.135 
 
The principle of open regionalism is at the heart of APEC’s activities.  The concept was first 
coined in 1981 by the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group (PBCSG) – a Japan study group 
composed of Japanese bureaucrats, businesspeople, and academics. 136   This notion was 
primarily endorsed and promoted by the activities of the transnational policy networks, such as 
PBEC, PAFTA, and PECC. While APEC officially endorsed the principle of open regionalism in 
its Seoul APEC Declaration in 1991, the concept was an important guiding principle for APEC 
from its inception in 1989.137
According to some experts, the principle of open regionalism refers to “an approach to 
regional economic cooperation which seeks to promote economic integration among participants 
without discrimination against other economies.” 138   The principle of non-discrimination 
endorsed in the concept of open regionalism in APEC goes beyond the traditional notion of free 
trade areas because the benefits of trade and investment liberalization will be applied “not only 
among APEC economies but also between APEC and non-APEC economies.” 139   Open 
regionalism stands in sharp contrast to a closed discriminatory form of regionalism, which policy 
elites in the Asia-Pacific region perceived as emerging in Europe and North America in the late 
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 1980s and early 1990s.  For those government officials who came to share a sense of crisis in the 
global liberal trade system, the principle of open regionalism provided a means to counter the 
growing protectionist tendency in other parts of the world.  In fact, these policy makers viewed 
APEC as a regionalist alternative to the global multilateralism which had encountered major 
problems. 
Why did APEC adopt the principle of open regionalism?  APEC members were divided 
over the interpretation and implementation of the notion.  On the one hand, many Asian 
countries insisted that any trade concessions reached within APEC should be applied to non-
APEC members on a Most Favored Nation (MFN) basis.  On the other hand, the United States 
has been most skeptical about liberalization on an unconditional MFN basis.  It was particularly 
concerned about the problem of free-riding by European economies.  Therefore, the U.S. 
government pressed for the principle of reciprocity. 140   However, the U.S. efforts to adopt 
reciprocity failed to gain support from other APEC members. 
Experts point out three main reasons why APEC has avoided discriminatory trade 
arrangements.  First, it was considered “impracticable to undertake regional trade liberalization 
by means of a conventional discriminatory free trade area of the kind sanctioned by the 
GATT/WTO.”  Second, “the trading interests of East Asian and the Pacific economies extend 
beyond APEC, including to Europe.”  Third, “trade discrimination involves the unnecessary 
costs of trade diversion, complicated in the Asia Pacific region by the likelihood of high 
associated political costs both within and outside of the region.”141
5.2.2.4 Issue Areas 
The scope of APEC’s activities has expanded enormously from trade and investment 
liberalization and facilitation to include education, energy initiatives, environmental protection, 
human resources development, finance, transportation, science and technology cooperation, and 
tourism.  During the first three formative years, APEC focused on trade facilitation and 
economic and technical cooperation, while pursuing a trade liberalization agenda indirectly 
through its efforts to support the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
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 negotiations.142  Although there was general agreement that APEC should focus on economic 
issues of common interest, no formal agendas were set prior to the establishment of APEC.  The 
responsibilities for the agenda-setting for the annual APEC meeting are primarily handled by the 
rotating APEC host for that particular year, which prepares and coordinates the workshops and 
meetings at various policy levels.143
The first APEC ministerial meeting covered four agenda items: (1) world and regional 
economic developments; (2) global trade liberalization – the role of the Asia Pacific region; (3) 
regional cooperation in specific areas; and (4) future steps for the Asia Pacific economic 
cooperation.144  At the inaugural meeting, the ministers agreed on the basic functions of APEC.  
According to the Chairman’s summary statement, 
• The objective of enhanced Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is to sustain the 
growth and development of the region, and in this way, to contribute to the growth 
and development of the world economy; 
• Cooperation should focus on those economic areas where there is scope to advance 
common interest and achieve mutual benefits (emphasis added).145 
 
At the second Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1990, the ministers formally 
endorsed the seven working project, which had already begun, as concrete areas for closer 
cooperation in APEC.  The seven projects included: 1) Review of Trade and Investment Data; 2) 
Trade Promotion: Programs and Mechanisms for Cooperation; 3) Expansion of Investment and 
Technology Transfer in the Asia Pacific Region; 4) Asia Pacific Multilateral Human Resource 
Development Initiative; 5) Regional Energy Cooperation; 6) Marine Resource Conservation: 
Problem of Marine Pollution in the APEC Region; and 7) Telecommunications. 
The Seoul APEC meeting in November 1991 led to the first comprehensive statement on 
the issue-areas covered by APEC.  The Seoul APEC Declaration identified the scope of activity 
for APEC, including: 
• Exchange of information and consultation on policies and developments relevant 
to the common efforts of APEC economies to sustain growth, promote adjustment 
and reduce economic disparities; 
• Development of strategies to reduce impediments to the flow of goods and 
services and investment world-wide and within the region; 
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 • Promotion of regional trade, investment, financial resource flows, human 
resources development, technology transfer, industrial cooperation and 
infrastructure development; 
• Cooperation in specific sectors such as energy, environment, fisheries, tourism, 
transportation and telecommunications.146 
 
At the same meeting, the ministers also established three additional work projects in the areas of 
fisheries, transformation, and tourism, now totaling ten work projects.   
During the second phase of APEC from 1993 to 1996, APEC put trade and investment 
liberalization at the center of its agendas.  In 1993, the first EPG report recommended that APEC 
pursue “free trade in the Asia Pacific” through global and regional trade liberalization.147  Yet 
the major driving force behind this move was the U.S. government.  Many Asian nations felt that 
the United States “hijacked” the APEC process at the 1993 Seattle meeting by putting the trade 
liberalization agenda at the center.148  At the second Economic Leaders’ Meeting held in Bogor, 
Indonesia, in November 1994, the APEC leaders announced the so-called Bogor Declaration, 
which included the following pledge: 
We further agree to announce our commitment to complete the achievement of our goals 
of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than the year 2020.  
The pace of implementation will take into account different levels of economic 
development among APEC economies, with the industrialized economies achieving the 
goals of free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and developing 
economies no later than the year 2020.149
 
This move to set up the time-specific goals for trade liberalization was largely driven by the 
United States and Australia.150  Yet, reflecting reservations among some APEC members, the 
declaration did not specify any concrete measures about how to achieve the stated goals.  In 
particular, Malaysia viewed the APEC’s move to put trade liberalization at the center of its 
activities as “a betrayal of APEC’s original purpose.”151
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 As a host of APEC in 1994, Indonesia articulated the need to add what President Suharto 
named development cooperation as another pillar of APEC’s activities.  Some members, 
especially the United States, even resisted the terminology of “development cooperation.”152  
Therefore, in preparing the 1995 APEC Summit in Osaka, Japanese officials suggested a more 
modest term “economic and technical cooperation” (Ecotech), which was officially adopted in 
the Osaka Action Agenda.  Consequently, the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda identified the so-
called “three pillars” of APEC: trade and investment liberalization, trade and liberalization 
facilitation (currently known as “business facilitation”), and economic and technical cooperation 
(Ecotech).  Trade and investment liberalization “reduces and eventually eliminates tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade and investment,” while facilitation “focuses on reducing the costs of 
business transactions, improving access to trade information and aligning policy and business 
strategies to facilitate growth, and free and open trade.”153  Ecotech is designed to “develop more 
effectively the human and natural resources of the Asia-Pacific region so as to attain sustainable 
growth and equitable development of APEC economies, while reducing economic disparities 
among them, and improving the economic and social well-being of [the] people.”154
By the mid-1990s, APEC members were increasingly divided over the relative 
importance of the three pillars.  On the one hand, Anglo-American economies, including the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, pushed for giving priority to trade and 
investment liberalization.  On the other hand, many Asian members (except for Hong Kong and 
Singapore) preferred to keep APEC’s focus on trade facilitation and economic and technical 
cooperation.  The promotion of the trade liberalization agenda by the Western members of APEC 
encountered resistance from many of the Asian members.  Conversely, many Western countries 
were not that enthusiastic about the goal of narrowing economic disparities among the APEC 
members, because they were unwilling to commit to the resource transfers to assist the poorer 
economies. 155   When Japan proposed Partners for Progress (PFP), APEC’s developing 
economies supported it.  However, some advanced countries, particularly the United States and 
                                                 
152 Yamazawa, "APEC's Economic and Technical Cooperation: Evolution and Tasks Ahead," 138; Yamazawa, Ajia 
Taiheiyo Keizai Nyumon [Introduction to Asia-Pacific Economy], 142-143. 
153 APEC website, http://www.apec.org/content/apec/about_apec/scope_of_work.html
154 APEC, Selected APEC Documents, 1989-1994, 7. 
155 John Ravenhill, "Mission Creep or Mission Impossible?  APEC and Security," in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn 
Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 135-154. 
 175 
 New Zealand, expressed skepticism about Japan’s initiative out of concerns about additional 
funding and resistance to establishing a standing agency with personnel.156  In particular, some 
US officials thought that the PFP proposal would divert the focus of APEC activity from its main 
task of trade and investment liberalization. 157   US Ambassador to APEC Sandra Kristoff 
maintained that “the APEC forum should not function in a ‘North-South manner’ as a body to 
disburse official development assistance (ODA) and other funds – a job that is already done by 
other institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB).”158  Eventually, Japan’s original 
PFP proposal was watered down to an initiative which focused on promoting technical 
cooperation in the following three areas of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation 
(TILF): standards and conformity, intellectual property rights, and competition policy.159
It has been emphasized that APEC is not a donor organization.  The nature of cooperation 
promoted by APEC is different from foreign aid, which transfers funds from donors to clients.  
Instead, Ecotech in APEC is designed to promote a wider scope of cooperation by exchanging 
information and sharing knowledge and technical expertise for the benefit of all Asia Pacific 
economies.160  With the agreement not to undertake projects that require large external capital 
infusions, such as construction of major infrastructure, Ecotech activities focus on technical 
cooperation with small-scale budgets.161  According to Yamazawa, a typical Ecotech activity 
was a “pet project” proposed and coordinated by an APEC member, financed mainly by the 
proponent, and partly supported by APEC’s Central Fund.162
The section of economic and technical cooperation of the Osaka Action Agenda in 1995 
stipulated that “APEC economies will pursue economic and technical cooperation in order to 
attain sustainable growth and equitable development in the Asia-Pacific region, while reducing 
economic disparities among APEC economies and improving the economic and social well-
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 being of all our people.”163  The Osaka Action Agenda identified thirteen areas that Ecotech 
seeks to promote: human resources development; industrial science and technology; small and 
medium enterprises, economic infrastructure; energy; transportation; telecommunications and 
information; tourism; trade and investment data; trade promotion; marine resource conservation; 
fisheries; and agricultural technology.164
During the third phase from 1997 to 1999, the trade liberalization agenda as APEC’s 
central goal apparently lost much of the momentum, especially with the stalemate of the Early 
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization initiative put forward at the 1997 Vancouver meeting – a topic 
that I turn to in the following min-case study.  Meanwhile, the Ecotech agenda began to receive 
some attention in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.165
5.3 MINI-CASE STUDY: FROM BOGOR TO THE EVSL 
As mentioned above, the APEC leaders agreed upon a timetable for achieving free trade in the 
Bogor Declaration in 1994.  At the APEC’s Economic Leaders’ Meeting held in Vancouver in 
November 1997, the leaders launched the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) 
initiative, which aimed at liberalization in the fifteen sectors that they identified before the 
timeframe set by the Bogor Declaration. 166    However, the EVSL was stalled when Japan 
refused to participate in the fishery and forestry sectors in the 1998 final package.167  In the end, 
APEC members gave up on pursuing the initiative and instead referred it to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
The Bogor Declaration represents APEC’s most ambitious statement of its commitment 
to trade and investment liberalization.  However, the liberalization agenda lost its momentum as 
the EVSL initiative proved unsuccessful in the late 1990s.  How did the conclusion of the Bogor 
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 Declaration in 1994 become possible in the first place?  What explains the failed attempt to 
pursue trade liberalization through the EVSL initiative in the late 1990s?  The following mini-
case study highlights divergent preferences among key APEC members and reveals how the 
differences affected interstate bargaining with regard to APEC’s trade liberalization efforts. 
As mentioned earlier, the trade liberalization agenda was primarily driven by Western 
members of APEC members, particularly the United States and Australia.  Meanwhile, the 
establishment of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and its recommendation provided an impetus 
for the push for trade liberalization.168  The 1993 EPG report recommended that APEC set a 
timetable for the “achievement of free trade” in the Asia-Pacific region.169  Specifically, the 
1994 EPG report set the year 2020 to complete that goal.170   At the Bogor APEC leaders’ 
meeting in November 1994, the leaders adopted the goal of trade liberalization in the region by 
2010 for advanced economies and by 2020 for developing economies. 
Given the fact that Indonesia had been the most reluctant about trade liberalization, it was 
surprising that the ambitious trade liberalization goal was reached under Indonesian 
chairmanship.  While the United States and Australia provided a significant push for this 
agreement, Indonesia’s President Suharto displayed his leadership in energetically seeking 
support from other reluctant ASEAN countries.  The two-tier timetable was to take into 
consideration different stages of development among APEC member economies.  However, 
some countries remained concerned about the Bogor goals.  In particular, Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir expressed his reservations by stating that the Bogor target dates are 
“indicative dates and non-binding.”171  Some other countries, including China, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Japan, also showed their hesitation about setting a timeframe for the trade 
liberalization goal.172  Despite the reservations of these countries, Suharto spearheaded the effort 
to reach the decision on the basis of a “broad consensus.”173
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 Despite the Bogor’s remarkable announcement, the declaration lacked any detail with 
regard to concrete measures to achieve the proposed goals.  The discussion of implementation 
was deferred to future meetings.  Moreover, disagreements about the interpretations of the 
agreement surfaced.  Several leaders, including Pual Keating and Goh Chok Tong, spoke of the 
non-binding nature of the agreement.  Skeptics questioned the effectiveness of an agreement that 
is not legally binding.174
In preparing the draft Action Agenda for the next Osaka APEC meetings in November 
1995, several issues gave rise to considerable controversy.  Among them, the most hotly debated 
were the following three issues: 1) How comprehensive should the APEC liberalization and 
facilitation process be?; 2) How should each APEC member economy implement the 
liberalization and facilitation?; and 3) Should the liberalization measures undertaken within 
APEC be applied to non-APEC members? 175  As the chair of APEC that year, the Japanese 
government took great pains to reach a consensus on these issues, while Tokyo attempted to push 
for its preferred modalities.  On the issue of comprehensiveness, the United States asserted that 
all sectors should be covered in the APEC liberalization process, while some Asian countries, 
such as Japan and Korea, maintained that certain sensitive sectors such as agriculture should be 
excluded.176  The Japanese government insisted on the principle of flexibility.  In the end, both 
principles of comprehensiveness and flexibility were included in the final draft of the Osaka 
Action Agenda (OAA).  These mutually contradictory principles led to further controversy, 
confusion, and the slowdown of the APEC liberalization process as shown especially in the case 
of the subsequent Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization negotiation. 
On the issue of measures for the implementation of APEC liberalization, the Japanese 
government pressed for what came to be known as “Concerted Unilateral Action (CUA).”  
MITI’s senior official for APEC, Hidehiro Konno, described APEC’s new type of liberalization 
process as “voluntary yet concerted liberalization on a peer pressure basis.”177  Foreign Minister 
Yohei Kono expressed Japan’s position, stating that “we have adopted the approach of 
concerting members’ voluntary efforts on the basis of mutual trust … APEC liberalization and 
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 facilitation should be implemented not by an excessively negotiation-like framework.”178  On the 
other hand, the U.S. government opposed the concept of concerted unilateral action, arguing that 
APEC would not be able to achieve comparability among each member’s efforts in the 
liberalization process.179  In the end, the principle of comparability was included in the final 
OAA, despite opposition from some countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand.180
The last issue concerned whether the APEC liberalization measures should be applied to 
non-APEC members on a non-discriminatory or reciprocal basis.  The United States, concerned 
about European free riding, insisted on the principle of reciprocity, arguing that any 
liberalization measures undertaken through APEC should be applied to non-APEC member 
states only on a reciprocal basis.  Other members, especially China, pressed for unconditional 
MFN status.181  The final OAA draft adopted the principle of non-discrimination.  The OAA 
established the following nine “general principles” for the implementation of the Bogor 
Declaration:  
1. COMPREHENSIVENESS 
The APEC liberalization and facilitation process will be comprehensive, addressing all 
impediments to achieving the long-term goals of free and open trade and investment. 
 
2. WTO-CONSISTENCY 
The liberalization and facilitation measures undertaken in the context of the APEC 
Action Agenda will be WTO-consistent. 
 
3. COMPARABILITY 
APEC economies will endeavor to ensure the overall compatibility of their trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation, taking into account the general level of 
liberalization and facilitation already achieved by each APEC economy. 
 
4. NON-DISCRIMINATION 
APEC economies will apply or endeavor to apply the principle of non-discrimination 
between and among them in the process of liberalization and facilitation of trade and 
investment.  The outcome of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific 
region will be the actual reduction of barriers not only among APEC economies but also 
between APEC economies and non-APEC economies. 
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 5. TRANSPARENCY 
Each APEC economy will ensure transparency of its respective laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures which affect the flow of goods, services and capital among 
APEC economies in order to create and maintain an open and predictable trade and 
investment environment in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
6. STANDSTILL 
Each APEC economy will endeavor to refrain from using measures which would have 
the effect of increasing levels of protection, thereby ensuring a steady and progressive 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation process. 
 
7. SIMULTANEOUS START, CONTINUOUS PROCESS AND DIFFERENTIATED 
TIMETABLES 
APEC economies will begin simultaneously and without delay the process of 
liberalization, facilitation and cooperation with each member economy contributing 
continuously and significantly to achieve the long-term goal of free and open trade and 
investment. 
 
8. FLEXIBILITY 
Considering the different levels of economic development among the APEC economies 
and diverse circumstances in each economy, flexibility will be available in dealing with 
issue arising from such circumstances in the liberalization and facilitation process. 
 
9. COOPERATION 
Economic and technical cooperation contributing to liberalization and facilitation will be 
actively pursued.182
 
As can be seen in these statements, the principles adopted in the Osaka Action Agenda contained 
a high degree of ambiguities and contradictory statements, reflecting the divergent differences 
among the APEC members over the trade liberalization agenda. 
At the APEC Economic Leader’s Meeting held in Subic Bay in November 1996, APEC 
leaders instructed their ministers to “identify where early voluntary liberalization would have a 
positive impact on trade, investment, and economic growth in the individual APEC economies as 
well as in the region.”183  Accordingly, following the Trade Ministers’ Meeting held in Montreal 
in May 1997, most APEC economies submitted proposals with their nominations.  The 
nominations naturally reflected the diverse interests of the nominating economies.  Many 
developing countries nominated primary products such as fruits, vegetables, and wood products, 
while Japan nominated eight sectors, including film, pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, 
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 investment regulations, gum products, fertilizer, and environmental equipment.184  As the host of 
APEC that year, Canada took great pains to prevent APEC from losing the momentum of 
liberalization agendas.  After a series of negotiations, senior officials agreed to identify fifteen 
sectors for EVSL and submitted their recommendation to their ministers.  Endorsing the fifteen, 
the ministers identified nine of them as priority sectors scheduled for immediate implementation 
and the remaining six for further development of schedules.  At Vancouver in November 1997, 
APEC leaders endorsed the ministers’ recommendations.  The Vancouver APEC Economic 
Leader’s Declaration stated:  
APEC’s liberalization proceeds on a voluntary basis, propelled by commitments taken at 
the highest level… We endorse the agreement of our Ministers that action should be 
taken with respect to early voluntary liberalization in 15 sectors, with nine to be advanced 
throughout 1998 with a view to implementation beginning in 1999.  We find this package 
to be mutually beneficial and to represent a balance of interests.185 
 
However, the nine sectors designated as priority sectors did not reflect the preferences of each 
APEC economy equally.  As Table 5-4 shows, seven out of the nine priority sectors were among 
the sectors nominated by the United States, while the final list hardly reflected Japan’s 
nominations.  The U.S. government was clearly the driving force behind the EVSL initiative and 
pressed for including its preferred sectors in the final list. 186   Meanwhile, the Japanese 
government had “unofficially expressed its objection to liberalizing the agriculture and forestry 
sectors under EVSL.”187  Tokyo was unhappy about the exclusion of transformation equipment 
from the list.  Also, the sectors were chosen mainly on the basis of exporters’ interests rather 
than on the basis of importers’ interests.188  Therefore, the list was likely to draw resistance from 
domestic producers. 
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 Table 5-4: Designated Sectors for Early Voluntary Liberalization 
Sectors Objectives Nominating economies 
Environmental goods and services* Tariffs, NTMs, Services, Ecotech Canada, Japan, C. Taipei, US 
Chemicals* Tariffs, NTMs, S&C, Customs, 
Investment 
Australia, HKC, Singapore, US 
Medical equipment* Tariffs, NTMs, Ecotech Singapore, US 
Energy equipment and services* Tariffs, NTMs, Services Australia, Thailand, US 
Telecommunications* S&C US 
Toys* Tariffs, NTMs China, HKC, Singapore, US 
Automotive products S&C, Customs, Ecotech US 
Food Tariffs, NTMs, Subsidy, S&C, 
Ecotech 
Australia, Canada, NZ, Thailand 
Fisheries* Tariffs, NTMs, Ecotech Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, NX, 
Thailand 
Oilseeds and oilseed products Tariffs, NTMs, Ecotech Canada, Malaysia, US 
Gems and jewelry* Tariffs, NTMs Thailand, C. Taipei 
Civil craft Tariffs Canada 
Forest products* Tariffs, S&C Canada, Indonesia, NZ, US 
Natural and synthetic rubber Tariffs, NTMs, Ecotech Japan, Thailand 
Notes: S&C = Standard and Conformance, Customs = Customs Procedures, Ecotech = Economic and technical 
cooperation, NTM = Non-tariff measures, HKC = Hong Kong China, C. Taipei = Chinese Taipei, NZ = New 
Zealand, * = nine priority sectors 
Source: Ippei Yamazawa and Shujiro Urata, "Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation," in Ippei 
Yamazawa, ed., Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Challenges and Tasks for the Twenty-First 
Century (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 89. 
 
During the negotiations to prepare a concrete implementation plan of the EVSL for the 
ministerial and leaders’ meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 1998, the split between the United States 
and Japan came to the fore.  The U.S. government insisted on including all of these nine sectors 
as a compete package.189  On the other hand, the Japanese government refused to accept the 
EVSL as a total package, insisting on the principals of “voluntarism” and “flexibility.”  Before 
accepting the 1997 Vancouver agreement, the Japanese government had expressed its 
reservations about liberalizing several sensitive sectors, including but not limited to forestry and 
fishery sectors.190  At Vancouver, Tokyo grudgingly accepted signing onto the Declaration only 
on the principle of voluntarism.191  The Joint Statement of Ministers at Vancouver clearly stated: 
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 “Recognizing the need for a balanced and mutually beneficial package, and recalling that 
the process of early liberalization is conducted on the basis of the APEC principle of 
voluntarism, whereby each economy remains free to determine the sectoral initiatives in 
which it will participate…” (emphasis added)192
 
Therefore, the Japanese negotiators interpreted the word “voluntary” attached in the initiative 
literally, as stated in the ministerial joint statement.  However, Japanese officials only later found 
that their interpretation was not shared by their American counterparts, who assumed the EVSL 
only as a total package proposal with a fixed timeframe.  U.S. officials maintained that the EVSL 
would be meaningful only as a total package.  The U.S. position was also supported by Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong.193  While the United States was willing to 
allow some flexibility for developing countries, it refused to apply similar flexibility to Japan as 
a developed country.194
Japan was not the only country which showed reservations about undertaking the EVSL 
in some of the designated sectors.  Initially, other Asian countries, such as China, Korea, and 
Taiwan, also resisted tariff and non-tariff measures (NTM) liberalization in the agricultural and 
fishing sectors.  Yet, even these countries made some concessions, while Japan refused to do so.  
Therefore, by June 1998, Japan found itself increasingly isolated, as Southeast Asian countries 
joined U.S. pressure on Japan to liberalize its fish and forestry sectors.195  However, APEC’s 
developing countries’ support for EVSL gradually waned in favor of the Japanese position.  For 
example, a Chinese delegate stated that China would participate in all the nine priority sectors 
only “partially” and “conditionally” “on the basis of voluntarism.”196  Meanwhile, Mexico and 
Chile had opted out of the program completely.  As the Kuala Lumpur ministerial meeting 
approached, the tension between American and Japanese delegates intensified as they continued 
to press for their own positions. 
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 By the ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998, China, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Malaysia also joined Japan in not supporting the EVSL program.197  Failing to 
reach a consensus on the implementation plan for the EVSL, APEC ministers decided to forward 
the tariff portion of the EVSL initiative it to the WTO.  The failure of the EVSL initiative can be 
explained by Japan’s effective use of its “blocking power” to prevent the U.S.-led initiative.198  
As Ellis Krauss points out, the EVSL initiative generally reflected American preferences.199  
This preference was not shared by many Asian members of APEC.  Therefore, in the face of 
strong “negative supply” in blocking the U.S. initiative, the United States did not have the 
capability to exercise its structural leadership.  In short, the preceding discussion of the 
negotiations on the trade liberalization agenda—from the Bogor Declaration in 1994 to the 
setback of the EVSL initiative in 1998—illustrates how different institutional preferences with 
regard to APEC’s agendas and modality (demand-side conditions) translated into a major 
obstacle on the supply side, leading to the stalemate of the EVSL. 
5.4 EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION 
What explains the initial institutional form that APEC took and its subsequent institutional 
evolution?  The ensuing section first summarizes empirical findings and then evaluates different 
theoretical expectations.  In accordance with the preceding discussions, APEC’s institutional 
evolution is divided into the following three phases: phase I (1989–1992), phase II (1993–1996), 
and phase III (1997–1999). 
APEC’s first phase saw ASEAN’s active efforts to convince other APEC members to 
adopt the so-called ASEAN Way as APEC’s modus operandi.  Since ASEAN’s opposition had 
been a major obstacle for the formation of an Asia-Pacific intergovernmental economic 
institution in the previous decades, the Australian and Japanese governments took great pains to 
ensure the participation of reluctant ASEAN members by incorporating ASEAN’s preferences 
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 for informal and non-legalistic approaches.  To give special credit to ASEAN’s experience, the 
first Joint Statement of the APEC Ministerial Meeting in Canberra stated that the APEC 
ministers recognized “the significant role ASEAN institutional mechanisms can continue to play 
in supporting the present effort to broaden and strengthen regional economic cooperation.”200  
Furthermore, APEC adopted consensus-based decision-making procedures, a practice exercised 
by ASEAN.  This enabled “coalitions at different stages of internationalization, and with 
different institutions, to protect their domestic political prerogatives and resources.”201
Moreover, APEC installed an informal practice of alternating APEC’s chair between 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN members. 202   Since the APEC chair and the chairing member 
economy take the primary responsibility for preparing, coordinating, and managing the APEC 
meetings, it has a privileged position in shaping the agenda and influencing the course of 
APEC’s development.  Therefore, ASEAN was given an opportunity to take advantage of the 
position as chair every other year. 
Yet ASEAN was not the only organization that influenced the initial institutional form of 
APEC.  The activities of preexisting nongovernmental forums such as PAFTAD and PECC in 
the preceding decades also had an important impact on shaping APEC’s institutional form.  First, 
the experiences of these groups demonstrated that nongovernmental actors, including private 
firms and the academic community, could make substantial contributions to the regionalist 
project by facilitating the exchanges of ideas and information.  Second, these nongovernmental 
bodies developed many practices, norms, and principles that were later adopted by APEC.  For 
example, these nongovernmental bodies played a crucial role in developing and spreading the 
concept of “open regionalism” that was later endorsed by APEC.  PECC also pioneered the 
practice of operating through the rotation of meetings among its member economies and by the 
principle of consensus, which was followed by APEC.  By taking an inclusive approach to the 
issue of membership, PECC served to “defuse many of the divisions which had until now posed 
major conceptual and practical obstacles to innovation.”203  PECC expanded its membership to 
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 many Pacific Latin American countries and the Pacific island nations, involving both developed 
and developing countries.204  Moreover, PECC made the participation of the so-called three 
Chinas possible in 1986 by incorporating each economy, rather than the state, which provided a 
formula for admitting three separate Chinese economies in APEC.205  In short, Hugh Patrick 
quoted one commentator saying “the fingerprints of PAFTAD are all over PECC and APEC.”206   
In summary, the initial form that APEC took drew heavily on the practices of preexisting 
institutions, such as ASEAN and PECC.  ASEAN members successfully managed to incorporate 
their institutional preferences within APEC during APEC’s early years.  To use Paul Evans’s 
metaphor, ASEAN played a pivotal role both as an “accelerator” and a “brake.”207  ASEAN 
served as an accelerator in the sense that ASEAN’s eventual acceptance to join the Asia-Pacific 
forum allowed the APEC initiative to move forward.  Yet, given the consensus-based decision-
making, ASEAN members were relatively successful in putting the brakes on the rapid 
institutionalization of the APEC process, as represented by their initial objection to the creation 
of a permanent APEC secretariat and the EPG.  Consequently, APEC’s initial form resembled 
closely that of ASEAN itself—an argument proposed by proponents of ASEAN-centered 
explanations reviewed in Chapter 2.  Meanwhile, APEC also benefited greatly from the long-
term activities of nongovernmental bodies. 
The second phase of APEC witnessed pro-active attempts by the U.S. government to 
transform APEC into a more formal institution for promoting trade and investment liberalization 
within the Asia-Pacific region.  U.S. President Clinton played a crucial role in initiating leaders’ 
meetings when the U.S. hosted APEC in 1993.  Yet this raised concerns among some ASEAN 
officials about APEC’s excessive institutionalization.  Moreover, the shift in APEC’s focus 
toward the trade and investment liberalization agenda alarmed many Asian members of APEC.  
Consequently, serious disagreements over APEC’s objectives and modalities came to the fore. 
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 Table 5-5: Action on EPG Recommendations 
EPG I  
Change name to Asia-Pacific Economic Community Rejected 
Adopt commitment and timetable for regional trade liberalization by 1996 Adopted 1994 
Commencement of Trade and Investment Facilitation Implemented 
Adoption of Asia Pacific Investment Code Adopted 1995 
Adoption of dispute settlement mechanism Rejected 
Introduce regular meetings of finance ministers Adopted 1994 
Mutual recognition of production standards and testing Under negotiation 
Staff Secretariat with permanent officials Not implemented 
  
EPG II  
Recognition that trade liberalization may be conditional (negotiated) or unconditional 
(unilateral) 
Not disputed 
Aim to complete liberalization by 2020 Agreed 1994 
Adopt a safeguard mechanism more rigorous and more comprehensive than WTO's Rejected 
  
EPG III  
Implement Uruguay Round commitments within half of agreed WTO period Rejected 
Address anti-dumping policies Rejected 
Introduce Asia Pacific Technology Fund Rejected 
Strengthening and application of Non-Binding Investment Principles Not implemented 
Source: Adapted from John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 128. 
 
This period also saw new impetus from the EPG, an APEC-appointed nongovernmental 
group, which submitted three reports to the APEC leaders from 1993 to 1995.  The most 
significant achievement of the EPG was to put trade liberalization at the center of APEC’s 
agenda.  Many ASEAN officials saw the EPG as representing the interests of advanced Western 
countries at the expenses of developing countries.  Despite its contributions to APEC’s trade 
liberalization efforts, the EPG soon saw its own limitations.  For example, the EPG’s 
recommendation for the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism was never accepted.  
The second EPG report modified the language from a “dispute settlement mechanism” to a 
“dispute mediation service.”  According to the report, a Dispute Mediation Service (DMS) 
“would provide assistance in resolving (and thus, over time, perhaps avoiding) economic 
disputes among its members.”208  The final report in 1995 again called for the creation of an 
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 APEC DMS.  Meanwhile, it also endorsed the centrality of WTO dispute settlement procedures 
to resolve trade disputes.209  The EPG’s proposal for an APEC DMS failed to gain support from 
APEC members. 
In short, the EPG made modest but significant contributions to APEC’s institutional 
development.  Although the EPG reports reflected the interests of Western members, especially 
the United States, the involvement of nongovernmental actors did provide innovative policy 
ideas.  According to former senior U.S. official Richard Baker, the EPG recommendations, 
especially the timetable for achieving free trade in the Asia-Pacific region, were “probably more 
ambitious than any position that the Clinton administration’s policymakers in this field would 
have formulated or been able to sell on their own at that time.”210  However, as demonstrated by 
the failure to persuade APEC leaders to adopt an APEC DMS, governments were the 
gatekeepers of regionalist projects.  Table 5-5 summarizes the main recommendations of the 
EPG and the APEC decisions on them. 
Although the Australian and Japanese governments were the main architects of APEC, 
the United States, with a strong push from the EPG, became the primary mover of APEC during 
this period.  This period saw important institutional changes, such as the inauguration of leaders’ 
meetings and the promotion of the trade and investment liberalization agenda to the top of 
APEC’s activities.  Consequently, APEC’s institutional trajectory departed from the preferences 
of ASEAN.  However, Western-style legalistic approaches were effectively rejected by most 
Asian members of APEC in favor of non-legalistic and flexible approaches. 
The third phase of APEC did not see any significant changes in APEC’s institutional 
form.  Instead, it saw the persistence of the contestation of norms and principles.  Many Asian 
members of APEC successfully blocked the U.S.-sponsored EVSL initiative by insisting on the 
principles of flexibility and voluntarism.  As a result of the failure of the EVSL initiative, 
APEC’s trade liberalization agenda was sidelined.  Having briefly summarized APEC’s 
institutional evolution in its first decade, the reminder of this section considers the relevance of 
the four theoretical perspectives for explaining APEC’s institutional form and evolution: 
neorealism, rational institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. 
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 Which perspective best explains the institutional form and evolution of APEC?  First, 
neorealist perspectives provided mixed results.  The initial institutional form that APEC took did 
not follow the neorealist expectation that multilateral institutions would be based on the 
preferences and norms of the dominant power—in this case, the United States.  On the contrary, 
APEC members paid disproportionate attention to the preferences of much weaker ASEAN 
members.  Neorealist perspectives failed to explain the disproportionate influence of ASEAN, 
relative to its capabilities, during its early years.  However, the subsequent institutional 
development of APEC during its second phase gave modest support for neorealist perspectives, 
in that many of APEC’s institutional milestones, such as the creation of the EPG and the 
elevation of APEC’s ministerial meetings to the heads-of-government level, have been primarily 
driven by Western governments, especially the United States and Australia (see Table 5-6).  
Furthermore, Western governments succeeded in putting the trade and liberalization agenda at 
the top of APEC’s activities during its second phase. 
 
Table 5-6: Major Institutional Milestones of APEC 
Year  Events Proposer(s)/Driver(s)* 
1989 APEC ministerial meeting Australia 
1992 Agreement to establish a permanent secretariat in Singapore Australia, the U.S. 
1992 Agreement to establish the EPG Australia 
1993 Establishment of economic leaders' meeting Australia, the U.S.** 
1994 Agreement to complete liberalization by 2020 EPG II, the U.S. 
1998 Failure of EVSL The U.S. 
 
* The origins of some of the proposals are not entirely clear. 
** The idea of economic leaders' meeting came from Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, but U.S. President 
Bill Clinton acted upon the idea. 
 
In this respect, the U.S.-led institutional development of APEC during this period seemed 
to come close to the expectation of hegemonic stability theory.  However, closer scrutiny 
revealed that the U.S. hegemon was not able to adopt a more legalistic approach to APEC’s trade 
liberalization agenda.  Furthermore, the U.S. failed to have APEC apply the principle of 
reciprocity to members’ trade liberalization commitments.  Instead, APEC endorsed the 
principles of flexibility and voluntarism that many Asian countries favored.  In effect, APEC’s 
Asian members used these principles as a defense against the “Western-style” rule-based 
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 negotiation approach involving binding commitments.211  Consequently, the relative success of 
the United States in guiding APEC’s agenda-setting did not fully allow the U.S. government to 
pursue its own interests in APEC.  Although the U.S. role in APEC was enhanced during the 
second phase in APEC’s evolution, the United States found itself more constrained than its 
dominant material capability would suggest. 
Second, rational institutionalist perspectives provided poor predictions.  It is clear from 
the preceding discussions that, in contrast to the rational institutionalist expectation, APEC is not 
designed to maximize its institutional efficiency or effectiveness. The adoption of consensus-
based decision-making procedures and the emphasis on informal consultations, for example, not 
only increased the inefficiency of negotiations, but also made any agreements among members 
extremely difficult. 
Third, sociological institutionalists emphasize the influence of prevailing norms.  
However, APEC is characterized by the contestation of different norms and ideas.212  Therefore, 
the real question for sociological institutionalists is which norms matters, or more importantly, 
whose norms matters.213  The major division exists between “Western” and Asian members of 
APEC.  Some scholars point out that APEC “represents a key site of contestation between 
‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ governments keen on implementing their own, potentially 
incommensurate, visions for APEC.” 214   With regard to APEC’s modalities of cooperation, 
Asian preferences for non-legalistic approaches prevailed over Western preferences for a more 
legalistic and rule-based approach.  However, sociological institutionalism is not well equipped 
to address why this is the case. 
Many scholars argue that there exist “Asian” approaches to regional cooperation that are 
distinct from “Western-style” approaches.  According to them, an “Asian way” emphasizes the 
principles of informality, consensus, non-interference, and avoidance of legalistic approaches.215  
The argument for the existence of “Asian” norms or an “Asian” way is often associated with 
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 broader assertions of “Asian values.”  However, as Miles Kahler shows, the choice against 
legalistic approaches is not uniformly observed among Asian countries’ approaches; many Asian 
countries are willing to bring interstate disputes to the WTO dispute-settlement procedures.216
Fourth, like sociological institutionalists, historical institutionalists take into account the 
impact of norms and ideas.  However, they highlight the temporal dimension in the evolution of 
norms and ideas.  In this view, historical institutionalists place the sequence of institution-
building at the center of analysis; they stress the impact of preexisting institutions on the 
subsequent formation of other institutions.  Unlike sociological institutionalists, who emphasize 
the impact of norms through the “logic of appropriateness,” historical institutionalists suggest 
that actors can be strategic, but the range of options is circumscribed by historically available 
choices.217  In this view, actors may use norms for a more instrumental purpose.  For example, 
APEC’s Asian members’ insistence on such principles as consensus, voluntarism, and flexibility 
can be viewed as their strategic attempt to defend their interests against the imposition of norms 
and principles preferred by Western members.218  This chapter showed that, consistent with the 
historical institutionalist argument, the initial institutional form that APEC took was greatly 
shaped by the preceding experiments in the activities of ASEAN and PECC. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has investigated the institutional form and development of APEC.  The analysis 
focused on two dimensions of regional institution-building: 1) the variation of institutional 
preferences (demand-side); and 2) the rise and fall of political leadership (supply-side).  As the 
previous chapter suggested, the agreement to create APEC in 1989 was a watershed event in the 
history of Asia-Pacific institution-building.  There soon surfaced, however, significant 
differences among member economies in terms of institutional preferences.  The most serious 
points of contention among APEC members are which issues APEC should focus on and how 
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 cooperation with APEC should be pursued.  The persistence of divergent preferences proved a 
major obstacle to APEC’s institutional development. 
On the one hand, Anglo-American members pressed for transforming APEC into a rule-
based negotiation site for trade liberalization with binding commitments and fixed timelines.  On 
the other hand, Asian members of APEC desired to keep APEC as an informal consultative 
forum for promoting economic and technical cooperation.  They prefer non-legalistic approaches 
to cooperation, without specific and binding obligations.  They emphasize the importance of 
consensus and flexibility to take into account the different stages of economic development 
among APEC members.  Divergent preferences among APEC members were only exaggerated 
by APEC member’s different reactions to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 and 
APEC’s inability to provide any effective mechanism to manage the crisis. 
Given the differences in institutional preferences among APEC members, how has APEC 
evolved in the way that it did in its first decade?  The analysis of interstate negotiations 
highlighted the importance of political leadership in proposing initiatives and mobilizing support.  
For example, given the previous U.S. government’s passive attitude toward APEC, President 
Clinton’s active interest in APEC and his leadership was crucial for convening the inaugural 
leaders’ meeting.  APEC’s Western members, through U.S. leadership with strong support from 
the EPG, also succeeded in putting the trade liberalization agenda at the top of APEC’s activities 
during its second phase of development from 1993 to 1996.  Yet the role played by Indonesia’s 
President Suharto in concluding the Bogor Declaration cannot be ignored.  Without his 
leadership, it would be difficult to explain Indonesia’s role in shepherding the establishment of 
deadlines for trade liberalization.219   
The weakness of political leadership in the later 1990s became a major obstacle to 
APEC’s activities.  Furthermore, the dissolution of the EPG after its submission of the third 
report in 1995 meant the loss of an important source of innovative ideas.  As John Ravenhill 
observes, “the correlation between the lack of supply of leadership to APEC since 1998 and the 
growth of bilateralism is surely no coincidence.” 220   In fact, the pace and direction of the 
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 institutional development of APEC has been strongly influenced by the “shift in venue of 
leadership from one member economy to another.”221
However, this chapter also showed that the absence of blocking power (“negative 
supply”) was as important a factor as the presence of positive leadership in moving an initiative 
forward.  Despite the success of U.S.-led efforts for setting trade liberalization as APEC’s 
dominant agenda in the early 1990s, APEC’s trade liberalization efforts encountered a serious 
challenge when the U.S.-led EVSL initiative failed in the face of resistance from Asian members, 
as examined in the mini-case study.  In fact, Asian governments effectively blocked the U.S. 
attempt to transform APEC into a rule-based negotiating body involving binding obligations.  
Consequently, the actual U.S. maneuver to pursue trade liberalization through APEC was 
extremely circumscribed. 
In summary, the slow progress in APEC’s institutional evolution can be explained by 
both demand and supply conditions.  On the demand side, the wide variation in terms of 
institutional preferences has been a major obstacle to the institutional development of APEC.  On 
the supply side, the absence of leadership or the existence of effective blocking power has been a 
major problem. 
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 6.0  CONSTRUCTING EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
One of the key origins of the idea behind a regional group comprising only of East Asian 
countries can be traced to the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s announcement in 
December 1990 of a proposal for creating an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). His proposal 
for creating an East Asian grouping, comprising Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, however, 
failed to materialize.  Nevertheless, beginning in 1997, ASEAN has successfully invited leaders 
from three Northeast Asian countries – namely China, Japan, and South Korea – to its informal 
summit meeting.  This newly formed East Asian regional grouping, which came to be known as 
the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), started to gain wider attention, while APEC was losing its 
momentum in the second half of the 1990s. 
What explains the emergence of East Asian regionalism in the form of APT in the late 
1990s despite the failed attempt to create an East Asian grouping in the early 1990s?  Why did 
the ASEAN states, which were very reluctant to become involved in a broader regional 
framework until the late 1980s, become proactive in seeking closer engagement with external 
powers in Northeast Asia?  Why did Asian governments decide to create a new consultative 
forum on an East Asian basis, despite the existence of an Asia-Pacific institutional framework in 
the form of APEC?  Why did the previously reluctant governments in Northeast Asia, 
particularly Japan, decide to get involved in an “Asians-only” gathering?  How did ASEAN 
countries succeed in bringing the three Northeast Asian countries together to the ASEAN-led 
regional forums? 
For some analysts, the formation of East Asian regionalism can be seen as the result of 
growing regional interdependence between Northeast and Southeast Asian economies.  For 
others, it represents the manifestation of an emerging East Asian identity.  Still others stress the 
shift in the configuration of power relations either at the global level or within the East Asian 
region as the main factor that led to the creation of East Asian regionalism.  Certainly these 
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 factors provided long-term reasons for the APT process.  However, this chapter suggests that the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 served as the most significant catalyst for triggering an 
urgent demand for a new East Asian regional mechanism and provided a political opportunity for 
the emergence of East Asian regionalism. 
This chapter consists of two main parts.  The first part explores why the EAEG proposal 
failed to get off the ground by investigating state preferences concerning regionalism among key 
governments in East Asia, including ASEAN members, Japan, and China, and one external actor, 
the United States.  The second part analyzes the formation of the APT by investigating the shift 
in state preferences concerning regionalism among the key governments and the actual political 
process by which the APT came into being.  Most importantly, it will be shown below that the 
Asian financial crisis made regional actors recognize the inadequacy of the global institutional 
arrangement to protect their interests as well as the insufficiency of the existing regional 
arrangements to deal with extraregional challenges.  The impact of the crisis led to the rapid 
growth of demand for creating a new East Asian regional mechanism.  Consequently, the crisis 
provided an opportunity for the development of a new regional arrangement on an East Asian 
basis.  The last section summarizes why and how the APT process was successfully launched. 
6.1 THE FAILURE OF THE EAEG PROPOSAL 
Against the backdrop of the perceived potential collapse of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations because of the breakdown of talks in Brussels in December 1990, Prime Minister 
Mahathir publicly announced his proposal for the EAEG during Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Peng’s visit to Kuala Lumpur during the same month.  The proposed members included the 
ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the three Indochinese states 
(Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), and Myanmar.1  The central feature of Mahathir’s proposed 
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 grouping is that it excluded four Western members of APEC, namely, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. 
Although Mahathir originally envisioned a trade bloc formed by these countries, he soon 
modified the idea and presented the EAEG as a consultative group largely due to the negative 
connotation of the term “bloc.”  However, the EAEG proposal did not gain much support either 
within or outside the ASEAN members.  Subsequently, at the ASEAN Economic Minister’s 
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in late 1991, through a suggestion from Indonesia, the proposed 
grouping’s name was changed to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) to downplay the 
image that it would serve as a trading bloc. 2   Modifying his earlier concept, Mahathir 
emphasized that the EAEC would be a loose, consultative forum for East Asian nations to 
discuss economic cooperation and that it would not be a closed trading bloc. 
 Similar to the creation of APEC, the direct catalyst for the EAEG proposal was the then 
stalled Uruguay Round and the rise of inward-looking regionalism in North America and Europe.  
Like APEC, the Malaysian proposal for the EAEG/EAEC was presented as a measure to 
“counter the threat of protectionism and regionalism in world trade.”3  However, whereas APEC 
attempted to support the global liberal trading order by promoting the principle of open 
regionalism, the EAEG was motivated more by the desire to counter the influence of the United 
States and Europe.4  Mahathir was well known for his outspoken criticism against Western 
powers.  For example, Mahathir stated during his speech in March 1991 that “the countries of 
Europe and America have a reputation for economic arm twisting” by using such issues as 
human rights, democratic practices, and environmental protection as excuses.5  For Mahathir, the 
chief purpose of the EAEG/EAEC proposal was “to provide a strong voice for the East Asian 
countries in trade negotiations with the rest of the world, particularly the EC [European 
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 Community] and NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement].”6   This stemmed from 
Mahathir’s frustration that the voices of developing countries like Malaysia or even of groups 
like ASEAN had not been respected.7
The Malaysian internal policy document stipulated the following five reasons for creating 
the EAEG/EAEC: 
(1) the need to provide the push to continue the Uruguay Round negotiations and in this 
circumstance, there is the necessity of having leverage in the negotiations, 
particularly in the areas of common concern to the region such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing actions, safeguards and investment issues; 
 
(2) the need for a stronger, cohesive voice in other trade matters; 
 
(3) the increasing tendency to set up trade groupings which will continue if the Uruguay 
Round was to eventually succeed and thus the need for a counterweight to that; 
 
(4) to ease off the pressures by OECD countries on ASEAN to move towards premature 
membership in that organization, and affinity with Japan within an economic group 
could help in easing off that pressure; 
 
(5) and, to meet the challenge of political-economic changes in Europe and he Americas 
which could divert immensely investment away from the ASEAN region.8 
 
In a series of speeches, Mahathir stressed the importance of enhancing the political bargaining 
leverage of the East Asian countries vis-à-vis extraregional actors.  For example, in his speech at 
the Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers on July 10, 1991, Mahathir maintained that “if 
ASEAN is to have a bigger say in trade negotiations internationally, then it must work together 
with the East Asian countries.”9  At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 19, 1991, he 
remarked that the EAEG would “provide ASEAN and other East Asian countries the leverage 
and a platform to act in concert and speak with one voice with regard to any trade problems or 
trade-related issues that affect us directly or indirectly.10  Similarly, the Malaysian International 
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 198 
 Trade and Industry, Minister Rafidah Aziz, talked of the “leveraging” the negotiating position of 
the East Asian countries in GATT negotiations.11
As Glenn Hook summarizes, Mahathir’s proposal can be viewed as “a short-term 
defensive reaction to the threat of economic damage from regionalist projects in Europe and the 
Americas, on the one hand, and the failure of the Uruguay Round to address issues of central 
concern to the developing countries, on the other.”12  In that sense, the major trigger for the 
APEC initiative and the EAEG proposal stemmed from the same set of developments in the 
extraregional environment.  However, whereas APEC deliberately avoided creating an exclusive 
form of regionalism, the EAEG initiative, at least initially, envisioned a trade bloc.  To the extent 
that it focused on the importance of enhancing a “countervailing power” vis-à-vis North America 
and the EC,13 Mahathir’s idea reflected more closely the neorealist view of regionalism which 
emphasizes a “balancing” function.  From this perspective, the EAEG/EAEC proposal can be 
viewed as an example of so-called “counter-regionalism.”14
Another reasoning behind Mahathir’s proposal was Japan’s growing economic influence 
in Southeast Asia.  Therefore, as can been seen in the policy document cited above, his proposal 
stressed the importance of Japan’s active role in the proposed grouping.  Ultimately, Mahathir 
hoped that Japan would be a leader in the proposed group.  This view was consistent with 
Mahathir’s policy of the “Look East” policy he had promoted since the early 1980s.  This policy 
aimed to promote economic growth by learning from the Japanese model of economic 
development. 
However, as discussed in more detail below, the EAEG/EAEC proposal not only failed to 
garner solid support within the ASEAN countries, but also elicited strong opposition from the 
United States.  In response, Mahathir attempted to clarify his proposal on many occasions, 
emphasizing that it should not be a trade bloc.  For example, at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, he remarked that “the EAEG is not a trade bloc but the 
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 concept is that of a loose consultative forum comprising countries in East Asia.”15  Noordin 
Sopiee, who was a close advisor to Mahathir and Director-General of the Institute of Strategic 
International Studies in Malaysia, also laid out the following eight principles on the EAEC 
initiative as an agreement among the ASEAN countries: 
1. The EAEC must be an example of outward-looking, open regionalism. 
 
2. The EAEC must be consistent with GATT; the EAEC must be a coalition for the success 
of the Uruguay Round and for such an open global trading system. 
 
3. The EAEC should aspire to be an example of North-South relations, showing what can 
be done when developed and developing countries are involved in a common enterprise 
for mutual prosperity. 
 
4. The EAEC should focus on a wide field.  Where enormous opportunities for regional 
economic cooperation between the countries of East Asia exist, they should not focus 
only on trade. 
 
5. Where trade is concerned, the EAEC should not be trade-diverting and should not create 
barriers to third country imports. 
 
6. The EAEC process should contribute to a sense of security and well-being for all the 
participating countries.  There should be no movement towards economic domination. 
 
7. The EAEC is not a competitor to APEC in the same way that APEC is not a competitor 
or an attempt to undermine GATT.  APEC should be strengthened. 
 
8. The EAEC should not be a competitor to ASEAN and of course should not undermine 
ASEAN.16 
 
While emphasizing the EAEC’s compatibility with the existing institutional frameworks – 
regional and global alike – Mahathir expressed his desire to create a mechanism to reduce the 
region’s vulnerability to external forces.  In short, he suggested that the history of East Asia 
should be “made in East Asia, for East Asia, and by East Asians.”17
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 6.1.2 State Preferences Concerning Regionalism 
The following pages examine the preferences of key countries in the East Asian region, 
including the ASEAN countries, Japan, and China, and one external actor, the United States, 
with regard to regionalism in the early 1990s.  Although clearly located outside the East Asian 
region, the United States is included in the investigation, because, as discussed below, the U.S. 
attitude toward regional arrangements in East Asia has had a significant impact on the attitudes 
of East Asian countries and whether regionalist projects can be successfully launched.  After 
outlining the preferences of the relevant actors, we turn to an analysis of how these different 
preferences were played out in the interstate negotiations with regard to the EAEG/EAEC 
proposal. 
6.1.2.1 ASEAN 
Although ASEAN was generally hesitant about a broader regional institution until the 
end of the 1980s, ASEAN leaders began to appreciate the benefits of broader multilateral 
mechanisms in the 1990s.  The previous chapter revealed that despite their earlier hesitation, 
once the APEC process started, many ASEAN members initially developed an interest in APEC 
as a way to ensure export markets in the face of U.S. protectionism and the perceived potential 
breakdown of the GATT trade negotiations.  ASEAN’s interest in broader regional arrangements 
was driven by the uncertainty following the end of the Cold War and its anxiety about becoming 
an irrelevant actor in global processes. 
However, some ASEAN members remained skeptical about APEC.  In particular, 
Malaysia had reservations about APEC because the Malaysian government perceived that APEC 
was dominated by Western members at the expense of ASEAN’s interests.  It was against this 
backdrop that Mahathir proposed the EAEG.  For him, the EAEG thus represented “a 
counterproposal to APEC.”18
Yet, his vision of creating a purely East Asian grouping did not gain immediate support 
from other ASEAN countries, with the exception of initial support from Singapore.  Singapore 
was the first ASEAN country to express its support for Mahathir’s proposal.  In January 1991, 
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 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong lent his support for the proposal, with the caveat that it should be 
consistent with GATT, would not establish trade barriers, and would be supplementary to 
APEC.19  However, other ASEAN countries were more reserved.  Thailand reacted cautiously to 
Mahathir’s call by maintaining that the proposal needed more discussion. 20  Thailand was 
apparently more in favor of strengthening intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and enhancing its 
relations with non-ASEAN countries within the APEC framework. 21   The Philippines also 
reacted coolly to the EAEG initiative.  For example, Philippine Trade Minister Peter Garrucho 
mentioned that he was “very skeptical” about any regional arrangement that might harm 
Manila’s relations with its trading partners. 22   Indonesia was most strongly opposed to 
Mahathir’s proposal, partly because President Suharto was upset by Mahathir’s failure to consult 
with him about the proposal in advance.23
Meanwhile, in June 1991, Prime Minister of Thailand, Anand Panyarachun, officially 
proposed the idea of an ASEAN free trade area.  The initial Thai proposal was opposed by 
Indonesia and the Philippines out of their concerns about the speedy elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers.  However, at the Singapore ASEAN Summit in January 1992, the ASEAN 
leaders signed on an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement, which incorporated an 
Indonesian proposal for a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme.24   As this 
decision revealed, the first post-Cold War summit led to ASEAN’s consensus that ASEAN 
members needed to redefine the importance of ASEAN as an organization by strengthening 
intra-ASEAN economic cooperation through its own regional cooperative scheme.  This 
reflected ASEAN’s “search for a new rationale” for the existence of the organization in the post-
Cold War and the post-Cambodia conflict era.25
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 With regard to the EAEC, the Singapore Declaration merely stated: “ASEAN recognizes 
that consultations on issues of common concern among East Asian economies, as and when the 
need arises, could contribute to expanding cooperation among the region’s economies, and the 
promotion of an open and free global trading system”26  Despite the lack of ASEAN’s consensus 
on the EAEC initiative, by the mid-1990s, most ASEAN countries came to realize that ASEAN 
needed to strengthen its relations with extra-ASEAN countries through regional multilateral 
channels.  It is against this backdrop that ASEAN became proactive in establishing multiple 
layers of broader regional arrangements, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), and ASEAN+3, all of which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
ASEAN’s new activism marked a sharp change to its earlier preference for maintaining a certain 
level of regional autonomy independent of the influence of major external powers.  In the 1990s, 
ASEAN leaders started to view regional cooperative schemes as a means to “ensure continued 
participation” in the global economy.27  Given ASEAN’s dependence on external export markets 
and foreign direct investment, ASEAN’s new activism around promoting closer engagement 
with external powers made economic sense.  However, ASEAN’s preference for regionalist 
approaches was driven by its political motive to engage with stronger states through a network of 
multilateral frameworks, which ASEAN hoped would dilute the influence of the great powers 
while allowing ASEAN members to present themselves as a united front. 
6.1.2.2 Japan 
 
Despite Mahathir’s call for Japan’s active leadership in the proposed grouping, Japanese 
reaction to his proposal was lukewarm.  Japan was particularly uncomfortable about the fact that 
the EAEG left out the United States, Canada, and Australia.28  Japan’s lack of support for the 
EAEG/EAEC proposal was not only because of strong U.S. opposition or Tokyo’s desire to 
avoid alienating its most important ally.  Japan clearly opposed the creation of any trade bloc as 
originally envisioned by Mahathir’s proposal on the grounds that it would accelerate 
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 protectionism.29  Moreover, having played an important role alongside Australia in the creation 
of APEC in 1989, Japan preferred to promote “Asia-Pacific” region-building in the form of 
APEC rather than advancing an “East Asian” regional grouping.30   For example, in 1993, Prime 
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for “the maintenance of the US presence and the promotion of 
a system of open economic co-operation in Asia-Pacific, and expressed support for APEC over 
EAEC.”31  In 1994, the newly elected Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama also emphasized 
Japan’s active participation in APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum as well as Japan’s 
endorsement of “open regionalism.”32  Tokyo’s preference for an Asia-Pacific grouping over a 
narrow East Asian regional group was also supported by the Japanese public.  In a public poll 
conducted in 1993, only 5 percent of Japanese respondents supported an “Asia only” option, 
while 61 percent supported an Asia-Pacific one.33   
As discussed in Chapter 4, Tokyo’s preference for an Asian-Pacific form of regional 
cooperation goes back to the mid-1960s.  Since then Japan has been central to the development 
of the Asian-Pacific concept.  In the post-war era, Japan has deliberately avoided associating 
itself with East Asian concepts, which would remind its neighboring countries of Japan’s earlier 
infamous concept of the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 34  Tokyo’s hesitation to 
support an East Asian regionalist idea stems in part from its concern that Japan’s involvement in 
such a scheme would rekindle memories of the Pacific War and generate Asian resistance, as 
Japanese regionalist proposals in the previous decades had encountered criticism from other 
Asian countries.  Moreover, given the political and economic importance to Japan of both sides 
of the Pacific Rim, Japan’s preference for an Asia-Pacific regional arrangement rather than an 
East Asian one is not surprising. 
                                                 
29 “Li Peng is Supportive of East Asia Market Idea,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 13, 1990. 
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32 Ibid., 196. 
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 6.1.2.3 China 
China was the first non-ASEAN country to express its support for the EAEG/EAEC 
proposal. 35   When Mahathir first put forward the EAEG proposal, Prime Minister Li Peng 
responded cautiously to Mahathir’s proposal by stating that it would require further discussion, 
while lending support for the idea only in principle.36  The Chinese official maintained that 
“[w]hile China believes that such cooperation would be useful, it should be developed in a looser 
forum (than a trade bloc).”37  Despite its initial cautious attitude, China subsequently expressed 
its support for the proposal, although the Chinese government opposed the inclusion of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan in the proposed grouping.  In June 1991, China extended its full support when 
President Yang Shangkun commented that the EAEC initiative was “of positive significance to 
the increasing economic cooperation in East Asia.”38
When China was invited to attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as an observer for the 
first time in July 1991, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen remarked: “The idea [of the EAEG] is 
fitting as it is about economic cooperation and seeking common interest and stance on world 
issues.  As mentioned by the Prime Minister [Mahathir], it is not a trade bloc and it is not an 
exclusive group.”39  On another occasion Qian offered implicit support for the EAEC by stating: 
“The Asian region could have many forms of cooperation within it.” 40  Further, he maintained: 
“East Asian countries were justified to have their own proposal (EAEC) as the countries were 
located in the same region.”41
6.1.2.4 The United States 
Not surprisingly, the United States reacted to Mahathir’s proposal most strongly among 
the other countries.  The George H. W. Bush administration vehemently opposed the EAEG 
proposal on the grounds that it would damage a trans-Pacific linkage.  In favor of strengthening 
the already existing trans-Pacific link in the form of APEC, the basic stance of the U.S. was that 
the U.S. government would not accept any regional arrangement in Asia that would exclude the 
                                                 
35 Leong, "The East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC): 'Formalized' Regionalism Being Denied," 62. 
36 “Li Peng is Supportive of East Asia Market Idea,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 13, 1990. 
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38 Cited in Ibid. 
39 Cited in Ibid. 
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 United States.42   For example, Vice-President Dan Quayle spoke of U.S. interest in staying 
involved and engaged in Asia, while arguing that any arrangement that excludes the U.S. would 
be counterproductive.43  The U.S. government was concerned that the United States would be 
excluded from the part of the world consisting of the most dynamic economies with the fastest 
growth rate.  Furthermore, it was perceived that the EAEG would allow Japan to dominate the 
region economically and politically.  Given the growing trade deficit with many East Asian 
countries and its domestic economic recession, there was a growing “Asia-phobia” in some 
circles in Washington, driven in particular by “Japan-phobia.”44
Secretary of State James Baker warned against the EAEG idea, maintaining that it would 
“draw a line down the Pacific.”45   The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Michael H. Armacost, also 
condemned the EAEG proposal by maintaining that “the formation of a smaller group, which 
excluded the United States, could only diminish APEC.”46  Assistant Secretary of State, Richard 
Solomon maintained that “GATT-compatible regionalism, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
strengthens efforts to sustain and expand a global free trade regime.  Closed, exclusionary 
grouping, however, would be very costly for trading partners on both sides of the Pacific.”47  In 
short, the EAEG/EAEC was unacceptable from the American perspective.  For the United States, 
its preference was to strengthen trans-Pacific economic relations through APEC. 
6.1.3 Interstate Negotiations on the EAEG/EAEC 
As noted above, the EAEG/EAEC proposal immediately elicited strong opposition from the 
United States.  On many occasions, U.S. officials not only criticized the proposal, but also 
exerted considerable pressure on many of the proposed member countries not to support the 
EAEG/EAEC proposal. Japan and South Korea in particular received much of this pressure.  
Immediately before his visit to Japan in November 1991, Secretary of State Baker sent a letter to 
                                                 
42 As discussed in Chapter 5, the U.S. government previously opposed the original APEC proposal put forward by 
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke that apparently did not include the United States. 
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44 Ibid. 
45 Mainichi Shimbun, November 29, 1991, p. 3.  See also Munakata, Transforming East Asia: The Evolution of 
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47 Cited in Eero Palmujoki, Regionalism and Globalism in Southeast Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 86. 
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 the then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michio Watanabe, in which he warned that the 
EAEC idea would “divide the Pacific region in half.”48  At the APEC meeting in Seoul, Baker 
told South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok that “it was Americans, not Malaysians, who 
had shed their blood for Korea” during the Korean War, when the latter suggested the possibility 
that his country might support Mahathir’s proposal.49  In his memoir, Baker recalls, “I took a 
moderate line on his [Mahathir’s] idea [of the EAEG] in public.  In private, I did my best to kill 
it.”50  In the face of firm opposition from the United States, both Japan and South Korea were 
not able to afford risking their bilateral relations with the United States. 
 Thus, the Japanese government deliberately took a noncommittal stance.  When 
Malaysia asked for Japan’s support for the EAEG/EAEC proposal, Japanese officials only 
answered that it was “considering” the proposal. 51   During Mahathir’s visit to Tokyo in 
December 1991, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa avoided talking about the EAEC.52  
The deliberate ambivalence in Tokyo’s attitude was seen by many observers as Japan’s strategic 
attempt to use the EAEG as a diplomatic card in order to enhance its bargaining leverage vis-à-
vis the United States.53
In the face of strong U.S. efforts to block the EAEC initiative, Mahathir responded 
strongly.  In his speech at the United Nations in September 1991, he remarked: 
In East Asia we are told that we may not call ourselves East Asians as Europeans call 
themselves Europeans and Americans call themselves Americans. We are told that we 
must call ourselves Pacific people and align ourselves with people who are only partly 
Pacific, but more American, Atlantic and European. We may not have an identity that is 
not permitted, nor may we work together on the basis of that identity.54
 
He continued to accuse the United States of setting a double standard in forming the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) while obstructing a similar attempt in Asia.  
                                                 
48 Shim Jae Hoon and Robert Delfs, “Block Politics: APEC Meeting Clouded by Fears of Regionalism,” Far 
Eastern Economic Review, November 28, 1991, p. 26. 
49 James A. Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 
(New York: Putnam, 1995), 610-611. 
50 Ibid., 610. 
51 Munakata, Transforming East Asia: The Evolution of Regional Economic Integration, 75. 
52 Verena Blechinger, "Flirting with Regionalism: Japan's Foreign Policy Elites and the East Asian Economic 
Caucus," in Verena Blechinger and Jochen Legewie, eds., Facing Asia - Japan's Role in the Political and Economic 
Dynamism of Regional Cooperation (Munich, Germany: Iudicium, 2000), 68. 
53 Mainichi Shimbun, May 4, 1991, p. 9; Nikkei Shimbun, April 29, 1991, p. 3. 
54 Mahathir’s speech at the Plenary of the Forty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York 
City, September 24, 1991, available at http://www.pmo.gov.my
 207 
 Mahathir went so far as to mention that such a double standard might be based on “racist bias.”55  
In response, some criticized the EAEC as “a caucus without Caucasians.”56
While the EAEC did not gain support outside ASEAN countries, even within ASEAN, 
the member states were divided over the EAEG/EAEC proposal. A major difference emerged 
with regard to the format of the EAEC, especially between Malaysia and Indonesia Malaysia 
favored establishing the EAEC independent of APEC, apparently to avoid influence from non-
Asian members of APEC, such as the United States.  On the other hand, Indonesia insisted on 
incorporating the EAEC under the APEC framework in order to avoid projecting the EAEC as an 
exclusive group. Since Mahathir and Suharto were unable to reach an agreement, the Singapore 
Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, proposed a compromise formula at the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in July 1993.  At this meeting, ASEAN ministers finally agreed to situate the EAEC as 
“a caucus within APEC.”57  Subsequently, from 1994 to 1996, ASEAN foreign ministers met 
with their counterparts from Japan, South Korea, and China to hold informal discussions at the 
annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM).  However, the EAEC concept itself did not take 
shape. 
6.1.4 Explaining the Failure to Launch the EAEG/EAEC Proposal 
Why did the EAEG/EAEC proposal fail to get off the ground in the early 1990s?  The first major 
obstacle was firm U.S. opposition, which effectively blocked the EAEG/EAEC initiative; by  
exercising its influence on its allies, especially Japan and South Korea, the U.S. convinced them 
not to support the proposal (an example of “negative supply”).  Second, the lack of Japanese 
support for the proposed East Asian grouping was a crucial factor in preventing its realization.58  
Third, the ASEAN countries were also divided over the Malaysian proposal. 
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 In addition to these three main reasons, Mahathir made at least two strategic mistakes in 
launching the EAEG/EAEC initiative.  First, the fact that Mahathir put forward his proposal to 
the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng without discussing it with other ASEAN members and 
building consensus within ASEAN damaged the initiative’s potential.  In particular, President 
Suharto of Indonesia, who acknowledged himself as the leader of ASEAN, was offended by 
Mahathir’s failure to consult with him.59  Consequently, as many commentators point out, the 
EAEG/EAEC proposal became entangled in the rivalry between Mahathir and Suharto and their 
aspirations to lead ASEAN and, more broadly, the world’s developing countries.60  Second, 
Mahathir’s confrontational style, with its explicitly anti-Western rhetoric, enhanced U.S. 
concerns about his proposal and the implications of excluding the United States.  For example, 
Baker wrote in his memoir that “Mahathir was not seen as particularly pro-American and was 
considered likely to cause mischief if crossed.”61
In summary, the EAEG/EAEC proposal did not materialize for the following three 
reasons: 1) strong U.S. opposition toward an exclusive grouping; 2) the lack of Japanese support 
for an “East Asia-only” grouping; 3) the lack of support among other ASEAN members; and 4) 
mistakes in Mahathir’s strategy. 
6.2 THE FORMATION OF ASEAN+3 
Despite the failure to launch an East Asian regional grouping in the early 1990s, ASEAN has 
nevertheless successfully invited the leaders from three Northeast Asian countries, namely, Japan, 
South Korea and China  to attend annual informal summits in the form of ASEAN+3 since 1997.  
What accounts for the emergence of East Asian regionalism in the form of ASEAN+3 in the late 
1990s? 
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 Like the analysis of APEC in Chapter 4, the first section that follows explores the 
demand-side question of why the APT was created, while the second section addresses the 
supply-side question of how the APT came into being. 
6.2.1 Why Cooperate on an East Asian Basis? 
Despite the lack of support for an East Asian Economic Grouping in the early 1990s, why did 
key actors in East Asia come to support the APT framework in the late 1990s?  The following 
section assesses the configuration of state preferences with regard to East Asian regionalism 
among the relevant countries, including ASEAN, Japan, China, and the United States.  It will be 
shown that ASEAN has shown a growing interest in seeking a closer engagement with Northeast 
Asian countries, while Japan, China, and the United States also became gradually receptive to 
the creation of an East Asian grouping. 
6.2.1.1 ASEAN 
In sharp contrast with ASEAN’s earlier resistance which persisted until the end of the 
1980s, by the mid-1990s, ASEAN has become supportive of broader regionalist projects, such as 
APEC, the ARF, and ASEM.  Despite its earlier hesitation, ASEAN found its own interest in the 
APEC process.  The establishment of the ARF in 1994 reflected ASEAN’s desire to create an 
institutional mechanism to deal with major powers in the region in a multilateral setting.  The 
creation of the ASEM process was driven by ASEAN’s aspirations to strengthen its relations 
with European countries.  It was against this backdrop that ASEAN countries also reached out to 
Northeast Asian countries in order to establish a regular political channel with them.  Before the 
onset of the Asian financial crisis, many ASEAN countries had recognized the need to strengthen 
their ties with Northeast Asian countries for at least three reasons.   
First, although many ASEAN leaders responded with a cautious attitude toward 
Mahathir’s call in the early 1990s to create an East Asian economic grouping, these leaders 
gradually began to recognize that ASEAN had no choice but to engage the Northeast Asian 
powers if ASEAN’s voice is to be heard in the global economy.  With that recognition, ASEAN 
started to develop its relationship with external non-ASEAN members by expanding its Post-
Ministerial Conference (PMC) full dialogue partnership to Korea in 1991 and China in 1996.  As 
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 Alice Ba observers, “[t]here was growing consensus throughout the 1990s that ASEAN must 
cultivate closer relations and institutional linkages with Northeast Asian economies if it were to 
respond adequately to new challenges or to have any leverage in a global economy dominated by 
much larger economies.”62
The second long-term motivation behind the formation of the APT stems from internal 
conflicts within APEC.63  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, by the mid-1990s, APEC 
members came to be highly divided between the Anglo-American economies, including the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and many of Asian economies, especially China and 
Malaysia.64  In particular, the U.S.-led attempt to use APEC as a vehicle to negotiate for greater 
trade and investment liberalization, alienated many Asian members who preferred to keep APEC 
an informal consultative forum for promoting economic and technical cooperation.  The Osaka 
APEC meetings witnessed the embryonic form of an “Asian coalition” that collectively 
prevented the transformation of APEC into a rule-based negotiation body for trade and 
investment liberalization with clear deadlines and binding obligations, a model favored by the 
United States.65  Consequently, in the eyes of many observers, the division within APEC, with 
Anglo-American states on the one side and Asian states on the other, contributed to the 
formation of Asian coalitions that stood against those whom they perceived as common 
opponents, and thus creating at least a limited sense of common identity among East Asian 
states.66
The different attitudes toward APEC among member economies can be attributed not 
only to the different levels of economic development among its members, but also to a deeper 
division with regard to the different forms of capitalism that the different economies embraced.  
East Asian countries adopted a distinct form of capitalism that is quite different from either 
European or North American forms of capitalism.  Stubbs argues that: 
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 This East Asian form of capitalism, which is increasingly found in the APT countries, is 
rooted in business networks – both Japanese and ethnic Chinese networks – and is 
characterized by strong state-business links.  It emphasizes production rather than 
consumption, and results rather than ideology, and tends to place a premium on market 
share as opposed to short term profits.  East Asian capitalism is also based more on social 
obligation and social trust than on the rule of law.67
 
In this view, East Asian regionalism makes more sense than Asia-Pacific regionalism.  
APEC contained the seeds of internal conflict which were to reveal themselves only later were 
only to be discovered, instead of being reconciled.  Indeed, APEC proved to be “a key site of 
contestation between ‘Asian’ and ‘Western governments keen on implementing their own, 
potentially incommensurate, visions for APEC.”68  The formation of the APT can be viewed as 
an attempt to defend a distinctly East Asian form of capitalism, which was especially important 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and Western responses to it.  
The third long-term motivation behind ASEAN’s initiative for the APT stemmed from 
their concerns over the rise of China.  A rapidly increasing Chinese power has continued to pose 
a serious challenge for other countries in Asia and especially small ASAEN states.  Since 
“containment” did not present an attractive or feasible option for Asian countries, Asian leaders 
came to recognize that they had no choice but to engage with China.  Therefore, they sought 
regional institutions to constrain Chinese behavior in a multilateral setting. Within a regional 
institution, ASEAN leaders wanted to pursue a balance-of-power policy between Japan and 
China as a counterweight against each.69  Moreover, ASEAN countries increasingly perceived 
the growing Chinese economic power as a challenge.  In particular, ASEAN leaders believe that 
the Chinese have been attracting increasing foreign investment at the expense of ASEAN.70  
Together, there was growing motivation on the part of the ASEAN countries to bring Northeast 
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 Asian countries into the fold of regional dynamics before the onset of the Asian financial crisis.  
However, as discussed below, it was the Asian financial crisis that provided the major catalyst 
that dramatically increased the demand for an East Asian regional institution on the parts of both 
ASEAN and the Northeast Asian countries. 
6.2.1.2 Japan 
Although Japan’s interest in APEC has gradually waned since the U.S. government began 
pressing for a greater trade and investment liberalization agenda at the fore of the forum’s 
agenda when it hosted APEC in 1993, Japan generally continued to support an Asia-Pacific 
rather than an East Asian regional arrangement.  However, by the mid-1990s, some business and 
political circles showed their support for the EAEC concept.  In late 1994, an influential business 
group, the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), expressed its support for the 
EAEC idea.71  In November 1995, another influential group, Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association 
of Corporate Executives), also demonstrated its support.72   
Despite some domestic support for the EAEC concept, until the mid-1190s, the Japanese 
government remained extremely cautious about attending any meetings held exclusively by East 
Asians.  For example, Japan refused to attend an informal “six plus three” meeting scheduled at 
the Thai resort island of Phuket in April 1995, attended otherwise by the economic ministers of 
the ASEAN members, alongside the economic ministers of China, Korea, and Japan.  When the 
Thai Deputy Prime Minister, Supachai Panitchpakdi, proposed the meeting to Rutyaro 
Hashimoto in September 1994, the then Japan’s Minister of International Trade and Industry, 
Hashimoto had insisted on the participation of Australia and New Zealand, expressing the 
concern that such a meeting would encounter opposition from the United States.73  Although 
Beijing had already expressed its intention to attend the meeting, the Japanese refusal to join and 
Korea’s decision to follow suit forced the Thai host to cancel the meeting.74
When the Japanese government received an invitation to attend the informal ASEAN 
summit in 1997, it was initially still reluctant to get involved.  Only after the Chinese 
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 government accepted ASEAN’s invitation did the Japanese government reveal its intention to 
attend the summit.75  At the first APT meeting, the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 
disagreed to the idea of making the APT summit an annual event.  Since he had earlier proposed 
bilateral summits between Japan and ASEAN, it was speculated that he preferred to strengthen 
the relationship bilaterally rather than on an East Asian basis. 76   When Japan received an 
invitation to attend the next ASEAN informal summit in 1998, it was reported that the Japanese 
government had initially demonstrated some hesitation in accepting the invitation.77  It was only 
at the third APT summit in 1999 that Tokyo’s more active interest in the APT process was 
recognized by ASEAN members.78
What explains the shift in Japan’s attitude toward East Asian regionalism?  Certainly, the 
moderation of U.S. hostility toward East Asian regionalism diminished Japan’s hesitation to take 
part in the first APT meeting.  However, there are at least two other reasons that motivated Japan 
to take an active interest in the APT.  First, the Asian economic crisis demonstrated that Japan 
had high industrial stakes in the economic health of the Southeast Asian countries as numerous 
Japanese firms were operating in the region.  Moreover, the crisis damaged Japan’s regional 
credentials, highlighting the image of the rise of China and the decline of Japan.  This contrast 
was perceived particularly by ASEAN countries by “a China that kept Chinese yuan steady vis-
à-vis U.S. dollars and a Japan that was not able to recover from a long recession and thus did not 
help the Asia-pacific economic recovery to come more swiftly and vigorously.” 79   This 
experience prompted the Japanese government to make more of an effort to engage with the 
region in order to curb the decline of Japanese influence in East Asia.  
Second, Japan’s interest in the APT process was increasingly driven by its political 
concerns over China’s growing influence in the region.  Clearly, Japan could not afford to let 
China take a leading role in the East Asian regional framework.  Thus Japan and ASEAN share 
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 an interest in hedging against China’s dominant role within East Asian regional dynamics.  In 
short, Japan’s growing interest in the APT was driven by both economic and political interests. 
6.2.1.3 China 
In contrast with a reluctant Japan, China had shown its support for Mahathir’s call for the 
creation of an East Asian grouping.  Although the Chinese had been skeptical about a 
multilateral approach, they rather quickly found an interest in an East Asian regional 
arrangement.  China shared an interest with Malaysia in forming a grouping that excluded 
Western powers. 
When ASEAN invited the leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries to their 1997 
informal summit, China’s President Jiang Zemin was reportedly the first one to officially accept 
ASEAN’s invitation.80  Yet, at the first informal summit in 1997, Beijing, like Tokyo, did not 
accept the idea of making the APT an annual event.  However, the years following this summit 
have seen China’s growing interest in the APT process, as demonstrated by China’s active role in 
proposing several proposals within the APT framework. 
China’s shift in attitude toward East Asian regionalism was motivated by several events 
and developments in the 1990s.81  First, in the aftermath of the post-Tiananmen isolation, Beijing 
had worked assiduously to improve its relations with Southeast Asian countries.  Second, China 
was wary of the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance during 1996-97.  Third, the Asian 
economic crisis provided China with a great opportunity to increase its position within Asia.82  
Fourth, China’s interest in the APT was further encouraged by NATO’s bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and by the Cox Report, which was released in the same year.  
Spurred by its growing dissatisfaction with U.S. policy, Beijing viewed the APT as insurance 
against persistent problems in the US-China relationship.  Finally, Beijing had recently adopted a 
more active role by taking some important initiatives, such as by viewing the APT as a means to 
strengthen its position in the region.  In short, China’s move toward the APT and greater 
economic diplomacy in Asia was initially driven as a response to the changing external 
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 environment, but China became more actively involved in shaping regional projects as a means 
of furthering its political objectives. 
6.2.1.4 The United States 
The U.S. government had strongly opposed the creation of a regional arrangement that 
would exclude the United States, as in both the case of the original Australian proposal for 
creating a regional forum for Western Pacific economic cooperation in 1989 and in Mahathir’s 
EAEG/EAEC proposal during the early 1990s.  However, in the latter half of the 1990s, the 
Clinton administration softened its attitude somewhat toward the formation of a grouping that 
would exclude the United States.  The first conspicuous absence of U.S. opposition toward such 
a grouping was observed when the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was launched in 1996.  
According to Davis B. Bobrow, “[n]either then nor since has either political Washington or 
economic New York paid much obvious attention to ASEM.83  In contrast to its staunch hostility 
toward the earlier EAEG/EAEC proposal, the U.S. response to the development of the APT has 
been remarkably soft, although the U.S. has encouraged the inclusion of Australia and New 
Zealand in the grouping.84  For example, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly described the 
development of the APT as “a very healthy kind of dialogue within East Asia.”85  Part of the 
reason for this response can be attributed to diminishing U.S. attention to the East Asian region.  
Ellen Frost remarked that the U.S. government has taken an attitude of “benign neglect” toward 
the development of East Asian regionalism.86  
There are at least two explanations for the change in America’s attitude toward East 
Asian regionalism.  The first explanation relates to changes in the economic conditions of the 
United States and Asian countries. U.S. opposition toward an “East Asia-only” grouping in the 
early 1990s was framed by anxiety over its decline, especially in the face of East Asia’s rapidly 
growing economies.  However, by the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy had recovered, while many 
                                                 
83 Davis B. Bobrow, "The U.S. and ASEM: Why the Hegemon Didn't Bark," The Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 
104. 
84 Muthiah Alagappa, "Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., 
Alagappa, Muthiah (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 75. 
85 Transcript of Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s statement on the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum, 
July 18, 2001, available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2001/0719/epf407.htm
86 Personal interview, September 24, 2005.  Frost is a former counselor to the U.S. Trade Representative and 
currently a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics and an adjunct research fellow at the National 
Defense University. 
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 Asian economies fell into the crisis of 19997–98.  The second explanation is based on U.S. 
perceptions of the impact of regional arrangements that exclude the United States.  Michael 
Wesley argues that the new regionalism as exemplified by the APT process “had showed itself to 
US policy makers to be incapable of constituting a challenge to US power.”87
6.2.2 Explaining the Shift in State Preferences 
What explains the shift in the configuration of state preferences regarding East Asian 
regionalism?  It will be argued below that the Asian financial crisis served as the single most 
significant trigger that created the demand for the development of the APT process.   After 
examining the impact of the crisis on the Asian countries, the ensuing section considers other 
alternative theoretical claims for explaining the change in state preferences in favor of 
regionalism, such as ideational changes, balance of power, and economic interdependence. 
6.2.2.1 The Asian Financial Crisis as a Trigger: Regionalism as a Defensive Mechanism 
The examination of the configuration of state preferences among key government players 
in the previous section revealed that there was a growing perception among many relevant 
governments of the need for closer ties between Southeast and Northeast Asian countries.  
However, it was the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 that provided the single greatest impetus 
for creating the urgent demand for a new East Asian regional mechanism.88  The financial crisis 
started in Thailand in July 1997 and spread quickly among almost all nations in the region.  As 
can be seen in Figure 6-1, the most severely affected countries included Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and South Korea, all of which registered a drastic drop in GDP growth rate.  
Meanwhile, only China and Taiwan were left relatively unaffected.  Although the timing and 
impact of the crisis differed in each country, all the crisis-affected countries experienced similar 
symptoms, including huge capital outflows, a drop in stock prices and real estate values, and the 
                                                 
87 Michael Wesley, "The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Bush Administration and East Asian Regionalism," in Mark 
Beeson, ed., Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia (New York: Routledge, 2006), 66. 
88 Many analysts argue that the Asian financial crisis served as the single greatest catalyst for the emergence of East 
Asian regionalism.  See, for example, Stubbs, "ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?," 448-450; 
Tsutomu Kikuchi, "East Asian Regionalism: A Look at the "ASEAN Plus Three" Framework," Japan Review of 
International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 23-45; Webber, "Two Funerals and a Wedding?," 357-359; Yu, "Explaining 
the Emergence of New East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest-Based Approaches," 284. 
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 sharp depreciation of currencies. Table 6-1 shows the magnitude of the reversal in capital flows 
experienced in these crisis-affected countries. 
 
Figure 6-1: Change in Real GDP Growth Rate, Selected Asian Countries 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Statistical Appendix, tables 2 and 6, p. 166, p. 173.   
  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/01/pdf/append.pdf
 
Table 6-1: Capital Flows to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand  
(U.S. $ billions) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Net external financing 98.1 118.6 39.5 -15.2 -4.9 
Net private flows 94.2 119.5 4.9 -38.7 -5.2 
Equity investment, net 15.5 16.8 5.2 16.8 30.1 
Direct investment, net 4.4 4.8 6.8 12.3 14.6 
Portfolio investment, net 11.0 12.0 -1.7 4.5 15.4 
Private creditors, net 78.7 102.7 -0.3 -55.5 -35.3 
Commercial bank credit, 
net 64.9 69.6 -17.4 -48.8 -29.3 
Nonbank credit, net 13.8 33.2 17.2 -6.7 -6.0 
Net official flows 3.9 -0.9 34.6 23.5 0.2 
International financial 
institutions -0.5 -1.9 22.7 19.7 -4.6 
Bilateral creditors 4.4 1.0 11.9 3.8 4.9 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, “Tracking Asia’s Recovery – A Regional Overview,” Asia Recovery Report 2001 
(Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2001), p. 145. 
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 The crisis provided the impetus for the emergence of East Asian regionalism for at least 
three reasons.  First, the crisis “greatly strengthened perceptions of mutual economic 
interdependence and vulnerability between Southeast and Northeast Asia.”89  Both government 
and business leaders in Northeast Asian countries became aware that their increased trade with, 
and investment in, Southeast Asia were greatly affected by the economic situations in those 
countries in the region.  Northeast Asian leaders realized that “the economic health of the 
ASEAN members was very much in their interests.” 90   For ASEAN members, the crisis 
highlighted the importance of forming institutional links with the larger economies in Northeast 
Asia in order to avoid any future crisis.91  As a result, leaders from both Northeast and Southeast 
Asia recognized that they are integral members of a broader region of East Asia. 
Second, the crisis demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing regional institutions, such 
as APEC and ASEAN, to respond to the crisis in any effective way.92  ASEAN did not have 
enough resources to deal with the crisis.  APEC also did not respond to the crisis in any effective 
way.  APEC lacked a “market-correction” function for dealing with the negative consequences of 
market activities.  In particular, APEC was not intended, nor designed to cope, with financial 
crises, because it focused on trade and investment liberalization agendas.93   Instead, it was 
primarily a “market-building” institution aimed at enhancing the efficiency of market 
activities. 94   In the end, APEC only endorsed the IMF program.  Consequently, the crisis 
revealed that ASEAN was too small to respond to the crisis, but APEC was too big to fully 
represent the interests of its Asian members.95
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 Finally and most importantly, the financial crisis revealed East Asia’s vulnerability to 
external forces, such as the rapid cross-border movement of short-term capital and the influence 
of global financial institutions.96  The crisis demonstrated the inadequacy of global institutional 
arrangements such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to protect interests of regional 
countries, thus calling into question the legitimacy of the global institutional framework in the 
first place.  East Asian regional leaders also confirmed the growing perception that global 
financial institutions are dominated by Western countries, especially the United States, and 
therefore do not reflect the interests of East Asian countries.97  Consequently, the crisis created 
the regional leaders’ desire to establish a regional mechanism as “a way of warding off the 
possible negative impacts of global processes and providing a degree of insulation for regional 
polities and economies.”98
In short, the crisis revealed the inadequacies of the existing institutional frameworks, both 
at the regional and global levels.  Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand Supachai Panitchpakdi, for 
example, remarked in 2000: “We cannot rely on the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or 
International Monetary Fund … we must rely [instead] on regional cooperation.”99  As a result, 
the crisis led to the emergence of an urgent demand for a new East Asian regional mechanism. 
6.2.2.2 Crises and Ideational Changes 
Many commentators argue that the crisis led to a dramatic change in thinking among 
policy elites in East Asia with regard both to how the region should be governed and what its 
relationship should be to the wider global context.100  The immediate impact of the crisis on 
regional elites was the growth of resentment against the West-dominated IMF and, more 
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no. 2 (2003): 251-268. 
97 For a scholarly analysis on this issue, see David P. Rapkin, "Is East Asia Under-Represented in the International 
Monetary Fund?," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3, no. 1 (2003): 1-28. 
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99 Quoted in David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Constructing Communities: The Curious Case of East 
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100 Alice D. Ba, "Contested Spaces: The Politics of Regional and Global Governance," in Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. 
Hoffmann, eds., Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence and Contestation (New York: 
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 particularly, the U.S. response to the crisis.101  According to Fred Bergsten, “most East Asians 
feel that they were both let down and put upon by the West.” 102  They believe that Western 
financial institutions caused or exacerbated the crisis by pulling out their money from the region 
and then declined to take part in the rescue operations.  At the same time, they believe that the 
IMF and the United States imposed the so-called “Washington consensus” through IMF 
conditionality and prescriptions, which, in their view, aggravated rather than alleviated the 
crisis.103  In the eyes of many observers, the perception of the “East Asian miracle” brought by 
the East Asian developmental state model was dramatically replaced by the image of “crony 
capitalism.”  This “feeling of ‘humiliation’ shared by many East Asian countries” 104 helped to 
define the boundary of a newly emerging regional arrangement in the form of the ASEAN+3 
framework.   
Many analysts inspired by constructivist approaches go so far as to suggest that the crisis 
has contributed to developing an East Asian regional identity based on a shared sense of identity 
and regional consciousness vis-à-vis the West.105  In this view, then, the crisis not only created 
the functional and material need for a new institutional mechanism to deal with new economic 
problems, but also produced ideational foundations for creating a regional institution based 
around East Asian countries.  Consequently, through the “politics of inclusion and exclusion,” 106  
Western countries, most notably the United States, were excluded from the East Asian regional 
institutional process which searched for a new regional institutional identity. 
Moreover, in general, the crisis evidently demonstrated the negative consequences of 
globalization without appropriate regulatory mechanisms, particularly in the area of monetary 
and financial coordination.  According to Kanishka Jayasuriya, it is precisely these sorts of 
“regulatory arrangement for policy coordination that the region lacked.” 107   The crisis 
undoubtedly revealed the limits of unregulated global capitalism, thus significantly challenging 
the dominant policy ideas that promoted financial liberalization.  While some Western 
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 commentators proclaimed the triumph of economic neoliberalism in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, others saw it as “the first serious challenges to the hegemony of neoliberalism as 
the dominant form of economic organization since the end of the Cold War,” thus leading to a 
crisis of neoliberalism.108  To respond to the limits of economic neoliberalism, policy elites in 
East Asia started to embrace “the idea that a globalized economy needs to develop regulatory 
structures for a range of financial and monetary issues, all of which encompass areas thought to 
be within the domain of domestic governance.”109  In short, there was growing demand among 
some regional leaders to create some kind of regional political mechanism to deal with the 
negative consequences of globalization. 110   Yet, despite the importance of these ideational 
changes within regional policy elites, it is worth stressing that such ideational change occurred 
only as a result of the crisis. 
6.2.2.3 The Shift in the Power Configurations 
Realist-informed theorists account for the formation of regionalism as a result of power 
realignments among regional powers or the shift in the broader balance of power among regional 
groupings.  The rise of China has been singled out as the most significant factor in changing the 
overall relative power configurations in East Asia, and thus China’s rise serves as a major source 
of concern among the region’s powers.  Although the rise of China can be analyzed in both 
military and economic dimensions, the most dramatic and immediate impact of the rise of China 
on the patterns of interactions among East Asian countries has been in the economic domain.  In 
light of China’s increasing economic might and growing political clout, some scholars like 
Samuel S. Kim, argue that the APT process “has had the broader strategic objective of 
enmeshing an increasingly powerful China into a regional financial regime in the making.”111
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 As Figure 6-2 indicates, measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, China’s 
GDP had surpassed Japan’s by the mid-1990s.  According to Akihiko Tanaka, concerns about 
China’s growing economic power were ignited by the World Bank report released in 1993, 
which calculated China’s GDP using the PPP.112  However, according to market exchange rates, 
Japan remains the world’s second largest economy, second only to the United States.  In 2003, 
Japan’s GDP was approximately three times that of China (Figure 6-3).  Although there is some 
room for controversy, there is general agreement that market exchange rates provide a better 
indicator for measuring relative power in the international economy, whereas purchasing power 
parity is a better indicator of comparative levels of total consumption.113  Apparently, there is a 
tendency that analysts who emphasize the impact of a rising China use the PPP to calculate 
China’s GDP. 
Although there is disagreement over the magnitude of China’s rising economic power, 
undoubtedly the China factor has become an increasingly important one in shaping the patterns 
of interactions across East Asia. The region has also witnessed the decline of Japan’s dominant 
role in the region’s economy, which has been severely eroded through a series of events and 
developments in the 1990s, such as the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble during 1990–
91, the subsequent economic stagnation, the Asian economic crisis, and the rise of China.114
Arguably, the gradual shift in the center of gravity from Japan toward China is the most 
significant change in overall trade and investment patterns among East Asian countries during 
the 1990s.115  During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there was a wide-spread perception that 
East Asian economies were coalescing around Japan.  It was against that backdrop that 
Mahathir’s EAEG was proposed.  Nevertheless, in the 1990s, this image of a Japan-centered East 
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 Asian economic system was not realized.116  Instead, the economic presence of China increased 
enormously. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Change in GDP at Purchasing Power Parity 
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Source: World Bank, WDI Online. 
 
Figure 6-3: Change in GDP at Market Exchange Rates 
(Billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars) 
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Source: World Bank, WDI Online. 
 
The decline in Japanese influence in the region throughout the 1990s can be seen in 
Japan’s declining share in regional trade, foreign direct investment, bank lending, and aid.117  On 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 85. 
117 Haggard, "The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy: International Relations Theory in Northeast 
Asia," 20. 
 224 
 trade, Japan has become a less important source of imports and destination of exports for the rest 
of the region. By 2001, the share of East Asian exports to Japan steadily dropped from 23 
percent of the region’s global exports in 1981 to 14 percent.118  On direct investment, Japan has 
become a less significant source of investment around the region in both relative and absolute 
terms.119  Furthermore, Japanese direct investment in the rest of Asia declined substantially after 
1997.120  On bank lending, the total amount of Japanese loans made by Japanese commercial 
banks to the rest of Asia has dramatically declined since the mid-1990s.121  Thus, by September 
2002, the share of Japanese banks in all outstanding international loans to East Asia dropped 
from 40 percent to only 17 percent.122  Finally, as a consequence of Japan’s prolonged economic 
stagnation during the 1990s, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has 
steadily declined following its peak in 1995. 
Meanwhile, the rise of China has been remarkable, especially in the economic domain.  
The major driving force behind China’s rapid economic growth was a dramatic increase of 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in China from 1992 onwards.123  The emergence of 
China as an increasingly important recipient of FDI has caused serious concern especially to 
ASEAN countries whose economic development has relied heavily on FDI from abroad (Figure 
6-4).  In 2002, China surpassed the United States for the first time as the world’s top recipient of 
non-stocks and FDI shares, with actual FDI reaching US$53.5 billion in 2003.124
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 Figure 6-4: Foreign Direct Investment in China and ASEAN5, 1979–2004 
(Billions of current U.S. dollars) 
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Source: World Bank, WDI Online. 
Note: ASEAN5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 
Figure 6-5: Shares in World Merchandise Exports, Selected Countries 
(Percent) 
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Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2005, available at:  
http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/appendix_e/a06.xls
 
Figure 6-6: Shares in World Merchandise Imports, Selected Countries 
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Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2005, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/appendix_e/a07.xls
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 Driven by FDI, China’s trade volume dramatically increased in the latter half of the 
1990s.  China’s merchandise exports rose from US$121 billion in 1994 to US$593 billion in 
2004; its merchandise imports rose from US$115 in 1994 to US$561 in 2004.125  As Figures 6-5 
and 6-6 indicate, China’s share in world exports and imports increased steadily in the late 1990s, 
while Japan’s share gradually declined.  As a result, China has become an increasingly 
significant trade partner for many countries. 
What impact did China’s increasing economic power have on the preferences of other 
regional powers over the issue of regionalism?  Certainly, China’s growing economic power has 
greatly affected the basic patterns of economic transactions not only in East Asia, but within the 
global economy.  As revealed by the previous cross-national study of the changes in preferences, 
the rise of China certainly had some bearing on the attitudes of other key governments in 
ASEAN, Japan, and the United States.  However, it was the perception, combined with 
projections, of China’s rise, rather than the growth in China’s material economic power that most 
influenced the policies of other regional powers. 
In particular, the Asian economic crisis effectively created the perceived contrast between 
“a declining, apathetic Japan and a rising, dynamic China.” 126   Despite the fact that Japan 
provided a large amount of financial assistance to help Asia’s economic recovery, the crisis-hit 
countries were disappointed by Japan’s inability to recover from its own economic stagnation 
and by its limited capability to take leadership in responding to the crisis.127  Asian countries 
apparently expected from Japan not just the provision of financial assistance, but also an 
expansion of imports through its own economic recovery.  As Naoko Munakata points out, 
“resistance to an increased Japanese role in the region was replaced by the expectation that Japan 
should lead the region out of the crisis and spearhead regional efforts to create a stable economic 
environment.”128  On the contrary, China managed to create the impression that it had instead 
acted as a responsible country by not devaluing its currency. 
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 Certainly, both China’s economic ascent and the relative decline of Japan’s influence 
have become increasingly important factors in shaping the configuration of state preferences 
among East Asian countries.  However, as I argued earlier, the initial impetus for generating the 
demand for an East Asian regional cooperative arrangement was catalyzed by the East Asia’s 
relationship with extraregional forces. 
6.2.2.4 The Growth of Regional Economic Interdependence 
Liberal theorists of international relations and many economists identify the deepening of 
regional economic interdependence in East Asia as the most important variable for explaining 
the creation of East Asian regionalism.129  As Table 6-2 indicates, intraregional trade shares 
among the APT countries rose from 30.93% in 1990 to 37.34% in 2001.  However, contrary to 
the expectation of the liberal perspective, the APT was created exactly at a time of temporary 
downturn in the level of intraregional trade shares among the APT countries.  The level of 
intraregional trade share among APT countries declined from 37.03% in 1995 to 35.45% in 1999 
in the wake of the financial crisis.  This prompts Ravenhill to suggest the possibility that “the 
decline in intraregional trade stimulated a new interest in regional collaboration as a means to 
stem this trend and a desire to place regionalism in East Asia on a more secure footing akin to 
that in the EU and NAFTA.”130  Nonetheless, if we look at the trade intensity of the APT, it 
shows a slight rising trend in the late 1990s, indicating an increasing intra-APT trade bias.  For 
liberals, this trend cultivated a supporting environment for creating the APT by providing a 
stronger incentive for the East Asian countries to create a cooperative framework among them. 
 
Table 6-2: ASEAN+3’s Intraregional Trade Share and Trade Intensity Index 
  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Trade Share (percentage) 30.93 33.70 37.03 36.42 35.45 37.34 
Trade Intensity Index 1.86 1.75 1.86 1.86 1.92 1.93 
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center of ADB, Integration Indicators Database (http://aric.adb.org/index.php) 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 See, for example, Masahiro Kawai, "East Asian Economic Regionalism: Progress and Challenges," Journal of 
Asian Economics 16 (2005): 30. 
130 Ravenhill, "A Three Bloc World?  The New East Asian Regionalism," 173. 
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 Table 6-3 indicates the changes in the trading patterns of the APT countries from 1980 to 
2004.  There are three important trends.  First, China became an increasingly important trade 
partner for other Asian countries.  The share of China in ASEAN’s total exports rose from 1.0% 
to 7.4% in 2004, while the share of China in ASEAN’s total imports increased from 2.7% to 
9.6%.  For Japan, China became the primary source of its imports with the share of China in 
Japan’s imports at 20.7% in 2004.  China also became an increasingly important destination for 
Japan’s exports with China’s share in Japan’s total exports reaching 13.1% in 2004.  
Consequently, China replaced the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner for the first 
time in 2004.131  South Korea’s trade with China has also increased dramatically since the two 
established diplomatic relations in 1992.  In 2004, China was the most important destination for 
South Korea’s exports.  As some scholars point out, the recent rise in intraregional trade share 
can be partly attributed to a dramatic increase in Chinese trade volume with other Asian 
countries.132  China has become an increasingly important production platform; China imports a 
growing amount of intermediate goods from other Asian countries, assembles them into final-
demand goods, and exports them to extraregional markets in North America and Europe.  As a 
result, a new triangular trade pattern and an international division of labor between China, other 
Asian countries, and the United States emerged. 
Second, Japan’s importance as a trading partner for ASEAN and South Korea has 
relatively declined.  In 1980, Japan was the top trading partner for ASEAN and China in both 
imports and exports.  However, Japan’s trade share in ASEAN imports and exports dropped 
significantly during the period 1990–2004, although still important.  Similarly, the proportion of 
Japan in China’s and South Korea’s exports and imports declined during the period 1980–2004.  
Yet Japan remained China’s primary supplier of its imports in 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 “China Now Japan’s Top Trade Partner,” Japan Times, January 27, 2005. 
132 Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism, 59; Hideo Ohashi, "China's Regional Trade and Investment Profile," 
in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 72. 
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 Table 6-3: Trade Shares, Selected Economies and Selected Years (%) 
 ASEAN 
Exports  Imports Trade 
Partner 1980 1990 2000 2004   1980 1990 2000 2004 
USA 16.3 19.4 19.0 15.5  15.0 14.4 14.0 11.3 
Japan 29.5 18.9 13.5 12.2  22.0 23.1 19.1 15.3 
China 1.0 1.8 3.8 7.4  2.7 2.9 5.1 9.6 
S. Korea 1.5 3.3 3.7 3.8  1.6 3.1 4.8 4.9 
ASEAN 17.3 19.0 23.0 22.2  14.4 15.2 22.5 22.6 
EU 12.5 15.6 14.5 14.4  13.0 15.3 10.7 11.4 
  Japan 
USA 24.5 31.7 30.1 22.7  17.4 22.5 19.1 14.0 
China 3.9 2.1 6.3 13.1  3.1 5.1 14.5 20.7 
S. Korea 4.1 6.1 6.4 7.8  2.2 5.0 5.4 4.9 
ASEAN 10.4 11.6 14.3 12.9  17.5 12.7 15.7 14.8 
EU 14.0 20.4 16.4 15.8  5.9 16.1 12.3 12.7 
  China 
USA 5.4 8.5 20.9 21.1  19.6 12.2 9.6 8.0 
Japan 22.2 14.6 16.7 12.4  26.5 14.2 17.8 16.8 
S. Korea - 0.7 4.5 4.7  - 0.4 10.0 11.1 
ASEAN 6.6 6.6 7.0 7.2  3.4 5.8 9.4 11.2 
EU 13.0 10.0 15.3 18.1   14.4 17.0 13.3 12.5 
  South Korea 
USA 26.4 29.9 21.9 17.0  21.9 22.1 18.2 12.9 
Japan 19.2 19.4 11.9 8.6  26.3 26.6 19.8 20.6 
China 0.0 - 10.7 19.6  0.1 - 8.0 13.2 
ASEAN 6.6 7.8 11.7 9.5  6.7 7.3 11.3 10.0 
EU 16.7 15.4  13.6  13.3   7.6 13.0 9.8 10.5 
          
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years 
 
Third, the United States remains an important trade partner for all the APT countries, 
despite its recent decreasing trade share in all of them except China.  The United States emerged 
as the primary destination for China’s exports, surpassing Japan and the EU; the share of the 
U.S. in China’s total exports dramatically increased from 5.4% in 1980 to 21.1% in 2004.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. share in ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea, albeit still significant, recorded a 
declining trend in the period 2000–2004. 
As shown in Table 6-4, many East Asian countries remained heavily dependent on 
inward FDI, with the notable exception of Japan.  In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
Indonesia experienced a negative FDI, or a net disinvestment, as many foreign firms withdrew 
investments in reaction to economic stagnation and social and political uncertainty.  However, 
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 other crisis-affected countries, including South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, recorded a rise in 
foreign investment as a share of gross capital formation. 
 
 
 
Table 6-4: Ratio of Inward Foreign Direct Investment to Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cambodia 17.1 23.5 36.1 34.7 28.0 
Indonesia 7.6 9.2 7.7 -1.6 -11.0 
Laos 20.7 29.4 19.2 14.6 17.8 
Malaysia 15.0 17.0 14.7 13.9 20.1 
Myanmar 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.7 
Philippines 8.9 7.8 6.2 12.7 5.1 
Singapore 31.2 29.7 35.3 20.6 26.1 
Thailand 2.9 3.0 7.2 26.7 13.7 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1 
China 14.7 14.3 14.6 12.9 11.3 
South Korea 1.0 1.2 1.7 5.7 9.3 
World 5.3 5.9 7.5 10.9 16.3 
Source: Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), p. 92. 
 
 
Table 6-5: Shares of Inward Foreign Direct Investment (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1995-2002 
  ASEAN 
U.S. 15.3 17.1 14.5 14.4 21.3 32.3 24.8 2.6 17.8 
EU 17.9 24.4 18.6 24.8 35.2 59.5 32.5 30.6 30.4 
Japan 20.0 17.5 15.3 17.6 6.1 2.0 8.7 24.3 13.9 
Asian NIEs 10.1 7.4 10.3 8.6 5.8 6.4 9.9 4.1 7.8 
  China 
U.S. 8.2 9.4 9.7 12.4 14.6 12.8 10.9 9.9 11.0 
EU 8.3 7.0 6.7 5.3 6.3 5.9 7.6 6.4 6.7 
Japan 8.1 9.2 8.3 11.4 9.9 14.2 7.4 5.4 9.1 
Asian NIEs 64.1 59.6 54.3 48.4 49.6 40.7 47.8 48.3 51.3 
  South Korea 
U.S. 33.0 27.3 45.7 33.6 24.1 19.2 34.5 49.4 29.7 
EU 23.7 27.9 33.1 32.6 40.2 28.9 27.1 18.3 31.3 
Japan 21.8 8.0 3.8 5.7 11.3 16.1 6.8 15.4 11.2 
Asian NIEs 6.8 8.7 1.9 13.9 5.8 4.5 5.9 4.3 6.5 
 
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005), pp. 
148-149, table VI.5; Masahiro Kawai, “Trade and Investment Integration and Cooperation in East Asia: 
Empirical Evidence and Issues,” in ADB, Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, 
Prospects, and Challenges (Manila: ADB, 2005), pp. 171-172, Table 7.4. 
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 Table 6-5 shows changes in the shares of inward FDI by source country and group from 
1995 to 2002.  During the period 1995-2002, the European Union was the largest foreign direct 
investor in ASEAN, accounting for 30.4% of investment on average.  The United States was the 
next largest investor in ASEAN, representing 17.8% of investment on average, although its share 
dropped significantly in 2002.  Although Japan was the top investor in ASEAN in 1995, its share 
in ASEAN’s investment significantly dropped from 20.0% in 1995 to 2.0% in 2000, while it 
recovered to 24.3% in 2002. For China, the share of Asian NIEs consistently recorded the 
highest, averaging 51.3% during this period.133  As for South Korea, the EU and the United 
States were equally important investors, with their shares representing 31.3% and 29.7% on 
average during this period.  Meanwhile, Japan’s share in South Korea’s investment was 11.2% 
on average.  In general, the data suggests that extraregional investors from the United States and 
the EU and intraregional investors in Japan and Asian NIES remain equally important sources of 
investors in the APT countries.134
6.2.3 How Was ASEAN+3 Created? 
Having examined the motivations behind the creation of the APT process, this section explores 
how the APT was created, focusing largely on the process’ initial stage.  Such an exploration 
requires tracing the developments in the first half of the 1990s that led to the formation of the 
APT.  In so doing, the ensuing section first illustrates the gradual steps toward the APT through 
some informal ministerial meetings among the APT countries and the ASEM process.  It also 
examines Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s call in 1995 for closer ties with the 
Northeast Asian countries and a similar proposal from Malaysia in 1996, respectively. The 
section then analyzes how the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 provided an important 
opportunity for developing the APT framework.  It will be argued below that despite the 
                                                 
133 The data can be misleading, however, because the large volume of Hong Kong’s FDI inflows to the PRC 
contains the so-called “round tripping,” which refers to the reversal of Chinese capital that investors channeled out 
of China to take advantage of differences in the treatment of foreign and domestic investors. 
134 For more detailed discussions on the FDI trend, see Eisuke Sakakibara and Sharon Yamakawa, "Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Role for Regionalism," in Shahid Yusuf, M. Anjum Altaf, and Kaoru Nabeshima, eds., 
Global Change and East Asian Policy Initiatives (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 63-119; Urata, "The 
Emergence and Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements in East Asia," 22-31; Masahiro Kawai, "Trade and 
Investment Integration and Cooperation in East Asia: Empirical Evidence and Issues," in Asian Development Bank., 
ed., Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, Prospects, and Challenges (Manila: ADB, 2005). 
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 Northeast Asian countries’ initial hesitance, it was ASEAN, as a group, which played a key 
entrepreneurial role in convincing these countries to participate in the ASEAN-sponsored 
regional process.  Despite ASEAN’s significant role as convener, participation by the Northeast 
Asian countries also stresses the increasing role played by leaders from the three Northeast Asian 
countries in the subsequent development of the APT process. 
6.2.3.1 ASEAN 
How did ASEAN successfully invite the three Northeast Asian countries to its informal 
summit in December 1997?  Below, I highlight the catalytic role that ASEAN played in initiating 
the APT process by investigating longer historical processes that resulted in the inauguration of 
the APT.  Given the lack of Japan’s structural leadership in East Asia and the absence of any 
institutional mechanism among Northeast Asian countries, ASEAN assumed the “costs of 
organizing” as the conference convener.  In this way, as host to the annual APT meetings, 
ASEAN has provided an important platform for promoting policy dialogue in East Asia.135
The APT initiative can be seen as part of ASEAN’s broader practice of so-called 
“conference diplomacy.”136  The concept of conference diplomacy stresses ASEAN’s use of an 
informal style of international conferences, which does not involve binding commitments from 
the participants, as a way to discuss issues of common interest and build consensus within 
ASEAN’s members.  ASEAN has used similar ASEAN-sponsored conferences as a way to 
enhance the collective bargaining leverage vis-à-vis external powers by attempting to present a 
united front.  The first example of ASEAN’s use of conference diplomacy as a way of engaging 
with external powers was set up in the form of the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) of the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1979.  Through the ASEAN PMCs, ASEAN 
foreign ministers met with their counterparts from ASEAN’s dialogue partners, including Japan, 
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Community.  However, ASEAN 
PMCs had their limitations due to the fact that the scope of issues discussed at these conferences 
                                                 
135 Markus Hund, "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism?  A Skeptic's 
Appraisal," The Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (2003): 386. 
136 For the concept of “conference diplomacy,” see Koichi Sato, ASEAN Rejimu: ASEAN ni okeru Kaigi Gaiko no 
Hatten to Kadai [The ASEAN Regime: Developments and Tasks of Conference Diplomacy in ASEAN] (Tokyo: 
Chikusa Shobo, 2003).  For a brief summary, see Koichi Sato, "ASEAN's Conference Diplomacy," Social Science 
Japan Newsletter 28 (2004).  For an application of the concept to the APT, see Sanae Suzuki, "East Asian 
Cooperation through Conference Diplomacy: Institutional Aspects of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Framework," 
IDE APEC Study Center Working Paper Series 03/04 No. 7 (March 2004). 
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 were mostly confined to those related to Southeast Asia, while major countries, such as China 
and South Korea, were not involved in the process.137  It was thus only following the 1990s that 
ASEAN began to use conference diplomacy more extensively. 
Prior to the initiation of the APT process, ASEAN, by the mid 1990s, had emerged as a 
proactive player in developing multiple layers of broader regionalist arrangements, such as 
APEC, the ARF, and ASEM.  As Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated, once ASEAN agreed to 
participate in APEC, it strove to become the core group within APEC by hosting the APEC 
meeting every other year and by attempting to shape APEC’s institutional form in its favor.  The 
ARF was created primarily through ASEAN’s initiative, although a similar proposal had been 
put forward by the Japanese government.  The proposal for creating the ASEM came from 
Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong.  As discussed below, the creation of ASEM 
provided the first opportunity for East Asian leaders to meet together without the presence of the 
United States, which proved conducive to the subsequent formation of the APT process. The 
opportunities provided by this meeting enabled ASEAN to successfully invite the leaders of the 
three Northeast Asian countries to ASEAN-sponsored annual informal summits held after 1997.  
The following discussion begins by describing the incremental developments that led to the 
formation of the APT process. 
In 1992, expressing a growing unease among East Asians about the formation of 
European and North American regionalism, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew described the EAEC 
as an “idea which will not go away.”138  In fact, the EAEC idea was discussed at a series of 
ASEAN foreign and economic ministerial meetings during the years between 1991 and 1997.139  
In July 1994, ASEAN foreign ministers met with their counterparts from China, Korea, and 
Japan at the AMM held in Bangkok in the form of a so-called informal “6+3” lunch meeting.  
While ministers had “discussed aspects of EAEC” during this meeting, there was little 
substantive progress.  Nevertheless, the meeting had a symbolic meaning as the first ministerial 
encounter among ministers from both Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, reflecting the 
                                                 
137 Akihiko Tanaka, "The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework," in Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas, 
eds., Advancing East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2007), 53. 
138 Bertha Henson, “ASEAN and NAFTA must Link Up – Mr. Lee,” The Straits Times, May 15, 1992. 
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 membership of EAEC.140  Foreign ministers from the three Northeast Asian countries joined the 
next AMM in Brunei in 1995, and then again in Jakarta in 1996, when ministers agreed to 
include those three countries in the program of all future ASEAN ministerial meetings.141
 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
As Stubbs points out, the turning point for bringing the East Asian leaders together came 
in the second half of 1995, when a series of meetings were held to prepare for the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) summit to be held in 1996.142  The idea of an ASEM was first proposed by 
Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong during his visit to France in October 1994.  In his 
speech, he pressed for the need “for Europe and East Asia to engage in a dialogue at the highest 
level,” in order to fill a missing institutional link between the two regions.143  On the European 
side, the Commission, having been informed by the report “New Asian Strategy” in July 1994, 
thus presented an interest in improving relations with the then growing East Asian market.  By 
mid-1995, both ASEAN and the EU agreed to hold the ASEM.  Yet, the issue of membership 
remained highly controversial, especially on the Asian side.  When ASEAN members invited 
Japan, China, and South Korea to join them as Asian representatives, there was “some reluctance 
on the part of the Japanese government, which still feared alienating the U.S., and the Chinese 
government, which worried about being a target of criticism over human rights.”144  Japan had 
insisted on inviting Australia and New Zealand on the Asian side.  While Singapore and 
Indonesia reportedly supported the Japanese idea, it was rejected by Malaysia on the grounds 
that they “do not share our Asian values.” 145   Consequently, at the informal “7+3” lunch 
meetings of foreign ministers in July 1995, ministers agreed to hold the ASEM without 
extending invitations to Australia and New Zealand. 
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 In March 1996, the inaugural ASEM summit meeting was convened in Bangkok, 
bringing together the leaders from ten Asian countries and the EU, and notably for the first time, 
without the presence of the United States.  In a sense, as Richard Higgott suggests, ASEM’s 
formation provided a symbolic meaning  in terms of the “politics of otherness” – it was 
significant who was excluded from the group rather than who was included.146  At the ASEM 
meeting, the United States was clearly a major concern to both sides of participants – “the ghost 
at the feast,” as Michael Leifer called it.147  Nevertheless, surprisingly, the United States did not 
pay much attention to ASEM.148  Many experts point out that ASEM – whose Asian membership 
was almost identical to the EAEG or the APT – helped East Asian countries cooperate with each 
other and develop an East Asian regional identity. 149   As a result, East Asian regional 
cooperation began to emerge by what Heiner Hänggi calls “regionalism through 
interregionalism.”150  
 
Goh Chok Tong’s Proposal 
In December 1995, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed that ASEAN 
leaders invite their counterparts from Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian countries to the 
first informal summit, which was to be held within the following 12 to 18 months.151  In his 
speech at the opening session of the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, Goh suggested that it 
was timely for ASEAN leaders to meet with their East Asian neighbors more frequently because 
of ASEAN’s growing trade, investment and other economic ties with them.  In his proposal, he 
highlighted the importance of Japanese and Korean “know-how” for the development of 
infrastructure in ASEAN countries.152  At this Bangkok summit, leaders agreed to hold the first 
informal summit in Jakarta in December 1996.153  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir lent his 
support for Goh’s proposal, although both leaders avoided linking it directly with Mahathir’s 
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 controversial EAEC proposal.154  It was also reported that Thailand demonstrated its support for 
the proposal.155
During the 29th AMM held in Jakarta in July 1996, the Malaysian foreign minister 
submitted a discussion paper on the EAEC which proposed that ASEAN members should work 
towards a “7+3+3” format by inviting not only China, Korea, and Japan, but three non-ASEAN 
Indo-China countries – namely, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar – to the first informal summit to 
be held in Jakarta later that year in December. 156  When asked about his views on Goh’s 
proposal, at the press conference following the ASEAN PMC, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukio 
Ikeda responded positively, much to the audience’s surprise.  He said: “Since we are expanding 
and deepening our relations with ASEAN … and if there is a concrete proposal from ASEAN, 
we would like to respond positively.”157  This response was in sharp contrast to the lukewarm 
attitude that Japan had taken on the EAEC proposal till that point.  Yet, at the first informal 
summit in Jakarta in 1996, the participation of leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries 
was not realized. Malaysia however expressed its intention to invite the three to the next informal 
summit to be held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, which was planned to mark the thirtieth anniversary 
of the establishment of ASEAN.158
In January 1997, Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited five Southeast Asian 
countries – Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore.  In an attempt to strengthen 
the relationship between Japan and the ASEAN countries, Hashimoto delivered a policy speech 
in which he highlighted three areas of cooperation: closer dialogues between Japan and ASEAN 
at top levels, multilateral cultural cooperation through cultural exchanges, and joint action to deal 
with global problems such as terrorism and drugs.  The most important element of his policy 
initiative was a proposal for annual Japan-ASEAN summits, beginning with the ASEAN 
Commemorative Summit to be held at the end of the year which aimed to mark the thirtieth 
anniversary of ASEAN’s foundation.159
While the Hashimoto proposal was welcomed by ASEAN member countries in principle, 
ASEAN leaders reacted to the proposal cautiously, stating that they would need to consult one 
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 another before making any decision about such a summit.  There were concerns among ASEAN 
countries that scheduling regular summits between Japan and ASEAN would complicate their 
relationship with other major powers in the region, such as China and the United States.160   
There were also speculations among some analysts that Hashimoto’s policy initiative was driven 
by Japan’s motive to counterbalance a growing Chinese power in the region.161
Therefore, in order to avoid antagonizing China, Malaysia proposed to invite the leaders 
of China and South Korea as well to hold a meeting with the ASEAN countries.162  During his 
visit to Japan in March 1997, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir sounded out the idea of 
convening a special Japan-ASEAN summit as well as a summit meeting between ASEAN and 
the three Northeast Asian countries.163  Some officials in ASEAN countries explained that they 
welcomed Hashimoto’s initiative but such a format could only be possible if China was accorded 
similar treatment.164  At the ASEAN Special Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur at the 
end of May in 1997, ASEAN countries formally agreed to invite the heads of government of 
China, South Korea, and Japan to an informal ASEAN summit in December 1997.165
Despite Japan’s initial reluctance to get involved in this format, the Chinese 
government’s agreement to confirm its attendance at the meeting apparently prompted its 
counterparts in Japan and South Korea to accept the invitation.166  Thus, Hashimoto’s initiative 
to create exclusive summit meetings between ASEAN and Japan had the unintended 
consequence of resulting in ASEAN’s counterproposal to convene a summit meeting of 
ASEAN+3 countries.  This, in turn, led to the first-ever informal summit meeting among the 
leaders from both Northeast and Southeast Asian countries.  Consequently, the first informal 
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 ASEAN+3 meeting was realized in a way that was quite different from what Hashimoto hoped to 
see. 
Although the decision to hold what came to be the first ASEAN+3 meeting was made 
before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997, it was the crisis that became a major 
impetus for the formation of the ASEAN+3 process.  The previous section revealed that the crisis 
created the demand for East Asian institution-building in order to promote regional cooperation.  
At the same time, the crisis provided opportunities for countries like China and Japan to seek 
regional influence through managing the crisis.  Beijing attempted to improve its status in the 
region by not devaluing its currency and offering aid packages.  As discussed in further detail in 
the next chapter, the Japanese government proposed setting up an Asian Monetary Fund in 
September 1997.  Although the finance ministers from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
expressed strong support for the proposal, strong oppositions from the United States and the 
IMF, as well as China, forced the Japanese government to give up the idea.167
On December 15, 1997, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, the first ASEAN+3 
summit was held after the regular ASEAN informal summit. ASEAN leaders also met their 
counterparts from China, Japan, and South Korea at separate bilateral meetings in the form of 
ASEAN+1.  Yet, it was not until 1998 that the APT leaders agreed to hold such meetings among 
the East Asian countries on an annual basis.  Furthermore, it was only at the third APT summit in 
1999 that the leaders released a joint statement. 
Despite its relatively modest start in 1997, how did the APT process get off the ground?  
The following section attempts to answer this question by exploring the growing roles of the 
three Northeast Asian countries in the APT process.  Political leaders in the three Northeast 
Asian countries played an increasing role in the APT process by proposing several important 
initiatives.  Despite ASEAN’s key role at the initial stage, the driving force behind the APT 
process shifted toward Northeast Asia rather than ASEAN. 
6.2.3.2 Japan 
Since Japan’s reluctance to get involved in East Asian regional institution-building was a 
major obstacle for the realization of the EAEC proposal, Japan’s participation in the first APT 
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 meeting in 1997 was a crucial factor for the successful launch of the APT.  However, at the first 
APT meeting, Japan was a passive participant and did not offer full support to the APT process, 
largely because Japan appeared to be more interested in strengthening Japanese-ASEAN bilateral 
relations as Hashimoto originally proposed at the start of 1997.168  Nonetheless, Japan gradually 
began to take an active role in the APT process after Hashimoto was replaced by his successor, 
Keizo Obuchi, in July 1998. 
At the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in Manila, Obuchi announced the Plan for 
Enhancing Human Resources Development and Human Resources Exchanges in East Asia.  The 
Philippine President, Joseph Estrada, named it the “Obuchi Plan” to show the ASEAN countries’ 
appreciation of this initiative.169  During the same meeting, Japan also proposed holding an 
ASEAN+3 foreign ministerial meeting in the following year on the occasion of the ASEAN 
PMC. 170   Accordingly, since 2000, ASEAN+3 foreign ministerial meetings have been held 
regularly.  Moreover, Obuchi was particularly enthusiastic about holding a trilateral leaders’ 
meeting among the “+3” countries.  Although he proposed such a meeting in Hanoi in 1998, his 
idea did not materialize because of objections from China.  The first three-way meeting was thus 
convened for the first time in the form of an informal breakfast meeting in Manila in 1999, after 
China finally agreed to the meeting being held.171   
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Japan’s Ministry of Finance played a leading 
role in establishing the Chiang Mai Initiative, which aimed to provide financial stability in the 
region.  In January 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed an Initiative for Japan-
ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership (JACEP) in order to strengthen economic 
collaboration between Japan and ASEAN.  Furthermore, he suggested that East Asian countries 
should work toward an East Asian Community that would “act together and advance together,” 
by making “the best use of ASEAN+3.” 172   These policy initiatives demonstrated Japan’s 
growing role in the APT process. 
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Zhu Rongji did not give an affirmative answer to the idea.  See Asahi Shimbun, November 29, 1999, p. 3. 
172 For Koizumi’s full speech, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html
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 6.2.3.3 China 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 “offered China important opportunities to 
demonstrate regional leadership and its commitment to Southeast Asia, relative to that of other 
powers [i.e., the United States and Japan].” The APT process provided yet another opportunity 
for Beijing to improve its status and exert its influence in the region, while minimizing the 
anxiety among many Asian countries of China’s growing power.  
Despite its reluctance to agree to regularize the APT at the first APT meeting, Beijing 
gradually took an active role in the APT process.  The first example of China’s role was 
manifested when the then Chinese Vice President, Hu Jintao, proposed a meeting of APT vice 
finance ministers and deputy central bank governors to discuss international financial matters.173  
At the APT summit in 1999, the Chinese proposed to regularize the meetings of finance 
ministers and central bank governors to discuss such issues as economic adjustment, financial 
reform, and reform of the international monetary system.174  Accordingly, in March 1999, such a 
meeting was held in Hanoi, where the agreement was reached to strengthen the surveillance of 
short-term capital flows.  This meeting was then followed by the first ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers’ meeting, held in Manila in April 1999.175
It was significant that such proposals came from the Chinese and they were taken into 
action.  Given China’s huge amount of foreign reserves, Chinese involvement in any regional 
financial cooperation was crucial.  As discussed in the next chapter, China’s support was critical 
for the establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000.  Jennifer Amyx suggests that 
China’s increasingly pro-active stance on regional financial cooperation has become a central 
driver for the ongoing development of regional financial cooperation, especially since the year 
1999 or 2000.176
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 6.2.3.4 South Korea  
While China and Japan would be considered the natural leaders in East Asia in terms of 
their power resources, neither could assume a leadership role because such a move would not be 
widely accepted by other countries in the region.  In light of this political landscape, South Korea 
believed it could potentially play its part as a middle power role in moving the APT process 
forward.177  During Kim Dae-jung’s presidency, South Korea played just such a role in the APT 
process. 
When Kim came into power in February 1998, he actively engineered the ASEAN+3 
process by advancing several important proposals.178  Faced with IMF conditions, he was forced 
to implement drastic domestic economic reforms. In November 1998, President Kim also 
attended the second APT summit as the first Korean president to do so, and was very enthusiastic 
about promoting East Asian cooperation.  During the meeting, he proposed the establishment of 
the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) that would consist of intellectuals from APT countries.  At 
the 2000 APT summit, Kim proposed the establishment of the East Asia Study Group (EASG) 
comprising government officials to assess the recommendations put forward by the EAVG.  The 
roles that these groups played will be explored in the next chapter. 
6.2.3.5 The United States 
As argued earlier, in the early 1990s, the Bush administration exercised strong pressure to 
block the EAEG/EAEC initiative.  In sharp contrast, in the latter half of the 1990s, the Clinton 
administration softened its attitudes toward the creation of a grouping that would exclude the 
United States.  In response to the creation of ASEM, the U.S. government “chose not to bark.”179  
It has also not opposed the ASEAN+3 process.180  Although the U.S. government, as an external 
power, has not been involved in the formation of APT, the absence of U.S. opposition provided a 
political space for East Asian countries to form an East Asia-only grouping. 
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 6.2.4 Explaining the Process of Construction 
How did it become possible to hold the first APT summit, while previous attempts to create an 
East Asian grouping had failed to materialize?  Despite its modest start in 1997, why and how 
did the APT process begin to take off with the development of many channels on an APT basis?  
The following pages highlight the three factors that contributed to the creation of the APT 
process. 
 
Incremental/Gradual Approach 
As noted earlier, the idea of forming an East Asian grouping was pursued through a series of 
unofficial meetings at the ministerial level before the inaugural ASEAN+3 leaders’ meeting in 
1997.  While identifying the Asian financial crisis and development of other forms of 
regionalism as a centripetal force for the development of the ASEAN+3, Takashi Terada 
highlights the importance of this pre-formative period before 1997.  It is during this period that a 
growing acceptance of the concept of East Asia, as a combination of both Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, began to emerge gradually through a series of AMM informal lunches, the 
establishment of ASEM, and Goh’s and Malaysia’s proposals to invite leaders from the three 
Northeast Asian countries.181  The indirect and gradual approach employed by ASEAN countries 
proved conducive to establishing a precedent for meetings in the form of ASEAN Plus China, 
Korea, and Japan.   
This approach was particularly helpful in determining the attitudes of the United States 
toward the formation of an East Asian grouping, which was a major factor for Japan’s initial 
reluctance to become involved in East Asian regionalism.  After all, the major reasons for the 
failure of the EAEG/EAEC proposal stemmed from U.S. opposition and Japan’s reluctance to 
participate.  Unlike the case of EAEG/EAEC, by the mid-1990s, the United States had become 
more tolerant of regional institutions that did not involve the United States.  This shift in U.S. 
attitude was an important factor in changing Japan’s approach toward East Asian regionalism.182  
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 In short, these unofficial and indirect channels contributed to paving the way for the 
establishment of ASEAN+3. 
Once the first APT summit was launched in 1997, APT leaders continued to employ a 
gradual approach toward institutionalization of the APT process.  As noted earlier, the first APT 
summit did not lead to the decision to regularize the meeting because of the reluctance on the 
part of such countries as Japan and China to commit themselves.  Therefore, the decision to hold 
the next APT meeting in Hanoi was particularly important to initiate the process of 
institutionalization.  While the term “ASEAN+3” was occasionally used in the media following 
1997, it was only after the ASEAN+3 meeting of finance ministers in Hanoi in March 1999 that 
the term became a common currency to describe the framework.183  This gradualist approach 
proved conducive in promoting a slow, but steady, development of the APT process. 
 
Timing and Sequence of Institution-Building 
As Akihiko Tanaka suggests, there were also some “chance elements” that tipped the process of 
the APT formation.184  While the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 played a major role as a 
catalyst for the development of the APT process, the first meeting in Kuala Lumpur was planned 
before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997.  ASEAN members formally agreed to 
invite leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries to their summit meeting in May 1997.  
The crisis “coincided with the initial meetings of the APT.”185  Therefore, it is incorrect to 
identify the crisis as the cause of the establishment of the APT.  Rather, the argument here is 
that, while the movement toward the establishment of the APT already existed prior to the crisis, 
the crisis became a key catalyst for the development of the APT process. 
Although there was a growing consensus in ASEAN policy circles, prior to the crisis, that 
ASEAN needed to develop a closer collaboration with its Northern neighbors, the crisis made 
ASEAN leaders realize this as an urgent need.  Furthermore, the crisis required new ideas that 
would provide regional solutions for regional problems, especially in the area of crisis prevention 
and management.  It is probably reasonable to assume that the APT process would not have 
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 developed in the way it did without the presence of the crisis.186  In other words, the crisis 
precipitated the critical juncture combining the demand and supply conditions that enabled the 
APT process to get off the ground.  This critical juncture set up a particular historical trajectory 
that promoted the subsequent development of a regional institution based largely on an East 
Asian focus. 
The history of regional institution-building in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific also 
highlights the importance of the sequence of events which led to the creation of each regional 
institution.  Since an institution is not created in a vacuum, one cannot think of the creation of a 
regional institution in isolation from other existing institutions.  For example, as some observers 
suggest, “without ASEAN there would be no APEC.”187  By the same token, as indicated by the 
name itself, if there was no ASEAN, there would have been no ASEAN+3.  Without ASEAN’s 
lead, it would have been impossible to bring the leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries 
to the same table.  All the APT summits have been held on the sideline of ASEAN summit 
meetings, which ASEAN members have been hosting on a rotating basis.  In this sense, 
ASEAN+3 provides an example of what some historical institutionalists call “layering,” which 
involves building a new institution on top of existing institutions while retaining some elements 
of those institutions and revising others, thus avoiding a series of negotiations.188  It has become 
common understanding in the Asia-Pacific region that the creation of new regional institutions 
should be built upon the experiences and activities of ASEAN, by largely adopting the so-called 
ASEAN Way. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, East Asian cooperation was to some extent born out of 
the formation of ASEM.  The establishment of ASEM before the APT contributed to developing 
the foundation for the creation of the APT.  Moreover, as demonstrated by the failure of the 
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 EAEG proposal, there is sufficient reason to assume that the creation of the APT would have 
been unlikely if the APEC project had not gotten off the ground.  APEC provided an institutional 
linkage for the United States to engage with East Asian economies, which subsequently helped 
to soften its stance toward regional institutions that did not involve the United States.  As argued 
above, this, in turn, helped to shift Japan’s initial lukewarm attitude toward East Asian 
regionalism.  Through his interviews with senior officials within MITI and MOFA, Terada 
suggests that “the existence of APEC, of which the United States is a member, has helped Japan 
to develop its further interest in ASEAN+3, since East Asian nations are able to maintain trade 
and investment dialogues with the United States through APEC.”189  Lastly, ASEAN+3 has 
contributed to subsequent trilateral meetings between the leaders of the “+3” countries, which 
started in 1999.  These developments all highlight the importance of taking into account the 
sequence of events which led up to regional institution-building. 
 
Leadership 
Given the lack of a widely-accepted leader, the question over leadership is the most controversial 
one in the context of East Asian regionalism.  ASEAN played an important role in initiating the 
APT meetings by bringing together the leaders from the Northeast Asian countries, despite their 
initial reluctance.  As Hadi Soesastro suggests, the APT was primarily “driven by ASEAN.  In 
fact, if ASEAN had not taken the lead, this process may not have emerged.  A Japanese or 
Chinese initiative would have killed it.”190  Some argue however that ASEAN played a leading 
role in the APT process only “by default” because of the competition for regional leadership 
between Japan and China and the lack of cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, the catalytic roles of middle-sized and small powers proved important in 
bringing the major powers to the process.  In the formative years of the APT process, ASEAN 
members, especially Malaysia and Singapore, together with South Korea, played important roles   
in setting the process in motion.191  As mentioned above, similar proposals by Singapore and 
Malaysia to invite the three Northeast Asian countries to the informal ASEAN summit were the 
                                                 
189 Terada, "Constructing an "East Asian" Concept," 268. 
190 Hadi Soesastro, "Asia-Japan Co-operation Toward East Asian Integration," in Ryokichi Hirono, ed., Regional 
Co-Operation in Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 25. 
191 Evans, "Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional 
Identity," 210. 
 246 
 first clear manifestation of ASEAN’s desire to develop an institutional link with the three 
countries.  Subsequently, Korean President Kim Dae-jung played an important leadership role in 
proposing the establishment of the EAVG and EASG. 
While the catalytic roles of smaller powers were important to initiate the process, the 
active participation of major powers like Japan and China was deemed crucial in keeping the 
process moving.  In contrast to its previous reluctance to participate in East Asian regional 
institution-building, Japan became more enthusiastic about deepening its relationship with its 
Asian neighbors within the framework of East Asian cooperation, while at the same time 
enhancing its ties with the United States. 192  More importantly than this, however, China’s 
adoption of a more proactive stance toward East Asian regional cooperation became a major 
driver for the development of the East Asian process.193   
As discussed above, many policy initiatives advanced by major regional powers like 
China and Japan made the ASEAN+3 process get off the ground.  While many observers believe 
that China and Japan have been competing for regional leadership in East Asia, this rivalry for 
leadership may not necessarily be a zero-sum relationship in the context of East Asian 
regionalism.  In fact, as long as they do not hamper each other’s initiatives, they may well 
contribute to moving East Asian regionalism forward – this has largely been the case thus far.  
Ravenhill suggests that, although historical suspicions and tensions in the region “have the 
potential to disrupt the new regional endeavors…, [s]uch tensions between the two economic 
giants of the region [i.e. China and Japan] … may rebound to the benefits of regionalism if their 
leadership rivalry continues to be translated into competing initiatives for moving integration 
forward.”194  As Douglas Webber correctly observes, “Sino-Japanese relations have not been 
transformed in the way that Franco-German relations were transformed in Western Europe after 
the Second World War.”195  Yet, policy initiatives by Japan and China in East Asian regionalism 
have been mostly “mutually reinforcing,” though not necessarily coordinated.196  The possibility 
of a co-leadership between Beijing and Tokyo is, however, bleak at this moment. To use Thomas 
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 Moore’s phrase, China and Japan have been “competing to cooperate” to strengthen their 
relationship with ASEAN countries.197
In summary, the APT process was first driven by ASEAN’s lead.  ASEAN played a 
catalytic role in bringing major regional powers like China and Japan together, despite their 
initial reluctance.  South Korea also played an important role in involving non-governmental 
actors in the process.  Once China and Japan became active participants in the APT process, their 
initiatives have been important factors in keeping the process moving forward.  It should also be 
noted that these developments have been made possible because of the absence of U.S. 
opposition, which was most critical for eliciting Japan’s active participation. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to answer why and how the ASEAN+3 process was successfully 
launched in the late 1990s, while the EAEG/EAEC proposal failed to materialize in the early 
1990s.  It argued that, while there emerged some seeds of East Asian institution-building before 
the onset of the Asian financial crisis, it was the Asian financial crisis that became a major 
catalyst that set in motion the subsequent development of the APT.  East Asian leaders 
collectively recognized the inadequacy of Western-dominated global institutional frameworks 
like the IMF to protect their interests in the management of the financial crisis.  According to 
Yoshihiro Iwasaki, a director of the ADB, “from the Asian point of view there is a stronger 
recognition that regional initiatives can help maximize the benefits of globalization while 
minimizing the disruptive effects of global financial markets.”198  As Paul Bowles suggests, 
“[t]he contours of post-financial crisis regionalism are, by state design, aimed at restoring to Asia 
a greater degree of political power and autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the United 
States and the international financial institutions it controls, in particular.”199
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Figure 6-7: Summary of the Argument for the Creation of ASEAN+3 
 
 
The creation of the APT was made possible because of ASEAN’s initiative through an 
incremental and gradual approach that they deliberately employed.  This incremental approach 
was particularly helpful to elicit the participation of Japan, which had been extremely cautious 
about joining any EAEC-like grouping due to the U.S. opposition.  The devastating Asian 
financial crisis ironically provided a great opportunity for the development of the APT in a much 
quicker and innovative way than would have otherwise happened.  Subsequently, a more active 
participation in the APT process by the Northeast Asian powers kept the APT process moving 
forward. 
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 7.0  THE INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION OF ASEAN+3 
The previous chapter discussed the factors that triggered the formation of the ASEAN+3 (APT) 
process.  The present chapter is concerned with the institutional form that APT has taken and 
institutional development of the APT process.  As noted in the previous chapter, APT started 
when ASEAN invited leaders of the three Northeast Asian countries to attend its summit 
meetings.  Since then, the three Northeast Asian countries have attended the annual APT summit 
as the “guests” of ASEAN.  Why has the APT continued to take this peculiar format, despite 
some countries’ proposals to hold the APT summits outside ASEAN as well?  What accounts for 
the composition of the APT participants?  Why have the APT countries decided to promote 
regional financial cooperation within the APT framework?  Specifically, why and how did the 
APT participants agree on the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), while Japan’s proposal for an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) failed to materialize? 
To address these questions, the first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of 
APT’s evolution during the first decade.  The second section analyzes the institutional form and 
evolution of APT first by exploring the institutional preferences of key participants and then by 
exploring how different state preferences affected the interstate negotiations in four dimensions 
of the institution.  The third section focuses on regional efforts to promote financial cooperation 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis as a mini-case study.  It illustrates that the successful 
launch of regionalist projects depend on the variation of state preferences and the supply of 
political leadership in the absence of blocking power.  The last section provides a summary of 
empirical findings and some theoretical implications of the institutional form and evolution of 
the APT. 
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 7.1 ASEAN+3’S FIRST DECADE 
The following pages briefly sketch APT’s evolution during the first decade since its inception.  
The institutional evolution of APT can be divided into three phases: phase I (1997–1999), phase 
II (2000–2003), and phase III (2004–2006).  The first phase saw the emergence and 
regularization of the APT process in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.  The second phase 
was increasingly characterized by changing internal dynamics, particularly the rise of China as 
an active player in regionalist efforts.  The third phase saw the emergence of increasing rivalry 
for regional leadership between China and Japan over different visions for the East Asian 
regional framework. 
7.1.1 The First Phase: 1997–1999 
The first APT summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 15, 1997, through ASEAN’s 
invitation of the three Northeast Asian leaders to their informal summit.  Although it was meant 
to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of ASEAN, ironically it took place in the midst of the 
financial crisis that not only severely affected most ASEAN countries but also damaged the 
reputation of ASEAN as an organization.  On the following day, ASEAN leaders also met with 
their counterparts from China, Japan, and South Korea at separate ASEAN+1 meetings.  While 
this historic event successfully brought together leaders from Southeast and Northeast Asian 
countries without the presence of Western powers, the outcome of the summit was not 
significant in substance.  Although each ASEAN+1 meeting led to the announcement of a joint 
statement, no joint statement was released by APT leaders as a whole.  Furthermore, South 
Korea’s President Kim Young-sam did not attend the meeting because of the crisis at home and 
Indonesia’s President Suharto was absent from the meeting because of illness.1  No agreement 
was reached to hold an “ASEAN-plus-three” leaders’ meeting again in 1998, nor did the 
countries agree to make it a regular event.  Although Prime Minister Mahathir proposed to 
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 convene similar summit meetings on a regular basis, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin were hesitant to support the idea.2   
As the host country of the next ASEAN informal summit to be held late in 1998, Vietnam 
invited leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries to attend the summit.3  President Kim 
Dae-jung of South Korea was the first leader to confirm that he would attend the summit.4  
While the Japanese government initially hesitated to accept the invitation, leaders from all three 
countries eventually confirmed their intention to take part in the ASEAN summit, leading to the 
second APT meeting.5
At the second APT informal summit in Hanoi in December 1998, leaders agreed to make 
the ASEAN+3 summit an annual event.6  At the same meeting, Chinese Vice President Hu 
Jintao proposed a forum of East Asian vice finance ministers and deputy central bank governors 
to discuss international financial issues and to develop a surveillance mechanism for the floating 
of short-term capital.7  Also, South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung proposed the establishment 
of an East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) made up of academics from the APT members to provide 
a vision for promoting East Asian cooperation.  The 1998 meeting proved more critical in 
substance than the previous year’s gathering.8  The third APT informal summit in 1999 realized 
for the first time the participation of all heads of state all ten ASEAN members and the three 
Northeast Asian countries.9  Held in Manila, this meeting led to the announcement of a “Joint 
Statement on East Asia Cooperation.”  After the Manila summit, various ministers from the 
thirteen countries—including ministers of finance, economics, foreign policy, agriculture and 
forestry, labor, and tourism—began to hold meetings on a regular basis. 
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Crisis,” International Herald Tribune, December 16, 1997, 13; Asahi Shimbun, December 17, 1997, 9. 
3 Terada, "Constructing an "East Asian" Concept," 269. 
4 “Kim Advances Free Market,” The Nation, September 18, 1998. 
5 Japanese government sources implied the possibility that Japan would turn down the proposal before the ASEAN 
foreign ministers’ meeting in July 1998.  Hisane Masaki, “Hanoi Proposes Special ASEAN Meeting,” Japan Times, 
July 1, 1998. 
6 Tim Johnson, “East Asian Leaders Agree to Hold Annual Summits,” Japan Economic Newswire, December 16, 
1998. 
7 Ibid.; “East Asian Informal Summit A Success: Spokesman,” Xinhua News Agency, December 22, 1998, 1. 
8 Akihiko Tanaka, "The Development of ASEAN+3," Social Science Japan Newsletter 28 (2004): 8. 
9 Cambodia became a member of ASEAN in April 1999. 
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 7.1.2 The Second Phase: 2000–2003 
The second phase in the development of the ASEAN+3 process from 2000 to 2003 saw rapid 
progress in the area of financial cooperation, the establishment of ministerial meetings in various 
areas, and the emergence of new ideas about the institutional development of ASEAN+3.  
Significant progress in financial cooperation was achieved when the finance ministers of the 
APT countries, who gathered in Chiang Mai in May 2000, agreed to set up a series of currency 
swap agreements among APT members.  The negotiations leading to the so-called Chiang Mai 
Initiative will be discussed in detail in the mini-case study. 
The fourth APT summit, held in Singapore in November 2000, witnessed discussions of 
what Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called “two big ideas” concerning the future institutional 
development of ASEAN+3, namely, the transformation of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia Summit 
and the proposal for studying the feasibility of an East Asian free trade and investment area.10  
The idea of an East Asia Summit reportedly came from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, 
while the idea of an East Asian free trade area was proposed by Thai Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai.11  During the same meeting, President Kim proposed the establishment of an East 
Asian Study Group (EASG) composed of government officials to assess the recommendations of 
the EAVG. 
In November 2001, the fifth APT summit meeting was held in Brunei.  At this meeting, 
APT leaders welcomed the submission of the final report of the EAVG.  The chairman’s 
statement noted that some of the measures proposed by the EAVG, such as the establishment of 
an East Asia Free Trade Area and the achievement of trade liberalization before the timeline set 
by APEC’s goals, were “bold yet feasible.”12  South Korean President Kim also highlighted 
proposals for establishing an East Asia forum and the evolution of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia 
Summit.  China, Japan, and South Korea also expressed their support for ASEAN’s efforts 
                                                 
10 Chua Lee Hoong, “ ‘Two Big Ideas’ to Boost East Asia,” The Straits Times, November 25, 2000, 1. 
11 “ASEAN-Plus-Three Meeting: Surin Keen on East Asian Talks: China Against US Naval Exercises,” Bangkok 
Post, November 26, 2000; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 25, 2000, 1, 7. 
12 “Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th th ASEAN Summit and the 5  ASEAN+3 Summit,” November 5, 2001, 
Brunei Darussalam.  See ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN+3 Documents Series 1999-2004 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 
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 toward regional integration, especially in the areas of human resource development, 
infrastructure, and information technology.13
In November 2002, the sixth APT summit was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  At this 
meeting, APT leaders received the final report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG).  Among 
other things, the leaders “expressed willingness to explore the phased evolution of the ASEAN+3 
summit into an East Asia Summit” in the long term, as recommended by the EASG.14   In 
October 2003, the seventh APT summit was held in Bali, Indonesia.  The APT leaders continued 
to discuss political, security, and economic issues of common interest.  At this meeting, the 
leaders expressed concern over the terrorist attacks in Jakarta and at the UN Headquarters in 
Iraq.  They also welcomed and showed their support for ASEAN’s adoption of the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which envisioned the three pillars of “ASEAN Security 
Community,” “ASEAN Economic Community,” and “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.”15  
Although the Bali summit saw a proposal for the eventual transformation of the ASEAN+3 
summit into the East Asia Summit, no major decision was reached. Instead, the transformation 
was considered a long-term goal.16
Despite the relatively rapid development of the APT framework, during this period the 
APT summits started to be “overshadowed” by other developments, especially China’s active 
overtures toward ASEAN. 17  At the ASEAN-China summit meeting held on the sidelines of the 
APT in November 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the establishment of an expert 
study group to explore the possibility on the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) with 
ASEAN.  In November 2002, Chinese and ASEAN leaders signed the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China.  China’s move to 
strengthen its relationship with ASEAN prompted the Japanese government to follow suit.  As 
discussed later, the emergence of China as an active player during this period became a major 
driving force behind the development of the regional process. 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Press Statement by the Chairman of the 8th ASEAN Summit, the 6th ASEAN+3 Summit and the ASEAN-China 
Summit,” November 4, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  See Ibid., 95. 
15 “Press Statement by the Chairperson of the 9th th ASEAN Summit and the 7  ASEAN Plus Three Summit,” October 
7, 2003, Bali, Indonesia.  See Ibid., 173, 180. 
16 Takashi Terada, "Creating an East Asian Regionalism: The Institutionalization of ASEAN+3 and China-Japan 
Directional Leadership," The Japanese Economy 32, no. 2 (2004): 73. 
17 Soesastro, "Asia-Japan Co-operation Toward East Asian Integration," 27. 
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 7.1.3 The Third Phase: 2004–2006 
This phase saw the formation of coexisting regional forums in East Asia.  At the eighth 
ASEAN+3 summit, held in Vientiane in November 2004, the leaders agreed to convene the first 
East Asia Summit (EAS) in Malaysia in 2005.  However, they failed to agree on the concrete 
shape of the EAS, including the agenda, membership, modalities, and relationship to the existing 
ASEAN+3 process.18  This decision surprised many observers because at the foreign ministers’ 
meeting held shortly before the summit, ministers had decided to defer the decision to a later 
time because of opposition from some ASEAN members, especially Indonesia.19  In July 2005, 
APT foreign ministers formally agreed that leaders from all the APT countries plus Australia, 
New Zealand, and India would meet at the inaugural EAS, while keeping the APT summit 
among the existing thirteen members. 
Accordingly, the APT and EAS were held as separate meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 2005.  At the ASEAN+3 summit, the leaders announced the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration, in which they reiterated the “common resolve to realize an East Asian community 
as a long-term goal” and confirmed that the APT process would “continue to be the main vehicle 
in achieving that goal, with ASEAN as the driving force.”20  The wording of the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration of the East Asia Summit remained much more ambiguous, stating only that the 
leaders agreed that the EAS “could play a significant role in community building in this 
region.”21
7.2 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION 
This section is divided into two sections.  The first section investigates the institutional 
preferences of the APT members.  The second section delves into the institutional form and 
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 evolution of the APT in four dimensions: membership, organizational structure, external 
orientation, and issue areas. 
7.2.1 Governmental Institutional Preferences 
The following section outlines the institutional preferences of ASEAN members, Japan, China, 
and South Korea.  It reveals different institutional preferences among these countries, most 
notably between the Chinese and Malaysian preference for a narrow East Asian regional 
framework on the one hand, and the Japanese and Singaporean preference for a broader regional 
arrangement on the other. 
7.2.1.1 ASEAN 
Since the inception of ASEAN+3, ASEAN governments have promoted the position that 
ASEAN provides an important platform for policy dialogue between Northeast and Southeast 
Asian countries.  As in other regionalist projects within the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN’s 
general institutional preference is based on the application of the “ASEAN Way” toward 
regional cooperation, which emphasizes informality, consensus decision-making, and avoidance 
of excessive institutionalization.  ASEAN strongly desires to maintain ASEAN-led processes in 
which ASEAN plays a central role in preparing regular meetings, setting agendas, and 
maintaining a privileged position as a chair of the conferences.  In short, ASEAN wants to 
remain an “organizational hub.”22  Although these views have been generally supported by all 
the ASEAN members, there are differences among them with regard to specific aspects of the 
APT process. 
As in the case of APEC, Malaysia and Singapore present two extreme opposing views.  
Malaysia has been the most consistent advocate of East Asian regionalism, comprising Northeast 
and Southeast Asia, since Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad called for the creation of the East 
Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) in the early 1990s.  Malaysia has consistently preferred this 
grouping—reformulated as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1991—to a wider 
regional grouping like APEC, which includes Western powers like the United States, Canada, 
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 Australia, and New Zealand.  Malaysia repeatedly opposed the inclusion of Australia and New 
Zealand in an East Asian grouping on the grounds that they do not belong to East Asia and do 
not share Asian values.23
Although the EAEG was initially perceived as an attempt to create an East Asian trading 
bloc, Mahathir denied such accusations by insisting that the EAEC would be “a loose 
consultative forum.”  For example, in his keynote address to the Asia Society Conference on 
“Asia and the Changing World” in Tokyo in May 1993, Mahathir stated that he was “not 
advocating a preferential arrangement or a free trade area, or a customs union, or a common 
market or an economic union for East Asia.”  Instead, the EAEC aimed to create “a loose 
consultative forum for the economies of the region.”24
When the APT process started in 1997, Mahathir initially avoided identifying it with his 
EAEC proposal.25  However, subsequently he did not hesitate to call it the resurrection of his 
EAEG/EAEC proposal.  For example, he stated in 1999: “We are still pushing for its formation.  
But there are already informal forums involving ASEAN and the three.  This is EAEC though we 
don’t call it as such.”26   More assertively, in 2003 he called on East Asian leaders to stop 
“hiding” behind the ASEAN+3 formation and admit the need to establish the EAEG.27
When the idea of holding a separate summit meeting with India or enlarging the 
ASEAN+3 into a “plus four” arrangement with India’s participation was floated at the 2000 
ASEAN+3 meeting, Malaysia disagreed with the idea, partly because it had good relations with 
Pakistan, a long-time rival of India. 28   This position also reflected Malaysia’s consistent 
preference for a narrower grouping consisting of only Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. 
In contrast with Malaysia’s preference for a narrow regionalism, Singapore prefers a 
wider East Asian regionalism incorporating Australia, New Zealand, and India.  Senior Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew proposed an “ASEAN Plus Three, Plus Two” formula for a regional subgroup 
                                                 
23 Irene Ngoo and Tan Kim Song, “Japan Wants NZ, Aussies in Asia-EU Summit,” The Straits Times, July 25, 1995, 
3. 
24 Mahathir’s speech at the Asia Society Conference on “Asia and the Changing World Order,” Tokyo, Japan, May 
13, 1993, available at http://www.pmo.gov.my. 
25 Asked after the first APT summit, Mahathir stated that “it [the first APT summit] is not the EAEC.  It is just 
identical (members of the EAEC).”  See “East Asian Leaders Set to Meet Again Before April,” Asia Pulse, 
December 16, 1997. 
26 Cited in Leong, "The East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC): 'Formalized' Regionalism Being Denied," 57. 
27 Chok Suat Ling and Kamarul Yunus, “Dr M: EAEG is a Reality,” New Straits Times, August 5, 2003, 1. 
28 “Support for Enhanced ASEAN-India Dialogue,” The Nation, November 6, 2001. 
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 within APEC by adding Australia and New Zealand.29  At the 2000 APT meeting, Singapore 
supported the idea of expanding the group to ASEAN Plus Four by inviting India to join the 
group.30  In 2002, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong compared ASEAN to a jumbo jet with one 
wing in the making in the East, through agreements with China and Japan, and the second wing 
under construction with India.31  More bluntly, Minister for Trade and Industry George Yeo 
stressed the importance of incorporating India as a counterweight against China.32  At the 2004 
summit, the new Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong supported the idea of including India, 
Australia, and New Zealand to the summit.33
At the same time, the Singaporean government repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
embedding the United States in the process of East Asian regionalism.  For example, in his 
keynote address at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council’s annual dinner in Washington, D.C., in 
2001, Prime Minister Goh underscored the importance of the United States as “a strategic weight 
to maintain equilibrium” between Northeast and Southeast Asia.34  In his speech at the Asia 
Society dinner in 2003, he warned that without the United States, the East Asian region would 
eventually be dominated by one player.  He stressed the resulting need for the U.S. to embed 
itself in the process of East Asian regionalism, calling it “a strategic as well as economic 
imperative.”35  In short, Singapore clearly shows its preference for a wider regional arrangement 
in contrast to Malaysia’s preference for a narrower grouping. 
In terms of the institutional shape of ASEAN+3, ASEAN’s preferred form is primarily an 
extension of ASEAN norms and principles into the APT process.  As within ASEAN itself, 
ASEAN prefers informality, nonbinding commitments, noninterference, and consensus decision-
making procedures within the ASEAN+3 process.  Not surprisingly, ASEAN members have a 
strong preference for maintaining ASEAN-led processes rather than moving toward “East Asian” 
processes.  Many ASEAN officials fear the possibility of ASEAN+3 transforming into 
“3+ASEAN,” given the gap in economic development between Northeast Asian and Southeast 
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 Asian countries.36  Thus, ASEAN officials repeatedly emphasize the need for ASEAN to remain 
in the driver’s seat.37  At the same time, ASEAN members view APT as a useful mechanism to 
pit China and Japan against each other within a multilateral setting. 
Now that the ASEAN countries are involved in a variety of regional arrangements, such 
as APEC, the ARF, and ASEAN+3, they want ASEAN to remain integral to these broader 
regional processes.  The ASEAN countries fear that ASEAN could become an irrelevant actor in 
these wider regional institutions.  Thus, ASEAN’s vision is to continue its strategy of “concentric 
circles” of cooperation discussed in Chapter 5. 
With regard to external orientation, some ASEAN countries like Malaysia see the APT 
process as a way to increase their regional voices vis-à-vis extraregional powers.  As Chapter 6 
argued, the initial impetus for the development of the APT process was the East Asian countries’ 
desire to reduce the East Asian region’s vulnerability to and over-reliance on external forces.  To 
use Mahathir’s words, the idea of an East Asian Community, which came to be discussed widely 
in the APT process around 2001, ultimately aims to uphold “the governance of East Asia, by 
East Asia, and for East Asia.”38  However, this does not mean that the APT countries desire to 
create complete regional autonomy.  On the contrary, they desire to use the APT process as a 
means to engage more actively in the world market.  In principle, all ASEAN countries support 
the notion of open regionalism in opposition to the creation of an inward-looking closed 
grouping. 
Since APT emerged in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN’s initial interest in 
the APT process naturally centered on financial issues.  In particular, ASEAN countries were 
especially interested in receiving financial assistance from Japan and China.  In the long run, 
however, ASEAN countries hope to strengthen their relations with the Northeast Asian countries 
in many fields. 
7.2.1.2 Japan 
In terms of membership, Japan has consistently preferred a broader regional grouping 
than the current composition of APT.  As noted in the previous chapter, Japan has a strong 
                                                 
36 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Future of ASEAN: ASEAN+3 or 3+ASEAN?” The Korea Herald, October 10, 2002. 
37 Hisatsugu Nagao, “East Asian Community Closer to Reality,” The Nikkei Weekly, July 12, 2004. 
38 Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, “Building the East Asian Community: The Way Forward,” New Straits Times, 
August 5, 2003, 10. 
 259 
 preference for an Asia-Pacific regional forum over an East Asian grouping.  Therefore, Japan 
was very reluctant to get involved in any exclusively East Asian grouping.  After the idea of 
promoting an East Asian grouping had surfaced, on several occasions Japan attempted to 
incorporate such countries as Australia, New Zealand, and India in any move to promote the East 
Asian regional process.  For example, when an informal meeting of economic ministers among 
ASEAN members, China, South Korea, and Japan proposed to be held in Phuket, Thailand, in 
April 1995, Japan refused to attend the meeting, insisting that Australia and New Zealand should 
also be invited.39  Similarly, Japan proposed inviting Australia and New Zealand to the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), pointing to the close economic and political links that Australia and 
New Zealand had with Asian countries. 40   Subsequently, encountering opposition from 
Malaysia, Japan grudgingly accepted the absence of the two countries from the ASEM. 
Even after APT began, Japan continued to show its desire to invite more members to 
participate in the East Asian process.  When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed an East 
Asian “community that acts together and advances together” in January 2002, he envisioned an 
East Asian community of which core members would include not only ASEAN+3 countries but 
also Australia and New Zealand.41  In supporting Koizumi’s vision, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) generally preferred an “ASEAN plus three plus two” format, which includes 
Australia and New Zealand.42  At the ASEAN+3 foreign ministerial meeting in 2004, MOFA 
prepared and distributed an issue paper that proposed to admit Australia, New Zealand, and India 
as members of the East Asian Community.43  The invitation of India to such a grouping was 
believed to have been encouraged by Japan’s fear about China’s possible predominance within 
an East Asian grouping and its desire to use India as a counterweight against China. 
Yet this vision is not entirely shared within the Japanese government.  The Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has advanced its own version of an “ASEAN plus five” 
grouping in the form of an East Asian Free Business Zone, comprising ASEAN, Japan, South 
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 Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  METI reportedly opposed Koizumi’s inclusion of 
Australia. 44   Moreover, there were differences of opinion even within MOFA; some Asian 
specialists in MOFA were reportedly reluctant about the inclusion of Australia.45
Despite some differences within Japan, Japan’s general preference for a broader 
regionalism is based on a combination of geopolitical, economic, and ideational factors, but it is 
particularly influenced by two factors: 1) the U.S. factor (i.e., Japan’s preference for maintaining 
a strong relationship with the United States); and 2) the China factor (i.e., Japan’s desire to dilute 
Chinese influence). 
With regard to external orientation, as in the case of APEC, the Japanese government 
emphasized the principle of “open regionalism” in opposition to creating a closed regional bloc.  
Issue papers prepared by the Japanese government stress that “ASEAN+3 should continue to 
articulate principles such as openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and conformity with global 
norms and systems.”46  Japan hopes to use APT as an opportunity to curb its declining influence 
in the East Asian region while maintaining a strong relationship with extraregional powers, 
especially the United States.  In terms of issue areas, the Japanese government promotes the 
concept of “functional cooperation” in various areas, such as trade and investment, information 
technology, finance, transnational issues, development assistance, energy, environmental 
protection, food, health, and intellectual property.47
7.2.1.3 China 
In terms of membership, China prefers a narrower framework for East Asian regional 
cooperation. 48   Not surprisingly, China strongly opposed the participation of India in the 
ASEAN+3 summit when the idea was floated in 2000.49  Moreover, the Chinese government 
wants to keep Australia, a close ally of the United States, out of the group.50
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 When the decision to hold the East Asia Summit (EAS) was reached in 2004, Beijing was 
initially enthusiastic about the inauguration of this new summit.  When Malaysia offered to host 
the inaugural EAS in 2005 at the ASEAN+3 foreign ministerial meeting in 2004, China quickly 
expressed its interest in hosting the second summit in 2007, which would mark the tenth 
anniversary of ASEAN+3.51  However, Beijing became less interested in the EAS once the 
decision was made to invite Australia, New Zealand, and India to the summit.  Subsequently 
Beijing insisted that ASEAN+3 should be the core of any permanent regional grouping.52  This 
reflected China’s preference for a narrower regional framework so that it can exercise greater 
leverage within the group. 
In describing the ASEAN+3 process, the Chinese government uses the term “10+3,” 
implying that the participants are on an equal standing in this relationship.53   Nonetheless, 
Beijing also acknowledges the important role of ASEAN as glue for this fragile grouping.  
Certainly Chinese leaders do not want to see any other single power dominating the ASEAN+3 
process.  At the same time, Beijing is well aware that any attempt by China to control ASEAN+3 
would stall the process.  Therefore, at least rhetorically, Beijing agrees to work within the 
ASEAN-led process as part of China’s recent “charm offensive” toward ASEAN.54  In this 
respect, Premier Zhu Rongji stressed that China “supports the continued important role by the 
ASEAN.”55  Similarly, at the ASEAN+3 foreign ministers’ meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan maintained that “China supports ASEAN in continuing to play an important role in 
East Asian cooperation.”56
                                                 
51 “China Offers to Host 2007 East Asia Summit, Says Syed Hamid,” Malaysia General News, July 1, 2004; Naraina 
Samad and Farrah Naz Karim, “China Offers to Host Summit,” New Straits Times, July 2, 2004, 8. 
52 John Burton, Victor Mallet, and Richard McGregor, “A New Sphere of Influence: How Trade Clout is Winning 
China Allies Yet Stoking Distrust,” Financial Times, December 9, 2005, 17; Asahi Shimbun, December 4, 2005. 
53 Melissa G. Curley, "Advancing East Asian Regionalism: An Introduction," in Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas 
Thomas, eds., Advancing East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2007), 17. 
54 Amitav Acharya, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” The International Herald Tribune, November 8, 
2003, 8. 
55 “Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development,” Zhu Rongji’s statement at the 5th 
ASEAN+3 Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, November 5, 2001, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25044.htm
56 Speech by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting, July 30, 2002, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25082.htm. 
 262 
 The Chinese government shares with ASEAN a preference for the informal and 
consensual style of regional cooperation emphasized by the ASEAN Way. 57   For example, 
pointing to “the diversity of national conditions and the unevenness in the level of economic 
development of various countries,” Premier Zhu Rongji emphasized the importance of such 
principles as “mutual benefit, incremental progress and stressing on practical results.”58  Further, 
China supports a gradual and incremental approach to the institutional development of the APT 
process.  Foreign Minister Tang maintained that “East Asian cooperation should move at a pace 
comfortable to all parties.”59
China emphasizes the complementary roles of different cooperative regional 
arrangements such as APEC, APT, and ASEM.60  Yet China has shown a particular interest in 
the APT process relative to other forums.  For example, Zhu identified APT as “the main channel 
of East Asia cooperation.”61  Zhu maintained that the APT process could serve as a vehicle 
through which to “gradually establish a framework for regional financial, trade and investment 
cooperation, and furthermore to realize still greater regional economic integration in a step by 
step manner.”62
In terms of issue areas, Zhu suggested that the APT should focus on the following areas 
of cooperation: the development of Mekong River Basin transformation and communication 
infrastructure, information technology, human resources development, agriculture, and 
tourism.63
7.2.1.4 South Korea 
President Kim Dea-jung (1998–2002) was an enthusiastic supporter of the ASEAN+3 
process.  In 1999, Kim expressed his desire to expand ASEAN+3 to encompass all of East Asia 
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 within the next ten years, which would maximize its political clout in dealing with rival regional 
blocs.  “I see a great deal of possibility in this ASEAN-plus-Three forum further expanding and 
further solidifying as a forum for East Asia as a whole,” he said. “It will be able to speak for the 
region vis-à-vis the North American Free Trade Area, vis-à-vis Latin America and vis-à-vis the 
European Union, and engage these organizations in cooperation as well as in competition.”64  
Kim’s strong support for turning ASEAN+3 into a more formalized institution was shown when 
his government reportedly strongly backed the Malaysian proposal to set up an ASEAN+3 
summit in 2002 as “a stepping stone to establish an East Asian Grouping.”65
Since President Roh Moo-hyun came into office in 2003, he has promoted his own vision 
of regional community focusing on Northeast Asia.  In his inauguration speech in February 2003, 
the newly elected president declared the dawning of the “Age of Northeast Asia.”  During his 
speech, he mentioned that he had “a dream of seeing a regional community of peace and co-
prosperity in Northeast Asia like the European Union.” 66   Accordingly, he established the 
Presidential Committee for Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative to study and advance his 
vision.  Roh Moo-hyun’s government has tended to focus on Northeast Asia as the core of wider 
regional groupings such as ASEAN+3 and APEC.  In this respect, the Roh administration 
advocated a “3+ASEAN” formula in which Northeast Asia clearly leads Southeast Asia, rather 
than the current ASEAN-led ASEAN+3 arrangement.  In terms of the future prospect, President 
Roh remarked that “the ASEAN Plus Three group would gradually develop into an East Asia 
Summit, eventually leading to the formation of the East Asian Community.”67
7.2.2 Four Dimensions of Institutional Evolution 
As with the analysis of APEC in Chapter 5, the ensuing section analyzes the institutional form 
and evolution of the APT process in four dimensions of regional institution: membership, 
organizational structure, external orientation, and issue areas. 
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 7.2.2.1 Membership 
As in any other regional institution, the issue of membership was extremely controversial 
in forming APT.  It was even more so because the participants in the APT process were almost 
identical to the list of countries to be included in the aborted EAEC proposal.68   As noted in the 
previous chapter, until the mid-1990s, U.S. opposition toward the EAEC kept some Asian 
countries, especially Japan, extremely cautious about participating in an East Asia–only 
grouping. 
Nevertheless, an East Asian grouping gradually emerged in the late 1990s in the form of 
APT.  Arguably the most important feature of APT’s membership is the absence of Western 
members of APEC.  While “Asia-Pacific” regionalism in the form of APEC encountered several 
obstacles and lost its momentum in the latter half of the 1990s, “East Asian” regionalism in the 
form of ASEAN+3 emerged as a new vehicle of cooperation.  As noted in Chapter 6, this new 
development was encouraged by the growing division within APEC between Anglo-American 
members and Asian countries and the East Asians’ frustration with U.S. reactions to the Asian 
financial crisis.  The Asian financial crisis created a significant demand for cooperation within 
East Asia. 
Although the membership of APT has not changed since its inception, the possibility of 
enlarging its membership has been discussed since 2000, when the idea of expanding the 
ASEAN+3 into a “plus four” arrangement with India’s participation was floated at the fourth 
APT summit in Singapore.  However, countries such as China and Malaysia objected to the 
idea.69  Thus, at this meeting, ASEAN leaders decided that it was “too early” to consider India’s 
participation on the grounds that the forum should concentrate on strengthening the current 
grouping.70  The following year, ASEAN members reached an agreement to invite India on an 
ASEAN+1 basis, with Thailand’s strong advocacy and Malaysia’s cautious support.71  In 2002, 
India began to convene regular meetings with ASEAN members in the format of ASEAN+1, 
although it has not been invited to the APT meeting. 
 
                                                 
68 While the EAEC would include ASEAN member states, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, 
APT does not include Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
69 “Support for Enhanced ASEAN-India Dialogue,” The Nation, November 6, 2001. 
70 Amit Baruah, “ASEAN ‘No’ to Summit with India,” The Hindu, November 25, 2000. 
71 “Support for Enhanced ASEAN-India Dialogue,” The Nation, November 6, 2001. 
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 Table 7-1: Representative Members’ Preferences on APT’s Enlargement 
Enlargement No Enlargement 
Japan, Singapore, (India), (Australia), (New 
Zealand) 
China, Malaysia 
 
Different state preferences among APT countries with regard to the membership of the 
grouping came to the fore during negotiations preparing for the inauguration of the East Asia 
Summit.  Table 7-1 summarizes membership preferences of several APT countries.  While some 
members like Japan and Singapore expressed their willing to invite additional countries to the 
group, others, especially China and Malaysia, resisted the expansion.72  The question of who is 
included and who is excluded not only has highly political implications, but also has an impact 
on prospects for the institutional development of the APT process. 
7.2.2.2 Organizational Structure 
The APT framework can be characterized as a consultative process with a multilayered 
structure, which consists of three levels: ASEAN+3, ASEAN+1, and +3.73  ASEAN+3 can be 
further divided into three levels.  The first comprises annual summit meetings of the heads of 
government from the thirteen countries.  The second involves regular and ad hoc meetings at the 
ministerial level.  The third involves senior officials from ministries and agencies.74  ASEAN+1 
summit meetings between ASEAN and Japan, South Korea, and China have been held annually 
since the first time APT leaders gathered in 1997.  Trilateral summit meetings among the “plus 
three” countries—Japan, South Korea, and China—were instigated in 1999 through the initiative 
of Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi.75  However, this three-way summit was not held in 2005 
because China and Korea refused to hold such a meeting in protest against the Japanese Prime 
Minister’s repeated visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines the war dead 
from WWII, including fourteen Class A war criminals. 
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 The most important feature of ASEAN+3 is that, as its name indicates, ASEAN+3 
originated in ASEAN’s practice of inviting the three Northeast Asian countries to their summit 
meetings as guests.  Leaders from the Plus Three countries, therefore, participate in these 
meetings by ASEAN’s invitation.  In such a format, only ASEAN countries can host ASEAN+3 
meetings, with ASEAN members rotating chairmanship annually in alphabetical order.  The 
rotating ASEAN chair plays a central role in preparing the summits, inviting participants, setting 
agendas, building consensus among participants, and drafting documents.  Although the idea of 
holding ASEAN+3 meetings outside ASEAN states has been floated since 2000, it has not 
materialized in the face of ASEAN’s hesitation.  Furthermore, Malaysia’s 2002 proposal for 
establishing a secretariat was rejected.  Thus, the APT process primarily consists of a series of 
regularized meetings rather than institutionalized organizations. 
Decision-making procedures in APT are primarily predicated upon the “ASEAN Way,” 
which emphasizes consultation, informal diplomacy, and consensus.  There is no formal 
decision-making body, nor does APT have a decision-making procedure based on majority 
voting.  Both Northeast and Southeast Asian leaders feel comfortable with informal decision-
making procedures based on consensus.  At the second economic ministers’ meeting, held in 
October 2000, ministers agreed on the “13 – X” principle, which would allow the 
implementation of proposed projects without full consensus of all the members.76  This principle 
is based on ASEAN’s “five-minus-one” formula originally developed by Singapore’s former 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.77  This practice was adopted within ASEAN as a pragmatic way 
of implementing projects without requiring unanimity as long as no one opposes them.78
 
Nongovernmental Actors 
While nongovernmental bodies like PBEC and PECC preceded APEC, there were 
initially no nongovernmental actors organized on an East Asian basis preceding the formation of 
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 the APT.79  However, many nongovernmental bodies were subsequently created to support the 
APT process.  Following South Korean President Kim’s proposal, the East Asia Vision Group 
(EAVG) was formally created in October 1999 and was chaired by a Korean academic, Han 
Sung-joo.80  The EAVG consisted of twenty-six intellectuals – two representatives from each of 
the thirteen countries in the APT.  The task assigned to the EAVG was to come up with concrete 
blueprints for East Asian cooperation.  The final report was submitted to the fifth ASEAN+3 
summit in Brunei Darussalam in 2001.81  At the fourth ASEAN+3 summit in November 2000, 
Kim proposed the establishment of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), consisting of 
government officials, to assess the recommendations of the EAVG and their implications for 
East Asian cooperation.  The EASG held six sessions from July 2001 to October 2002.  The final 
report of the EASG was submitted to the 2002 ASEAN+3 summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
In response to the EASG’s proposal, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT) was 
established in Beijing in September 2003.  It was formed to “serve as a bridge between the 
academic community and political decision-makers” in the region.82  Similarly, following the 
EAVG’s recommendation and the endorsement by the EASG and the leaders of the APT 
countries, the East Asian Forum (EAF) was formed in Seoul in December 2003 to enhance 
understanding and cooperation among government officials, academics, and business leaders 
from the APT countries. 83   Motivated by these developments, the Council on East Asian 
Community (CEAC) was established in Tokyo in May 2004.  The CEAC consists of 
representatives from corporations and government agencies as well as prominent intellectuals in 
Japan.  It aims to conduct policy discussions among its members and produce policy 
recommendations.84
The East Asia Business Council (EABC) meeting, another short-term measure put 
forward by the EASG, was inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in April 2004.  The first 
EABC meeting was organized by the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia 
                                                 
79 Evans, "Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional 
Identity," 202. 
80 Han Sung-joo is a former foreign minister who later served as an ambassador to the United States. 
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82 Ibid. 
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 (NCCIM).  The main task for the EABC is, in the words of its chairman Tan Sri Azman Hashim, 
“to provide private sector perspective and feedback to the ASEAN+3 governments with the aim 
of deepening economic cooperation and linkages and to strengthen cooperation among the 
private sectors of ASEAEN, China, Japan, and Korea.”85  The Malaysian government, with the 
International Trade and Industry Ministry acting as the lead agency, played an important role in 
the formation of the EABC. 86   These nongovernmental groups may constitute a nascent 
transnational policy network.  It is yet unknown to what extent these newly formed networks of 
nongovernmental organizations, such as the EAF, NEAT, CEAC, and EABC, can influence 
intergovernmental processes within the APT framework. 
 
East Asia Summit 
When the idea of the transformation of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia Summit was floated 
at the 2000 APT meeting, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh, who was a chair of that meeting, 
recommended “a gradual evolution.”87  The EAVG report in 2001 called for “the evolution of 
the annual summit meetings of ASEAN Plus Three into the East Asian Summit and for the 
establishment of an East Asian community.”88  When the idea of an East Asian Summit was 
discussed at the Bali APT meeting in 2003, one of the major controversial issues was the 
question of which county should host the first meeting.89
As noted earlier, the original idea was to “transform” ASEAN+3 into a more formalized 
East Asia Summit.  As a logical evolution of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia Summit, the 
possibility of holding the summits outside ASEAN countries was discussed.  For example, at the 
2002 ASEAN+3 summit in Singapore, Prime Minister Goh pointed to the possibility for 
Northeast Asian countries to assume the role of chairmanship at East Asia Summits.90  South 
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun stated in 2003 that “the Northeast Asian countries should 
alternately host the ASEAN Plus Three summit once every three or four years as an interim step 
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 towards the East Asia Summit.”91  However, some ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and 
Thailand, showed reservations about convening an East Asian summit; they were particularly 
hesitant about extending the role of chairmanship to the three Northeast Asian countries, 
apparently because of concerns that it could eclipse the APT process.92
At a meeting of foreign ministers from the APT in July 2004, ministers discussed the idea 
of holding the inaugural East Asia Summit in Malaysia in 2005.  At that meeting, China 
officially expressed its interest in hosting the second East Asia Summit in 2007, while lending its 
support for Malaysia’s chairmanship for the first summit.93  In response to China’s move, Japan 
proposed to co-host the inaugural East Asia Summit with Malaysia.  At the APT summit in 
November 2004, the APT leaders agreed to hold the inaugural meeting in Malaysia in 2005.  
Through a series of negotiations at a meeting of foreign ministers in July 2005, it was agreed that 
the East Asia Summit would be hosted and chaired only by ASEAN members.94  It was also 
decided at the same meeting that two separate summit meetings would be held in Malaysia: the 
APT meeting among the existing thirteen APT members and the East Asia Summit among the 
same thirteen countries plus Australia, New Zealand, and India.  Accordingly, following the 
regular 2005 ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, the thirteen APT leaders gathered for the APT 
summit on December 12, and those leaders plus the three additional leaders participated in the 
inaugural EAS summit on December 14.  As of now, APT and EAS coexist as two different 
groupings, though all the participants except Australia, New Zealand, and India are the same. 
 
Secretariat 
The idea of establishing a secretariat for ASEAN+3 was discussed at the 2001 ASEAN+3 
leaders’ meeting in Brunei.  In June 2002, the Malaysian government officially proposed the 
establishment of an ASEAN+3 secretariat in Kuala Lumpur with an offering of US$ 10 million 
(RM 38 million) to cover the first five years of its operations.95  However, Malaysia’s proposal 
did not gain support among other ASEAN members.  Although China, Japan, and South Korea 
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 were reported to have given tacit support for the proposal, some officials of the other ASEAN 
countries reacted to the proposal skeptically, viewing it as an attempt to institutionalize the 
ASEAN+3 process.96  As one ASEAN diplomat warned, many ASEAN officials were concerned 
that if ASEAN+3 were further institutionalized, ASEAN would be “neutralized” by the 
Northeast Asian giants, especially China, and “lose its luster as a regional entity.”97  Similarly, 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh expressed his reservations about the establishment of an 
ASEAN+3 secretariat, stating that ASEAN would be overshadowed by the three North Asian 
giants. 98   Furthermore, the Indonesian and Singaporean governments were particularly 
concerned that the creation of an ASEAN+3 secretariat would weaken the ASEAN secretariat in 
Jakarta and the APEC secretariat in Singapore, respectively.  The Thai government indicated that 
it preferred to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.99  The Philippines stated that it 
would be too early to establish an ASEAN+3 secretariat, fearing that it would overshadow the 
ASEAN Secretariat.100
At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in July 2002, ASEAN senior 
officials discussed three options: 1) Malaysia’s proposal to establish a separate secretariat to be 
hosted by an ASEAN member country; 2) the expansion of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta; 
and 3) the establishment of an ASEAN+3 bureau within the ASEAN Secretariat.101  All of these 
options were considered infeasible.102  Instead, as a compromise, the idea of establishing an 
“ASEAN Plus Three Unit” within the ASEAN Secretariat eventually gained support from the 
ASEAN members.  Accordingly, in December 2003, the ASEAN Plus Three Unit was 
established at the ASEAN Secretariat “to assist the ASEAN Plus Three Co-chairs to coordinate 
and monitor ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation.”103
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 7.2.2.3 External Orientation 
When any new institution is created, there are always questions about how it should 
relate to existing institutions at the regional and global levels.104  When Mahathir announced his 
EAEG proposal, it was primarily viewed as a challenge to the newly formed APEC, especially in 
the eyes of the U.S. government.  Many commentators also saw APEC and EAEG as “competing 
regionalism.”105  In fact, one of the reasons for the failure to launch the EAEG proposal can be 
attributed to the fact that APEC had not yet been firmly established.  Once the APEC program 
got off the ground, the existence of APEC helped some countries like Japan to feel less 
constrained to pursue an “Asia-only” option while maintaining good relations with the United 
States through APEC.106
East Asian leaders are well aware of the importance of the region’s relationship with the 
extraregional world.  In particular, they recognize the strategic and economic importance of the 
United States.  Therefore, any proposals for creating an Asia-only grouping had to confront the 
question of how to accommodate the relationship with United States.  East Asian leaders have 
stressed that APT eschewed an inward-looking closed regionalism.  For example, when such 
ideas as the transformation of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia Summit and the creation of an East 
Asia free trade area were proposed at the 2000 APT summit in Singapore, Singapore Prime 
Minister Goh stated that these suggestions should pursue the principle of “open regionalism.”  
He also stressed that the development of the APT reflected a growing East Asian identity, but it 
was “not an attempt to shut out Washington.”107
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, APT leaders 
confirmed their resolve to work more closely together to generate the region’s own “internal 
dynamism” in order to reduce dependence on the U.S. market.  Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, for example, spoke to the Singapore media: 
“[In the post-September 11 world], it is very important for all of us to work together.  For 
us to depend on the US alone as a market for growth will be much more difficult in future 
because the US economy is likely to slow down.  So we recognize the need to generate 
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 internal dynamism and that we should do through further cooperation amongst 
ourselves.”108
 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir also warned against ASEAN’s overdependence on the U.S. 
economy, stating more bluntly: “There is too much dependence on the U.S.  When it is affected, 
all of ASEAN would be hit as well.” 109  Here lies East Asian leaders’ dilemma: while they 
desire to have greater control over regional affairs and reduce their overdependence on external 
powers like the United States, many of them hope to keep the United States engaged in the East 
Asian region. 
Nevertheless, some analysts contemplate the possibility that East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific, which are represented by APT and APEC respectively, constitute “rival regions.”110  As 
discussed in detail below, although Japan’s proposal for creating an Asian Monetary Fund failed 
to clearly identify its relationship with the global institutional framework, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) explicitly established a link with the IMF within the APT framework in 2000.  
The CMI thus confirmed that it would be complementary to the role of the IMF.111  The 2001 
EAVG also stressed the importance of finding the raison d’etre for the APT within the existing 
institutional framework by recommending that the APT “avoid duplication of the work of other 
related organizations and regional frameworks and instead complement their contributions.”112  
Although the relationship among existing regional institutional arrangements remains somewhat 
unclear, the APT is not aimed at creating a closed regional bloc. 
7.2.2.4 Issue Areas 
Since the financial crisis was the primary catalyst for the formation of the APT process, it 
is not surprising that the initial efforts for developing regional policy coordination focused on 
monetary and financial cooperation.  However, regional cooperative efforts in the form of APT 
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 have been expanded to include a wide range of issues, including political and security issues, the 
environment, and social welfare.113  In a “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation” released at 
the third APT summit in 1999, leaders agreed to promote cooperation on eight fields within the 
APT framework, including economic cooperation, monetary and financial cooperation, social 
and human resources development, scientific and technical development, cultural and 
information, development cooperation, politics and security, and transnational issues.114
 
Table 7-2: Scope of Cooperation within ASEAN+3 
 Area of Cooperation Year of Establishment 
1 Politics and Security 2000 
2 Economic, Trade, and Investment 2000 
3 Finance and Monetary 2000 
4 Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry 2001 
5 Labor 2001 
6 Environment 2002 
7 Tourism 2002 
8 Culture and Arts 2003 
9 Energy 2004 
10 Health 2004 
11 Information Technology and Communications 2004 
12 Social Welfare and Development 2004 
13 Transnational Crime and Counter-Terrorism 2004 
14 Science and Technology* 2001 
15 Youth* 2004 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, Annual Report, 2004–2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005), p. 66. 
Note: * Only at senior officials level; all other areas of cooperation are at ministerial and senior officials levels. 
 
 
Economic Cooperation 
The first ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM+3) was held in Yangon in May 
2000.  While ASEAN+3 ministers met twice each year in 2000 and 2001, AEM+3 meetings have 
been held annually afterwards.  At the second AEM+3 meeting in October in 2001, economic 
ministers agreed to identify three priority areas of cooperation: accelerating trade, investment, 
and technology transfer; encouraging technical cooperation in information technology and e-
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 commerce; and strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and supporting 
industries.115
In the trade area, many initiatives have been pushed forward more on a bilateral basis 
than on a region-wide basis.  Traditionally, the East Asian region was characterized by the 
absence of any formal preferential trade arrangements.  At the end of 2001, China, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia were the only members of the WTO that did not belong to 
any discriminatory trade agreements.  In 1998, however, East Asian governments began to 
actively negotiate bilateral preferential agreements.116  The most dramatic change has come from 
Japan and Korea, both of which had long eschewed the pursuit of discriminatory regional 
approaches in favor of a “multilateralism-only” policy based on the GATT system.  In his visit to 
Japan in October 1998, Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung proposed to start negotiating a free 
trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries.  This move by Korea and Japan apparently 
made the Chinese concerned about the possibility of being isolated from the FTA trend in East 
Asia, motivating them to consider FTAs as a policy option.117
In November 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the creation of a joint expert 
group to explore ways to enhance China-ASEAN economic cooperation, including the China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area.  China’s proposal came as a surprise to many observers because of 
China’s traditionally reluctant attitude toward regional trade arrangements.118  Accordingly, a 
China-ASEAN Experts Group on Economic Cooperation was established to explore the 
possibility of establishing an FTA between the two.  The expert group completed the feasibility 
study and submitted the report in October 2001.  Most importantly, the report called for the 
establishment of an ASEAN-China FTA, which would create a huge economic region of 1.7 
billion people with a GDP of about U.S. $2 trillion and total trade of U.S. $1.23 trillion, within 
ten years.119
In November 2001, Chinese and ASEAN leaders endorsed the ideas envisioned by the 
expert group and agreed to initiate the negotiation process.  Within two years from the initial 
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 proposal, the leaders from both sides signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation at the ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002.  The Framework 
aimed at the establishment of free trade between China and the original five ASEAN members 
by 2010 and between China and ASEAN’s four new members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam) by 2015.  To ease ASEAN’s concerns about the implications of an FTA, China agreed 
to reduce tariffs on a number of goods, including agricultural products, over three years 
according to the timetable in three product categories (zero tariffs for all products no later than 
January 2006) as an “early harvest” phase of liberalization.  China’s concession to ASEAN 
members to eliminate tariffs at the early stage contributed to getting ASEAN on board.120  The 
early harvest program allows ASEAN members to make an early entry to China’s market in 
many products before a full FTA is finalized.  This move by China was motivated more by 
political interests than by economic interests.121
In order to catch up with these Chinese moves, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi proposed a “Comprehensive Economic Partnership” with ASEAN during his trip to 
ASEAN in January 2002.  At the same time, Japan and Singapore signed the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership (JSEPA), which marked the first bilateral 
agreement (including free trade agreements) that Japan had ever reached.  These Japanese 
initiatives came immediately after China’s agreement to begin formal discussions of an ASEAN-
China FTA in November 2001.  Moreover, Japan signed a joint declaration on a Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership with ASEAN at the Phnom Penh APT summit in November 2002.   
These trends show a chain reaction of initiatives, especially between China and Japan.  
However, as Ellen Frost observes, Japan has been “lagging behind” probably since around 2000.  
In fact, it “is now China, not Japan, that sets the pace, shape, and direction of regional trade 
institution-building.” 122   The biggest obstacle in a Japan-ASEAN economic partnership is 
Japanese domestic constituencies.  These include not only resistance from the agricultural sector 
but also opposition by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare to the free movement of 
health-care workers.123
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 On an East Asian regional level, the idea of creating an East Asian Free Trade Area 
(EAFTA) was formally tabled at the ASEAN+3 leaders’ meeting in Singapore in November 
2000.  At that meeting, leaders agreed to set up a working group to study the benefits and 
feasibility of establishing an EAFTA. 124   The EAVG report submitted in 2001 also 
recommended the establishment of an EAFTA and liberalization of trade well ahead of the 
APEC Bogor Goal. 125   However, the EASG report identified it as a long-term measure.126   
Furthermore, at the 2002 trilateral summit talks among China, Japan, and South Korea, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed a feasibility study of an FTA among the three Northeast Asian 
countries. The Japanese government, however, reacted cautiously to Zhu’s proposal.127
 
Financial and Monetary Cooperation 
Before the Asian financial crisis hit the region, there were few regional schemes for 
financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.  However, the financial 
crisis generated an urgent need to create a regional mechanism for crisis prevention and 
management in the future.  Consequently, many proposals for regional financial and monetary 
cooperation have been put forward in the aftermath of the crisis.  The initiatives that have 
emerged in East Asia have focused on four areas: policy dialogue and surveillance mechanisms, 
establishment of a liquidity support facility, financial system strengthening, and Asian bond 
market development.128
 
Policy Dialogue 
The financial crisis highlighted the need for a regional mechanism for policy dialogue 
and surveillance.  In October 1998, the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) was established to 
strengthen regional cooperation through information exchange, an early warning system and a 
peer review process, and a monitoring mechanism for economic and financial developments.129  
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 As proposed by the Chinese, finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries met for the first time 
in April 1999 on the sidelines of the annual ADB meeting in Manila.  In November 1999, 
ASEAN+3 leaders confirmed the importance of “strengthening policy dialogue, coordination and 
collaboration on the financial monetary and fiscal issues of common interests.”130  To this end, 
the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) process was established in May 
2000.131  Finance ministers of this group have met once a year and their deputies semiannually to 
exchange information and promote policy discussion.  The group has taken the initiative to 
create a mechanism for monitoring short-term capital flow and to develop a regional early 
warning system to detect regional financial vulnerabilities.132
The second type of cooperation is the establishment of a liquidity support facility, which 
is based on sharing foreign exchange reserves among countries in the region.  This type of 
coordination, which can be referred to as resource coordination, constitutes a stronger form of 
coordination than policy dialogue.133  The magnitude and contagious nature of the financial 
crisis made East Asian countries realize not only their own overreliance on the IMF as a lender 
of last resort, but also the limitations of the global financial institution for crisis prevention and 
management.134  Therefore, policy elites in the region recognized the need to create a regional 
financing facility to deal with liquidity crises and minimize the risk of currency crises, which 
requires the pooling of reserves from participating members.  The East Asian leaders recognized 
the benefits of taking advantage of the abundant foreign reserves in the region (See Table 7-3).  
In May 2000 the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched as a first step toward establishing a 
regional financing facility.  It was based on the expansion of the ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
(ASA) and the establishment of a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among 
ASEAN+3 countries to provide financial liquidity support in the event of a future financial crisis.  
The CMI is regarded as “the most important accomplishment of the ASEAN+3 process to 
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 date.”135  Because of the centrality of the CMI within the APT process, the establishment of the 
CMI will be examined later in detail as a mini-case study. 
 
Table 7-3: Comparison of Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$ billion) 
  1997 2003 
ASEAN 142.44 228.48 
ASEAN+3 509.90 1439.03 
US 30.81 39.72 
EU-15 371.99 232.35 
Latin America 157.99 175.05 
Eastern Europe 74.21 187.37 
Middle East 75.02 89.03 
 
Source: http://www.aseansec.org
 
The third type of regional cooperation aims at strengthening domestic institutions and 
markets. 136   The Asian crisis dramatically revealed the weakness of domestic financial 
institutions among East Asian countries.  The rapid financial liberalization that many East Asian 
countries had been undertaking since the mid-1980s had not been accompanied by appropriate 
domestic institutions.  Consequently, East Asian leaders recognized the need for domestic 
reforms to establish sound and stable financial systems.  They also recognized the need for some 
form of regional institutional mechanism to ensure the implementation of domestic reforms at a 
higher level.  However, initiatives to develop common regional measures for strengthening the 
region’s financial system remain limited. 
 
Asian Bond Market 
The last development in the financial sector is the growth of interest in developing Asian 
capital markets.  Before the Asian crisis, many firms in Asia had largely relied on short-term, 
dollar-denominated financing.  This caused the so-called “double mismatch” problem, that is, 
both maturity and currency mismatches.  A maturity mismatch was caused by the fact that 
domestic banks and firms relied on short-term borrowing for long-term investments, while a 
currency mismatch emerged because the debit was denominated in foreign rather than local 
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 currencies.137  The risks caused by the double mismatch problem were revealed by the crisis of 
1997–98, which highlighted the region’s vulnerability to the volatility in short-term capital 
movements.  This experience prompted regional leaders to realize the need to channel a large 
pool of Asian savings for long-term investment within the region by developing domestic and 
regional capital markets in Asia.138
Against this background, initiatives to develop Asian bond markets were proposed to 
reduce the risks associated with the double match problem.  The Executives’ Meeting of East 
Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) launched the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in June 2003.  
The ASEAN+3 finance ministers also endorsed the establishment of the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative (ABMI), which was originally proposed by Japan’s Ministry of Finance. 139   The 
objective of the ABMI is “to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia, enabling better 
utilization of Asian savings for Asian investments.”140  These initiatives to develop regional 
bond markets have shown relatively rapid progress.141
 
Political and Security Cooperation 
Politics and security were included in the areas of cooperation identified by the 1999 
Joint Statement.  The Philippine government proposed the establishment of the East Asia 
Security Forum within the APT framework to discuss security issues.  Although the proposal not 
adopted, the APT leaders did not exclude security issues from the agenda of the APT summit.142
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Japan 
attempted to adopt an antiterrorism declaration prior to the APT summit.  However, despite its 
effort, Tokyo failed to gain support from ASEAN countries and China.  On the contrary, there 
was even an attempt to issue an objection to the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan.  This 
proposal from Malaysia reportedly had gained support from Indonesia, while it was rejected by 
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 the Philippines and Singapore.143  At the ASEAN summit right before the APT summit, ASEAN 
members issued the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism to express their 
concern and their efforts to fight terrorism, but they remained reluctant to adopt a similar 
declaration at the APT meeting.  China, which had taken the initiative to push the APEC forum 
in Shanghai in October to condemn terrorism, expressed a lukewarm attitude toward Japan’s 
proposal.  Because of lack of support from the ASEAN countries and China’s cautious attitude, 
Tokyo’s attempt to have the APT issue an antiterrorism declaration failed.144  Nonetheless, at the 
foreign ministers’ meeting in 2002, the foreign ministers from the APT countries agreed to 
cooperate on transnational crimes such as terrorism. 
7.3 MINI-CASE STUDY: FROM THE AMF TO THE CMI 
In August 1997, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Japanese officials called for the 
creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF).  It was to be capitalized to US$100 billion, with 
half of its reserves to be provided by Japan and the rest by other regional powers, such as 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China.145  Although the proposal received a certain level of 
support from regional leaders, strong opposition from the United States and the IMF forced the 
Japanese government to give up the AMF proposal.  However, the idea of creating a regional 
scheme for financial cooperation did not disappear.  Following a series of negotiations, in May 
2000 the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 countries agreed to develop a network of currency swap 
and repurchase agreements known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). 
Why did the AMT proposal fail to get off the ground, while it gained some support from 
some regional leaders?  Despite the failure in an earlier attempt to create a regional financial 
facility, why and how was the CMI successfully launched?  Although it is incorrect to view the 
CMI as the resurrection of the AMF because of the differences between the two, both initiatives 
aimed to develop a framework for financial cooperation among Asian countries without the 
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 participation of the United States.  Therefore, this paired comparative analysis provides further 
insight into why some “Asia-only” regionalist initiatives get off the ground, while others do not. 
As in the preceding analyses, the present mini-case study seeks to explain the failure of 
the AMF and the successful formation of the CMI by exploring the variation of state preferences 
among key regional actors concerning financial cooperation and the political process of interstate 
negotiations.  In particular, it addresses why there was a demand for the creation of a regional 
mechanism to enhance financial cooperation and how the CMI initiative came into being, despite 
the earlier failure to establish a regional financial facility.  The following section begins, 
however, by briefly reviewing the pre-crisis history of financial and monetary cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  It then assesses the causes of the failure in launching the AMF proposal.  
Finally, it explores why and how the CMI was successfully established. 
 
Pre-Crisis Initiatives 
Prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis, regional cooperation in financial and 
monetary issues in Asia was very limited.  Nonetheless, there were some attempts for regional 
financial cooperation.  The idea to create a regional monetary fund was first advanced with the 
establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966.  Advocates for the idea 
envisioned an Asian equivalent of the IMF which would complement the activities of the ADB 
in the same way that the IMF complements the activities of the World Bank.  However, the idea 
failed to elicit support, and it was being shelved for some decades.146
In 1977, ASEAN set up the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) – a small scheme to 
provide liquidity to one another in times of crisis.  However, the swap arrangement, which 
amounted to $80 million, was too small to counter the movements of capital that occurred during 
the 1997 currency attack in Asia.147  In 1991, Japan took the lead to establish the Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP).  It has met twice a year at the senior 
official level since then.  The first meeting of EMEAP central bank governors was held in July 
1996.  In September 1995, Bernie Fraser, who was the governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia at the time, proposed to establish an Asian version of the Bank of International 
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 Settlements (BIS).  The objective of the proposed institution was, in Fraser’s words, to “provide 
a more focused forum than presently exists in the region to help central banks cope with the 
emergence of deregulated, global financial markets and their consequences.”148
Right before the eruption of the 1997–98 crisis, Japanese officials had begun 
contemplating the idea to create a regional mechanism for stabilizing Asian currencies in case 
financial crises emerged within Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF).  The idea rose mostly from 
the outbreak of the Mexican peso crisis that began late in 1994.  Japanese officials became 
concerned that if a similar crisis occurred in Asia, Asian nations would probably not be able to 
receive IMF loans proportionate to the ones Mexico received because of the lack of the Asian 
countries’ IMF quotas commensurate with their rapid economic development.149  While many 
MOF officials began to discuss the idea frequently, they were not able to reach consensus, 
especially with regard to whether or not the United States should be included in such a regional 
institution.150  Before the idea was finalized and discussed with other countries involved in the 
tentative proposal, a currency crisis hit Thailand in July 1997. 
 
The Asian Monetary Fund 
Following a rapid drop of the Thai baht on August 11, 1997, Japan’s Vice Finance 
Minister of International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, announced the proposal to create an AMF 
at a conference held in Tokyo to discuss a rescue package for Thailand.  Since the U.S. 
government refused to contribute to the financial aid package, American officials did not attend 
these initial meetings.151  On September 10, Sakakibara wrote an unofficial memo to explain his 
proposal to officials in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia and sent 
other senior officials from the International Finance Bureau of the MOF to China and 
Australia.152  At Japan’s request, the AMF idea was discussed internationally for the first time at 
the joint annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank held in Hong Kong in late September. 
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 Japan’s AMF proposal envisioned a regional fund to pool foreign exchange reserves from 
countries in the region to finance the debt of the crisis-affected countries.  The United States was 
not included in the Japanese plan.  In particular, Sakakibara believed that Asian leaders would 
need a regional framework to discuss regional financial problems without U.S. pressure.153  He 
personally held the view that Japan should play a larger role in Asia more autonomous from U.S. 
influence.154  Given the U.S. refusal to participate in the Thai bailout package, other officials in 
the MOF were also convinced that the U.S. would not contribute to such a regional fund.155
Malaysia, especially Prime Minister Mahathir, a well-known critic of the IMF, was the 
most enthusiastic supporter of the AMF proposal, while most ASEAN member countries, 
including Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were also generally supportive of the idea.156  
However, China and Singapore were unwilling to lend their support.  The Chinese reluctance to 
support the Japanese initiative was apparently based on their suspicion regarding Japanese 
regional hegemonic ambitions.157  Singapore was reluctant to support a regional framework that 
excluded the United States.158  Reactions from South Korea were mixed.  The South Korean 
government initially opposed the AMF proposal because of its concerns over U.S. opposition as 
a recipient of the IMF rescue package and its suspicion regarding Japan’s ambitions for regional 
dominance. 159   However, Seoul eventually endorsed the AMF concept for several reasons, 
including its own harsh experience with IMF conditionality and increasing recognition of the 
benefits of the AMF idea.160
Not surprisingly, the United States and the IMF strongly opposed the AMF idea.  U.S. 
officials, especially Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, were concerned that an AMF would undermine the role of the IMF by creating 
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 “moral hazard” problems.  They were particularly worried that such a fund would be offered 
under weaker conditionality than that of the IMF program.161
Facing strong opposition from the IMF, the United States, and many European 
governments, as well as lack of support from China, by the end of October 1997 the Japanese 
government had no choice but to gave up the idea of establishing an AMF.162  Instead, on 
November 19, 1997, central bankers and finance ministers from East Asian countries, as well as 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, agreed to establish the Manila 
Framework Group (MFG).  Its objective was to develop a regional framework for financial 
cooperation in order to restore and improve financial stability in the region.  Most importantly, 
the MFG established a new regional mechanism for economic monitoring and surveillance to 
complement the IMF’s surveillance mechanism.163  Thus, the MFG essentially confirmed the 
central role of the IMF in dealing with the financial crisis.164  In addition to a surveillance 
mechanism, the MFG focused on economic and technical cooperation in finance (“financial 
ecotech”), measures to strengthen the IMF’s ability to manage financial crises, and development 
of cooperative financing arrangements.165  The MFG departed from Japan’s AMF proposal in 
that it lacked any funding facility to pool resources from member countries.  Moreover, the MFG 
consisted of fourteen Asia-Pacific countries, including the United States. 
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative 
Although the AMF was aborted in favor of the MFG, East Asian leaders continued to 
search for an appropriate way to promote regional financial cooperation.  As noted earlier, 
finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have held regular meetings since 1999.  At their 
second meeting, held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2000, the finance ministers agreed to 
establish the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI).  The CMI “involves an expanded ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement that would include all ASEAN countries, and a network of bilateral swap and 
repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan and the Republic of 
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 Korea.”166  Why and how did the APT countries agree to establish the CMI within three years of 
the failed attempt to establish the AMF? 
As argued in the previous chapter, the motive behind the development of regionalist 
initiatives within the APT framework was defensive.  As William Grimes points out, “the East 
Asian states have been driven by a motivation to reduce their vulnerability to global finance 
rather than to maximize market efficiency.”167  Even after the failure to launch the AMF, Japan’s 
interest in developing some sort of regional scheme for financial cooperation did not disappear 
among Japanese officials.  Japan modified its original position under the leadership of Haruhiko 
Kuroda, who succeeded Sakakibara in 1999.  Kuroda envisioned a regional financial institution 
that would supplement rather than compete with the IMF. 168   Although critical of IMF’s 
conditionality program during the Asian financial crisis, Kuroda and his MOF colleagues 
acknowledged the IMF’s important role in any regional financial architecture. 
Despite Japan’s pivotal role in launching the CMI, the most important change among 
East Asian countries that made the establishment of the CMI possible was the shift in China’s 
attitudes toward regional financial cooperation.  Given its vast pool of foreign exchange 
reserves, 169  China’s participation was particularly crucial for the creation of any regional 
framework for financial cooperation.  Therefore, besides opposition from the United States and 
the IMF, China’s lack of support for the AMF idea was also a major obstacle to the creation of a 
regional fund.  However, China gradually changed its attitudes toward regional financial 
cooperation.170  When the concept of the CMI was put forward, China lent its support, marking a 
sharp contrast to its negative attitude toward Japan’s AMF proposal. 
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 Table 7-4:  International Reserves of East Asia, 1999–2005 (US$ billion) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 
Japan 287.0 354.9 395.2 461.3 663.3 833.9 829.9 
China 157.8 168.3 215.7 291.2 408.2 614.5 659.1 
South Korea 74.0 96.1 102.8 121.4 155.3 199.0 206.0 
Taiwan 106.2 106.7 122.2 161.7 206.6 242.0 253.2 
Hong Kong 96.3 107.5 111.2 111.9 118.4 123.5 122.4 
Singapore 76.9 80.1 75.4 82.1 95.7 112.2 116.0 
Indonesia 26.5 28.5 27.3 31.0 35.0 35.0 33.3 
Malaysia 30.6 29.5 30.5 34.2 44.5 66.4 74.1 
Philippines 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.1 13.5 12.9 14.8 
Thailand 34.1 32.0 32.4 38.1 41.1 48.7 47.1 
 
Source: Yung Chul Park, Economic Liberalization and Integration in East Asia: A Post-Crisis Paradigm (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 196.  
Original sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and The Economist (2005), July 16–22 and June 11–17. 
  
Note: * at the end of May   
 
During the negotiations leading to the establishment of the CMI, the key issue was the 
relationship between any regional financial mechanism and the IMF.  More specifically, the 
main issue was whether the conditions for lending should be linked with IMF programs.  
Malaysia strongly insisted on no linkage.  Other ASEAN countries, with the exception of 
Singapore, preferred weak IMF linkage.171  On the other hand, China and South Korea favored 
close linkage with IMF programs.  Given the concentration of foreign exchange reserves in 
countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, and Singapore (see Table 7-4), they could foresee 
themselves as the sole donors of funds within the region.172  In particular, China pressed for as 
much as 100 percent linkage, despite the fact that Chinese officials remained critical of IMF 
conditionality applied to its 1998 rescue packages. 173
Given the variation of state preference concerning the shape of a regional financial 
arrangement, especially its relationship with the IMF, Japan played “the pivotal arbitrating role 
in working out the general conditions and principles for the currency swap network.”174  From 
July to August 1999, before the CMI was announced in May 2000, the Japanese government 
under Prime Minister Obuchi dispatched a high-level mission, called the Mission for the 
Revitalization of the Asian Economy, to six Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
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 Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and South Korea.  Headed by Hiroshi Okuda, the then chairman 
of the board of Toyota Motor Corporation and the chairman of the Japan Federation of 
Employers’ Association (Nikkeiren), the so-called Okuda Mission comprised private sector 
business leaders, academics, and high-ranking officials from the MOFA, the MOF, the MITI, 
and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA).  The purposes of the mission were to study the issues 
and needs facing East Asian countries two years after the eruption of the crisis, to assess Japan’s 
assistance to the crisis-affected countries, and to study the tasks for the recovery of Asian 
economies and their prosperity in the twenty-first century and the role of Japan in the region.175
One of the recommendations of the final report, which was released in November 1999, 
was the need for a regional emergency liquidity facility.  These “behind-the-scenes” activities 
proved conducive to assessing regional interests in financial cooperation and building consensus 
in support of a regional emergency financing mechanism. 176   In addition to a series of 
negotiations with the countries in Asia, the Japanese government made particular efforts to 
assure the United States that the proposed idea of a web of swap agreements was not related to 
the AMF concept.177  Moreover, having modified its position in favor of some linkage to IMF 
programs, the Japanese government emphasized that the CMI would complement the role of the 
IMF.178
At the ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ meeting held in Honolulu in May 2001, the 
ministers agreed on the concrete design of the CMI, including the crucial agreement on a linkage 
with IMF programs, which allows only 10 percent of the bilateral swap agreement to be drawn 
without the approval of the IMF.  In other words, the remaining 90 percent of the assets 
mobilized under the CMI requires the acceptance of an IMF program.  Over the next few years, a 
series of bilateral swap arrangements were reached (see Table 7-6).  As of the year 2004, the 
total amount of swap agreements was $36.5 billion.179  Skeptics of the CMI argued that the 
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 amounts involved under the CMI would be inadequate for preventing speculative attacks.180  
Others criticized the CMI’s linkage to the IMF conditionality for undermining the CMI’s 
capacity to be used independently.181  Still others pointed to the limited nature of the CMI as a 
series of bilateral agreements rather than a multilateral regional fund. 
 
Table 7-5: Currency Swaps under the Chiang Mai Initiative (as of 2004) 
Parties Currencies Conclusion Dates Size 
Japan-Korea $/won July 4, 2001 $2 billion 
Japan-Thailand $/baht July 30, 2001 $3 billion 
Japan-Philippines $/peso August 27, 2001 $3 billion 
Japan-Malaysia $/ringgit October 5, 2001 $1 billion 
PRC-Thailand $/baht December 6, 2001 $2 billion 
Japan-PRC yen/renminbi March 28, 2002 $3 billion 
PRC-Korea renminbi/won June 24, 2002 $2 billion 
Korea-Thailand $-won/baht June 25, 2002 $1 billion 
Korea-Malaysia $-won/ringgit July 26, 2002 $1 billion 
Korea-Philippines $/peso August 9, 2002 $1 billion 
PRC-Malaysia $/ringgit October 9, 2002 $1.5 billion 
Japan-Indonesia $/rupiah February 17, 2003 $3 billion 
PRC-Philippines renminbi/peso August 31, 2003 $1 billion 
Japan-Singapore $/S$ November 10, 2003 $1 billion 
Korea-Indonesia $/rupiah December 24, 2003 $1 billion 
PRC-Indonesia $/rupiah December 30, 2003 $1 billion 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, “Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI): Current Status and Future Directions,” 
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/cmi_currentstatus.pdf
 
However, there has been some progress.  In May 2005, the finance ministers reached 
several important decisions at the tenth APT finance ministers’ meeting held in Istanbul.  First, 
they agreed to establish a collective decision-making mechanism for the current bilateral 
arrangements as a first step toward multilateralization of the CMI arrangement.  Second, they 
agreed to significantly increase the size of swaps.  Third, it was agreed that the size of swaps that 
could be withdrawn without the IMF-supported program would be increased from 10% to 
20%.182  Following the Istanbul Agreement, the total swap size has been doubled, reaching $75.0 
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 billion by May 2006.183  The question about the effectiveness of the CMI remains.  However, the 
establishment of the CMI framework itself was significant, given the historical lack of financial 
cooperative systems in the East Asian region. 
Four conclusions can be drawn from the above mini-case study.  First, there needs to be 
at least a minimum level of agreement among key members if a regionalist project is to be 
successfully launched.  In particular, the differences in policy preferences of two major regional 
powers can be a major obstacle to a regionalist initiative.  In the East Asian context, a basic 
agreement between Japan and China seems essential for the success of any regionalist project.  
Give China’s objection to Japan’s AMF proposal, even if the United States and the IMF had not 
opposed it, the AMF would not have been established.  The change in China’s attitude toward 
East Asian monetary regionalism was crucial for creating a meaningful financial arrangement in 
East Asia. 
Second, an external hegemonic power can effectively block a regionalist initiative.  
Given East Asian countries’ dependence on the United States, the policy stance of the U.S. 
government is a major factor in the success of an “Asia-only” regionalist project.  The U.S. 
successfully prevented the formation of the AMF, just as it killed Mahathir’s EAEG proposal 
discussed in the previous chapter.  In a sharp contrast to U.S. opposition to the AMF, U.S. 
reactions to the CMI concept were remarkably muted, if not positive.184  For example, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who had strongly opposed the AMF, expressed his 
support for the CMI agreement.185  IMF officials also lent their support to the establishment of 
the network of currency swaps under the CMI.186  The absence of U.S. “blocking power” was a 
necessary condition for the successful launch of the CMI.187
Third, external orientation is an extremely important component of a regionalist project.  
Particularly important for the CMI was its relationship to the IMF.  The AMF failed to establish 
such a relationship with the preexisting global institutional framework, which was a major reason 
for its failure.  As noted earlier, many U.S. and IMF officials were concerned that the AMF 
would undermine the role of the IMF by becoming a potential rival institution.  The muted U.S. 
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 response to the CMI can be explained by the fact that the CMI clearly established a strong link 
with the IMF program.  U.S. officials are now convinced that the CMI is complementary to the 
role of the IMF rather than challenging it.  The CMI’s linkage to the IMF eased U.S. concerns 
about the moral hazard problem. 
Fourth, the mini-case study highlights the importance of entrepreneurial leadership in 
gaining support from key members.  Japan’s AMF proposal was a big departure from Japan’s 
earlier hesitation to take a regionalist initiative.  In fact, many perceived it as “a sign of Japan’s 
willingness to take independent regional leadership.”188  However, Japan failed to gain support 
not only from the United States, but also from key regional powers like China.  Sakakibara’s 
initial failure to circulate his plan to China apparently increased China’s suspicion about Japan’s 
proposal.189  In contrast with the failure to exercise leadership in the case of the AMF, Japan’s 
Ministry of Finance took great pains to coordinate different policy preferences among key 
regional states prior to the CMI agreement.  In particular, Japan succeeded in gaining support 
from China.  It was Japan’s entrepreneurial leadership, with China’s support, that made the 
establishment of the CMI possible. 
7.4 EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL FORM AND EVOLUTION 
What explains the institutional form and evolution of the ASEAN+3 process?  The following 
section first provides a summary of empirical findings and then discusses theoretical 
implications. 
The APT from 1997 to 1999 was characterized by a very modest start.  The first APT 
gathering was convened through ASEAN’s initiative without setting any formal agenda; the 
participating leaders did not even agree to regularize the APT meeting because of Japanese and 
Chinese hesitation.  However, through their experiences of the Asian financial crisis, East Asian 
leaders gradually realized that the existing global institutional frameworks were not sufficient to 
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 protect their interests; they recognized the urgent need for a regional mechanism to reduce the 
region’s external vulnerability.  Since they also recognized the inadequacy of existing regional 
institutions such as ASEAN and APEC, they desired to develop a new East Asian regional 
mechanism for promoting regional financial cooperation.  In short, the initial impetus for the 
development of the APT framework was a defensive motive to protect East Asian regional 
interests. 
The crisis also had a significant impact on the initial institutional make-up of the APT 
framework, especially in terms of its membership and issue areas.  In the wake of the crisis, East 
Asian leaders soon recognized that ASEAN did not have the capacity to manage the crisis; at the 
same time, they confirmed the already growing perception that APEC did not accurately 
represent the interests of East Asian countries.  In other words, they realized that ASEAN was 
too small, but APEC was too big.  Therefore, the newly formed APT grouping, which included 
the three major Northeast Asian countries and excluded Western powers like the United States, 
provided them with an appropriate forum for enhancing regional financial cooperation. 
During the second phase of APT from 2000 to 2003, the development of the APT process 
was increasingly driven by “intraregional competitive dynamics” rather than the defensive 
motives that dominated the first phase.190  Most importantly, the emergence of China as an active 
regionalist player became the major driving force within the East Asian regional process.  At the 
same time, however, China’s bold initiatives such as the ASEAN-China FTA overshadowed the 
APT multilateral forum.  Prompted by China’s activism in regional affairs, Japan strengthened 
its diplomatic efforts to curb the decline of its influence in the region and counter China’s 
growing power. 
Meanwhile, the APT process also benefited from input from nongovernmental actors.  
The East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) submitted its final report in Brunei Darussalam in 2001.  
The EAVG report proposed twenty-two key recommendations in six fields: economics; finance; 
politics and security; environment and energy; society, culture, and education; and institutional 
cooperation.  The EAVG put forward fifty-seven concrete measures, including the establishment 
of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), establishment of a self-help regional facility for 
financial cooperation, establishment of poverty alleviation programs, evolution of the annual 
ASEAN+3 summit meetings into the East Asia Summit, and establishment of a nongovernmental 
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 East Asia Forum made up of governmental and nongovernmental representatives from the 
region.191
In response to the EAVG report, the East Asia Study Group (EASG) of government 
officials submitted its final report in 2002.  In assessing the concrete measures put forward by the 
EAVG, the EASG identified seventeen concrete measures as short-term goals, flagged nine 
measures as medium-to-long-term measures that required further study, and excluded the 
remaining thirty-one measures from its list of recommendations to the ASEAN+3 summit.  
Among “the implementable concrete measures with high priority” were the formation of an East 
Asia Business Council, establishment of an East Asian Investment Information Network, and 
formation of a network of East Asian think tanks and a nongovernmental East Asian Forum.  
Medium-term and long-term measures that the EASG identified included the formation of an 
EAFTA, establishment of an East Asia Investment Area, establishment of a regional financing 
facility, and evolution of the ASEAN+3 summit into the East Asia Summit.192
During this period, the EAVG and EASG set the tone for discussions of the institutional 
development of the APT process.  Certainly the EAVG, through the EASG’s response, has 
played an important, albeit limited, role in the process of APT institution-building.  However, the 
involvement of civil society within the APT countries remains extremely limited.  The process of 
East Asian community-building has been “almost exclusively at the elite levels.”193  In fact, 
while the EAVG and EASG reports have been discussed in various policy dialogues and among 
senior government officials, they “have attracted virtually no public attention.”194
The third phase of APT’s development from 2003 to 2006 saw the acceleration of 
competitive initiatives from China and Japan, both of which pressed for their preferred form of 
the APT.  The most serious points of disagreement were concerned with the issue of 
membership.  The issue of future membership of the APT group became highly politicized in the 
competition for regional leadership between China and Japan.  The outcome was the coexistence 
of two regional arrangements: the inauguration of the East Asia Summit among sixteen countries 
and the continuation of the APT among the existing thirteen members. 
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 The remainder of this section considers the implications of the empirical observations 
from the following theoretical perspectives: neorealism, rational institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.  First, neorealist approaches provide limited but 
important insights into the institutional evolution of the APT.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the way in which the APT process came into being posed a puzzling question with 
regard to the important role of non-great powers like ASEAN countries in assuming “the cost of 
organizing.”  Reflecting the origin of the APT process, the institutional features of the APT 
process largely reflected the practices of ASEAN itself, which challenges the neorealist view that 
the form of multilateral institutions reflects the interests of great powers. 
However, analysis of the subsequent development of the APT process confirms the 
neorealist expectation about the importance of power.  Although ASEAN played a crucial role in 
drawing the three bigger powers in Northeast Asia into an ASEAN-sponsored regional 
framework, it was those three countries that provided a subsequent boost to the institutional 
development.  Furthermore, ASEAN’s refusal to extend the chairmanship to the three Northeast 
Asian countries illustrates that power considerations are at play, though neorealists may expect a 
more clear transition from the fabricated “ASEAN+3” format to a “3+ASEAN” process.  From a 
neorealist perspective, the failure to allow the Northeast Asian countries to host the APT 
meetings can also be explained by mistrust and power competition among the Northeast Asian 
countries, especially between China and Japan.  The analysis of the establishment of the CMI 
confirmed the importance of agreement between Japan and China, two regional giant powers.  It 
also highlighted the importance of the absence of opposition from the U.S. hegemonic power.  
The institutional make-up of the CMI confirms that although the creation of the CMI was 
encouraged by the interests of both small countries in need of rescue funds and major powers 
(Japan and China) as potential lenders, a strong IMF linkage within the CMI framework 
primarily reflects the interests of the lenders. 
Second, rational institutionalists have difficulty in explaining the informal and consensual 
nature of the APT’s institutional design.  The adoption of consensus-based decision-making 
stems from the fact that APT countries are more concerned about proceeding at a speed 
comfortable to all participants than enhancing the efficiency of negotiations.  The lack of 
precision and enforcing mechanisms also poses a challenging question for rational institutionalist 
understandings of institutions. 
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 Third, sociological institutionalists would explain the institutional form of the APT as a 
result of the prevailing socio-cultural preferences for particular institutional features.  Unlike the 
case of APEC, the analysis of institutional preferences suggests that there is a high level of 
convergence of preferences among the East Asian countries for a loose and informal process.  In 
this respect, there are some benefits to analyzing APT’s institutional form from a sociological 
institutionalist perspective.  However, sociological institutionalist interpretations of institutions 
preclude the possibility that these expressed norms may be instrumental tools that politicians use 
in a strategic way. 
Fourth, for historical institutionalists, the APT provides an example of what some 
historical institutionalists call “layering,” which refers to the practice of building a new 
institution on top of existing institutions by retaining some elements of the preexisting 
institutions and revising others. 195   Furthermore, the persistence of the peculiar format of 
“ASEAN+3,” despite Northeast Asian countries’ attempt to convene the APT summit meetings 
outside ASEAN capitals, shows a “path-dependent” nature of the institutional structure. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the institutional form and evolution of the APT process.  The central 
feature of APT is the centrality of ASEAN to the APT process.  APT originated from ASEAN’s 
invitation to the leaders from the three Northeast Asian countries to attend their summit meetings 
as guests.  Since the first APT meeting, all the APT summits have been held on the sidelines of 
the ASEAN summits, which ASEAN members have been hosting on a rotating basis.  The 
rotation of chairmanship among ASEAN members provides the hosting ASEAN country with 
greater leverage in setting the agendas for the APT meetings.  Many ASEAN leaders’ insistence 
on retaining ASEAN’s privileged position to host the APT meetings stemmed from their political 
concerns about potential domination by the three Northeast Asian giants.  The extension of the 
ASEAN Way into the APT process can be explained by the convergence of institutional 
preferences among ASEAN countries and the three Northeast Asian countries. 
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 The analysis of APT’s institutional evolution shows that although the initial political 
demand for an East Asian regional cooperative arrangement was catalyzed by East Asia’s 
relationship with extraregional forces, intraregional dynamics became an increasingly important 
factor in the subsequent development of the APT process.  Moreover, although the APT was 
initially set up through a top-down initiative by national government leaders without any 
nongovernmental organizations promoting the creation of an East Asian intergovernmental 
institution, the APT has since embraced more interaction between bottom-up and top-town 
processes with the emergence of several nongovernmental bodies to support the APT process.196  
The mini-case study on the successful formation of the CMI highlighted the importance of 
political demand for regional financial cooperation and the supply of political leadership in 
coordinating among different preferences and providing the institutional designs that are 
consistent with the existing global institutional framework.  
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 8.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has explored: 1) why and how the specific historical circumstances at the each 
critical juncture (in the late 1980s and the late 1990s) were conducive to creating Asia-Pacific 
and East Asian regional institutions, respectively; and 2) why these two regional institutions took 
the forms that they took and how and why they evolved in the way they did.  To answer the first 
question, Chapters 4 and 6 analyzed the formation of APEC and ASEAN+3 (APT), respectively, 
by exploring triggering mechanisms, the demand for a regionalist project, and the supply of 
entrepreneurial political leadership.  Chapters 5 and 7 addressed the second question with regard 
to the institutional form and evolution of these two regional arrangements by investigating 
institutional preferences of key members and exploring the four dimensions of the institutional 
form: 1) membership; 2) organizational structure; 3) external orientation; and 4) issue-areas. 
This concluding chapter is divided into five sections.  The first section summarizes 
empirical findings in Chapters 4–7.  The second section evaluates the conceptual framework by 
revisiting the alternative hypotheses for the formation and evolution of regionalism introduced in 
Chapter 3.  The third section considers the extent to which the analytical framework proposed in 
this dissertation can be applied to other cases.  The fourth section discusses the prospects of 
regionalism in Asia and some policy implications.  The last section provides future research 
agendas. 
8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter 4 explored why and how APEC was created in 1989, while the earlier proposals for 
similar regionalist projects failed to materialize.  The analysis of state preferences concerning 
regionalism among relevant governments showed that the existence of ASEAN’s strong 
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 resistance was a major obstacle for creating an Asia-Pacific regional arrangement until the late 
1980s.  Although the Japanese government occasionally showed an interest in creating an Asia-
Pacific regional forum, it was well aware that Japan’s initiative would cause suspicion and 
resistance among other Asian countries because of the “history problem.”  While the “supply” of 
regionalist ideas developed mostly by nongovernmental policy networks was abundant, it failed 
to create an urgent governmental demand for the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional mechanism.  
Therefore, despite some governmental interests, no political leaders took the initiative to put 
proposals such as the OPTAD into practice.  Instead, the PECC was created as a 
nongovernmental body through joint leadership by the Japanese and Australian governments.  It 
was not until the late 1980s that many Asia-Pacific governments recognized the need for an 
intergovernmental arrangement in the region. 
Empirical investigation showed that in the late 1980s, many governments in the Western 
Pacific countries were increasingly concerned about the growing U.S. unilateral tendency, the 
prospect of emerging regional blocs, and the stalemate of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations.  The strongest demand for creating an intergovernmental mechanism in the Asia-
Pacific came from the Japanese and Australian governments.  Japan was particularly concerned 
about the danger of over-reliance on the United States in the face of growing trade frictions 
between the two in the 1980s.  In response to increasing U.S. pressure on Japan in the late 1980s, 
a regionalist approach was recognized as an appealing option for the Japanese government in 
order to constrain U.S. unilateral actions, while at the same time keeping the United States 
engaged in Asia.  At the same time, the Australian government sought the creation of a regional 
forum to avoid its marginalization from the perceived emergence of regional trading blocs, none 
of which include Australia as a natural member.  Canberra’s pursuit of a regionalist approach 
was also based on its strategic motive to increase its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the U.S. 
government, given the former’s growing conflicts of interest with the latter’s trade policy. 
By the late 1980s, ASEAN’s resistance to the creation of an Asia-Pacific 
intergovernmental forum had declined because of the adoption of more liberal trade policies by 
many of the ASEAN countries in the 1980s.  Furthermore, ASEAN members also became 
concerned about the marginalization as a result of the perceived triadization of the world 
economy and the possible collapse of the liberal trading system, which came to outweigh their 
fear of domination by major powers in a proposed Asia-Pacific regional grouping.  What was 
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 decisive to change ASEAN’s attitude was the U.S. proposal for free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with ASEAN members, which ASEAN leaders perceived as a threat.  ASEAN’s agreement to 
join the Asia-Pacific regional forum in July 1989 proved a “tipping point” in allowing the 
inaugural APEC meeting in Canberra in November in the same year.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
government, which was earlier reluctant to support an Asia-Pacific regional framework, also lent 
its support for the creation of the Asia-Pacific regional forum.  To sum up, the configuration of 
state preferences concerning regionalism greatly shifted in support of Asia-Pacific regionalism in 
the late 1980s. 
Encouraged by more flexible attitudes of previously reluctant governments, the late 
1980s became a window of opportunities for realizing an Asia-Pacific regionalist idea.  Although 
the activities of non-governmental bodies like PAFTAD and PECC have long promoted Asia-
Pacific regionalist ideas, it was the Australian government that assumed the primary “costs of 
organizing” in proposing the initiative to create APEC, mobilizing support from the proposed 
participants, and hosting the inaugural APEC meeting.  Meanwhile, the Japanese government 
played an important but “behind the scenes” role, because of the normative constraint arising 
from its historical legacy.  It must be noted, however, that the successful launch of the APEC 
initiative became possible, because the U.S. government had become more receptive to the idea 
of creating an Asia-Pacific regional arrangement.  Moreover, the subsequent development of 
APEC was encouraged by the end of the Cold War. 
Chapter 5 argued that the persistence of divergent institutional preferences and the lack of 
consistent leadership proved major obstacles to APEC’s institutional development.  The most 
important sources of differences were the organizational structure of APEC and the prioritization 
of APEC’s key issues.  While Western members pressed for a more legalistic and rule-based 
approach, Asian governments favored consensus-based decision-making procedures based on 
informal consultations.  Moreover, countries such as the United States and Australia sought to 
use APEC as a vehicle for trade liberalization, while most Asian countries resisted this direction 
in favor of focusing on economic and technical cooperation. 
Major institutional developments, such as the establishment of economic leaders’ 
meetings, the establishment of the EPG, and the establishment of the secretariat, were driven 
primarily by Western members of APEC, especially the United States and Australia.  Alarmed 
by these moves, Asian countries succeeded in putting the brakes on APEC’s excessive 
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 institutionalization.  Consequently, APEC’s modalities of cooperation continued to be 
characterized by principles such as consensus, flexibility, and concerted unilateralism. 
Heralding the second phase of APEC’s institutional development, the direct involvement 
of the leaders beginning in 1993 became a prominent feature of APEC in comparison to other 
multilateral organizations mainly dealing with trade issues.1   During APEC’s second phase, 
however, differences over institutional preferences among the APEC members came to the 
forefront, as the U.S. government attempted to turn APEC into a rule-based negotiating body for 
trade and investment liberalization.  Nevertheless, although the United States succeeded in 
initiating economic leaders’ meetings and bringing its preferred agendas to the center of APEC’s 
activities, the actual success of U.S. attempts to transform APEC to its favored design was 
extremely limited.  The mini-case study on the stalemate of the U.S.-led Early Voluntary 
Sectoral Liberalization initiative illustrates how different institutional preferences with regard to 
APEC’s modality and objectives came to stall the negotiations, thus preventing the U.S. 
government from transforming APEC into a rule-based vehicle for trade liberalization. 
Chapter 6 explored why and how the ASEAN+3 process was successfully launched in the 
late 1990s, as well as why Mahathir’s first attempt to create an East Asian grouping in the form 
of the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in the early 1990s failed to materialize.  It argued 
that the EAEG failed to materialize because of U.S. opposition, lack of Japanese support, lack of 
consensus among other ASEAN countries, and Mahathir’s strategic mistakes.  Despite the failure 
of the EAEG, a similar East Asian grouping was formed as the ASEAN+3 when ASEAN leaders 
invited their counterparts from China, Japan, and South Korea to attend the ASEAN summit 
meetings, starting in 1997.  The Asian financial crisis served as a major catalyst for the 
development of the APT.  The crisis generated a widespread regional dissatisfaction with global 
institutional frameworks such as the IMF.  It also revealed the inadequacy of the existing 
regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC.  Consequently, the crisis prompted East Asian 
leaders to promote the creation of a regional mechanism on an East Asian basis. 
ASEAN’s role as a convener proved particularly important in drawing the bigger three 
Northeast Asian countries into the ASEAN-sponsored regional process.  Prior to the onset of the 
financial crisis, the ASEAN countries had taken incremental steps toward the creation of an East 
                                                 
1 The WTO and NAFTA, for example, do not have leaders’ meetings.  Aggarwal and Morrison, "APEC as an 
International Institution," 314. 
 300 
 Asian gathering.  The gradual approach helped to assess the U.S. attitude toward East Asian 
regionalism, which was crucial for eliciting the participation of a reluctant Japan.  Given the 
absence of trust among the Northeast Asian countries and the lack of structural leadership from 
either Japan or China, ASEAN took the central role in organizing and hosting the annual APT 
meetings.  Meanwhile, Japan’s inability to exercise a leadership role during the crisis prompted 
Japanese leaders to rethink Japan’s role in East Asia and encouraged its active participation in 
the East Asian intergovernmental process.  On the other hand, the crisis provided China with an 
excellent opportunity to increase its status in regional affairs.  As a result, the crisis became a 
watershed event in the development of an East Asian regional grouping. 
Chapter 7 showed that there is a convergence of institutional preferences among the APT 
countries for informal, incremental, and consensus-based processes.  The APT was created on 
the sidelines of ASEAN itself, whose members only can rotate the chairmanship of annual APT 
leaders’ meetings.  A hosting ASEAN member plays a central role in preparing the meetings, 
inviting participants, drafting policy documents and statements.  Given ASEAN’s concerns about 
the domination of the APT process by the Northeast Asian countries and the lack of an accepted 
leadership role of any Northeast Asian country, the APT leaders confirmed ASEAN’s centrality 
in the process on several occasions.  Despite general agreement on the informal and incremental 
nature of the APT process, the APT countries remained divided over the preferred membership 
of the APT. 
The analysis of APT’s evolution showed that, although the initial creation of the APT 
was encouraged by the region’s desire to create a regional self-help mechanism relatively free 
from external powers like the United States and U.S.-dominated international financial 
institutions, its subsequent institutional development was fed more by changing internal 
dynamics, especially the relationship between China and Japan.  The continued disagreement on 
the issue of membership and the failure to agree on the modality of the East Asia Summit led the 
East Asian leaders to hold two separate summit meetings rather than “transforming” the APT 
into the East Asia Summit as originally planned. 
The mini-case study of the Chiang Mai Initiative established under the APT process 
highlighted the importance of agreement between Japan and China as two regional giants and the 
absence of opposition from the U.S. hegemonic power for the successful launch of an Asian 
regionalist initiative.  Despite the fact that East Asian countries’ interest in developing an East 
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 Asian regional framework stemmed from their realization that the existing global institutional 
frameworks are insufficient to protect their interests, they also realized the necessity of “nesting” 
a newly created institution within the preexisting institutional environment.2
8.2 THEORETICAL EVALUATIONS 
This dissertation analyzed the formation of APEC and the APT by exploring two dimensions of 
regional institution-building.  The first stage of analysis addressed the question of why the Asia-
Pacific and East Asian regionalist projects were launched in the late 1980s and late 1990s, 
respectively.  The demand-side question of explored four possible explanations: 1) realist 
accounts of the formation of regionalism as the result of the shifting political balance of power; 
2) liberal explanations for regionalism as a logical response to regionalization (i.e., the rise of 
regional economic interdependence); 3) constructivist approaches to regionalism as a result of 
the growth of regionalist ideas; and 4) the defensive regionalism perspective that sees 
regionalism as regional states’ defensive mechanism for dealing with new shared problems 
arising from a set of extraregional developments. 
Realist explanations fared relatively well in explaining the rise of governmental demand 
for regionalism as a response to external challenges stemming from the shifting configuration of 
political and economic power.  In the late 1980s, the strengthening of European regional 
integration and the emergence of North American regionalism led to power re-alignments, 
which, in turn, prompted Western Pacific countries to respond with their own regionalist project 
as a vehicle to increase their collective political bargaining leverage vis-à-vis extraregional 
actors.  The development of regionalism in other parts of the world was clearly a major trigger 
for the creation of APEC.  However, APEC was not created as a counterbalancing force against 
other regional groupings as the conventional realist might expect.  Rather, it was designed 
                                                 
2 As noted in Chapter 3, the concept of “nesting” is from Vinod V. Aggarwal.  For an application of the concept to 
the CMI, see Grimes, "East Asian Financial Regionalism in Support of the global Financial Architecture?  The 
Political Economy of Regional Nesting," 353-380. 
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 primarily as a means to prevent the emergence of closed regional groupings and “to facilitate 
wider global processes” by espousing the concept of open regionalism.3
Another motive behind the creation of a regional grouping that realist-oriented 
perspectives focuses on was the new challenges from the U.S. hegemon.  The initial Australian 
initiative and the subsequent Mahathir’s EAEG proposal that did not include the United States 
reflected closely the conventional realist logic of balancing against the challenge from the U.S. 
hegemon.  However, the actual APEC project followed the neorealist institutionalist logic of 
constraining the U.S. behavior within a multilateral setting.  In the case of APT, realist-inspired 
analysts explain the formation of the APT as a response to a growing Chinese power.  Certainly 
the rise of China provided a long-term motive for creating a regional mechanism to deal with the 
new challenges that it has posed.  However, the APT was not characterized by “balancing” 
against a rising power in a conventional sense.  Rather, the APT was designed to embed an 
increasingly powerful China into a regional mechanism. 
The second explanation that focuses on the rise of intraregional economic transactions 
provided the economic logic of regionalism.  However, it failed to explain the timing for the 
growth of governmental demand for a regional mechanism.  ASEAN’s concerns over the 
political implications of an Asia-Pacific regional institution were a major obstacle for creating 
such an institution. It was not until regional governments faced challenges at the global level that 
governments realized the need for an intergovernmental regional forum.  There was not enough 
evidence to support the expectation of the liberal perspective that the demand from private 
sectors for an intergovernmental mechanism altered the previously reluctant governments’ 
preferences in favor of regionalism.  In the case of APT’s formation, contrary to the expectation 
of the liberal perspective, the APT was created exactly at the time when the level of intraregional 
trade declined. 
The third explanation, based on a constructivist approach, did not provide a satisfactory 
explanation, either.  This perspective sees the formation of regionalism as a response to the 
development of regionalist ideas or regional identity.  From this perspective, the formation of 
APEC can be viewed as the result of cumulative effects by activities of non-governmental bodies 
in developing and promoting regionalist ideas over extended periods of time.  However, this 
perspective failed to explain the timing for regional institutional creation, because earlier 
                                                 
3 Higgott, "The Theory and Practice of Region: The Changing Global Context," 22. 
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 proposals for creating Asia-Pacific regional institutions in previous decades simply failed to 
realize.  Unlike the abundance of Asia-Pacific regionalist ideas, there were few proposals for 
creating a regional institution among only East Asian countries.  The notable exception was 
Mahathir’s EAEG proposal put forward in the early 1990s, which gave rise to a lot of 
controversy among policy elites not only in East Asian countries, but also in the United States.  
Yet it was only after the financial crisis that many East Asian leaders spoke of the emergence of 
a sense of East Asian identity.  However, there was not enough empirical evidence to support the 
existence of a firm East Asian identity. 
The fourth explanation, which emphasizes defensive motives of regional states for using 
regionalism as a means of dealing with a set of extraregional challenges, was strongly supported 
by the empirical analysis of the formation of both APEC and APT.  The empirical analysis of the 
formation of APEC showed that in the late 1980s, many Western Pacific countries were 
increasingly concerned about the prospect of emerging regional blocs and the resultant potential 
collapse of the liberal trading system.  In other words, the governmental demand for an Asia-
Pacific regional mechanism was triggered by the defensive motive of “loss aversion” rather than 
a clear sense of potential gains.  Although advocates of an Asia-Pacific regional organization had 
outlined the expected benefits of reducing transaction costs and enhancing market activities, 
regional governments did not perceive the urgent need for the creation of an intergovernmental 
mechanism.  It was not until governments perceived the potential threats to ongoing regional and 
global market activities that they recognized the benefits of a regional mechanism as a device to 
avoid the potential losses. 
In the case of APT’s formation, it was the Asian financial crisis that triggered the urgent 
governmental demand for a new East Asian regional mechanism.  The development of the APT 
was formed as a collective response to the East Asian region’s vulnerability to the negative 
consequences of unregulated global forces, manifested by the Asian financial crisis.  Policy elites 
in East Asia viewed the newly formed APT as a device to minimize the risks associated with a 
rapid movement of short-term capital.  In this sense, it can be argued that at the initial stage of 
forming the APT, the East Asian leaders were more concerned with the elimination or 
management of “public bads,” rather than the provision of collective goods.4  In other words, the 
                                                 
4 Nicola Phillips points out Latin American countries’ desire to minimize “public bads” such as financial volatility 
and market failure.  Nicola Phillips, "Governance after Financial Crisis: South American Perspectives on the 
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 development of the APT was spurred more by “common aversions” than by “common 
interests.”5
Furthermore, the crisis not only revealed the inadequacy of the existing regional 
arrangements such as ASEAN and APEC, but also led East Asian leaders to recognize that the 
global institutional arrangements such as the IMF do not protect the interests of the East Asian 
countries.  Therefore, the APT was considered a way to reduce the region’s over-reliance on 
external actors.  Nevertheless, as has been often noted, like other regionalist projects in the 
current wave of “new regionalism,” the APT does not aim to insulate the region from the 
external world.  Rather, the post-crisis development of East Asian regionalism can be best 
viewed as a regional mechanism to provide a “buffer” between individual national economies 
and the vagaries of the global financial system.6  In short, the demand for both APEC and APT 
was driven by defensive motivations to protect domestic interests threatened by extraregional 
challenges.  
The supply-side aspect of regional institution-building explored how regional 
arrangements came into existence, analyzing the actual political process by which the demand 
for the creation of regional institutions translated into their supply.  This stage of analysis 
focused on two questions.  The first question assessed the relative importance of major and non-
major powers in the process of constructing a regional institution.  At the initial stage of 
institutional creation, the analysis of the process of creating both APEC and APT highlighted the 
entrepreneurial roles played by weaker powers, such as Australia and ASEAN members as a 
group, in proposing the respective regionalist project.  The question was not what material 
resources leaders had, but rather how they employed leadership.  Policy processes and strategies 
mattered. 
This contradicts the expectation of the neorealist perspective that generally posits that the 
creation of a multilateral institution is led by either a single regional hegemon or a core group of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Reformulation of Regionalism," New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 391.  For discussions on the concept of 
“public bads,” see also Nicola Phillips and Richard A. Higgott, "Global Governance and the Public Domain: 
Collective Goods in a 'Post-Washington Consensus' Era," CSGR Working Paper No. 47/99 (1999); Bobrow and 
Boyer, Defensive Internationalism: Providing Public Goods in an Uncertain World. 
5 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," 125-126. 
6 Ba, "Contested Spaces: The Politics of Regional and Global Governance," 205; Helen E. S. Nesadurai, 
"Introduction: Economic Security, Globalization and Governance," The Pacific Review 17, no. 4 (2004): 478; Miles 
Kahler, "Economic Security in an Era of Globalization: Definition and Provision," The Pacific Review 17, no. 4 
(2004): 485-502. 
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 powerful states.  However, once APEC and APT got off the ground, more powerful states played 
an increasingly important role by proposing some important initiatives in both regional 
arrangements.  Nonetheless, powerful countries’ attempts to transform those regional forums into 
their preferred types of institutions were far more constrained than the neorealist perspective 
would assume. 
The second issue is concerned with respective roles of state and non-state actors.  The 
empirical analysis of the process of creating APEC and APT showed that, although governments 
were certainly the main architects of the both regional arrangements, non-governmental actors 
did play a modest but an important role in shaping the institutional make-up and evolution by 
providing important policy ideas and recommendations.  In the case of APEC, there were ample 
sources of information and ideas from the existing non-governmental organizations like 
PAFTAD and PECC when government officials needed them.  On the other hand, there were no 
such bodies organized on an East Asian basis prior to the formation of the APT.  However, the 
East Asian region has also seen the growth of many nongovernmental groups to support the APT 
process.  In particular, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) (1999 – 2001) provided important 
policy recommendations, although the group itself was created by a governmental initiative and 
disbanded after the completion of the mission.  Several of its recommendations were 
implemented in the APT process.  Therefore, it is wrong to assume that the process of regional 
institution-building is exclusively in the hands of states.  Nonetheless, the intergovernmentalist 
claim that states retain the control over the basic course and speed of regional institution-building 
holds true for both APEC and APT. 
The analysis of the institutional forms that APEC and APT took showed that, contrary to 
the neorealist expectation, the institutional forms of these regional groupings are not designed in 
favor of more powerful states.  Since ASEAN’s resistance was the major obstacle to creating an 
Asia-Pacific regional institution, the other APEC members initially allowed ASEAN to shape the 
institutional form of APEC to protect their interests against the more powerful members of 
APEC.  Consistent with realist perspectives, relative power considerations were at play in 
crafting APEC’s institutional design.  However, the disproportionate influence of ASEAN in 
shaping the initial form that APEC took requires other explanations. 
The rational institutionalist perspective also proved unsatisfactory in the sense that 
empirical findings show that both APEC and APT are not designed to maximize the efficiency of 
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 institutional functions.  Rather, there is ample evidence that both of them are designed to protect 
the interests of weaker powers.  For example, the employment of consensual decision-making 
procedures not only slows the process of negotiations, but also makes it extremely difficult for 
members to reach any substantial agreement, because any member that is not comfortable about 
an initiative can veto it.  The adoption of such norms as flexibility and voluntarism are 
deliberately designed to allow each member government to have a certain freedom of action 
rather than to ensure compliance with agreements.  Moreover, as demonstrated, some members 
have attempted to enlarge the membership of the regional group for political reasons such as to 
make the grouping inefficient and to dilute the influence of a particular country. 
While sociological institutionalists rightly point to the impact of regional norms and ideas, 
they leave the issue of competing norms and ideas unanswered.  APEC members were united in 
the sense that all APEC members generally support the idea of market-led regional integration.  
They also support the idea that an open and liberal multilateral trade regime is required for 
sustaining economic growth and stability in the region.  However, there emerged serious 
disagreements over the issue of how trade liberalization should be pursued under the APEC 
program.  For example, although APEC espoused the principle of open regionalism, the U.S. 
government challenged it by calling for applying the principle of reciprocity to trade 
liberalization.  Many Asian governments, on the other hand, insisted on the principle of non-
discrimination and unilateral liberalization.  Asian and Western members of APEC are also 
divided over their preferred modalities of cooperation.  Whereas Western members pressed for a 
more legalistic and rule-based approach, Asian governments favored consensus-based decision-
making procedures based on informal consultations.  The persistence of the contestation between 
competing norms and principles proved a major obstacle to APEC’s institutional development. 
Historical institutionalists emphasize the path-dependent nature of institution-building.  
In fact, the findings suggest that the institutional forms of both APEC and APT are highly 
influenced by the experiences of preexisting institutions.  The institutional form of APEC was 
built upon the experiences of ASEAN and nongovernmental forums, such as PAFTAD and 
PECC.  APT was created on top of ASEAN, retaining the centrality of the ASEAN Way toward 
regional cooperation. 
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 8.3 THE PROSPECT OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 
What are the future prospects of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia?  What are the 
policy implications that this dissertation suggests?  As indicated in the introductory chapter, the 
emergence of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalist projects is a relatively new phenomenon.  
Given the long absence of regular policy channels in the Asia-Pacific and East Asian regions in 
the previous decades, the establishment of such forums at the intergovernmental level itself is a 
major achievement.  However, there are at least four major obstacles to the development of 
regionalist projects in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.  The first obstacle to the development of 
both APEC and the APT is the lack of consensus among members with regard to the general 
principles, objectives, and modalities of cooperation of the forums.  As discussed in Chapters 5 
and 7, empirical analysis of the institutional preferences in both institutions showed a 
considerable degree of divergence among key members.  Since both APEC and the APT operate 
by consensus, any substantial disagreements can stall initiatives.  As illustrated in the mini-case 
study in Chapter 5, the U.S.-sponsored EVSL initiative stalled because of disagreements between 
its advocates and many Asian opponents.  The mini-case study in Chapter 7 showed that Japan’s 
proposal for the Asian Monetary Fund did not materialize primarily because of U.S. and Chinese 
objections.  Both cases illustrated that the presence of strong “negative demand” translates into 
“negative supply” in blocking an initiative. 
Second, internal conflicts among members can be a major obstacle to the development of 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia.  Historical antagonism still exists between Japan 
and other Asian countries, especially China and South Korea.  Coupled with the resurgence of 
nationalism in many countries in Asia, including China, South Korea, and Japan, the “history 
problem” can hinder regional cooperative processes.  The cancellation of the three Northeast 
Asian leaders’ meeting in 2005 in protest against Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is a case in point.  Mutual mistrust and suspicion among Asian 
countries can potentially derail regionalist projects.  Furthermore, it is often noted that there is 
competition for regional leadership between China and Japan.  Although regional competition 
does not necessarily impede the regional process as long as states do not obstruct rival’s 
initiatives, it can potentially disrupt the regional framework if such competition escalates into a 
vicious cycle. 
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 Third, the surge of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) can complicate multilateral 
arrangements at both the global and regional levels.  The proliferation of bilateral free trade 
agreements since the mid-1990s is indeed remarkable.  Bilateral trade agreements not only divert 
bureaucratic resources away from regional and global trade negotiations, but also lead to what 
Jagdish Bhagwati calls “spaghetti bowl” effects, which create crisscrossing preferential trade 
arrangements with different tariff rates and rules of origin.7
Fourth, the U.S. attitude toward East Asian regionalism remains an important factor that 
can affect the development of the APT.  U.S. opposition toward any initiatives within the Asia-
only grouping would make it difficult for some countries like Japan to support the initiatives.  
Although the U.S. government did not oppose the formation of the APT, the U.S. government 
might change its attitude and obstruct the development of the APT process.  Some U.S. officials 
are increasingly alarmed by the likelihood that China could use the Asia-only forum as a device 
to increase its regional influence at the expense of U.S. interests. 
8.4 FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
There are at least three sets of tasks that researchers need to tackle.  The first two sets of issues 
are concerned with relationships among different types of intergovernmental arrangements 
formed at various levels in different regions of the world and in different time periods.  
Intergovernmental agreements can be formed at a range of geographic scopes, involving 
different number of actors; they can be bilateral, sub-regional (such as the Greater Mekong 
Region), regional (such as the EU and APT), interregional (such as APEC and ASEM), and 
global multilateral (such as the WTO).  However, the relationships among them are not entirely 
clear.  For example, does the rise and fall of the WTO trade negotiations correlate with waves of 
states’ interests in regionalism?  What does the recent surge of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) imply for global and regional institutional arrangements?  Do bilateral or regional FTAs 
                                                 
7 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, "U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas," in Jagdish N. Bhagwati and 
Anne O. Krueger, eds., The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995). 
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 become stepping stones or stumbling blocks for global trade negotiations?8   Why do states 
choose one policy channel over others?  These questions require further investigation for a better 
understanding of regional and global dynamics.9
The second issue is concerned with the temporal dimension of regional institution-
building.  Although this dissertation touched upon the sequence of regional institution-building, 
more systematic research needs to be done to analyze the impact of preceding regional 
institutions on the subsequent creation of institutions.  The existing literature often analyzes the 
creation of a regional institution in isolation from other pre-existing institutions in the region.  
However, institutions are not created in an institutional vacuum.  If we focus on the Asia-Pacific 
region, we can address such questions as these: How has ASEAN influenced the institutional 
form that APEC took?  What roles did ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) play in 
creating the ARF?  How did internal differences within APEC encourage the creation of APT?  
How has the formation of ASEM contributed to the subsequent formation of the APT process?  
The central aim of this research would be to underscore the salience of the temporal dimension 
of institutional analysis by demonstrating the impact of the sequence of regional institution-
building. 
The third set of issues is concerned with institutional effects.  This dissertation focused 
primarily on institutional creation and evolution, leaving the issue of institutional effects out of 
the scope of investigation.  Nonetheless, the question of whether these regional institutions 
matter remains an important one.  Specifically, did regional arrangements such as APEC and 
APT make any difference in terms of interstate relationship among members?  If so, when and 
how did they matter? 
The literature on international institutions has shifted its attention from the question of 
whether institutions matter to the question of how they matter in affecting the behavior of 
states.10  Furthermore, scholars of institutions have started to tackle the issue of whether different 
                                                 
8 This question has gained a wide policy and scholarly attention since the surge of regional arrangements in the early 
1990s.  See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
9 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo have developed a typology of different modes of trade management.  See 
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, "Beyond Network Power?  The Dynamics of Formal Economic Integration 
in Northeast Asia," Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2005): 189-216; Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, "The 
Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism," European Journal of East Asian 
Studies 4, no. 2 (2005): 233-261. 
10 Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 729-757. 
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 types of institutions have different effects on state behavior. 11   Scholars of comparative 
regionalism have just started to address not only why different regionalist projects take different 
forms, but also the issue of whether these different forms have different institutional effects.12  
Moreover, it is imperative to explore how different regional arrangements affect one another.  
These are extremely complex and difficult tasks that deserve further research. 
The concept of a region has recently gained wide attention from both scholars and 
policymakers.  Policymakers in many parts of the world have recognized regional arrangements 
as an increasingly important component of the foreign policy apparatus to deal with a rapid 
change in global dynamics.  In fact, it is argued that we live in a “world of regions.”13  The new 
research agenda suggested above leads the researcher to explore the relationships between 
different regional arrangements within and across the region and over different time periods 
rather than studying each regional institution separately.  Needless to say, further research on the 
institutional effects of regional arrangements is of great interest not only to scholars but also to 
patricians. 
The creation of regional institutions is a complex phenomenon.  States have various 
motives to create regional institutions.  Yet forming a regional institution is an extremely 
difficult task that requires careful planning, coordination, and political leadership.  As we have 
seen in this dissertation, Asia-Pacific and East Asian leaders have overcome many formidable 
obstacles in creating APEC and the APT.  Consequently, the creation of these regional 
arrangements has significantly changed basic patterns of interaction among countries in the Asia-
Pacific and East Asia.  However, these regional institutions have encountered many limitations.  
APEC has already suffered from its own institutional crisis with many critics blaming it for a 
lack of substantive outputs.  It is yet to be seen whether the APT will encounter a similar 
institutional crisis.  Creating a regional institution requires a high level of governmental 
commitment and political leadership; yet sustaining the institution also requires substantial 
political resources.  Whether the regional institution can keep attracting the same level of 
                                                 
11 Liliana Botcheva and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence," 
International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 1-26. 
12 Some scholars have started to engage in these important issues.  See Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, 
eds., Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, Forthcoming). 
13 Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. 
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 political commitment and resources depends on whether it can serve certain roles for member 
countries. 
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